FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1352864-000

Total Deleted Page(s) = 45
Page 5 ~ b1 - Per; b3 - CIA;
Page 6 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 28 ~ b1 - Per; b3 - CIA;
Page 37 ~ b1 - Per; b3 - CIA; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 38 ~ b1 - Per; b3 - CIA;
Page 39 ~ b1 - Per; b3 - CIA;
Page 40 ~ b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 48 ~ Duplicate;
Page 49 ~ Duplicate;
Page 53 ~ b1 - Per; b3 - CIA;
Page 69 ~ Duplicate;
Page 70 ~ Duplicate;
Page 89 ~ b1 - Per; b3 - CIA;
Page 144 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7D; b7E;
Page 145 ~ b3; b7D; b7E;
Page 147 ~ b3; b7E;
Page 148 ~ b1 - Per; b3 - CIA; b7E;
Page 149 ~ Duplicate;
Page 150 ~ Duplicate;
Page 151 ~ Duplicate;
Page 152 ~ Duplicate;
Page 153 ~ Duplicate;
Page 154 ~ Duplicate;
Page 156 ~ b1 - Per; b3 - CIA;
Page 158 ~ b1 - Per; b3 - CIA; b7D; b7E;
Page 210 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7D; b7E;
Page 211 ~ b3; b7D; b7E;
Page 212 ~ b3; b7D; b7E;
Page 213 ~ b3; b7D; b7E;
Page 245 ~ b1 - Per; b3 - CIA; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 246 ~ b1 - Per; b3 - CIA;
Page 247 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7D; b7E;
Page 248 ~ b3; b7D; b7E;
Page 316 ~ b1 - Per; b3 - CIA; b6; b7C;
Page 318 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 319 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 320 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 321 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 322 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 323 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 362 ~ b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 363 ~ b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 364 ~ b7D;
Page 365 ~ b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 366 ~ b6; b7C; b7E;

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
X Deleted Page(s) X
X No Duplication Fee X
X For this Page X
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-18-2020 BY [redacted] ADC . b6
b7C

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: [redacted]

b1 Per
b3 CIA

1. Attached hereto is a translation of portions of a report recently received from [redacted]

2. [redacted]

b3
b7E

3. We are passing the information regarding the two alleged Polish agents in Canada (see paragraphs 5 and 6) to Canadian liaison. We have requested that they advise us in advance of any steps which they plan to undertake other than discrete routine investigation. As one of these alleged agents is a U.S. citizen residing in Canada, and the action of the other is directed against the United States, we believe the most realistic approach is for you to coordinate directly with the [redacted] on this case. If you concur, will you please keep us advised of developments in order to assist us in our continuing effort to evaluate source [redacted]

b7D

b1 Per
b3 CIA

4. The information in the attached report, with the exception noted in paragraph 3 above, may not be passed to any other agency.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

S. H. Horton

[redacted]

b1 Per
b3 CIA

1 Attachment

REC-14 65-65192-65168

JUL 27 1960

ENCLOSURE

62 AUG 9 1960

Photostat - C's to
UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

b3
b7E

1. "TISLER's testimony kicked up a big rumpus in Prague. Czech Military Intelligence assumes that TISLER had access to documents which illuminate the October 1956 changes in Poland from the point of view of the CSR security organs, Party, and [redacted] b7D Naturally, these documents had a strong anti-Gomulka accent. For these reasons, the Czechs are understandably afraid that if these documents were passed to the Americans by TISLER and if they are published, they will make public the former position of the CSR toward the Polish October problem and thereby cause a deterioration in the relationship between Poland and the CSR, which isn't especially satisfactory in any case. Because the [redacted] refers in these documents to various 'indications' and 'evaluations' by the Soviet Union and the Central Committee of the CPSU, it is obvious that publication of them can again complicate the 'friendly' relationship between Poland and the Soviet Union on the political level. This is why the Czechs are afraid of further revelations by TISLER. They assume that TISLER certainly passed the Americans these documents because they were stored for a rather long time in the archives of the Czech Legation in the U.S."

2. "According to KGB information, a conference of the CE chiefs of the NATO countries recently took place. It was decided there to work on espionage cases in the West more actively and to exploit them for propaganda purposes. This information was sent to Prague, Warsaw, and Berlin by the KGB with the warning of maximum caution. Therefore, until this is changed, all IS work in the U.S., as well as in the European area, has been appreciably limited and special security measures have been imposed. The KGB and the RU are awaiting a corresponding counter-blow for the U-2 affair and have warned the satellite countries not to play into the hands of Western CE." b1 Per b3 CIA

3. "ZYBURA (see paragraph 17 of [redacted] dated 2 May 1960) does not plan an inspection trip to the West at present. In July he is supposed to take a lengthy vacation; therefore, it can be assumed that the whole operation will not take place earlier than September."

4. "Following the departure of CZAJER, who is taking a vacation, the Polish residentura in the U.S. is being run by SZYMCZYKIEWICZ (CIA note: undoubtedly Stefan SZYMCZYKIEWICZ, who is well known to you.) [redacted] the new resident, is preparing for his departure, which is supposed to take place at the end of August." b7D

b3
b7E

65-6092-68

4-22 (Rev. 1-22-60)

Federal Bureau of [redacted]gation
Records Br[redacted]h

7-20- , 1960

- [ ] Name Searching Unit - Room 6527
- [ ] Service Unit - Room 6524
- [ ] Forward to File Review
- [ ] Attention Corby
- [/] Return to McDonnell 2264
  Supervisor Room Ext.

Type of References Requested:

- [ ] Regular Request (Analytical Search)
- [ ] All References (Subversive & Nonsubversive)
- [x] Subversive References Only
- [ ] Nonsubversive References Only
- [ ] Main _____ References Only

Type of Search Requested:

- [ ] Restricted to Locality of _____
- [ ] Exact Name Only (On the Nose)
- [x] Bu

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-13-2020 BY [redacted] ADC b6 b7C

Subjec[redacted]

Birthdate & Place _____

Address _____

Localities _____

R# _____ Date 7-21 Searcher Initials [redacted]

Prod. _____

	FILE NUMBER	SERIAL
	NK	

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-18-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. McDonnell

~~SECRET~~

65-65192

Date: July 27, 1960

To: Director
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N.W.
Washington 25, D. C.

Attention: Mr. S. H. Horton
Acting Chief
Counterintelligence Staff

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject: [redacted]

b1 Per
b3 CIA

[redacted] paragraphs five and six of attachment thereto concerning alleged Polish intelligence agents residing in Canada.

In that one of these alleged agents is reportedly a United States citizen and the other directed against the United States, we will coordinate directly with the [redacted] on these matters and you will be advised as to the developments.

b7D

2 - Ottawa (Enclosures - 4)(2 copies each of relet and its enc.)
1 - Chicago (Enclosures - 2)(1 copy each of relet and its enc.)
1 - New York (Enclosures - 2)(1 copy each of relet and its enc.)
1 - Washington Field (Enclosures - 2)(1 copy each of relet and its enc.)

b1 Per
b3 CIA

65-65192-69

REC-72

FX-100

MAILED 2
JUL 28 1960
COMM-FBI

NOTE TO LEGAT, OTTAWA:

[redacted] Dr. Heinrich Schutze, pseudonym of an unidentified source who has been furnishing information through drops to Central Intelligence Agency abroad concerning Polish and Soviet intelligence efforts against the United States. According to Central Intelligence Agency this source is not evaluated to date and his reports may be part of a Soviet Bloc deception or disruption operation. Only the data

NOTE TO LEGAT, OTTAWA, CONTINUED PG TWO
SEE NOTE ON YELLOW, PG TWO

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
Delloach
Mason
McGuire
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

WJM:llc (11)

1 - Foreign Liaison (route through for review)

62 AUG 2 1960

MAIL ROOM [ ] TELETYPE UNIT [ ]

~~SECRET~~

Director
Central Intelligence Agency

NOTE TO LEGAT, OTTAWA, CONTINUED

in paragraphs five and six of the attachment to enclosure may be discussed with [redacted] Information b7D received from this source may not be included in documents intended for dissemination but, where appropriate, should be placed in the cover pages of the reports of individual subjects.

Follow this matter closely with [redacted] to assure that all information of investigative and intelligence interest to this Bureau is promptly obtained.

NOTE ON YELLOW:

Instant communication classified "~~Secret~~" since it contains portions of CIA letter so classified.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-18-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

b6
b7C

1 - Liaison; 1 - Mr. McDonald (Donnell)

65-65192

Date: July 25, 1960

BY LIAISON

To: Director
Central Intelligence Agency

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

b1 Per
b3 CIA

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject: [redacted]
INTERNAL SECURITY - POLAND

Reference is made to your letter of July 15, 1960, and the enclosure thereto captioned "Soviet Bloc Reserve Intelligence Networks for Wartime," your reference [redacted]

In line with your suggestion, [redacted] will be queried in a general way for any information he may possess on this topic and your Agency will be advised of the results thereof.

On the basis of available information, the reserve networks as outlined by the source and the current emphasis thereon by Soviet-bloc intelligence would appear to be accurate and most logical.

We would appreciate the results of your queries concerning this matter.

b3
b7E

b1 Per
b3 CIA

EX 109

2 - Chicago (Enclosures-4) (See note, page two)
1 - New York (Enclosures-2)
1 - WFO (Enclosures-2)

REC-52 65-65192

19 AUG 9 1960

WJAGD:hrt
(10)

b1 Per
b3 CIA
b7E

1 - Bufile [redacted]

NOTE: Secret since it repeats contents of CIA let so classified [redacted]

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

MAILED 6
JUL 25 1960
COMM-FBI

RECORDED COPY

SECRET

Director
Central Intelligence Agency

NOTE: SAC, Chicago:

b1 Per
b3 CIA

Enclosed are two copies of CIA letter 7-15-60 with enclosure thereto classified "Secret." [redacted] referred to in relet are Pawel Monat and Frantisek Tisler, respectively. The contents of relet should not be included in documents intended for dissemination. [redacted] [redacted] "Dr. Heinrich Schutze," whose background is known to you. Pursuant to CIA's request, [redacted] should be interviewed generally re his knowledge of Soviet-bloc reserve intelligence networks, particularly Poland's as distinct from the peacetime illegal residenturas. The utmost caution should be exercised in interviewing [redacted] to insure that he will not become aware that we have received a report in this matter from another source. The results of this interview, which should be conducted as early as possible, should be incorporated in a letterhead memo and submitted to the Bureau for dissemination to CIA.

SECRET

SECRET

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 08-18-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: 7/27/60

FROM : W. A. Branigan

1 - Belmont
1 - Branigan
1 - Papich
1 - McDonnell

SUBJECT: SOVIET-BLOC RESERVE INTELLIGENCE NETWORKS FOR WARTIME

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) by letter dated 7/15/60 captioned [redacted] furnished a report on captioned matter received from "Dr. Heinrich Schutze" (pseudonym for an unidentified and unevaluated source who has been furnishing information to CIA abroad concerning Polish and Soviet intelligence efforts against the U. S.). b1 Per b3 CIA

In essence, source reports the Soviet-bloc Reserve Intelligence Network for Wartime (MOB) is a network apart from the regularly active peacetime illegal residenturas with the capability of striking against enemy powers prior to military operations. The MOB is divided into two sectors, espionage and sabotage, and its agents recruited from persons not susceptible to internment during wartime. Following recruitment, the MOB agent is given minimum training and after testing, is "put on ice," his only assignment, a signal contact by which he indicates everything is all right. Contacts are held at a minimum, perhaps once in two years for morale and instruction purposes. Pay is at least commensurate with their regular jobs. The sabotage networks rarely consist of more than three agents, whereas in espionage they operate as "singletons" to be organized in an emergency by an already chosen principal agent.

Pioneered by the Soviets as far back as 1932 and highly successful during World War II, this operation was approached indifferently by the satellites until 1954, when under pressure from the KGB (Soviet Committee for State Security) and GRU (Red Army Intelligence), they intensified the building of similar networks.

According to source, there now exists a Czech and East German operation aimed at West German industry; a GRU plan against allied bases in Europe; and an enormous GRU plan against the U. S. and based in South America, aided by the Chinese. Latter

65-65192

REC-31 65-65192-71

WJM:prg (5)

4 AUG 9 1960

EX 109

62 AUG 12 1960

ESP/SEC.

SECRET

A. H. Belmont
RE: SOVIET-BLOC RESERVE INTELLIGENCE
NETWORKS FOR WARTIME
65-65192

reported to have a MOB network of 2,500 in Japan alone. While Poland is reluctant to subordinate its MOB plan to the Soviet over-all plan, the political outlook is such that it will be brought under the Soviet master plan.

ACTION:

CIA contacting Pawel Monat, Polish defector, and Frantisek Tisler, Czech defector, for additional information regarding this operation. Bulet 7/25/60 requested Chicago similarly contact [redacted] Instant report regarding MOB network will be further evaluated on receipt of information from these sources. b7D

Mr. McDonnell

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-18-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

b6
b7C

SAC, Newark

August 11, 1960

Director, FBI [redacted]

b3
b7E

EDUARD MARTIN FISCHEL

[redacted]

Subject was born July 6, 1902, at Bacharach, Germany, and is a German scientist and rocket expert who was brought to United States on December 6, 1945, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff under the protective custody and control of the Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency.

b3
b7E

OSI advised through Liaison 7/26/60 that its records indicate that in 1955 subject was employed at Kearsott Engineering Company, 218 Market Street, Newark, New Jersey, which company is under the security cognizance of the Air Force (Newark Air Procurement District).

Under date of May 2, 1960, CIA furnished the following report, classified ~~"Secret"~~, from "Dr. Heinrich Schutze" who is further described below:

"For a long time the KGB (Soviet State Committee for Security) has pushed without great success a campaign for the return from the United States to the German Federal Republic of various German specialists, with the purpose of making relations more tense and to realize its intelligence plans. It is known that such a plan has been practically realized through unofficial channels in connection with the person of Professor Doctor Eduard Fischel, who is rocket specialist and has worked in the United States for a long time. Professor Fischel works with Werner von Braun and is a leading expert in the field of rockets. He allegedly adopted US citizenship a long time ago."

For your information, since April, 1958, an unidentified individual using the pseudonym "Dr. Heinrich Schutze" has exchanged correspondence with CIA abroad concerning Polish and Soviet intelligence efforts against the United States. This individual has refused to appear for personal contact and his identity, motivation, and reliability remain unestablished. From time to time he has provided CIA with extremely significant information concerning Soviet-bloc knowledge of US intelligence

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN
INTELLIGENCE COPY FILED IN

50 AUG 15 1960

WDM:clc
(5)

65-65192-

NOT RECORDED
150 AUG 12 1960

(1) 65-65192 (Schutze)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

YELLOW DUPLICATE
AUG 11 1960
MAILED

Letter to

SAC, Newark

RE: EDUARD MARTIN FISCHEL

[redacted] b3 b7E

operations abroad and also significant information concerning specific individuals dispatched by the Soviets and the Poles against the United States. There can be no doubt, on the basis of his past production, that this individual enjoys high-level access to Polish and/or Soviet intelligence circles. Both CIA and the Bureau have been most circumspect in conducting investigation upon his information because of the possibility that his activity may constitute a Soviet-bloc deception operation. Possibly Soviet-bloc intelligence may be furnishing information considered expendable with sufficient color of truth to induce substantial counterintelligence efforts by the United States.

CIA has requested that the information received from this source not be further disseminated and, therefore, in any future report the information should be included in the cover pages only.

By letter dated July 11, 1960, CIA authorized the Bureau to advise the competent agency of source's report concerning Fischel and to process the matter as appropriate. In order to protect its source, CIA requested that we conceal the origin of this information when passing it to a third agency.

You are requested to make inquiry at the Kearsott Engineering Company and at the Newark Procurement District to determine subject's current location and employment. On receipt of such information the Bureau, following authorization from the appropriate agency having security cognizance, contemplates an interview of subject to determine if he has been approached by Soviet-bloc intelligence.

NOTE:

Information concerning subject's employment at Kearsott Engineering Company furnished Mr. F. H. Fields of Liaison orally by OSI 7/26/60.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-18-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

1-McDonnell

1-Liaison

BY LIAISON

REC-5 65-65192 - 73

EX-112

Date: September 21, 1960

To: Director
Central Intelligence Agency

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject: [redacted]
INTERNAL SECURITY - PO

To S.H. Hunter CIA 9/22/60 CDB

b1 Per
b3 CIA

Reference is made to your letter dated September 9, 1960, your reference [redacted]

[redacted]

No investigation is contemplated at this time on information contained in referenced letter. However, we would appreciate the receipt of any further information in this matter affecting our internal security responsibility or any information providing a basis for further evaluation of [redacted]

b1 Per
b3 CIA

WJM:prg (5)

[redacted]

According to relet, [redacted] in 4/60 reported that a clerk in the Office of the British Naval Attache, Warsaw, Poland, had been recruited by Polish Intelligence during 1951; transferred to the British Admiralty Office in 1953; he was taken over by KGB (Soviet Committee for State Security). [redacted] furnished with his report a photocopy of 99 items passed to the Polish Intelligence Service in 1952.

b1 Per
b3 CIA

(continued page 2)

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

62 SEP 27 1960

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b1 Per
b3 CIA

Director
Central Intelligence Agency

[redacted]

b1

According to INS records, [redacted] entered the U. S. at Niagara Falls, NY, on 2/22/55 and sailed from NYC for England on 3/3/55.

b6
b7C
b7E

[redacted]

b1

Instant classified ~~Secret~~ as it contains portions of CIA's letter which is so classified.

~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-18-2020 BY [redacted] ADG b6 b7C

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

RECEIVED FROM
JUL 15 1960
CIA SUP

15 JUL 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: [redacted] b1 Per b3 CIA

1. The attached report entitled "Soviet Bloc Reserve Intelligence Networks for Wartime" was recently received from [redacted]

2. We plan to query [redacted] for any information which they may have on this topic, and we suggest that [redacted] be queried in a general way on the subject.

3. We should appreciate your comments on and evaluation of this information.

4. It is requested that no dissemination or use of the attached information be made without prior clearance with this Agency.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

S. H. HORTON

[redacted]

1 Attachment

EX 100
REC-B

65-65192-72

AUG 10 1960

65-65192

1 ENCLOSURE

b3 b7E

5 AUG 16 1960

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-18-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Soviet Bloc Reserve Intelligence Networks For Wartime

History

1. At the meeting of the chiefs of the General Staff of the Warsaw Pact in Warsaw in July 1956, Marshal ZHUKOV delivered the speech in which he made the following points: The construction of a tank costs about $50,000. The work of a MOB agent over a ten-year period costs about the same. (NOTE: The term an MOB agent or MOB network used by the source was defined by the source as a reserve agent network for wartime which is developed in addition to regularly active peacetime illegal residenturas.) It was shown in World War II that a good MOB agent is worth more than 1000 tanks; therefore, without consideration of the cost, we must systematically develop a highly qualified MOB network everywhere against the imperialists, in order, if necessary, to strike before it even comes to military operations. A regular and fraternal collaboration among our countries is more than necessary in this. It is one of the most important tasks of the military and of the secret services to solve this problem properly.

2. Then ZHUKOV caused a great sensation when he mentioned further in his speech that his friend Marshal ROKOSSOVSKI (who was present at the meeting) had been sent to Canada illegally between 1932-35 specifically on an MOB assignment for the GRU, and that he had been able to carry out there important MOB tasks. ROKOSSOVSKI confirmed this and admitted that it had not been easy for him to "legalize" himself, because, although he spoke French very poorly, he had a French passport. During that time, ROKOSSOVSKI was contacted and supported in his MOB work by a Politburo member of the Canadian CP. The development of MOB networks by the satellite intelligence services was treated rather indifferently until 1954-55. Only because of pressure by the GRU and the KGB did they start to build these nets. First, the military intelligence services began, more or less because of the GRU pressure within the framework of the Warsaw Pact. Later, and with little success, the political intelligence services were harnessed up for this purpose. In contrast, the GRU and KGB had worked in this field for years. The GRU in particular, supported by the KGB, has achieved a great deal in this field.

2 Xerox
5-15-60
YFP

~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE

3. The hitherto little-noticed, but very strong and capably directed [redacted] has been very active in this field and has developed strong MOB bases in Asia, North and South America. In April 1960, General Grzegorz KORCZYNSKI, Chief of Z-II, visited Communist China with a delegation from the Polish General Staff. He learned that the [redacted] in Japan alone, has built up an MOB network of about 2500 agents. b7D

Modus Operandi

4. The MOB network is divided into two most important sectors: espionage and sabotage. MOB agents are recruited above all from persons who have good relations with the police of their countries in order to prevent the likelihood of the internment of the agents during wartime. Of primary interest as agents are people who are not in the military service or who are reserve officers. As a standard practice, when the KGB and GRU recruit two or more agents in an important spot, the appropriate ones are put on ice and earmarked for MOB.

5. After recruitment, an MOB agent is provisionally given minimum training and instruction and later, after testing, is put on ice. His only assignment is the maintenance of a signal contact by which he indicates that everything is all right. Contacts (which are only for instruction and morale purposes) are carried out very seldom; perhaps once in two years. The agents are supported financially throughout the entire period, receiving at least the same amount which they earn in their regular jobs. MOB networks designed for sabotage purposes rarely contain more than three agents. In espionage networks, the agents work or are on ice as "singletons", to be organized together only in an emergency by an already-chosen principal agent.

Coordination

6. MOB plans were developed by Z-II in 1953 and were corrected in 1956. A new plan is now being worked out in Z-II under the direction of the Deputy Chief, Tadeusz WIEDYNAK. In Department I of the UB, MOB matters are directed by the Deputy Chief of Department I, Zbigniew DYBAIA. In the Chief Directorate I of the MFS, the sabotage MOB plans were prepared ca. January 1960 by Section 8.

7. Between the Czech and East German intelligence services there exists an operational plan for MOB sabotage against West German industry, which plan had until recently the code name, "PLAN Y." This plan, prepared by sections of the civilian intelligence services, consists of an undermining of the military industry in West Germany so that it could, in an emergency, be severely crippled or completely destroyed. A regular exchange of information takes place between the Czechs and the East Germans for the purpose of proper collection of intelligence and development of the MOB network.

8. During the recent conference of bloc Security Ministers in Prague (19-22 May 1960), the KGB (with GRU support) planned to coordinate all MOB network plans and in particular to ensure that the eastern countries concern themselves with this project regularly and continuously. To what extent the KGB succeeded in this at the conference, and what was discussed during the conference, is unknown. However, from the KGB/GRU point of view, the best partners in this field are the East German and Czech intelligence services. With the Polish Z-II, as well as Department I of the UB, the KGB and GRU have a harder time, because the Poles are reluctant to subordinate their MOB plans to the overall Soviet plan. In the present political situation, however, the outlook is that Z-II and the UB will be brought under the Soviet MOB master plan.

Targets

9. In addition to "PLAN Y", described in paragraph 7 above, the GRU and the KGB in Berlin have been working for years on an MOB operation against rocket bases and atomic bases in Europe, above all in West Germany. An enormous MOB operation is being prepared against America by the GRU and the KGB with the help of the Chinese, above all against the strategic bases. The main base of operations is South America, where illegal sabotage and espionage agents have been and are being set up.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-18-2020 BY [redacted] ADC b6 b7C

~~SECRET~~

RECEIVED FROM
AUG 25 1960
CIA SIP

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

25 AUG 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: [redacted] b1 Per b3 CIA

HEINRICH SCHUTZE

1. [redacted] has reported from time to time on Zbigniew DYBALA aka Zbigniew LEWANDOWSKI aka Zbigniew JAWORSKI, Deputy Director of Department I of the UB, but he has never been thoroughly debriefed on DYBALA. b3 b7E

2. We request that [redacted] be asked, at your earliest convenience, for all the information he can possibly recall on DYBALA. Some specific questions we would like covered follow:

a. What languages does he speak?

b. Give details (dates, destination, length of stay, etc.) on any known travel of DYBALA in the West.

c. Give a detailed description of DYBALA's personality. Some traits to cover are: sense of humor, energy, intelligence, education, ability to organize and command.

d. What sort of relations does DYBALA have with Soviet advisors?

e. What is DYBALA's political orientation?

f. What is DYBALA's professional reputation? What does [redacted] personally think of DYBALA's professional ability? b1 Per b3 CIA

g. Who are DYBALA's friends at the upper government and Party levels? Who are his enemies?

3. For background information on DYBALA, we call your attention to our [redacted] dated 28 July 1958, Subject: Dr. Heinrich

Copy to [redacted] by routing slip for ☐ info ☐ action date 8-31-60 by [redacted] Please, as promptly

65-65792

NOT RECORDED
167 SEP 6 1960

ENCLOSURE

12 SEP 1960

~~SECRET~~

62 SEP 8 1960

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

SCHUTZE. Please note that the source of paragraphs 2.a.(4) and (5) is [redacted] 1.8(1)

b1 Per
b3 CIA

4. An early reply will be appreciated.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

James L. Hunt Jr.
S. H. Horton

[redacted] 1.8(1)

~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-18-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

- McDonnell

b6
b7C

Legal [illegible], Ottawa

10/11/60

Director, FBI

[redacted]

b3
b7E

b1 Per
b3 CIA

[redacted]

[redacted]

b7D

Follow these matters closely with the [redacted] to assure that any information of investigative or intelligence interest to the Bureau is promptly obtained.

1 - 65-65192 [redacted]

b1 Per
b3 CIA

1 - Foreign Liaison Unit (route through for review)

WJM:prg
(8)

b3
b7E

NOTE: By letter dated 7/15/60 [redacted] which was classified ~~Secret~~, CIA advised that info was received from [redacted] to the effect that [redacted] or an individual with a similar name, an engineer, recently entered Canada to be employed by the Canadian Electrical Company. As a UB (Polish Security Police) agent since 1954, he has the assignment of establishing espionage contacts in Canada and US.

b6
b7C
b7E

(continued page 2)

ORIG COPY FILED IN

YELLOW
DUPLICATE
OCT 10 1960
MAILED

65-65192-
NOT RECORDED
46 OCT 13 1960

189
51 OCT 18 1960

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

Director
Central Intelligence Agency

Inquiry by the Bureau developed that Fleischmann was investigated by U. S. Army intelligence in Europe as a result of the allegations made by CIA's extremely sensitive source, [redacted] which allegations alleged that Fleischmann and others were compromised and doubled by Polish Intelligence while employed by U. S. Army intelligence in Europe. This employment was from 1954 to 1956. Neither Department of the Army nor CIA has been able to confirm the allegations or to develop any info substantiating same. Further, CIA has indicated the possibility that its source, [redacted] could be practicing deception. Fleischmann was last reported as teaching at Chapel Hill, NC. In view of CIA's limitations of use of info furnished [redacted] and failure by both Army and CIA to develop any confirmation of allegations against Fleischmann in Europe where allegations were centered, no investigation was warranted by the Bureau, and CIA is being so advised.

b1 Per
b3 CIA

Classified ~~Secret~~ as it reports info so classified by CIA.

SECRET

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-18-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: [redacted] b1

b1 Per
b3 CIA

[redacted] b1

2. We should appreciate hearing from you on the results of your investigation thus far.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

for S. H. Horton

[redacted] b1

b1 Per
b3 CIA

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

NOT RECORDED
46 AUG 23 1960

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

RECEIVED FROM
SEP 9 1960
CIA SJP

REG 5

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-18-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT [redacted]

b1 Per
b3 CIA

1. In a letter received from [redacted] in April 1960 he alleged that a clerk in the office of the British Naval Attache, Warsaw, Poland, had been recruited around 1951 by the Polish Intelligence Service. [redacted] wrote that the clerk's name was something like "HUPPKENER, HAPPKENER, or HUPPENKORT", and that "this source was allegedly transferred at the beginning of 1953 to the Admiralty in England and, because he was very important and valuable, was taken over by the KGB." In addition, [redacted] attached to his letter a photocopy of an index of ninety-nine items which were allegedly delivered by this source to the PIS during 1952. [redacted]

b1 Per
b3 CIA

[redacted]

[redacted]

b1 Per
b3 CIA

[redacted]

REC-38 65-65192

5-4-77 SEP 22 1960

SECRET

[redacted] (S)

b1 Per
b3 CIA

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

S. H. Horton

S. H. HORTON

[redacted] (S)

SECRET

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GC ENT

Memorandum

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 08-18-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

b6
b7C

TO : R. O. L'ALLIER

DATE: 9-16-60

FROM : S. J. PAPICH

SUBJECT: [redacted]

b1 Per
b3 CIA

The following information was furnished to Liaison Agent on 9-15-60 by James Hunt, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

The U.S. Embassy, Warsaw, Poland, had advised that [redacted] has been granted a visa. He will be assigned as a Secretary, Polish Embassy, Washington, D. C. and will leave Warsaw on or about 9-24-60.

b7D

Hunt pointed out that information previously furnished by source in instant case indicated that [redacted] is a UB Agent.

ACTION:

The above information is being directed to the attention of the Espionage Section.

SJP:sap (4)

1-Branigan
1-Liaison
1-Papich

EX 105

REC- 35 65-65192-74

OCT 11 1960

62 OCT 13 1960

SECRET

SECRET

United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation

CLASSIFIED b6 b7C

Date: September 14, 1960

To: Director, FBI (65-65192)

From: Legat, [redacted]

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 08-18-2020 BY [redacted] ADG b3 b7E

Subject: [redacted] b1 Per b3 CIA

[redacted]

2 - Bureau
2 - Ottawa (1 cc [redacted]
WJJ:jhc
(4)

b1 Per b3 CIA

[redacted]

23 [redacted] 75

10-12 1960

b3 b7E

ENCLOSURE 78/1/60

Ltr to Ottawa dated [redacted] under [redacted]

[redacted]

OCT 18 1960

SECRET

SECRET

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-18-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

[redacted] (8)

b1 Per
b3 CIA

Reference your letter of July 15, 1960, [redacted] (8)

Therein you mention that the information in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the attached report is being passed to Canadian liaison and suggest that the FBI coordinate directly with [redacted] on these cases

b7D

By letter September 14, 1960 Legat, Ottawa advised [redacted] states no information has been received [redacted] to date on this matter.

b1 Per
b3 CIA

Information re person in [redacted] to whom matter directed or to be directed is requested so Legat Ottawa can be advised.

b7D

ENCLOSURE

65-192-15

SECRET

SECRET

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-18-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

1/19/61

CODE

1 - McDonnell

TELETYPE

URGENT

TO SACS CHICAGO
CINCINNATI
NEW YORK
SAN FRANCISCO
WFO (BY SPECIAL MESSENGER)

FROM DIRECTOR FBI (65-65192)

LT.COL. MICHAL GOLENIEWSKI, AKA. DR. HEINRICH SCHUTZE, ROMAN TARNOWSKI, IS-PO. IN APRIL, ONE NINE FIVE EIGHT, SUBJECT, THEN UNIDENTIFIED, USING THE PSEUDONYM "DR. HEINRICH SCHUTZE" COMMUNICATED WITH US [redacted] AND OFFERED TO BE OF ASSISTANCE BY WAY OF FURNISHING INFO RE SOVIET AND POLISH INTELLIGENCE EFFORTS AGAINST US. SINCE THAT TIME, SUBJECT HAS FURNISHED A LARGE VOLUME OF INFO INDICATING HIGH-LEVEL ACCESS TO POLISH AND/OR SOVIET INTELLIGENCE CIRCLES. HE REFUSED TO APPEAR FOR PERSONAL MEETINGS AND, THEREFORE, HIS IDENTITY, POSITION, AND MOTIVATION REMAINED UNKNOWN. INVESTIGATIONS TO DATE MOST DISCREET TO PRECLUDE COMPROMISING A POSSIBLY LEGITIMATE AND MOST SENSITIVE SOURCE. SUBJECT ESTABLISHED DIRECT CONTACT WITH CIA JANUARY SIX, ONE NINE SIX ONE, IN WEST BERLIN, GERMANY, SEEKING ASYLUM AND PRODUCING DOCUMENTS IDENTIFYING HIMSELF AS A POLISH INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL ASSIGNED TO SCIENTIFIC SECTION OF POLISH SECURITY SERVICE [redacted]

b1 Per
b3 CIA

b3
b7E

EX 100 REC-40 MCT-24 65-65192-80

1 - [redacted]
1 - 100-350264 (Polish Intelligence Activities in the US)
1 - 100-344406 (Polish Security Services)
WFO [illegible] (10) See note page 3.

52 JAN 16 1961

JAN 10 4:08 P 35A

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

SECRET

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

TELETYPE TO SACS CHICAGO
CINCINNATI
NEW YORK
SAN FRANCISCO
WFO
RE: LT. COL. MICHAL GOLENIEWSKI
65-65192

PARENTHESIS. SUBJECT IN PRELIMINARY INFO FURNISHED CIA ADVISED THAT HIS SECTION OF UB DIRECTS THE FOLLOWING OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AGENTS IN US: [redacted] WHO ENTERED US OCTOBER ONE EIGHT, ONE NINE SIX ZERO, AND CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO POLISH TRADE MISSION, WASHINGTON, D.C.; [redacted] CHIEF, DOSIMETRY DIVISION, INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR RESEARCH, POLISH ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, WHO ENTERED US OCTOBER TWO SIX, ONE NINE SIX ZERO, ON FELLOWSHIP TO STUDY AT ROBERT A. TAFT SANITARY ENGINEERING CENTER, CINCINNATI, OHIO; AND [redacted] PARTICIPANT WHO ENTERED US SEPTEMBER TWO SEVEN, ONE NINE FIVE NINE, AND IS CURRENTLY STUDYING BIOCHEMISTRY AT UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA MEDICAL CENTER, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA. ADDITIONAL INFO RE ABOVE INDIVIDUALS WILL BE FURNISHED ON RECEIPT. WFO, CI, AND SF DISCREETLY ESTABLISH PRESENT LOCATION AND ACTIVITIES OF RESPECTIVE INDIVIDUALS. INSTITUTE APPROPRIATE MAIL COVERS. FISURS AUTHORIZED WHERE NEED INDICATED. CG, NY, AND WFO, IN COVERAGE OF OFFICIAL ESTABLISHMENTS, BE ALERT FOR INFO RE INSTANT DEFECTION. SUBMIT RESULTS BY AIRTEL WITH APPROPRIATE LETTERHEAD MEMO SUITABLE FOR DISSEMINATION. INFO RE IDENTITY OF SUBJECT TO BE CONFINED TO COVER PAGES AS HE HAS NOT AS YET BEEN SURFACED. SUBMIT NECESSARY FD 227's.

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-18-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

1 - Liaison
1 - McDonnell

REC- 46
65-65192 — 16
EX-127

BY LIAISON

Date: November 4, 1960

b3
b7E

To: Director
Central Intelligence Agency

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

b1 Per
b3 CIA

Subject: [redacted]
INTERNAL SECURITY - FO

[redacted]

[redacted]

1 - [redacted]

b3
b7E

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

WJL:djs (6)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

~~SECRET~~

NOV 15 1960

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

~~SECRET~~

Director
Central Intelligence Agency

In other matters reported [redacted] of which we are knowledgeable, [redacted] allegations are not so strongly supported by tangible evidence and in many instances his reports confine themselves to an allegation that an individual has been recruited by Soviet-bloc intelligence or is a target of intelligence interest. From the information made available [redacted] there can be little doubt but that he does have access to high-level information within the Soviet-bloc intelligence services. However, this does not obviate the possibility that this operation could yet be a Soviet-bloc intelligence deception or disruption operation and the information furnished [redacted] considered expendable. b1 Per b3 CIA

While the proportions and the results of the British investigation tend to mitigate this latter possibility, until such time as [redacted] identity, nationality, position, and motivation are established, it is felt this operation must be circumspectly regarded. b1 Per b3 CIA

The information being furnished by your Agency concerning the [redacted] operation is appreciated. We would also appreciate being advised as soon as possible of any additional evaluation made by your Agency concerning this operation.

NOTE:

Relet from CIA requested our opinion of the [redacted] operation in the light of developments in the British investigation. In the British case, [redacted] original report was accompanied by copies of 99 official British documents which had been passed to Polish Intelligence in 1952. Subsequent investigation disclosed clandestine espionage meetings between [redacted] an Admiralty employee, and [redacted] passage of materials, and the possession of secret code books, containers, and other items associated with espionage. b6 b7C b7E

[redacted] "Doctor Heinrich Schutze," a pseudonym for an unidentified source who has been furnishing information through drops to CIA abroad re Polish and Soviet intelligence efforts against the United States. This source has not been evaluated to date and his reports may be part of a Soviet-bloc deception or disruption operation. b1 Per b3 CIA

Instant classified ~~"Secret"~~ in that it contains portions of information contained in relet classified ~~"Secret"~~ by CIA.

~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-18-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

MEMORANDUM

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (65-65192)

DATE: 11/21/60

FROM SAC, [redacted]

b3
b7E

SUBJECT [redacted]

b1 Per
b3 CIA

Re Bureau letter dated 7/25/60 entitled as above and attaching a photostat copy of CIA letter dated 7/15/60.

Attached for the Bureau are five copies of letterhead memorandum dated November 21, 1960, and entitled "SOVIET BLOC RESERVE INTELLIGENCE NETWORKS FOR WARTIME, INTERNAL SECURITY - POLAND".

One copy each is designated for the information of New York and Washington Field because of their interest in Polish intelligence activities.

b3
b7D
b7E

Information contained in referenced letterhead memorandum was furnished by [redacted] to SA JOHN J. JARMUL on November 17, 1960.

Both letterhead memorandum and letterhead memorandum evaluating source, FD-323, are classified ~~secret~~ since information contained therein originates with an extremely sensitive and valuable source and involves foreign intelligence activity in the United States.

AGENCY CIA (Horton)
REQ. REC'D 12-1-60
BY Liaison
FORM
BY W. J. Jarmul

UNRECORDED COPY AND COPY OF ENCLOSED IN [redacted]

3 - Bureau (Encls. 5) (RM)
1 - New York (Encl. 1) (Info) (RM)
1 - Washington Field (Encl. 1) (Info) (RM)
7 - Chicago
1 - [redacted]
1 - 100-17864 (POLISH INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN U.S.)
1 - 100-21057 (POLISH CONSULATE - CHICAGO)
[redacted]
b3
b7D
b7E
1 - 100-19235 (SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICES - MODUS OPERANDI)
[redacted]

52 DEC 5

JJJ:mcg
(12)

ENCLOSURE

cc [redacted]

10 NOV 25 1960

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] b3 b7D b7E

Special Agents handling information originating with [redacted] should be aware of the following Bureau instructions:

It is the responsibility of Chicago, the contacting office, to process and submit to the Bureau and interested offices all pertinent information received from [redacted] by letterhead memorandum suitable for dissemination. Dissemination restricted to date except for CIA, which is handled by the Bureau. b7D

The Bureau has instructed that no action may be taken on data received from this source which could possibly compromise informant, who is an extremely sensitive and valuable source. His identity, information received from him and investigations predicated thereon, should be confined to Bureau personnel on a need-to-know basis. Source should never be referred to by name or title in any communication.

Should a question arise at any time regarding the advisability of taking any investigative step based on source's information, the question should be resolved in favor of security of this informant. Any special problems involving source or handling information from him should be referred to the Bureau for decision. There must be no dissemination locally. When setting forth data originating with source to other Field Division, such offices should be appropriately cautioned as outlined herein.

Investigation predicated on data furnished by [redacted] should be submitted separately in report or letterhead memorandum form, whichever is appropriate. In situations where an investigation is requested of an auxiliary office and it is necessary to refer to material from [redacted] same should be referred to in the administrative pages of the report or cover letter to the letterhead memorandum. b7D

The Chicago Division should be furnished with a copy of all correspondence and reports where investigation predicated on information from [redacted]

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-18-2020 BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. [redacted]

Chicago, Illinois
November 21, 1960

b3
b7E

SOVIET BLOC RESERVE INTELLIGENCE NETWORKS FOR WARTIME INTERNAL SECURITY - POLAND

On November 17, 1960, in connection with a general discussion on Soviet and satellite espionage networks and their possible effectiveness in the event of a war, source advised that based on his personal experience there is no question in his mind but that the Soviets have a definite plan of intelligence operation against the West in the event of a war and that this plan is without doubt very closely geared to satellite operations. Source stated only a limited number of thoroughly indoctrinated individuals in the satellite nations would be aware of the program.

Source advised that no positive or definite information has come to his attention as of this date but that in the event the international situation begins to deteriorate seriously, he feels that at that time the necessary information will be made available to those who have the need to know. Source expressed the belief that whatever program the Soviets have set up to be operational in the event of war, the program no doubt is already in effect and possibly consists principally of mass infiltration and recruitment and the establishment and maintenance of a dormant network for use when required. Source feels the Soviets are placing a great deal of emphasis on intelligence and propaganda based on intelligence because they feel they can win domination of the world without resorting to war through an organized and aggressive program whereby they can take country by country without resorting to war.

Source pointed out that these are his observations and are not based on any specific knowledge he may have at this time.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the property of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE
65-65192-77

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-18-2020 BY [redacted]

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~SECRET~~

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

[redacted]

Chicago, Illinois
November 21, 1960

b3
b7E

Title: SOVIET BLOC RESERVE INTELLIGENCE NETWORKS FOR WARTIME

Character: [redacted]

Reference: Letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

~~SECRET~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE 65-105192-77

SECRET

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 08-18-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

b6
b7C

TO : Mr. L'Allier

DATE: January 6, 1961

FROM : S. J. Papich

SUBJECT: [redacted]

b1 Per
b3 CIA

The following information was furnished to the Liaison Agent on January 5, 1961, by James Hunt, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

Michal Goleniewski has advised CIA that when he made his trips into East Berlin and visited his mistress, he used the name of Roman Tarnowski. His mistress knew him under this particular name. Hunt advised that a review of CIA files has indicated that Polish Intelligence ran an intelligence operation in East Germany some time in the past and it was disclosed that one of the key Polish agents involved was an individual using the name of Roman Tarnowski.

Goleniewski further advised CIA that prior to leaving Warsaw he secreted several documents and notes in preparation for his escape. [redacted]

b1 Per
b3 CIA

Goleniewski was queried concerning [redacted] employee of the United States Intelligence Agency who allegedly had been recruited by the KGB. He told CIA that he definitely had received information from one of his sources that [redacted] had been recruited by the KGB several years ago.

b7D

ACTION:

The above information is being directed to the attention of the Espionage Section.

SJP:ban
(5)

1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. McDonnell
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich

REC-26 65-65192-78

EX 100

JAN 10 1961

59 JAN 13 1961

65-65192

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 08-18-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

b6
b7C

Memorandum

TO : Mr. L'Allier

DATE: January 9, 1961

FROM : S. J. Papich

SUBJECT: [redacted]

b1 Per
b3 CIA

Set forth is additional information transmitted to the Liaison Agent on January 7, 1961, by James Hunt, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

With regard to the Polish intelligence agents, Goleniewski has advised that the full name of the agent on the West Coast is [redacted] He reportedly came to the United States about a year ago as an exchange student. He is studying medicine at the University of California, Berkeley, California, and was scheduled to remain in the United States for about four years. In Poland he had been an instructor at the Lublin Medical Academy. At Berkeley he is studying under an unidentified professor who has a hunchbacked daughter. There may be a romantic interest between this daughter and [redacted] So far, [redacted] has had little to do in the intelligence field. He was instructed to acclimate himself with life in the United States. His cover name is [redacted] and he is equipped to correspond directly to a mail drop in Warsaw. It was Goleniewski's recollection that [redacted] reported the development of a source, a woman who works in a library, possibly for the State Department in Washington, D. C. CIA hopes that once the Agency obtains Goleniewski's notes and documents further identifying data may be found concerning the people mentioned above.

b6
b7C
b7E

With regard to the Polish agent in Cincinnati, Goleniewski has now advised that this individual is [redacted] He came to the United States in October, 1960, on a grant made available by the International Atomic Energy Commission, Vienna, Austria. He is studying at the Taft Sanitary Engineering Center, Cincinnati, Ohio. In Poland he was connected with the Institute of Nuclear Research. He has a wife and two children residing in Poland. He has not been in the position to accomplish anything significant in the way of intelligence collection. His over-all assignment is to collect technical documents. He is handled by [redacted] a Polish National who reportedly is in the United States assigned to a Polish trade mission.

b3
b7E

SJP:ban
(5)
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. McDonnell
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich

REC-47 65-65192-79 65-65192 5-um

EX-117

10 JAN 11 1961

Memo Branigan to Belmont 1-10-61 wjm:gmk

50 JAN 13 1961

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum Panich to L'Allier
Re: [redacted]

b1 Per
b3 CIA

Hunt stated that Goleniewski volunteered information concerning [redacted] He knows [redacted] and is aware of the nature of his intelligence assignment in this country. He suggested the possibility that because of his knowledge of [redacted] assignment the Poles possibly would withdraw [redacted] from the United States after they realize that Goleniewski has defected. This is speculation. Goleniewski characterized [redacted] as not being of strong character and a type who could be recruited.

With regard to Goleniewski's motivation for defection, he has informed CIA that he has a deep hatred for the KGB. This stems from a past experience and he claims that his wife became mentally deranged because of the KGB. The CIA officers handling the interrogation have described Goleniewski as being most cooperative so far. He speaks freely, directly, and seems to volunteer information without any reservation. Physically he is tired and nervous. He is deathly afraid of KGB and Polish reprisal.

ACTION:

The above information is being directed to the attention of the Espionage Section.

TELETYPE TO SACS CHICAGO
CINCINNATI
NEW YORK
SAN FRANCISCO
WFO

RE: LT. COL. MICHAL GOLENIEWSKI
65-65192

NOTE: Background info re identification, defection of subject, and allegations re [redacted] set forth in memoranda L'Allier to Belmont 1/5/61 and Papich to L'Allier 1/9/61. b6 b7C b7E

Teletype facilities being utilized to promptly notify receiving offices of subject's defection and identity of individuals identified by him as operational Polish Intelligence agents in US.

10177

TYPED BY

SECRET

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 08-18-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

Memorandum

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram

b6
b7C

TO : Mr. L'Allier

DATE: January 11, 1961

FROM : S. J. Papich

SUBJECT: [redacted]

b1

On January 10, 1961, James Hunt, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), advised that [redacted] would very likely arrive in the United States on January 12, 1961. They will be placed in a safe house located near Washington, D. C. Hunt stated that [redacted] will be made available to us for interview as soon as possible. He personally did not see any problem in arranging an interview next week.

b1 Per
b3 CIA

Hunt also stated that the material [redacted] had secreted in Warsaw has been safely recovered [redacted] and is being shipped to Washington. The material includes several rolls of microfilm.

b1 Per
b3 CIA

According to Hunt, [redacted] is very fluent in the Polish, Russian, and German languages. He also has a good knowledge of French. CIA's interrogations so far have been conducted in the German language. This was primarily done because [redacted] past reports had been prepared in the German language and it was felt that questioning would be more effective if conducted in German.

ACTION:

The above information is being directed to the attention of the Espionage Section.

SJP:ban
(5)

1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. McDonnell
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich

REC-71 65-65192-81

15 JAN 13 1961

ENCLOSURE

50 JAN 17 1961

SECRET

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-18-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Washington 25, D. C.

9 January 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ATTENTION: Mr. S. J. Papich, Liaison Officer

SUBJECT: (Lt. Col.) Michal GOLENIEWSKI [redacted]

b1 Per
b3 CIA

HEINRICH SCUTZE

1. Subject is being considered in connection with the above Project. It is requested that you make a check of your files on the basis of the attached data and furnish this Office with the results thereof in duplicate.

2. This request is forwarded in triplicate. It will be appreciated if two copies will be returned with the results of the check of your files.

3. Your cooperation will be sincerely appreciated.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

Sheffield Edwards
Director of Security

1 ENCLOSURE

Attachments: [redacted]

REC 101

65-65192-8

b1 Per
b3 CIA

NOT RECORDED
10 JAN 12 1961

2 cc returned to C.N Cunningham 1/10/61

~~SECRET~~

65-65192

No Investigation Conducted by FBI Pertinent to your inquiry. This is the result of a request for an FBI file check only and is not to be considered as a clearance.

52 JAN 16 1961

4-22 (Rev. 1-22-60)

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Records Branch

1-10, 1961

- [ ] Name Searching Unit - Room 6527
- [ ] Service Unit - Room 6524
- [ ] Forward to File Review
- [ ] Attention _____
- [x] Return to McDonnell 2264
  Supervisor Room Ext.

Type of References Requested:

- [ ] Regular Request (Analytical Search)
- [x] All References (Subversive & Nonsubversive)
- [ ] Subversive References Only
- [ ] Nonsubversive References Only
- [ ] Main _____ References Only

Type of Search Requested:

- [ ] Restricted to Locality of _____
- [x] Exact Name Only (On the Nose)
- [ ] Buildup [ ] Variations

Subject Michal Colenicwski
Birthdate & Place _____
Address _____
Localities _____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 08-18-2020 BY [redacted] ADC _____ b6 b7C

R# _____ Date 1-10 Initials ely

Prod. _____

	FILE NUMBER	SERIAL
	NSI	
	Dnol	
P1	100-344485-83 (Jan Colenicwski)	

4-22 (Rev. 1-22-60)

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Records Branch

_____, 19___

- [ ] Name Searching Unit - Room 6527
- [ ] Service Unit - Room 6524
- [ ] Forward to File Review
- [ ] Attention _____
- [x] Return to M. Donnell 2264
  Supervisor Room Ext.

Type of References Requested:

- [ ] Regular Request (Analytical Search)
- [x] All References (Subversive & Nonsubversive)
- [ ] Subversive References Only
- [ ] Nonsubversive References Only
- [ ] Main _____ References Only

Type of Search Requested:

- [ ] Restricted to Locality of _____
- [x] Exact Name Only (On the Nose)
- [ ] Buildup [ ] Variations

Subject Roman Jarmowski

Birthdate & Place

Address

Localities

R# _____ Date 1-10 Searcher Initials ej

Prod. _____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-18-2020 BY [ ] ADC
b6
b7C

	FILE NUMBER	SERIAL
	1241	

~~SECRET~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

- ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 08-18-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

b6
b7C

TO : *A. H. Belmont*

DATE: *January 10, 1961*

1 - Mr. Parsons *1 - Mr. Branigan*
1 - Mr. Belmont *1 - Mr. McDonnell*
1 - Mr. DeLoach

FROM : *W. A. Branigan*

SUBJECT: *LT. COL. MICHAL GOLENIEWSKI, also known as*
Dr. Heinrich Schutze
Roman Tarnowski
INTERNAL SECURITY - PO

The purpose of this memorandum is to summarize briefly the events leading to the defection of subject and subsequent developments to date.

In April, 1958, subject, then unidentified, using the pseudonym "Dr. Heinrich Schutze," communicated with U. S. intelligence [redacted] *offering to be of assistance by way of furnishing information regarding Soviet and Polish intelligence efforts against the U. S. Since that time, subject has furnished a large volume of information to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) abroad through drops, such information indicating high-level access to Polish and/or Soviet intelligence circles. His identity, position, and motivation being unknown, the possibility of a deception operation was calculated but investigations instituted and discreetly conducted so as to protect a possibly legitimate and sensitive source.*

b1 Per
b3 CIA

Subject established personal contact with CIA 1/11/61 at West Berlin, Germany, seeking asylum and identifying himself as an intelligence official assigned at Scientific Section, Polish Security Service (UB).

Subject, in primary information furnished CIA, advised that his Section of the UB directs the following operational intelligence agents in the U.S.: [redacted] *who entered the U. S. 10/18/60 and is assigned to the Polish Trade Mission, Washington, D. C.* [redacted] *Chief, Dosimetry Division, Institute of Nuclear Research, Polish Academy of Sciences, who entered the U.S. 10/26/60 on a fellowship to study at Robert A. Taft Sanitary Engineering Center, Cincinnati, Ohio. Subject states* [redacted] *is handled by* [redacted] *has the assignment of collecting technical data but to date has accomplished nothing of significance.* [redacted] *participant who entered the U. S. 9/27/59 and is studying biochemistry at the University of California Medical Center, San Francisco. He is to acclimate himself in the U.S., is equipped with a mail drop in Warsaw, and reportedly has developed a source possibly in the State Department, Washington, D. C.*

b3
b7E

65-65192-83

65-65192
WJM:gmh (6)

REC-92

15 JAN 13 1961

57 JAN 18 1961

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum Mr. Branigan to Mr. Belmont
Re: Lt. Col. Michal Goleniewski
65-65192

Subject advised CIA that his cooperation and defection were motivated by his deep hatred for the KGB (Soviet Committee for State Security). Subject is deathly afraid of the KGB and the UB.

OBSERVATIONS: b7E

Investigations based on information provided by subject to date have failed to disclose any operational intelligence activity in the U. S. on the part of individuals named. With respect to [redacted] *described herein, investigations instituted at the time of their U. S. entry have to date failed to disclose intelligence activity. In view of instant information from subject, appropriate offices have been instructed to intensify these investigations.*

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-18-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

4-41 (Rev. 1-11-60)

DECODED COPY

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

XXX **Radio** ☐ **Teletype**

URGENT 1-12-61

TO DIRECTOR AND SAC, WASHINGTON FIELD BRANIGAN

b3
b7E

FROM SAC, SAN FRANCISCO 120155

LT. COL. MICHAL GOLENIEWSKI, AKA., IS-PO. REBUTEL JANUARY 10, LAST. [redacted] PRESENTLY STUDYING TOWARD PH. D BIOCHEMISTRY TAKING FULL COURSE AND EMPLOYED AS TEACHING ASSISTANT AT UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA MEDICAL CENTER, SF. VICE CHAIRMAN OF BIOCHEMISTRY DEPARTMENT WHO HANDLES EXCHANGE STUDENTS IS DR. FRANK WORTHINGTON ALLEN, WHOM [redacted] DESCRIBED AS DISCREET AND RELIABLE PERSON. SF INDICES NEGATIVE ON ALLEN. [redacted] PRESENTLY RESIDING 1392 SIXTH AVENUE, SF. THIS IS TWO FLAT DWELLING. [redacted] LIVES IN UPPER FLAT WITH FOUR OTHER MEDICAL CENTER STUDENTS, IDENTITIES UNKNOWN AT PRESENT. OWNERS OF FLAT WHO RESIDE BELOW [redacted] ARE WILLIAM AND MARY CANTOR, SEAMAN AND HOUSEWIFE RESPECTIVELY. STUDENTS HAVE NO PHONE. MAIL COVER HAS BEEN PLACED. PHOTO OF [redacted] NOT YET AVAILABLE. WFO REQUESTED TO IMMEDIATELY OBTAIN SAME IF AVAILABLE AND REPORT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AVAILABLE AT INS AND STATE. INS, SF, HAS NO RECORD OF [redacted] BUREAU REQUESTED ADVISE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WHETHER CIA CONTEMPLATING OPERATING MAIN SUBJECT IN PLACE. IF SO, INVESTIGATION, SF WILL BE MOST DISCREET. IF NOT, INVESTIGATION WILL BE INTENSIFIED MORE OPENLY SINCE AS SOON AS DEFECTION KNOWN, [redacted] WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE ADVISED BY U. B. HE IS COMPROMISED AND DESTROY ANY INCRIMINATING MATERIAL. ASSUMING DEFECTION IS KNOWN TO POLES, BUREAU AUTHORITY REQUESTED TO INTERVIEW DR. ALLEN. SF WILL INTERVIEW THE CANTORS AND CONSIDER INTERVIEWING THE MOST LOGICAL ROOMMATE

b6
b7C
b7D
b7E

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

2 CC: WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE. Place copy in: [redacted] 65-15192-84

b3
b7E

REC-9 65-15192-12 JAN 18 1961

51 JAN 18 1961

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

4-41 (Rev. 1-11-60)

DECODED COPY

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

XXX **Radio** ☐ **Teletype**

PAGE 2 FROM SAN FRANCISCO 120155

OF [redacted] AFTER APPROPRIATE IDENTIFICATION AND INQUIRY. ANY FURTHER DETAIL RECEIVED FROM CIA RELATIVE TO NATURE OF [redacted] ASSIGNMENTS WILL ASSIST IMMEASURABLY IN DIRECTION OF INVESTIGATION AS TO WHETHER ASSIGNMENT WAS ONE OF ORIENTATION OR HAD SUBAGENTS HE WAS CONTACTING OR MANNER IN WHICH HE WAS COMMUNICATING HIS INFORMATION.

b6
b7C
b7E

RECEIVED: 12:11 AM RADIO

12:35 AM CODING UNIT RN

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

~~SECRET~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 08-18-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W. C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : Mr. Belmont

DATE: January 5, 1961

FROM : R. O. L'Allier

SUBJECT: LIEUTENANT COLONEL MICHAL GOLENIEWSKI, AKA
[redacted]
INTERNAL SECURITY - POLAND

b1 Per
b3 CIA

Since April, 1958, an individual using the pseudonym of Doctor Heinrich Schutze has been transmitting information to drops in West Germany arranged by Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). His information has related to both Polish and Soviet intelligence operations in Europe and to some extent in this country. Schutze's true identity had been unknown and consequently his bona fides had never been established.

On January 3, 1961, S. H. Horton, CIA, advised the Liaison Agent that Schutze transmitted a communication indicating that "he will be coming out." Schutze stated that the KGB was closing in on him and that he would need political asylum and necessary protection. On January 4, 1961, Horton advised that the subject appeared in the United States Consulate, West Berlin, where he established contact

[redacted]

b1 Per
b3 CIA

[redacted] Subject identified himself as Lieutenant Colonel Michal Goleniewski, born August 16, 1922, Nieswierz (formerly part of U.S.S.R.), Poland. Up to December, 1957, he was the Deputy Chief of Military Counterintelligence. Since that date he has been the Deputy Director for the Scientific Branch in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. He advised that in this capacity he had also acted for the KGB in the UB (Polish Security Service).

b6
b7C
b7E

He appeared in West Berlin with his [redacted] an East Berlin National who up-to-date has known the subject as being a Polish journalist under another name. Her parents reside in East Berlin and she has a sister and brother living in West Berlin. He surrendered to CIA his Ministry of Internal Affairs identification card and a similar document identifying him as being connected with the UB.

SJP:ban
(7)
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. McDonnell
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich
1 - Mr. Parsons
1 - Mr. Belmont

REC-91 65-65192-85
EX-117
12 JAN 13 1961

65-65192

52 JAN 18 1961

COPY TO MR TOLSON

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum L'Allier to Belmont
Re: LIEUTENANT COLONEL MICHAL GOLENIEWSKI, AKA
[redacted]
INTERNAL SECURITY - POLAND

b1 Per
b3 CIA

CIA planned to move subject and his girlfriend to Frankfurt, Germany, on January 5, 1961, at which time he will be interrogated at great lengths. CIA will place emphasis on "hot leads," particularly those bearing on any United States angles. If the interrogation proceeds satisfactorily and no evidence is developed that subject is a fraud, CIA very likely will move subject to the United States within a week.

Horton stated that a review of CIA records disclosed one reference indicating that an individual with the same name has been serving as the Deputy Director of Section 6, Department 1, in the UB. This is the Scientific Branch. With regard to the aforementioned connection with KGB Horton stated that this has not been clarified but CIA plans to look into this angle very intensively because of the potential importance.

Subject indicated that he expects to be missed by his superiors by noon (Washington, D. C., time, January 5, 1961). He has not asked for any special treatment but expects that he and his mistress will be protected. He advised that his mistress has been visably shaken over this most recent development and Goleniewski believes she might need some medical attention. CIA has provided a doctor.

b1 Per
b3 CIA

As you know, the subject previously furnished information concerning Soviet intelligence operations directed against the British. [redacted]

[redacted]

ACTION:

The Espionage Section was advised of the above on January 4, 1961, and has been reviewing Bureau files concerning subject. Liaison will closely follow developments and will keep you advised.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-18-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

1/12/61

CODE

TELETYPE URGENT

1 - Parsons
1 - Mohr
1 - Callahan
1 - Belmont
1 - Branigan
1 - McDonnell

TO SACS NEW YORK
WASHINGTON FIELD (BY SPECIAL MESSENGER)

FROM DIRECTOR FBI (65-65192)

LT. COL. MICHAL GOLENIEWSKI, AKA. DR. HEINRICH SCHUTZE, ROMAN TARNOWSKI, IS - PO. CIA HAS ADVISED THAT SUBJECT AND HIS MISTRESS ARE SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE IN US ON EVENING OF JANUARY ONE TWO, ONE NINE SIX ONE, AND WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR INTERVIEW BY BUREAU AGENTS SOMETIME DURING WEEK OF JANUARY ONE FIVE, ONE NINE SIX ONE. SUBJECT SPEAKS FLUENT POLISH, RUSSIAN, AND GERMAN. IT IS REQUESTED THAT SAS CHESTER J. GUSTOWSKI, NY, AND JOSEPH E. MICHALSKI, WFO, REPORT TO SOG, ROOM ONE SEVEN FOUR TWO AT NINE AM, JANUARY ONE SIX, ONE NINE SIX ONE, FOR TWO-DAY REVIEW OF PERTINENT INFO PRIOR TO INTERVIEW OF SUBJECT, TO BE SCHEDULED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THEREAFTER.

WJM:PRG
(10)

NOTE: Teletype facilities being used because of time element involved.

See cover memo Branigan to Belmont 1/12/61 re same subject prepared by WJM:prg.

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

57 JAN 18 1961

MAIL ROOM [ ] TELETYPE UNIT [ ]

100 REC-33 65-65192-

VIA TELETYPE
JAN 12 1961
2:15 PM

19 JAN 18 1961

SECRET

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 08-18-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach b6
Malone b7C
McGuire
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : MR. D. E. MOORE

DATE: 1/10/61

FROM : A. H. Belmont

cc Mr. Belmont
Mr. Branigan
Mr. Papich
Mr. Kuhrtz

SUBJECT: [redacted]

b1 Per
b3 CIA

At the US Intelligence Board meeting on 1/10, in executive session, James Hunt of CIA briefed the board members on the background of the Schuetze operation, starting with the initial letter addressed to the Director, [redacted] and running up to the development of the British case on [redacted] and the defection of Schuetze, his arrival in Berlin, and the fact that he is being brought to the US by CIA, together with his mistress. [redacted]

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Hunt said that the cache of material which Schuetze hid in Poland has been recovered and is being brought out of Poland, at which time it will be given careful examination.

b1 Per
b3 CIA

Hunt said that according to Schuetze, the UB has designated Pawel Monat for assassination, in the same manner as the Polish official who defected in France, and further the UB knows the present whereabouts of Monat in the US. [redacted]

ACTION:

I think we should keep in very close contact with CIA, as we have been, in order to immediately receive any information given by Schuetze which is pertinent to our responsibilities; to conduct an interview of Schuetze at the proper time when he arrives here, and to find out what the "cache" consists of, with particular respect to our interests and responsibilities.

[redacted]

EX-105

65-65192

REC-58

16 JAN 16 1961

b3
b7E

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

AHB:CSH (5)

65-65192

XEROX

JAN 17 1961

59 JAN 25 1961

52

SECRET

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-18-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

b6
b7C

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: 1/12/61

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: LIEUTENANT COLONEL MICHAL GOLENIEWSKI,
also known as Dr. Heinrich Schutze,
Roman Tarnowski
INTERNAL SECURITY - PO

The purpose of this memorandum is to effect the interview of subject in the Washington, D. C., area by Polish-speaking Agents familiar with the background of subject and experienced in Polish Intelligence activities.

On 1/10/61 James Hunt, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), advised that subject and his mistress are scheduled to be brought to the US on the evening of 1/12/61. They will be placed in a safe house located near Washington, D. C., following which subject will be made available to us for interview during the week of 1/15/61. Subject speaks fluent Polish, Russian, and German.

It will be recalled that subject, prior to his defection on 1/6/61, furnished a large volume of information through drops to CIA abroad using the pseudonym Dr. Heinrich Schutze regarding Polish and Soviet Intelligence against the US. Such information indicated an intelligence interest in persons now residing in the US on whom investigations were instituted. To date no operational intelligence activity on the part of these individuals is indicated. On 1/6/61 subject in personal contact with CIA identified himself as an official of Polish Intelligence and furnished information regarding three operational intelligence agents in the US on whom investigations have been intensified.

REC-2 65-65192-88

Mr. Hunt has advised that material secreted by subject in Warsaw, Poland, prior to his defection has been recovered and consists of several rolls of microfilm.

OBSERVATIONS:

25 JAN 18 1961

In view of the information furnished to date by subject, he should be thoroughly debriefed by Polish-speaking Agents knowledgeable concerning Polish Intelligence activities for all

Enc.
65-65192
WJM:prg
(7)

1 - Parsons
1 - Mohr
1 - Callahan
1 - Belmont
1 - Branigan
1 - McDonnell

59 JAN 25 1961

65-65192
5 cys

A. H. Belmont
RE: LIEUTENANT COLONEL MICHAL GOLENIEWSKI
65-65192

information in his possession supplementing pending investigations and such other information as he possesses of interest to the Bureau. Such Agents, prior to interview, should be afforded the opportunity to review at the Bureau all information emanating from subject and the investigative developments in related cases.

SAs Joseph E. Michalski of Washington Field and Chester J. Gustowski of New York Office, Polish-speaking Agents, are experienced and knowledgeable regarding Polish Intelligence activities in the US. SA Gustowski is familiar in part with information received from subject.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the attached Teletype be sent directing that SAs Joseph E. Michalski, Washington Field, and Chester J. Gustowski, New York Office, report to the Bureau at 9a.m. on 1/16/61 for a two-day review period in preparation for interview of subject, which is to be arranged as soon as possible thereafter.

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 08-18-2020 BY [redacted] ADC b6 b7C

FBI

Date: 1/11/61

Transmit the following in PLAIN TEXT
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL - REGISTERED
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, SAN FRANCISCO

SUBJECT: LT. COL. MICHAL GOLENIEWSKI, aka.,
IS - PO

[redacted] b3 b7E

Remyradgram 1/11/61, captioned LT. COL. MICHAL GOLENIEWSKI, aka., IS - PO.

Enclosed herewith are five copies of a letterhead memo dated 1/11/61, captioned [redacted]

Enclosed letterhead memo has been classified ~~confidential~~ since unauthorized disclosure of the Bureau's interest in a participant in an official exchange could be detrimental to the defense interest of the nation.

Records of the East-West Contacts Staff, U.S. Department of State were furnished to SA CLYDE D. NICOLL by ROBERT J. MARTENS, Case Officer of instant staff.

Source mentioned in letterhead memo is [redacted] (established source), [redacted] San Francisco, who furnished information to SAs JOSEPH M. WUSLICH and WAYNE K. WELCH. b7D

Other sources mentioned are [redacted] and [redacted] who are in regular contact with SA STANLEY J. EAGER. b7D

Information in the files of INS, San Francisco, was obtained by SA JOHN T. KERLER.

Investigation of [redacted] continuing and subsequent communications pertaining to [redacted] will be furnished under caption [redacted] b3 b6 b7C b7E

62-6519?-89

P-
4 - Bureau (Encls. 5)(AM REG.)
[redacted]
JMW:ls
(7)

JAN 12 1961

Approved: [redacted] Sent [redacted] M Per [redacted]
Special Agent in Charge

ESP.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-18-2020 BY: [redacted] b6 b7C

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
422 Federal Office Building
Civic Center
San Francisco 2, California

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

January 11, 1961

b3 b6 b7C b7E

[redacted]

Records, East-West Contacts Staff, U.S. Department of State, revealed on September 29, 1959, that [redacted] Poland, Passport No. [redacted] type of visa "J," arrived September 27, 1959, via KLM Flight 605 at New York International Airport with destination University of California Medical Center, Berkeley, California. b6 b7C

A source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised on January 11, 1961, that [redacted] was associated as an [redacted]

This source stated [redacted] presently resides at [redacted] California, and turned over his previous flat at [redacted] to a fellow Pole, [redacted] According to this source, [redacted] was pursuing the same course as [redacted] b6 b7C

Source stated that both were "in good standing" at the [redacted] and there was no indication that their activities were other than those for which they were admitted to the Medical Center. b6 b7C

Sources, who have furnished reliable information in the past regarding Polish activities in the San Francisco Bay Area, have furnished no information regarding [redacted]

The records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, San Francisco, California, on February 19, 1960, reflected that [redacted] had Polish Passport Number [redacted] issued by the Polish Government. He had a "J" type visa and was listed as an exchange visitor and arrived. b6 b7C

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

65-65192-89

ENCLOSURE

in the U.S. on January 25, 1960, at New York, New York, via "Swiss Air Flight 848." He was destined to the [redacted] San Francisco, California, and was admitted until July 15, 1960. His address in Poland was listed as [redacted] upon entry at New York City, on January 25, 1960, was paroled to San Francisco because his passport was invalid. His passport was subsequently revalidated at Chicago, Illinois, and he was formally admitted at San Francisco February 19, 1960. b6 b7C

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-18-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

RECEIVED FROM
JAN 1 1961

REC-10

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Washington 25, D. C.

13 January 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

ATTENTION: Mr. S. J. Papich, Liaison Officer

SUBJECT: [redacted] [redacted]

b3
b7E

1. Reference is made to our letter dated 30 April 1954, concerning the above captioned project.

b1 Per
b3 CIA

[redacted]

3. Your cooperation in this matter will be very much appreciated.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

Sheffield Edwards
Director of Security

Attachments: Bio. Data

No Investigation Conducted by FBI
Pertinent to your inquiry.
This is for the benefit of a request for
an FBI file check only and is not to
be considered as a clearance.

REC-10 65-65192-90

7 JAN 18 1961

65-65192

5-mm

~~SECRET~~

CLOSURE
REC's stamped & returned to CIA
1-16-61
SGP/ieb

67 JAN 25 1961

SECRET

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-18-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

b6
b7C

BIOGRAPHIC DATA

[redacted]

b1 Per CIA

ENCLOSURE

65-65192-91

SECRET

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~SECRET~~

REC 44

Memorandum

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 08-18-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6 b7C

RECEIVED JAN 19 1961

TO : J. Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

DATE: January 16, 1961

FROM : C. G. McCarthy, Acting Chief Intelligence Officer
Immigration and Naturalization Service

b1 Per CIA

SUBJECT [redacted] Michal GOLENIEWSKI (travel name Wladislaw NOWAK) [redacted]

b6 b7C

Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

REC-44 65-65192-91

The subjects named above, whose inspection was deferred under the immigration laws, were paroled into the United States at Washington, D. C. on January 12, 1961.

JAN 19 1961

C. G. McCarthy

5-WPM

65-65192

59 JAN 25 1961

VIA LIAISON

~~SECRET~~

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-18-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

B I

Date: 1/18/61

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-65192)

FROM: SAC, [redacted]

MICHAL GOLENIEWSKI
CS

b3
b7D
b7E

ReButels 1/10/61 and 1/12/61, captioned Lt. Col. MICHAL GOLENIEWSKI, aka Dr. HEINRICH SCHUTZE, ROMAN TARNOWSKI, IS-PO, advising of subject's recent defection and pending interview with him.

[redacted]

b7E

3-Bureau
1-New York (Info)(RM)
1-Chicago (Info)(RM)
1-WFO

JEM:res
(6)

AIRTEL

MCT 16 65-60112-98

REC-53

2 JAN 19 1961

FEB 3 1961

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M P
Special Agent in Charge

1 - Mr. McDonnell
1 - Mr. O'Neill

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-18-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

b6
b7C

1/13/61

Airtel

To: SACs,
2 - [redacted]

From: Director, FBI [redacted]

[redacted]

b3
b7E

Re San Francisco radiogram 1/12/61 captioned "Lt. Col. Michal Goleniewski, aka; IS - FO."

Additional information has been furnished to CIA by Goleniewski concerning subject as follows:

Subject studying under unidentified professor at University of California who has hunchbacked daughter. There may be a romantic interest between subject and this daughter. Subject expects to continue study in the U.S. for approximately four years. So far, subject has had little to do in the intelligence field. His instructions are to acclimate himself to U.S. life. He has cover name [redacted] and is equipped to correspond directly to a mail drop in Warsaw. Goleniewski recollects that subject reported development of a source, a woman who works in a library, possibly in the Department of State, Washington, D. C. Attempts will be made to further develop the above information in future interviews with Goleniewski and through analysis of his documents and notes. Goleniewski has arrived in U.S. and will not be operated in place.

b3
b7E

Bufiles contain following regarding Dr. Frank Worthington Allen, University of California:

WFO letter 2/20/58 enclosed a letterhead memorandum, same date, classified ~~"Confidential,"~~ furnishing information from a source (documentation - anonymous) that during the period 2/7-14/58 Frank W. Allen and Adam W. Lis of the University of California School of Medicine contacted the Czech Embassy, Washington, D. C., to request a visa. They planned to drive through

(1 - 65-65192 (Goleniewski)
1 - 116-370429 (Lis)
WFO:gmh (9)

185 JAN 17 1961

SEE HOME PAGE 3

ORIGINAL FILED IN

JAN 23 1961

b3
b7E

Czechoslovakia prior to attending the International Biochemical Congress in Vienna which was to be held 9/1-6/58. They also indicated an intention to visit Poland prior to visiting Vienna.

San Francisco is in possession of Los Angeles report 9/29/42 captioned "SITA Travel, Incorporated; et al," which indicates Frank Allen, 2736 Bancroft Way, Berkeley, California, (not otherwise identified) visited Europe in 1938.

San Francisco report 6/23/48 in case captioned "Bernhardt Weidenbaum - HA-2426; AEAA," San Francisco file 116-7622, sets forth San Francisco interview of Dr. Allen on page 9 and additional information on page 11.

"American Men of Science," (Volume 1, 1955), contains following regarding Frank Worthington Allen: "born 9/3/03, Harbor Beach, Michigan; married 1935; two children; AB degree, Stanford, '29; Ph.D. biochemistry, University of California, '33; instructor in biochemistry '33-'38; asst. prof. '38-'43; assoc. prof. '46-'53; prof. '53 ___; Legion of Merit; Sanit Comm; '43-'46, Lt. Col."

San Francisco file 116-40196 captioned "Adam Wiktor Lis" contains background regarding Lis who applied for Czech visa with Allen in 1958.

In view of additional information received from Goleniewski, Bureau does not believe it advisable to interview Dr. Allen until further information developed regarding identity of the hunchbacked daughter of professor.

San Francisco attempt to account for any movement of subject which would give him the opportunity to develop a source in a library at Department of State, Washington, D. C., or possibly in the San Francisco area. In this connection, it is noted that prior correspondence in this case does not account for subject's whereabouts between arrival in the U.S. on 9/27/59 and verification of attendance at University of California on 11/9/59.

WFO carefully review Soviet and Eastern European Exchanges Staff records for all information regarding subject.

In connection with existing mail cover, San Francisco will, if possible, effect photographic coverage of any envelopes, post cards or other documents which appear to have significance as an alert to subject from Polish Intelligence Service that his status may be compromised.

b3
b7E

NOTE: Subject is [redacted] engaged in research at the University of California Medical School, San Francisco. He was named by "Schutze" as a UB (Polish Intelligence Service) agent. Bureau radiogram 1/10/61 advised San Francisco to institute mail cover and conduct necessary investigation to determine subject's activities and contacts. Re San Francisco radiogram requested Bureau authority to contact Dr. Frank J. Allen, under whose direction subject works. Until identity of hunchbacked daughter of professor established, however, interview of Allen is considered to be premature.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-18-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

Date: 1/24/61

AIRTEL

TO: DIRECTOR, [redacted]

b3
b7E

FROM: SAC, [redacted]

SUBJECT: [redacted]
(OO:BS)

Enclosed herewith are six copies for the Bureau and two copies each for the Boston, Chicago and New York Offices of a letterhead memo dated and captioned as above. A similiar number of copies of a letterhead memo evaluating the confidential source used in the above mentioned memo is also enclosed.

The confidential source mentioned is [redacted] who furnished the information to SAs JOSEPH E. MICHALSKI and CHESTER J. GUSTOWSKI on 1/19/61.

b7D

Copies are being furnished for the information and assistance of the Boston, Chicago and New York Offices in view of the possibility of future investigation by those offices in this matter.

The letterhead memo is classified ~~"Secret"~~ to protect the identity of the defector who has not been surfaced and who is currently furnishing information of value and because it describes alleged recruitment plans of an American citizen by the Polish Intelligence Service.

The evaluation memo is classified ~~"Secret"~~ for the reasons mentioned above.

(1) - Bureau (Enc 6)
(1) - 65-65192)
2 - Boston (Enc 2)(Info)(RM)
2 - Chicago (Enc 2)(Info)(RM)
2 - New York (Enc 2)(Info)(RM)
2 - WFO
(1 - [redacted]
JEM:pt
(12)

b7D

NOT RECORDED
185 JAN 31 1961

AIRTEL

CARBON COPY
FEB 3 1961

ENCLOSURE

FILED IN

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-18-2020 BY: [redacted]

SECRET b6 b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
January 24, 1961

[redacted] b3 b7E

On January 19, 1961, a confidential source advised that Lieutenant Colonel Skibinski, Chief of Section VIII, Department II of the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs (MSW), Warsaw, Poland, which is concerned with counter-intelligence work against foreign diplomatic missions in Poland, furnished the following information in 1959 concerning plans of the Polish Security Service (UB) to recruit Miss [redacted] an employee of the United States Embassy in Warsaw. b7D

Miss [redacted] had been recommended as a likely prospect for recruitment by [redacted] who was concerned with press matters at the United States Embassy in Warsaw at that time, to the Soviet Ministry of Internal Security (MGB). The MGB at Warsaw, in turn, furnished this information to Colonel Matejewski, Chief of Department II (Polish counterintelligence) in the UB, who, along with Skibinski, was in liaison with the MGB.

An employee of a UB detachment in Warsaw named Szczygiel was acquainted with one Bulanda, who knew Miss [redacted] cousin in Poland (name not recalled). Szczygiel b7D was to become acquainted with Miss [redacted] and would then introduce a UB agent to her. The purpose of this introduction was to eventually compromise Miss [redacted] as it was felt that she was available for amorous advances by males. This plan did not materialize as the circumstances for such an introduction at the Hotel Bristol Dining Room and again on the terrace of the Grand Hotel were not felt to be propitious for some unknown reason. In addition, Miss [redacted] reserved attitude discouraged such advances and the plan to compromise her was postponed for the time being. This plan was to be put into operation at a later date but Miss [redacted] was transferred from Warsaw in the meantime.

~~[redacted]~~ 65-65192-

ENCLOSURE

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

b3
b7E

Informant later learned through Colonel Jastrzebski of Department I of the UB that the UB planned to go ahead with recruitment plans concerning Miss [redacted] who was now in the United States. b7D

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-18-2020 BY:

SECRET

FD-323 (3-28-60)

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Washington, D.C.
January 24, 1961

Title [redacted] b7D

Character

Reference Memorandum dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) used in reference communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

ENCLOSURE

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-18-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Trotter
W. C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

b6
b7C

TO : Mr. Belmont

DATE: January 25, 1961

FROM : R. O. L'Allier

SUBJECT: [redacted]

b1 Per
b3 CIA

As you know, Special Agents Gustowski and Michalski have been interviewing the Polish intelligence official who recently defected and who was brought to the United States by Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). You may be interested in the following information which was volunteered to the Liaison Agent on January 24, 1961, by [redacted] CIA, who has been in regular contact with the defector, whom we have referred to as [redacted]

[redacted] was highly impressed with Gustowski and Michalski. He stated that the Bureau Agents appeared to have a sound knowledge concerning Polish intelligence activities and their emphasis for small details convinced him the Bureau Agents really knew their job.

b1 Per
b3 CIA

ACTION:

For information.

SJP:ban
(7)

1 - Mr. Parsons
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. McDonnell
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich

REC-16 65-65192-93

15 JAN 31 1961

* CODE WORD FOR POLISH INTELLIGENCE OFFICIAL WHO DEFECTED.

5-4pm

54 FEB 6 1961

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-18-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

1/24/61

AIRTEL

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted]

b3
b7E

FROM: SAC, WFO [redacted]

UNSUB; aka "Chlopak"
(Illegal Resident Polish
Military Intelligence Agent)
IS - PO
(OO:NY)

[redacted]

b1 Per
b3 CIA

Enclosed herewith are six copies for the Bureau and two copies each for NY and CG of a letterhead memo, dated and captioned as above. Also enclosed are a similar number of copies of a letterhead memo evaluating the confidential source used in above-mentioned memo.

b7D

The confidential source mentioned is [redacted] who was interviewed in the Polish language by SAs JOSEPH E. MICHALSKI and CHESTER J. GUSTOWSKI on 1/19/61.

Two copies each are being furnished to the office of origin, New York, and for the information and assistance of CG which is conducting investigation in this matter.

The letterhead memo is classified "Secret" to protect the identity of a defector who has not been surfaced and who is currently furnishing information of value.

The evaluation memo is also classified "Secret" for the reason mentioned above.

b3
b7E

ORIGINAL FILED

(4) - Bureau (Enc. 6)
(1) - 65-65192)
2 - New York [redacted] (Enc. 2) (RM)
2 - Chicago (Enc. 2) (Info) (RM)
2 - WFO
(1 - [redacted]

b3
b7D
b7E

AIRTEL

65-65192

JEM:jmp
(10)

NOT RECORDED
98 FEB 6 1961

ENCLOSURE

59 FEB 6 1961

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

For purposes of clarification as how informant managed to obtain information in enclosed, his relationship with Colonel TADEUSZ JEDYNAK, Deputy Chief of Polish Military Intelligence, described by informant as his primary source of information concerning "CHLOPAK," is set out.

Informant stated that he and JEDYNAK were such good friends and knew each other for such a long time that they were on a first-name basis with each other. Informant noted that he managed to piece together fragmentary discussions with JEDYNAK on this topic during the course of two social visits and over a few drinks, prior to and following JEDYNAK's trip to the U.S. in 1959. During the course of these talks, informant tried to give the impression to JEDYNAK that he was merely indicating a professional interest in such matters.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-18-2020 BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~SECRET~~

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
January 24, 1961

UNKNOWN SUBJECT;
also known as "Chlopak"
(Illegal Resident Polish
Military Intelligence Agent)

On January 19, 1961, a confidential informant advised that he first learned in 1956, that an illegal resident agent under the cover name of "Chlopak," had been recruited by the former Director of O-II (Polish Military Intelligence, now called Z-II) General Waclaw Komar prior to late 1952 when Komar had fallen out of favor in Poland and had been arrested. Informant stated that Colonel Czaplicki of Department I, Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs (MSW - Foreign Intelligence) was aware of the existence of this agent and that Colonel Tadeusz Jedynak, Deputy Director of O-II, knew many particulars about him.

According to informant, Czaplicki requested him to intervene with Jedynak as the Polish Security Service (UB) was interested in activating "Chlopak," a dormant O-II operative. Informant noted that there was considerable professional jealousy between the two intelligence services at that time.

Informant stated he contacted various O-II officials in that respect but that the request for utilization of "Chlopak" was refused, as O-II planned to activate him in the near future.

During these contacts with O-II officials, informant stated he learned that "Chlopak" came to Warsaw for an operational contact with Komar, but departed shortly after hearing of his arrest. Informant added that he also learned in 1956 that O-II considered "Chlopak" to possess fairly good potential as an illegal agent.

Informant advised that Jedynak had the following information at his disposal in 1959 concerning "Chlopak":

"Chlopak" was Jewish and had been sent to the United States by Colonel Komar to set up an illegal residentura. He had been warned of Komar's arrest by

~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE

65-65192-

UNKNOWN SUBJECT;
also known as "Chlopak"
(Illegal Resident Polish
Military Intelligence Agent)

Jewish friends in Warsaw and would also have been arrested as an "American agent." He was given $25,000 by O-II to open a travel agency in New York City and was reported to be currently prospering. His contacts were primarily in military circles. Current O-II plans were to activate "Chlopak" and to exploit his military contacts which were considered to be the important phase of this entire operation while he, himself, was considered to be unimportant and expendable. O-II felt that "Chlopak" had now sufficiently acclimatized himself in the United States and for that reason Jedynak would check into the possibility of utilizing him in a third country operation and handled by Colonel Mieczyslaw Roman, Military Attache, Polish Legation, Ottawa, Canada.

Informant stated that it was his impression that Jedynak had claimed in the Fall of 1950 that "Chlopak" had become an American citizen sometime between 1948 and 1952. Informant further advised that Jedynak stated that O-II plans to activate "Chlopak" had not changed and furnished the following additional information concerning him:

The Polish Military Internal Service (WSW) checked the airlines the very day "Chlopak" left Warsaw by Polish airlines Lot immediately upon learning of Komar's arrest in late 1952. "Chlopak" had arrived in Warsaw perhaps one week before Komar's arrest (exact date not recalled) and, in any event, shortly before. "Chlopak" presumably opened a travel agency shortly upon arrival in the United States perhaps in 1948 or 1949.

Informant also noted that, according to Jedynak, "Chlopak" was a Major during the Spanish Civil War and fought on the Loyalists' side. During that period, General Komar, as member of the Dabrowski Brigade in Spain, became acquainted with "Chlopak" and they became good friends. Both Komar and "Chlopak" were referred to as "Dabrowszczaki" which is a title reserved for Polish volunteers who served in the Dabrowski Brigade during the Spanish Civil War. Informant noted that it was common practice for Komar to recruit members of the Dabrowski Brigade for Polish intelligence and/or espionage activities.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-18-2020 BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C

FD-323 (3-28-60)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~SECRET~~

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Washington 25, D. C.
January 24, 1961

Title UNKNOWN SUBJECT; also known as "Chlopak" (Illegal Resident Polish Military Intelligence Agent)

Character INTERNAL SECURITY - PO

Reference Memorandum dated and captioned as above at Washington, D. C.

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-18-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

17 JAN 1961

b6
b7C

b1 Per
b3 CIA
b7E

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: [redacted]

[redacted] has already been reported orally to the Bureau, reported in early January 1961 as follows on Subjects, who are allegedly UB Department I (Foreign Intelligence) agents in the United States.

b6
b7C
b7E

a. [redacted] Polish citizen, is an atomic scientist or student currently studying in the San Francisco area under a professor who has a hunchbacked daughter. [redacted] has an "unclear" romantic involvement with this hunchbacked girl. [redacted] arrived in the U.S. about a year ago (circa January 1960) and is supposed to stay four years. He was recruited by a UB Department I, Section 6 (Scientific/Technical Section) staffer named BYSZTYGIER (phonetic) two years ago (1958-59) in Warsaw. [redacted] UB cryptonym is [redacted] His target is the atomic energy field and he is at present only supposed to acclimatize himself until circa mid-1961. His only current contact to the UB is via open code accommodation address in Warsaw. So far he has reported only on his personal situation and on the development of an unidentified woman who allegedly works in the library of the Department of State in Washington.

[redacted]

b. [redacted] Polish citizen, engineer, is currently working in the "Cincinnati Company," city of location uncertain. This company makes machine tools. He arrived in the U.S. about three or four months ago and is supposed to stay two years. He is a recruited agent of Department I, Section 6. His UB cryptonym is "ASSISTANT." He is run by [redacted] (sic), Section 6 staffer under Polish Trade Mission cover in Washington. His target is technical documentation. He has not produced anything yet. He has had one operational meeting in the Polish Trade Mission in Washington.

[redacted]

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

AIRTEL TO CE [redacted]
FO [redacted]

1-24-61 WEO:fr

57 FEB 9 1961

65-65192-94

FEB 2 1961

FEB 3 1961

9 FEB 1 1961

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-18-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

b6
b7C

1/31/61

AIRTEL

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted]

b3
b7E

FROM: SAC, [redacted]

[redacted] [redacted]

(OO:CV)

b1 Per
b3 CIA

Enclosed herewith are six copies for the Bureau, two copies for Cleveland, and one copy each for Chicago and New York of a letterhead memo dated and captioned as above. A similar number of copies of a letterhead memo evaluating confidential source used in above mentioned memo is also enclosed. The confidential source is [redacted] who furnished the information to SAs JOSEPH E. MICHALSKI and CHESTER J. GUSTOWSKI on 1/26/61.

b7D

Copies of instant airtel are being furnished New York and Chicago for information in view of Bureau's instructions regarding handling of material attributed to [redacted]

b7D

If not previously done and deemed to be advisable, Cleveland is requested to furnish pertinent information to Chicago and New York in this matter.

b6
b7C
b7E

In commenting as to the reliability of the information contained in enclosed, informant stated that it was obtained during the course of a social visit at Lieutenant Colonel [redacted] home in Warsaw. At that time [redacted] produced a letter, purported to be from his brother in

(4) - Bureau (Enc - 6)
1 - (65-65192)
1 - Chicago (Enc - 1) (Info) (RM)
2 - [redacted] (Enc - 2) (RM)
1 - New York (Enc - 1) (Info) (RM)
2 - SFO
1 - [redacted]
JEM:bjn
(10)

65-65192-
NOT RECORDED
78 FEB 10 1961

b3
b7D
b7E

AIRTEL

ENCLOSURE

51 FEB 16 1961

ORIGINAL FILED IN

SECRET

[redacted] b3 b7E

Cleveland, and commented on its contents. Informant also pointed out that he and [redacted] have been close friends and associates for about ten years and that they had similar positions of responsibility during that time within the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs. b6 b7C b7E

Above information should be handled with utmost caution and maintained on a need-to-know basis in view of informant's present status.

The letterhead memo is classified "~~Secret~~" to protect the identity of a defector who has not been surfaced and who is currently furnishing information of value.

Evaluation memo is classified "~~Confidential~~" in view of Bureau's investigative interest in subject, a Polish alien, whose brother may possibly be a UB Official in Poland.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-18-2020 BY [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
January 31, 1961

[redacted]

b3
b7E

On January 26, 1961, a confidential source advised that Lieutenant Colonel [redacted] Section 2, Department I (Foreign Intelligence) Polish Security Service (UB), of the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs (MSW), mentioned in 1954 that he had a brother in Cleveland, Ohio, who recently married a Polish girl whose maiden name was Piskorska. Source furnished additional information in this matter which he attributed to [redacted] as follows:

b6
b7C
b7E

This brother, who also used the surname of [redacted] emigrated to Cleveland, Ohio, from Canada, not too long ago. Shortly after his arrival, he notified Lieutenant Colonel [redacted] of this marriage through correspondence.

b3
b7E

Lieutenant Colonel [redacted] was surprised to hear from his brother as they had not corresponded with each other for a number of years. He also was a little disturbed as he felt that he had not been getting foreign assignments in the past because the Polish Government was aware that he had a brother living in the West. A renewal of correspondence with his brother would serve to lessen even further his chances of obtaining an assignment abroad.

Source furnished the following data concerning Lieutenant Colonel [redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted] was attached to Department III (Internal Security) of the MSW about 1950, and was subsequently transferred to Department I. On one of his very rare trips outside of Poland, [redacted] went to Vienna, Austria, in October, 1960, to recruit an Israeli citizen for the UB. He has a wife and one child and resides on Aleja Niepodleglosc, Warsaw, Poland. [redacted] also has another brother who lives in Katowice, Poland.

Source reiterated that as of December, 1960, he had been unable to learn anything further concerning [redacted] brother, who reportedly resided in Cleveland, Ohio.

b6
b7C

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-18-2020 BY [redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL

FD-329 (3-28-60)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

b6
b7C

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Washington 25, D.C.
January 31, 1961

Title [redacted]

b3
b7E

Character [redacted]

Reference Memorandum dated and captioned as above in Washington, D.C.

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

65-65192-
ENCLOSURE

CONFIDENTIAL

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-19-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

AIRTEL 1/30/61

b3
b7E

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted]

FROM: SAC, WFO [redacted]

[redacted]

(OO:CI)

ReBuairtel 1/16/61, dual captioned [redacted] and as above.

Enclosed herewith are six copies for the Bureau and two copies each for the Chicago, Cincinnati, and New York Offices, of a letterhead memo dated and captioned as above. A similar number of copies of a letterhead memo evaluating confidential source used in above mentioned memo is also enclosed.

The confidential source mentioned is [redacted] who furnished the info to SAs JOSEPH E. MICHALSKI and CHESTER J. GUSTOWSKI on 1/25/61.

b7D

Copies are being furnished for the information and assistance of the Chicago and New York Offices who have received copies of reBuairtel and in view of likelihood of investigation by those offices in this matter.

WFO will remain alert through established sources for any appearance by [redacted] in WDC, bearing in mind the possibility of a future operational contact under cover of the Polish Embassy between [redacted]

b7E

4-Bureau (Enc-6)
(1-65-65192)
2-Chicago (Enc-2)(Info)(RM)
2-[redacted] (Enc-2)(RM)
2-New York (Enc-2)(INfo)(RM)
8-WFO
(1-[redacted]
(1-[redacted]

b3
b7D
b7E

ENCLOSURE

JEM:res
(13)

65-65192-

FEB 21 1961

AIRTEL

b3
b7E

[redacted]

For purposes of clarification, informant obtained info concerning [redacted] while informant was Chief of Section VI and prior to his defection. Thumbnail sketches of agents and co-opted workers such as [redacted] containing such information as recruitment data, cover-name, and area of operation were therefore available to him. In addition informant obtained additional info during discussions with various case officers who handled such persons. This info should be maintained strictly on a need-to-know basis and extreme caution used regarding the above in view of informant's present status.

The letterhead memo is classified ~~"Secret"~~ to protect the identity of a defector who has not been surfaced and who is currently furnishing information of value.

The evaluation memo is classified ~~"Confidential"~~ since unauthorized disclosure of the Bureau's interest in a participant in an official exchange could be detrimental to the defense interests of the Nation.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-19-2020 BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C

SECRET

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Washington 25, D.C.
January 30, 1961

[redacted]

b3
b7E

On January 25, 1961, a confidential source advised that [redacted] was turned over to Section VI, (Scientific/Technical Branch), Department I, (Foreign Intelligence) of the Polish Security Services (UB), Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs, Warsaw, Poland, for operational purposes as a co-opted worker about February, 1958. Source stated that Emil Dorosz, a Polish Intelligence agent whose cover name is "Dobosz," of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, had recruited [redacted] Source pointed out that co-opted workers were usually persons of a relatively high caliber and intelligence who, because of their training or background, possessed the potential to assist Polish Intelligence abroad and had agreed to do so. He further noted that [redacted] utilization by Section VI as a co-opted worker was due to [redacted] background as a Scientist-Physicist attached to the Institute of Atomic Energy in Warsaw, Poland, and was occasioned by a forthcoming stay abroad on his part.

b7E

Source furnished the following information concerning [redacted] association with Section VI:

b7E

[redacted] was aware of the code name [redacted] which was assigned to him. Mr. Bysztyga, with whom [redacted] had gone to school many years previously, became [redacted] case officer and was charged with the responsibility of indoctrinating him and directing his activities on behalf of the UB.

65-65192 -

ENCLOSURE

SECRET

[redacted] b3 b7E

Prior to [redacted] departure for France sometime in 1959, where he was associated with an atomic energy research center for seven months, [redacted] had been trained to recognize and how to extract intelligence information. It was also impressed upon [redacted] that he was to concentrate upon meeting people, especially in the scientific field, and to be alert for any potential recruits by Polish Intelligence. b7E

Upon [redacted] return to Poland, he was further indoctrinated by Mr. Bysztyga in view of a contemplated stay in the United States in the near future. Since [redacted] already had some experience, this indoctrination concentrated mainly on such matters as precautionary measures to be taken relative to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and how to conduct himself if he should be followed. b7E

Prior to his departure for the United States sometime in 1960, Bysztyga arranged a meeting in Warsaw, Poland, between [redacted] a Section VI officer who would act as [redacted] principal in the United States and who would himself be coming to the United States as an employee of the Polish Trade Mission, Washington, D.C., shortly. At this meeting plans were made for a meeting between [redacted] and [redacted] in the United States, under the cover of the Polish Embassy, Washington, D.C. b7E

In late 1960, a telegram was received by Bysztyga from the UB residentura at the Polish Embassy, signed under the code name [redacted] assigned to this residentura, that contact had been established in accordance with plans. In November, 1960, Bysztyga received a second telegram signed [redacted] which indicated that [redacted] had met in person in Washington, D.C., and that everything was going well. b7E

Since [redacted] is currently undergoing a period of acclimatization in the United States he has furnished no information as yet to his principal. His general assignment in the United States is in connection with technical documentation and with developing contacts, bearing in mind recruitment possibilities by Polish Intelligence. [redacted] has received much training in photography and is well versed in various photographic techniques.

[redacted]

b3
b7E

Source also stated that he was acquainted with [redacted] by reputation only and that he could furnish no additional information about him or about any operational plans or changes that may have occurred subsequent to December, 1960, concerning his activities as a co-opted worker.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-19-2020 BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CONFIDENTIAL

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Washington 25, D.C.
January 30, 1961

Title [redacted]

b3
b7E

Character [redacted]

Reference Letterhead memo dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

65-65192-

ENCLOSURE

CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-19-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

1/25/61

AIRTEL

TO: DIRECTOR, [redacted]

FROM: SAC, WFO (105-New)

b3
b7E

SUBJECT: [redacted]

(CO:WFO)

b1 Per
b3 CIA

Enclosed herewith are six copies for the Bureau and one copy each for Chicago and New York of a letterhead memo dated and captioned as above. A similar number of copies of a letterhead memo evaluating the confidential source used in above mentioned letterhead memo is also enclosed. The confidential source mentioned is [redacted] who furnished the information to SAs JOSEPH E. MICHALSKI and CHESTER J. GUSTOWSKI on 1/19/61.

b7D

Copies are being furnished for the information of the Chicago and New York Offices in view of the possibility of future investigation by those Offices in this matter. The letterhead memo is classified ~~"Secret"~~ to protect the identity of a defector who has not been surfaced and who is currently furnishing information of value and because it describes alleged recruitment plans of an American official of the U. S. Government by Soviet Intelligence. The evaluation memo is classified ~~"Secret"~~ for the reasons mentioned above.

(4) - Bureau (Enc. 6)
(1) - 65-65192)
1 - Chicago (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
1 - New York (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
2 - WFO
(1 - [redacted]

b3
b7D
b7E

JEM:bjt
(8)

AIRTEL

1802 ENCLOSURE

62 FEB 10 1961

65-65192-
NOT RECORDED
78 FEB 1 1961

ORIGINAL FILED

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-19-2020 BY: [redacted] b6 b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

January 25, 1961

[redacted] b3 b7E

On January 19, 1961, a confidential source advised that he had learned over a period of time in 1959, that the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs (KGB) had conceived a grandiose plan to compromise Mr. [redacted] the United States Embassy in Warsaw, Poland, at that time, for purposes of recruitment by Soviet Intelligence. Source attributed this information to Lieutenant Colonel [redacted] Chief of Section Eight, Department Two, of the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs (MSW), Warsaw, Poland, which is concerned with counter intelligence work directed against foreign diplomatic missions in Poland. According to the source, [redacted] also furnished the following information concerning this plan: b6 b7C b7D

The KGB regarded [redacted] who was well-known in Prague, Czechoslovakia, and in Moscow, Russia, as an especially important target and indicated that no effort or expense should be spared in their desire to recruit him. The over-all plan was to confront [redacted] and blackmail him after all the groundwork for compromise had been laid, presumably after [redacted] contemplated transfer from Warsaw. The KGB felt that friendly relations between the United States and Poland would not provide the proper atmosphere, so far as the Soviets were concerned, for such an approach. In addition, the KGB regarded the psychological factor as extremely important in this situation. If [redacted] was transferred to the West, such as to London, England, as KGB hoped he would be, and submitted to this form of blackmail and agreed to cooperate, the KGB would then know that they have a good agent whom they could trust and rely upon. b7D

The initial phase of this plan was put into operation when it was learned that [redacted] was amenable to extra-marital activities. As Mrs. [redacted] was aware of the possibility b7D

65-65192-

ENCLOSURE

of surveillance in Warsaw by the Poles, the KGB waited until she took a trip to Moscow where she spent the night with an unidentified male (nationality unknown) in a hotel room and photographed their activities.

The second phase of this operation was initiated with the assistance of Mr. [redacted] who handled press matters at the United States Embassy in Warsaw at that time. [redacted] gathered numerous specimens of [redacted] handwriting which he turned over to the KGB. Soviet graphologists practiced at length to perfect Kiesoe's handwriting from these examples. b7D

During the same period, source learned from one Mr. Kolnik, first name unknown, who was in charge of audio-surveillances being conducted in Kiesoe's office at the United States Embassy in Warsaw, that Polish Intelligence had obtained considerable information from this technique. Entire conversations and reports that [redacted] had dictated, such as the report on Vice President Nixon's recent trip to Poland, were recorded. Source noted that he had reviewed some of these reports furnished by Kolnik, but that Kolnik himself was not aware of the operation directed against [redacted] by the KGB. b7D

The KGB was extremely interested in obtaining all of the above information which was furnished them through their liaison with Polish Intelligence. The KGB planned to have [redacted] reports, which had been obtained through audio-surveillance, written out in longhand by Soviet graphologists and make it appear as if [redacted] himself had prepared them, presumably for Soviet Intelligence. b7D

The third phase of this operation was to deposit a huge sum of money in Switzerland in [redacted] name. Source noted that money was of no significance to the KGB in an operation of this nature.

Upon completion of all phases of this operation, the KGB would confront Kiesoe with the information they had accumulated and, under the threat of blackmail if he should refuse, would attempt to recruit him.

Source emphasized that [redacted] character, reputation and loyalty to the United States were respected and highly regarded by both the Soviets and the poles and that [redacted] was considered to be an extremely capable diplomat who was doing a good job in the service of the United States Government. b7D

Source further noted that as of December, 1960, he had received no information indicating that this approach of [redacted] had been made by the KGB.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-19-2020 BY: [redacted]

FD-323 (5-28-60)

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

SECRET

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Washington 25, D. C.
January 25, 1961

b3
b7E

Title: [redacted]

Character: [redacted]

Reference: By memorandum dated and captioned as above at Washington, D. C.

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

SECRET

65-65192-

ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-19-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

1/30/61

AIRTEL

TO: DIRECTOR, [redacted]

b3
b7E

FROM: SAC, [redacted]

b1 Per
b3 CIA

[redacted]

(OO:CG) [redacted]

Enclosed herewith are six copies for the Bureau and two copies each for the Chicago and New York Divisions of a letterhead memo dated and captioned as above. A similar number of copies of a letterhead memo evaluating the confidential source used in above-mentioned memo is also enclosed. The confidential source mentioned is [redacted] who furnished the information to SAs JOSEPH E. MICHALSKI and CHESTER J. GUSTOWSKI on 1/26/61. Copies are being furnished for the information of New York in view of that division's interest in JAN SLUSARZ, mentioned therein, and also for control purposes.

b7D

[redacted]

b7D

ORIGINAL FILED

4 - Bureau (Encls. 6)
(1-65-65192)
2 - [redacted] (Encls. 2) (RM)
2 - New York (Encls. 2) (RM)
2 - WFO
(1- [redacted])

b3
b7D
b7E

JEM:mdc
(10)

AIRTEL

65-65192-
NOT RECORDED
201 FEB 3 1961

2 ENCLOSURE

180

59 FEB 9 1961

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

b7D

Extreme caution should be used regarding above information and it should be maintained on a need-to-know basis in view of informant's present status.

It is noted that investigation has disclosed that SKOCZEK arrived in the U. S. from Vienna, Austria, on 4/20/59, and that Colonel MONAT departed from Poland in June, 1959. As mentioned in enclosed, informant felt that the reason SLUSARZ did not meet SKOCZEK in Vienna in the spring of 1959, was due to the turmoil in the UB caused by MONAT's defection. Informant stated that he was not absolutely sure of the date that SLUSARZ met SKOCZEK but that he was positive that it was later than originally planned and that he felt this delay was caused by MONAT's defection.

The letterhead memo is classified "Secret" to protect the identity of a defector who has not been surfaced and who is currently furnishing information of value, and because it describes alleged operational plans by the UB regarding an agent residing in the U. S. The evaluation memo is classified "Secret" for the reasons mentioned above.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-19-2020 BY: [redacted] b6 b7C

FD-323 (3-28-60)

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Washington, D. C.
January 30, 1961

Title [redacted] b3 b7E

Character

Reference Memorandum dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

~~SECRET~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE

65-65192 -

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-19-2020 BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

January 30, 1961

[redacted]

b3
b7E

On January 26, 1961, a confidential source advised that he learned in the Spring of 1959, that Major (Jan) Slusarz, who is currently attached to the Polish Embassy in Mexico, planned to meet an agent of Department I (Foreign Intelligence), Polish Security Service (UB), named Aleksandr Skoczek in Vienna, Austria, for purposes of indoctrination prior to this agent's imminent departure for the United States. Source provided the following particulars concerning Skoczek and UB plans to utilize him in the United States.

Skoczek resided at Kollerstrasse 6/7, Vienna III, Austria, in early 1959, and had been a trusted, proven agent of Department I of the UB since 1953. Skoczek's principal in the UB was Major Slusarz, who was enthusiastic about Skoczek's potential as an illegal agent in the United States. The reason that Slusarz planned to meet Skoczek in Vienna in the Spring of 1959, was to indoctrinate him further prior to his departure. This trip did not materialize until later in 1959, possibly because of the turmoil caused in Polish Intelligence circles by the defection, presumably to the United States, of a Polish Military Intelligence official in the meantime, named Colonel Pawel Monat.

Skoczek has been trained in the usual techniques used by illegal agents with regard to microdots, microphotography, use of coded messages, secret writing by means of some silver metal encased in cuff links or tiepin, and the use of Calcium Jodatum Tablets in developing messages.

ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

65-65192-

Re: [redacted]

b3
b7E

Skocsek's UB assignment in the United States was to gather information about the various Polonia (Polish-American) societies and Polish emigres, and to concentrate on matters pertaining to the political field as well. In this connection he was to develop important contacts and to be alert for any potential recruits by the UB. He had an important contact who was a leader in Polonia circles in Chicago, Illinois, and who is a naturalized United States citizen (identity unknown). It was through this person's efforts that Skocsek was able to emigrate to the United States.

As of late 1958, Skocsek was in a period of acclimatization in the United States and had furnished no information to his UB superior, Major Slusarz. Contact with Skocsek was maintained exclusively through Slusarz, who contemplated a meeting with him outside of the United States and after completion of this acclimatization period, which usually took about one and one-half years. The residentura attached to the Polish Embassy, Washington, D. C., had not been informed of Skocsek's identity or UB connections.

Source further noted that Lieutenant Colonel [redacted] an official in Department II of the UB, also considered Skocsek to be an excellent agent with good Polonia contacts in the United States. According to source, [redacted] advised in the Spring of 1960, that Skocsek was being transferred to Department I of the UB for operational purposes.

b6
b7C
b7E

Source stated that as of December, 1960, he had been unable to learn anything further concerning Skocsek or his association with the UB.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-19-2020 BY [redacted] ADC b6 b7C

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

RECEIVED FROM
JAN 27 1961
CIA SD

27 JAN 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: [redacted] b1 Per b3 CIA

1. Forwarded for your information are the results of Subject debriefing.

2. [redacted] b1 Per b3 CIA

[redacted]

3. Queried about this matter in Frankfurt shortly after his defection, [redacted] changed his statement somewhat. He opined that [redacted] should be induced to defect outright because he would not have the guts to serve in place. [redacted] added some words along the lines of [redacted] do not grow on trees, you know." b1 Per b3 CIA

4. At the instant debriefing [redacted] more or less reverted to his original position presented in the letter, i.e., that an attempt to recruit [redacted] in place was worthwhile. He elaborated on [redacted] personality in the following manner:

5. Col. [redacted] Chief, Section 2, Department I, remarked to [redacted] that he considered the personnel policy of Department I rather strange. This sentence served as introduction to [redacted] complaint that [redacted] should never have been assigned to the U.S. and it was clear from [redacted] remarks this decision had been taken by DYBALA (true name DYBALOW) and SIENKIEWICZ. [redacted] stated that [redacted] was venal and all he wanted was make money at minimum risk. This had already been b3 b7E b1 Per b3 CIA b6 b7C b7E

65-65192-1
6 FEB 1 1961

1 XEROX
FEB 2 1961

63 FEB 8 1961

~~SECRET~~

apparent during [redacted] tour in Switzerland when [redacted] engaged in smuggling of watches and became guilty of irregularities with his operational funds; specifically [redacted] had accounted for bigger agent payments than he actually made. [redacted] terminated his remarks by pointing out that "surely in the U.S. there are plenty of people willing to pay [redacted] more than the UB."

6. When asked whether [redacted] venality was generally known [redacted] said that he did not think so but that [redacted] is certain that [redacted] Department I, know about it. [redacted] also told [redacted] that he had presented his misgivings regarding [redacted] unsuitability for the Chicago assignment to DYBALA and SIENKIEWICZ before [redacted] departure but his opinion was disregarded. [redacted] believes that the reason is that [redacted] is a protege of DYBALA or SIENKIEWICZ or both. [redacted] speculates that somehow, through presents or otherwise, DYBALA/SIENKIEWICZ benefited from the proceeds of [redacted] smuggling activities and operational accounting irregularities in Switzerland.

7. [redacted] suggests that we prepare a controlled agent as bait for [redacted] and then at the right moment inform [redacted] that he had been had and persuade him "in a nice way" to cooperate with us.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

S. V. Boster
by James Angleton

[redacted] (S)

~~SECRET~~

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-19-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

FBI

Date: 1/27/61

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, [redacted]

FROM: SAC, [redacted]

UNSUB; aka "Chlopak"
(Illegal Resident Polish
Military Intelligence Agent)
IS - PO
(OO:NY)

[redacted]

ReWFOairtel 1/24/61, captioned as above.

Enclosed herewith are six copies for the Bureau and two copies each for New York and Chicago of a letterhead memo, dated and captioned as above. A similar number of copies of a letterhead memo evaluating the confidential source used in above mentioned memo are also enclosed.

The confidential source mentioned is [redacted] who furnished the info to SAs JOSEPH E. MICHALSKI and CHESTER J. GUSTOWSKI on 1/25/61.

Two copies each are being furnished the office of origin, New York, and for the information and assistance of Chicago which is conducting investigation in this matter.

The letterhead memo is classified ~~"Secret"~~ to protect the identity of a defector who has not been surfaced and who is currently furnishing information of value and because it contains info concerning an illegal agent obtained from this sensitive source. 65-65192-

The evaluation memo is also classified ~~"Secret"~~ for the reason mentioned above.

NOT RECORDED
136 FEB 1 1961

(4) - Bureau (Enc.6)
(1 - 65-65192)
2 - Chicago (Enc.2)(Info)(RM)
2 - [redacted] (Info)(RM)(Enc.2)
2 - WFO
(1 - [redacted]

ENCLOSURE

JEM:ddt
(10)

AIRTEL

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

63 FEB 8 1961

~~SECRET~~

b6
b7C
b3
b7E
b1 Per
b3 CIA
b3
b7E
b7D
b3
b7D
b7E

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-19-2020 BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

~~SECRET~~

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
January 27, 1961

UNKNOWN SUBJECT
Also Known As "Chlopek"
(Illegal Resident Polish
Military Intelligence Agent)
INTERNAL SECURITY - PO

On January 25, 1961, a confidential source advised that he had learned from Colonel Tadeusz Jedynak, Deputy Director of G-II (Polish Military Intelligence) sometime in the Fall of 1959, that "Chlopek" still operated a travel agency in New York City. Source noted that he obtained information following Jedynak's trip to the United States, but that Jedynak apparently did not establish contact with "Chlopek" at that time.

Source further advised that it was Jedynak's custom to refer to all persons of Polish extraction who served in the International Brigade in Spain during the Spanish Civil War as "Dabrowszczaki," whether or not they had served in the Dabrowski Brigade in Spain. It is noted that source referred to "Dabrowszczaki" as Polish volunteers who served in the Dabrowski Brigade on the Loyalist side during the Spanish Civil War.

Source also stated that he believed that "Chlopek" received the $25,000 from G-II to open a travel agency in cash but that he was not sure. He further stated that the Colonel Zagorski, who probably was aware of "Chlopek's" identity, was a former G-II official who had emigrated to France with his family (time not recalled). Source could furnish no information concerning Zagorski's present whereabouts.

~~SECRET~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

65-65192-

ENCLOSURE

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-19-2020 BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C

FD-323 (3-28-60)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

[redacted]

Washington 25, D. C.
January 27, 1961

SECRET

Title : UNKNOWN SUBJECT; also known as "Chlopak" (Illegal Resident Polish Military Intelligence Agent)

Character: INTERNAL SECURITY - PO

Reference: Memo dated and captioned as above

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

SECRET

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

65-45199-

ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-19-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

b6
b7C

1/23/61

AIRTEL

TO: DIRECTOR, [redacted]

b3
b7E

FROM: SAC, [redacted]

b1 Per
b3 CIA

[redacted]

(00:WFO)

Enclosed herewith are six copies for the Bureau and one copy each for the Chicago and Detroit Offices of a letterhead memo dated and captioned as above. Also enclosed are a similar number of copies of a letterhead memo evaluating the confidential source used in above-mentioned memo.

The confidential source mentioned is [redacted] b7D
who was interviewed in the Polish language by SAs JOSEPH E. MICHALSKI and CHESTER J. GUSTOWSKI on 1/18,19/61.

Copies are being furnished for the information of Chicago and Detroit in view of Chairtel 1/27/61, to the Director captioned as above, copy for Detroit, indicating possibility of investigation in this matter by these offices. b3 b7E [redacted]

The letterhead memo is classified "Secret" to protect the identity of a defector who has not been surfaced and who is currently furnishing information of value and because it contains allegations that the subject, an American citizen, had been recruited by Soviet Intelligence.

The evaluation memo is also classified "Secret" for reasons mentioned above.

4 - Bureau (Enc. 6)
(1 - 65-65192)
1 - Chicago (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
1 - Detroit (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
2 - WFO
(1- [redacted] b7D
(5)

65-65192-
NOT RECORDED
78 FEB 2 1961

180
51 FEB 9 1961

9 ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

ORIGINAL FILED IN

b3
b7E

[redacted]

In order to clarify circumstances in which informant had access to and received oral information which he used to substantiate his allegation concerning [redacted] as set forth in enclosed, brief descriptive data concerning the positions informant held in Polish Intelligence during pertinent periods mentioned in enclosed is submitted herewith. b7D

Informant was [redacted] from the middle of 1947 until the beginning of 1950. During that period he became acquainted with SKIBINSKI who became indebted to the informant as the latter had intervened when consideration was being given to dismiss SKIBINSKI. As noted in enclosed, the majority of the information concerning [redacted] was attributed to SKIBINSKI while the latter was in liaison with MGB (Soviet Ministry of State Security) in Warsaw. Informant was transferred to Gdansk (Danzig), Poland the beginning of 1950 and, other than hearing that [redacted] went to Turkey, lost interest in this [redacted] case and learned nothing further concerning this matter while in Gdansk. b7D

In 1953, informant [redacted] the UB and was sent to Poznan, Poland [redacted] b7D

On 12/2/55, informant [redacted] informant renewed his acquaintanceship with Lieutenant Colonel SKIBINSKI who was head of a section within the UB primarily responsible for investigations directed against certain foreign diplomatic establishments in Warsaw. In this position SKIBINSKI was, of a necessity, in liaison with the KGB in Warsaw. The informant and SKIBINSKI were very close friends and remained such until informant defected from Poland. b7D

Informant has emphasized that he has no prima-facie evidence to support his allegation against [redacted] as he has never seen any reports or other material emanating from b7D

[redacted] b3 b7E

[redacted] and submitted by him to the KGB. He consistently maintains, however, that in his opinion, all indications point to such recruitment and that such a conclusion on his part was derived from his long experience in intelligence activities as well as from information he received from sources mentioned herein, which he considers to be irrefutable. b7D

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-19-2020 BY [redacted]

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

SECRET

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
January 23, 1961

[redacted]

b3
b7E

On January 18 and 19, 1961, a confidential informant stated that [redacted] who had been attached to the United States Embassy in Warsaw, Poland, had been recruited by the Soviet Ministry of Internal Security (KGB) presumably while employed as United States Consul at Poznan, Poland, sometime prior to 1950. Informant based his allegation on the following: b7D

While [redacted] was at Poznan, Poland, the KGB Adviser there at that time was one Major Majorow, who indicated that [redacted] was a matter of interest to the KGB. Majorow noted that Colonel Fiszman, the Soviet Deputy Chief Adviser to Department II of the Polish Security Service (UB) in Warsaw, Poland, was also interested in [redacted] and had learned that his true name was [redacted] and that he had relatives somewhere in that part of Poland which had been taken over by the Russians following World War II. b7D

During this same period the UB was also interested in recruiting [redacted] and had assigned four of their agents to establish contact with him in the hope that he might try to recruit them. The reason for UB's interest in [redacted] was that there had been some indications that he was engaged in intelligence activities, presumably for the United States. These agents were as follows: b7D

Miss Polakowska, a buxom female of Russian descent who was actually placed in social contact with [redacted] but nothing further materialized out of their relationship. b7D

Count Turno (UB code name - "Marek") who owned the Hotel Continental in Poznan where [redacted] resided. Turno was subsequently arrested on charges of espionage for the United States, but has been released.

Mr. Podwatrasiewicz (UB code name - "Poldek") who had once lived in the United States and also in Gniezno, Poland. This agent was very active in his efforts to recruit [redacted] He b7D

65-65192-

SECRET

ENCLOSURE

[redacted] b3 b7E

was subsequently jailed for former Gestapo activities for the Germans, but has since been released and is again working for the UB.

Mr. Czartoryski, described as being of illegitimate birth and a homosexual who used to meet [redacted] at the Hotel Continental. b7D

The UB plan was to have [redacted] attempt to recruit one or more of these agents, but [redacted] did not display much interest in any of them other than Turno. It was noted that [redacted] likes to associate with people who are considered to be "important."

In June, 1955, the UB headquarters in Warsaw advised the UB in Poznan that a physical surveillance team, headed by Major Bubel, was coming to Poznan for the express purpose of conducting a surveillance on [redacted] during the time of the Poznan Fair. This surveillance team did not follow [redacted] from Warsaw as he was driving the United States Ambassador to Poland to Poznan. However, they managed to follow [redacted] shortly after his arrival in Poznan for a period of three to five days and photographed a suspicious transaction by [redacted] in an antique shop and also noted other suspicious activities in a book store. Major Bubel interpreted [redacted] activities as definitely worthy of investigation and it was felt that [redacted] was probably renewing old contacts from the time when he had been assigned to Poznan. b7D

When [redacted] happened to recognize one of the surveillance men from Warsaw, he appeared to be shocked that he had been followed. He cursed this individual, spat at him, and then threatened to strike him. [redacted] left Poznan shortly thereafter. b7D

When Colonel Alexandrow, the KGB Adviser in Poznan at that time, was informed of [redacted] suspicious activities, he merely shrugged them off. This action was in complete variance with normal Russian reactions displayed in the past concerning any matter that might be even remotely interpreted to be a possible intelligence contact. b7D

In view of Alexandrow's disinclination to conduct an investigation, Colonel Knyrkow, the Chief KGB Adviser to the UB in Warsaw, was advised of [redacted] activities in Poznan,

[redacted] b3 b7E

but also appeared to be disinterested in the matter. Shortly thereafter, the Polish case file on [redacted] was picked up by Alexandrow under some pretext in Poznan. It was later determined through Major Bubel that [redacted] case file in Warsaw had also been picked up about the same time by Colonel Knyrkow. In September, 1955, inquiry was made of Knyrkow concerning this action. Knyrkow reiterated that [redacted] actions in Poznan did not warrant investigation and further emphasized that [redacted] was not "one of your agents." b7D

During the early part of 1957, Lieutenant Colonel Skibinski, Chief of Section Eight, Department II of the UB, which is concerned with operations against western diplomatic installations and personnel in Warsaw, expressed the wish that the Americans would transfer [redacted] from Warsaw as he was a KGB agent. Skibinski's position necessitated liaison with the KGB in Warsaw and much of the information he had concerning [redacted] was as a result of this contact with KGB. b7D

Skibinski stated that [redacted] had been recruited by the KGB while attached to Poznan as United States Consul and that such recruitment definitely occurred prior to [redacted] transfer to Turkey. Skibinski further advised that the [redacted] case was considered to be a very secret matter and that he was being directed by the KGB in Prague, Czechoslovakia, rather than the KGB in Warsaw. b7D

[redacted] contact with the KGB in Prague was described as a Polish correspondent. Skibinski affirmed that he obtained this particular piece of information from Colonel Ryszard Matejewski, Chief of Department II (Counterespionage) of the UB.

Sometime later Skibinski advised that [redacted] b7D whose KGB code name of [redacted] was probably unknown to him, had also obtained much information of a confidential nature from the United States Embassy in Warsaw which he passed on to the KGB. The source of this information was attributed to Skibinski's KGB contact named Kaliguzov or Goliguzov.

Examples of the type of information that [redacted] b7D furnished the KGB were the results of a conference of military attaches in Germany; reports on the Chinese-American

[redacted] b3 b7E

talks in Warsaw; meeting of various western diplomats with United States Ambassador Beam in which the "Little Marshall Plan" for Poland was discussed; United States Embassy Secretary Johnson's meetings with a Polish Parliamentary Deputy named Lagota; information that an agent in Poland of a German intelligence organization whose initials were "D.B." had contacted the United States Embassy requesting assistance in re-establishing contact with his organization; and information concerning various employees of the United States Embassy in Warsaw.

In addition, [redacted] obtained numerous handwriting b7D specimens of the Counselor of the United States Embassy in Warsaw, Mr. [redacted] which he passed on to the KGB. KGB graphologists were to practice extensively in duplicating [redacted] handwriting in connection with a grandiose plan to recruit [redacted] by compromising him.

Skibinski stated that the above information had been furnished by [redacted] to the KGB who, in turn, turned it over b7D to the UB inasmuch as it pertained to the United States Embassy in Warsaw.

In conclusion, informant noted that although he had no prima-facie evidence in support of his allegation he felt that there was, in his opinion, every indication that [redacted] was an agent for the KGB.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-19-2020 BY: [redacted]

FD-323 (3-26-60)

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

SECRET

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Washington 25, D. C.

January 23, 1961

b3
b7D
b7E

Title [redacted]

Character [redacted]

Reference **Memorandum dated and captioned as above.**

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

SECRET

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-19-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

1/27/61

AIRTEL

TO: DIRECTOR, [redacted]

b3
b7E

FROM: SAC, [redacted]

[redacted]

(OO:SF)

b1 Per
b3 CIA

ReBuairtel to SF 1/13/61 captioned as above.

Enclosed herewith are six copies for the Bureau, two copies for the NY and SF Offices, and one copy for CG of a letterhead memo dated and captioned as above. A similar number of copies of a letterhead memo evaluating confidential source used in above-mentioned memo is also enclosed.

b7D

The confidential source mentioned is [redacted] who furnished the information to SAs JOSEPH E. MICHALSKI and CHESTER J. GUSTOWSKI on 1/25/61.

Copies are being furnished for the information and assistance of the CG and NY Offices in view of possibility of future investigation by those offices in this matter.

It will be noted that informant had been in charge of Section VI, Department I of the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs, prior to defection. In this position, he was able

(4)- Bureau (Enc. 6)
(1)- 65-65192)
1 - Chicago (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
2 - New York (Enc. 2) (Info) (RM)
2 - San Francisco (Enc. 2) (RM) (AM)
2 - WFO
(1 - [redacted])

JEM:jmp
(11)

65-65192-
NOT RECORDED
185 FEB 16 1961

AIRTEL

2 ENCLOSURE
63 FEB 20 1961

ORIGINAL FILED IN [redacted]

b3
b7D
b7E

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

to review summarized versions concerning co-opted workers in his section such as recruitment dates, identity of case officer, area of operation, etc. Remainder of information source attributes to general office talk and to informal discussions with a case officer, charged with indoctrination and handling of a particular co-opted worker. This information should be on a need-to-know basis and handled with extreme caution in view of informant's present status.

The letterhead memo is classified "Secret" to protect the identity of a defector who has not been surfaced and who is currently furnishing information of value.

The evaluation memo is classified "Confidential" since unauthorized disclosure of the Bureau's interest in a participant in an official exchange could be detrimental to the defense interest of the Nation.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-19-2020 BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~SECRET~~

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

January 27, 1961

[redacted]

b3
b7E

On January 26, 1961, a confidential source advised that [redacted] had been recruited as a co-opted worker by one Mr. Rubin of the Inspectorate Office in Lublin, Poland, of Section VIII, Department I (Foreign Intelligence) of the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs (MSW), in March, 1959. Source noted that Section VIII was charged with the selection and recruitment of Poles for intelligence work abroad. The source explained that co-opted workers were normally selected on the basis of their educational background and position in life and were relatively intelligent individuals who possessed potential to assist in intelligence activities.

Source noted that he learned that the following information had been maintained in [redacted] case file within Department I:

b3
b7E

[redacted] was transferred to Section VI (Scientific/Technical Branch) of Department I, under cover name of [redacted] for operational purposes in view of his scientific background and expected departure for the United States, which took place about January, 1960. Mr. Synatyga, whom [redacted] knew as Mr. Grodzicki, was charged with the responsibility of indoctrinating [redacted] and with supervising his case.

Indoctrination procedure of [redacted] included (1) How to recognize and extract essential information; (2) Precautions to be taken relative to the Federal Bureau of Investigation; (3) How to conduct himself in the event he should be followed; and (4) How to code his correspondence to an accommodation address in Warsaw, Poland.

b3
b7E

~~SECRET~~

65-65192-

ENCLOSURE

[redacted] b3 b7E

Source stated that Bysatyga planned to meet [redacted] in the United States or in Mexico, where [redacted] could possibly go as a tourist, about six or seven months after [redacted] had sufficiently acclimatized himself in the United States. The length of time for such acclimatization was considered to be approximately one and one-half years. Source advised that Bysatyga was to inform [redacted] at that time that his principle in the United States would be Mr. [redacted] of the Polish Trade Mission, Washington, D.C., and that he would be given specific assignment at the same time. b3 b7E

Source pointed out that [redacted] present assignment in the United States was general in nature, which was normal for persons who fitted in [redacted] category and particular circumstances. Source further stated that, in view of [redacted] technical background, his general assignment during the acclimatization period was to concentrate on matters pertaining to the field of atomic energy. b3 b7E

Source recalled that in December, 1960, [redacted] sent a letter to the accommodation address in Warsaw, bearing a return address in San Francisco, California. In this letter, [redacted] stated that everything was well with him and that he had met a woman who worked in the library of the State Department (location not known), who appeared to have some romantic interest in him and whom he might be able to utilize. Source stated that other letters [redacted] had directed to this accommodation address were merely to advise of his personal situation. b3 b7E

It was the source's impression that a professor in a university near San Francisco, California, (name unknown), sponsored [redacted] association with this university. Source believed that [redacted] was recommended to this professor by a mutual friend in Warsaw, Poland, who was also a professor (name unknown). Source stated that he did not believe that [redacted] had met his sponsor prior to his arrival in the United States and that [redacted] apparently went directly to California upon his arrival. Source further noted that Bysatyga felt that the primary reason for this invitation was that a romantic interest might possibly develop between [redacted] and the American professor's daughter, who was hunchbacked. b3 b7E

[redacted]

b3
b7E

Source also stated that [redacted] association with Section VI was unknown to representatives of the Polish Government in the United States as of December, 1960. He further noted that he was not personally acquainted with [redacted] and could furnish no additional information about him or about operational plans that Polish intelligence may currently have concerning [redacted]

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-19-2020 BY [redacted]

FBI 223 (3-28-60)

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CONFIDENTIAL

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Washington 25, D. C.
January 27, 1961

b3
b7E

Title [redacted]

Character [redacted]

Reference Memorandum dated and captioned as above at Washington, D. C.

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

CONFIDENTIAL

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-19-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

b6
b7C

1/26/61

AIRTEL

TO: DIRECTOR, [redacted]

b3
b7E

FROM: SAC, [redacted]

[redacted]

b1 Per
b3 CIA

(00:PG)

b3
b7E

ReBulet to WFO dated 11/17/60, and WFO letter to the Director dated 1/19/61, both captioned as above.

Enclosed herewith are six copies for the Bureau; two copies each for the Albany, New York and Pittsburgh Offices and one copy for the Chicago Office of a letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above. A similar number of copies of a letterhead memorandum evaluating the confidential source used in above memo is also enclosed.

The confidential source mentioned is [redacted] who furnished the information to SAs JOSEPH E. MICHALSKI and CHESTER J. GUSTOWSKI on 1/25/61.

b7D

A copy is being furnished for the information of the Chicago Office in view of the likelihood of future investigation by Chicago in this matter. For the information of Chicago, New York and Albany Offices, subject was born [redacted] at Witowo, Poland; has been accepted for study at the Carnegie Institute of Technology, Pittsburgh, Pa.; and is expected to arrive in the United States in February, 1961.

b6
b7C

4- Bureau (Enc. 4)
(1- 65-65102)
2- Albany (Enc.2) (RM)
1- Chicago (Info)(RM)
2- New York (Enc.2)(RM)
2- Pittsburgh (Enc.2)(RM)
2- WFO
(1- [redacted])

b7D

65-65102
NOT RECORDED
98 FEB 20 1961

JEM:dab
(13)

ENCLOSURE

AIRTEL

50 FEB 27 1961

~~SECRET~~

ORIGINAL FILED IN

[redacted]

b3
b7E

For further info, source, prior to defection, had been in charge of Section VI, Department I, Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs, and in this position had, as a matter of policy, such matters as pertaining to co-opted workers in his section brought to his attention.

LEADS

ALBANY DIVISION

AT ST. ALBAN'S, VERMONT

Will be alert for any information relative to arrival of subject and will immediately advise Bureau and appropriate offices.

NEW YORK DIVISION

AT NEW YORK, NEW YORK

Will be alert for any information pertaining to subject and will immediately advise the Bureau and interested offices of the subject's arrival in the United States.

PITTSBURGH DIVISION

AT PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA

1. Upon arrival of subject, will conduct appropriate investigation in accordance with Bureau instructions to determine subject's activities and contacts while in the Pittsburgh area.

2. Will discreetly place a stop with established sources at Carnegie Institute of Technology concerning expected arrival of subject.

WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE

AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

Will place a stop at Central Office, INS, in connection with subject's arrival in the United States.

The letterhead memorandum is classified "Secret" to protect the identity of a defector who has not been surfaced

b3
b7E

and who is currently furnishing information of value. The evaluation memorandum has been classified "Confidential" as unauthorized disclosure of the Bureau's interest in a participant in an official exchange could be detrimental to the defense interests of the nation.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-19-2020 BY [redacted]

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~"SECRET"~~

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
January 26, 1961

b3
b7E

[redacted]

On January 25, 1961, a confidential source advised that Andrzej Wilk had been recruited for intelligence work by one Mr. Strzelec of the Office of the Inspectorate of Department I (Foreign Intelligence Branch), Ministry of Internal Affairs (MSW), Poznan, Poland. In view of Wilk's technical background, he was subsequently transferred from Section VIII, Department I, which is charged with such recruitments, to Section VI (scientific/technical section), Department I, for control purposes and was assigned the code name of "Andrzej." Wilk's case officer in Section VI was Lieutenant Selwet, a mechanical engineer whom source recalled as having once been stationed in England for the Polish Government.

According to source, Selwet's responsibilities were to indoctrinate Wilk. Source described usual indoctrination procedure in such matters by Polish Intelligence as: (1) gathering of information, primarily in the co-opted worker's particular field; (2) precautions to be taken with regard to the Federal Bureau of Investigation; (3) how to conduct themselves in the event they should be followed; and (4) how to direct correspondence in code to an accommodation address in Poland. Source pointed out that persons of higher caliber and intelligence were generally recruited as co-opted workers.

In view of Wilk's contemplated short stay of six to nine months in the United States, source specified that Wilk's responsibility was merely to gather all possible information and to bring it back with him to Poland. Source further noted that Polish co-opted workers who came to the United States for short stays normally followed this procedure and concentrated on gathering information rather than establishing contacts in the United States. Source continued that they were always to be alert for any likely prospects for recruitment by Polish Intelligence, however, and were to report on such prospects upon their return to Poland. Source also noted that the above assignment was typical for persons in Wilk's category.

1 XEROX
FEB 17 1961

ENCLOSURE

~~"SECRET"~~

ENCLOSURE
65-65192-

RE: [redacted]

b3
b7E

Source stated that he did not know Wilk personally and that he could furnish no additional information concerning him. Source further noted that such plans to utilize Wilk were current as of December, 1960, and that he was unaware of any other particulars concerning such contemplated utilization.

PROPERTY OF THE FBI
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-323 (3-28-60)

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-19-2020 BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~"CONFIDENTIAL"~~

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Washington 25, D.C.
January 26, 1961

Title [redacted]

b3
b7E

Character [redacted]

Reference Memorandum dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

65-65192

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ENCLOSURE

~~"CONFIDENTIAL"~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

[redacted]

b3
b7E

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-19-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Parsons
1 - Belmont

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: 2/1/61

FROM : Mr. W. A. Branigan

1 - Conrad
1 - Branigan
1 - Downing

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Evans

SUBJECT: LIEUTENANT COLONEL MICHAEL GOLENIEWSKI
IS - PO
INTERNAL SECURITY - POLAND

1 - McDonnell
1 - O'Neill

Bureau Agents are currently interviewing the captioned Polish defector, a former UB (Polish Intelligence Service) staff officer, who furnished voluminous intelligence information through CIA under the pseudonym "Dr. Heinrich Schutze" prior to his defection on 1/6/61. This memorandum brings up to date information furnished by Goleniewski concerning [redacted] Polish scientists now in the United States under the [redacted] According to Goleniewski, they were recruited and trained by the UB to collect technical data relating to the atomic energy field and to identify scientists and others who have potential for recruitment by the UB.

b3
b7E

[redacted] is a Polish [redacted] who arrived in the United States on 10/26/60 at New York City under an International Atomic Energy Agency fellowship. He is sponsored in the United States by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), Washington, D. C., and is paid subsistence allowance by NAS of $8 per day. NAS arranged for [redacted] to be placed for study and research at the Robert A. Taft Sanitary Engineering Center, Cincinnati, Ohio, a United States Health Service facility. [redacted] has no access to classified information but he is engaged in research involving effects of radiation and is associated with American scientists prominent in the atomic field.

b7E

65-65192-95

REC-34

[redacted] is being handled by another UB agent, [redacted] an official attached to the Polish Trade Mission in Washington, D. C. According to Goleniewski, [redacted] and his principal in Washington met at the Polish Embassy shortly after [redacted] arrival in the United States, but [redacted] has no specific assignment at this time and is acting under instructions to acclimate to his new surroundings.

b7E

65-65192
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]

EX-108

5-C

b3
b7E

WEO:ct
(10)

51 FEB 10 1961

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Memorandum Branigan to Belmont
Re: LIEUTENANT COLONEL MICHAEL GOLENIEWSKI
65-65192

Cincinnati is conducting intensive investigation to ascertain [redacted] activities and contacts. On 1/31/61 Cincinnati obtained 160 photographs of materials in [redacted] possession through a highly confidential source. The photographs were processed in the laboratory and have been found to contain lists of atomic scientists in the United States and other countries, several pages of five-digit groups of numbers which may be code specimens and numerous pieces of correspondence in Polish and English. The Cryptanalysis Translation Section is analyzing the number groups and the correspondence. b7E

Goleniewski has advised that the UB training of co-opted-workers such as [redacted] has included use of a double-meaning code in correspondence with an accommodation address in Warsaw, Poland. They are also trained in the use of secret inks. He indicated that [redacted] is a proven agent of the UB since he has successfully completed a previous assignment in France as a co-opted worker. b7E

[redacted] the second UB-directed Exchange participant identified by Goleniewski, is studying toward a doctorate in Biochemistry at the University of California Medical School. He has been in the United States since 9/27/59. [redacted] are handled by the same UB staff officer in Warsaw. [redacted] has the same general assignment as [redacted] with regard [redacted] and identification of recruitment targets. Goleniewski has personally seen coded correspondence directed to Warsaw by [redacted] in which the latter claimed to have developed a romantic connection with a woman who Goleniewski recalls to be a Department of State employee. [redacted] has not furnished any information of technical value, according to Goleniewski and is still acclimating to the United States. He is expected by the UB to remain in this country for approximately three years. San Francisco has been instructed by the Bureau to identify all contacts of the subject and photographic mail coverage has been effected. [redacted] is also expected to be contacted by the Polish Trade Mission official, [redacted] and WFO is alert to such a possibility. b7E

These cases are being carefully analyzed and closely followed at the Bureau. Investigation is being directed toward realizing any prosecutive potential which may exist. The absence of immediate access to classified information by either [redacted] mitigates against the prosecutive potential, but their contacts and activities b7E

will be carefully scrutinized to develop any information which may be evidence of a violation of law. The potential for defection of either of these exchangees in place exists. The possibility will be considered but insufficient information is available at thistime to make a recommendation as to this course of action. It is not believed that straight defection would serve as an intelligence gain of sufficient value to consider such an approach at this time.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

SECRET

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-19-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

AIRTEL 2/2/61

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted]

b3
b7E

FROM: SAC, [redacted]

[redacted]

b1 Per
b3 CIA

(OO:MIAMI)

Enclosed herewith are six copies for the Bureau and two copies each for the Miami, New York and Savannah (ONE) Offices, of a letterhead memo dated and captioned as above. A similar number of copies of a letterhead memo evaluating the confidential source used in the above-mentioned memo is also enclosed.

The confidential source mentioned is [redacted] b7D who furnished the information to SAs JOSEPH E. MICHALSKI and CHESTER J. GUSTOWSKI on 1/26/61 and 2/1/61.

For the information of the Miami and Savannah Offices, informant was Chief of Section 6, Department I, of the UB prior to his defection. In this capacity he was closely associated with UB officials mentioned in enclosure and in view of the interest that his section had in this matter, obtained the information from discussions

b3
b7D
b7E

RUC
4 - Bureau (Enc.6)
(1-65-65192)
2 - [redacted] (Enc.2)(RM)
2 - New York (Enc.2)(RM) (Info)
1 - [redacted] (RM) (Enc. 1) (Info)
2 - WFO
(1 [redacted]
JEM:erc

(11)

AIRTEL

65-65192-
NOT RECORDED
78 FEB 6 1961

2 ENCLOSURES

51 FEB 9 1961

ORIGINAL FILED IN

SECRET

[redacted]

b3
b7E

with them as set forth. The above should be maintained strictly on a need-to-know basis and extreme caution used in view of informant's present status.

Copies are being furnished for the information of the New York and Savannah Offices in view of previous investigation in this matter by those offices.

It will be noted that information initially received in May, 1960, indicated that informant had claimed that "RICHARD" had carried out his mission brilliantly in the United States and referred to military installations in the Miami area in this connection. When interviewed, informant stressed that "RICHARD's" principle accomplishment in the United States was his contact with KOKENZIE, who escorted him to various places of interest such as an United States air base.

The letterhead memo is classified ~~"Secret"~~ to protect the identity of a defector who has not been surfaced and who is currently furnishing information of value.

The evaluation memo is classified ~~"Confidential"~~ as it reveals the Bureau's investigative interest in a foreign national who was employed at the United States Embassy in Warsaw, the disclosure of which could be detrimental to the defense interests of the United States.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-19-2020 BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

~~SECRET~~

Washington 25, D. C.
February 2, 1961

b3
b7E

[redacted]

A confidential source advised on January 26, 1961, and February 1, 1961, that Lieutenant Colonel Skibinski, a Sectional Chief in Department II (counter-espionage), Polish Security Service (UB), Warsaw, Poland, mentioned in September, 1959, that a Polish national, employed in the Consular Section of the United States Embassy in Warsaw, Poland, was associated with the UB and could be utilized by Polish Intelligence in connection with a forthcoming trip to the United States on his part. According to the source, Skibinski also furnished the following information concerning this employee:

The UB had assigned him dual cover names of "Robert" and "Ryszard" (Richard). He was a trusted employee at the United States Embassy and, while in that capacity, had developed a friendship with an American of Polish descent named Wronowski, who had recently visited Poland. "Ryszard" planned to visit Wronowski in Miami, Florida, and to travel about in the United States for a month or two. His tentative assignment for the UB would be to establish as many contacts as possible, bearing in mind their recruitment potential, and to obtain any information which might be of value to the UB.

Skibinski also felt that "Ryszard's" services might be effectively utilized by Section 6 (technical/scientific branch), Department I of the UB and, therefore, this section should contribute to some of the expenses involved relative to this trip. Source stated that Section 6 thereupon contributed $200.00 with the understanding that this section would be furnished any pertinent information of interest to it upon his return.

~~SECRET~~

65-65192-

ENCLOSURE

RE: [redacted] b3 b7E

Source further stated that Mr. Leks, a Deputy Chief in Department I, reported the following information concerning "Ryszard's" visit late in 1959:

He had met Wronowski, who owned a travel agency in Miami, Florida. Wronowski proved to be of no value in connection with his assignment and merely showed "Ryszard" about in the Miami area.

When "Ryszard" left Miami, he met one Mr. Kokenzie, a former United States Army pilot with the rank of Captain, who had received a medical discharge because of tuberculosis. Kokenzie resided near a United States Army airport at Savannah, Georgia, and even took "Ryszard" to the Officer's Club there. In addition, Kokenzie was actively associated in an official capacity with the General Pulaski Club in Savannah.

"Ryszard" became very friendly with Kokenzie and was enthusiastic about this contact he had developed. The source advised that the above information was then revealed to Colonel Tadeusz Jedynak, Deputy Chief of Z-II (Polish Military Intelligence) who exhibited an interest in this matter in view of its military aspects relative to Kokenzie. Although no definite plans were made, Jedynak took into consideration several possibilities to continue this matter, such as initiating correspondence with Kokenzie with the view of inviting him eventually to Poland or to send "Ryszard" back to the United States at a later date to see him.

Source stated that this operation did not materialize and believed that it was entirely discarded because "Ryszard" became involved in some illegal manipulations of United States bonds in Poland for which he was incarcerated shortly thereafter in 1960.

Source said that he later learned in 1960 that "Ryszard" was in reality Wladyslaw Skrzypczak, which was also confirmed by Mr. Leks. It was the source's opinion that the UB or Z-II had

RE: [redacted] b3 b7E

not made any further efforts to continue their operation with regard to Kokenzie as of December, 1960, and that it was extremely doubtful that it would be done in the future in view of Skrzypczak's duplicity, since contact with Kokenzie would necessarily have to be instituted by Skrzypczak.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the property of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is loaned to your agency. It and its contents should not be distributed outside your agency.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-19-2020 BY [redacted]

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Washington 25, D. C.
February 2, 1961

Title [redacted]

b3
b7E

Character

Reference Memorandum dated and captioned as above

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

65-45192-

ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-19-2020 BY [redacted] ADC b6 b7C

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

RECEIVED FROM CIA SUP FEB 7 1961

RECEIVED FROM FEB 7 1961 C.A SUP

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT [redacted] Polish Intelligence Activities in the U.S. b1 Per b3 CIA

1. [redacted] has provided us with lists of UB Department I (Foreign Intelligence) agents. There are three categories of agents in these lists:

a. Current agent and agent development cases (as of May 1960) of Section 6 (Scientific-Technical), Department I, UB.

b. Agents of Section 6 who are to be turned over to Section 2 (Western Hemisphere) for handling as of 21 May 1958.

c. Agent cases of Section 6 which are to be retired to archives.

2. Following is a list of agents in category 1-a above:

[redacted] b3 b7D b7E

-97

REC. 11 17 FEB 10 1961

~~SECRET~~

Copy delivered personally to Gastonski at WFO 2-8-61 WFM/bmc

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-19-2020 BY [redacted] ADC 56 FBJ 1961

b6
b7C
b1 Per
b3 CIA
b7E

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT : [redacted]

1. Information recently received from [redacted] reveals that a [redacted] West German citizen and [redacted] residing in Ruedelsheim, Germany, [redacted] is a witting UB agent. According to Source, [redacted] never earned a university degree, but was supplied by the UB with a false doctorate certificate from the University of Wroclaw in exchange for his cooperation. Subject is [redacted] and has given the UB information of this nature. Source also reported that [redacted] had been a GESTAPO agent in 1939.

b3
b7E

b1 Per
b3 CIA

[redacted]

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

NOT RECORDED
FEB 27 1961

50 MAR 1 1961

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-19-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

b6
b7C

SAC, Cleveland [redacted] 2/10/61

b3
b7E

Director, FBI [redacted] 1 - McDonnell

[redacted]

IS - PG

b3
b6
b7C
b7D
b7E

Reurlet 1/18/61 requesting authority to interview subject for the purpose of resolving whether he is a [redacted], Chief of Section 2, Department I, MSW. Authority for such interview is granted.

ReWFOairtel to the Bureau in captioned matter 1/31/61, copies of which were furnished you, setting forth results of interview of [redacted] the original source, on 1/26/61. The info set forth therein strongly indicates that subject is in fact the [redacted] Chief of Section 2, Polish Security Service (UB).

While there is no prohibition as to your utilizing info contained in reWFOairtel, it is believed that subject, at the outset, should be approached and interviewed as an immigrant, thereby giving him the opportunity to volunteer background info and the degree of association with relatives in Poland. Such procedure would afford us an opportunity to evaluate the degree of cooperation on his part and his sincerity and reliability. In the event subject does not volunteer info re his relationship to Lt. Col. [redacted] he may be specifically questioned in this regard on the basis of info in our possession, in a manner, however, that will not disclose the identity of [redacted] as our source. He should be questioned as to whether he has ever been approached by the UB or any other intelligence service prior to or since his arrival in the US. He should be questioned also re any and all contacts with Polish officials and/or establishments.

b6
b7C
b7E

b7D

The results of this interview should be submitted in a form suitable for dissemination, together with your recommendations as to future action in this matter.

1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]

1 - 65-65192 (Goleniewski)

WJM:prg
(6)
See note page 2.

65-65192-
NOT RECORDED
136 FEB 10 1961

YELLOW DUPLICATE
FEB [illegible]
MAILED

57 FEB 13 1961

b3
b7D
b7E

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-19-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

2/1/61

AIRTEL

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted]

b3
b7E

FROM: SAC, [redacted]

[redacted]

(NO:NY)

Enclosed herewith are six copies for the Bureau, three copies for New York, and one copy for Chicago of a letterhead memo dated and captioned as above. A similar number of copies of a letterhead memo evaluating the confidential source used in above-mentioned memo is also enclosed.

b3
b7D
b7E

CONFIDENTIAL

The confidential source mentioned is [redacted] who furnished the information to SA JOSEPH A. MICHALSKI and CHESTER J. GUSTOWSKI on 1/26/61.

One copy is being furnished for the information of the Chicago Office in view of Chicago's interest in Polish Intelligence activities and possibility of future investigation in this matter by Chicago. For information of

4-Bureau (Enc. 6)
(1-65-65195)
1-Chicago (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
3-[redacted] (Enc. 3) (RM)
[redacted]
3-NYC
[redacted]

JEM:eer
(11)

b3
b7D
b7E

AIRTEL

65-6492
NOT RECORDED
128 FEB 6 1961

180 2 ENCLOSURES

59 FEB 13 1961

ORIGINAL FILED IN

[redacted] b3 b7E

Chicago, investigation is currently being conducted in New York to determine identity of Colonel KONYLINSKI mentioned in attached. If deemed pertinent and advisable, New York will furnish Chicago with additional particulars in this case.

For further information of interested offices, informant had no firsthand knowledge concerning information in enclosed. He obtained such information from informal conversations with Lieutenant Colonel [redacted] b6 b7C and ANTONI CZAJKE, whom he had known for many years and with whom such discussions frequently took place. b7E

The letterhead memo is classified "Secret" to protect the identity of a defector who has not been surfaced, and who is currently furnishing information of value, and because it contains an allegation of an offer by a United States citizen to sell information to Polish Intelligence in the United States.

The evaluation memo is also classified "Secret" for the reasons stated above.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-19-2020 BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
February 1, 1961

b3
b7E

[redacted]

On January 26, 1961, a confidential source advised that Lieutenant Colonel [redacted] Head of Section Two, Department I (Foreign Intelligence) of the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs, furnished the following information concerning one Colonel Kobylinski in the Fall of 1939:

b6
b7C
b7E

Kobylinski was a Polish Combat Veteran who had been engaged in an official capacity for Polish Intelligence in the Silesia section of Poland before Poland became a communist nation. In 1939 Kobylinski was associated with a Polish Veteran's Organization in the United States as an official.

Kobylinski was personally acquainted with Jan Kanya, who was attached to the Polish Embassy, Washington, D. C., and several times during 1959 offered to sell him information concerning an underground organization. This organization, according to Kobylinski, was currently operating in the Silesia area of Southern Poland against the present communist regime in Poland. [redacted] interpreted this offer by Kobylinski as provocation on behalf of the United States, and that American Intelligence was using Kobylinski in that respect.

b6
b7C
b7E

Kanya, who was also actively engaged in activities for the Polish Security Service (UB), reported this offer to Antoni Czajor, the Chief at that time of the UB Residentura attached to the Polish Embassy, Washington, D. C. Both Kanya and Czajor were skeptical as to the authenticity of this approach by Kobylinski, and decided to turn him down.

ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

65-69192-

Re: [redacted]

b3
b7E

The source further noted that after Anthony Major was recalled to Poland, the beginning of the Summer of 1950, he was still suspicious of this affair by Kobylinski and felt that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had probably promoted the entire scheme.

The source was unable to furnish any additional information regarding Kobylinski or any further action taken by the FBI in this matter.

This [illegible] is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-323 (3-28-60)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-19-2020 BY [redacted] ADC b6 b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Title

Character

Reference

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

65-6177-

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-19-2020 BY [redacted]

b6
b7C

2/9/61

AIRTEL

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, WFO [redacted]

b3
b7E

[redacted]

(OO: PH)

Enclosed herewith are six copies for the Bureau, two copies for PH, and one copy each for CG and NY Offices, of a lettorhead memo, dated and captioned as above. A similar number of copies of a letterhead memo evaluating the confidential source used in above-mentioned memo are also enclosed.

b3
b7D
b7E

The confidential source mentioned is [redacted] who furnished the info to SAs JOSEPH E. MICHALSKI and CHESTER J. GUSTOWSKI on 2/1,8/61.

For info of the Bureau and interested offices, PH report of SA WILBUR S. METCALF, dated 6/2/58, captioned as above, indicates that on 3/30/58 FBI Agents observed ELMER PIEKARSKI and ANTONI CZAJKA (known Polish intelligence agents) visit the residence of [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

ROC

4 - Bureau (Enc. 6)
(1 - 65-65192) [redacted]
1 - Chicago (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
1 - New York (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
2 - [redacted] (Enc. 2) (RM)
2 - WFO
(1 - [redacted])

b3
b7D
b7E

1 ENCLOSURE

JEM:mrs
(10)

65-65192
NOT RECORDED
183 FEB 21 1961

AIRTEL

FEB 24 1961

WFO [redacted]

b3
b7E

For further info, informant was Head of Section 6, Dept. I, UB (Polish Security Service), prior to his defection and in that position obtained data set out in enclosed memo. In view of informant's present status, extreme caution should be used regarding above and info supplied by this source should be maintained on a need-to-know basis.

Copies are being furnished for the info of CG and NY in view of possibility of investigation by those offices in this matter.

LEADS

PH DIVISION

AT HARRISBURG, PA.

1. Will conduct appropriate investigation of subject to determine:

   1. Background (employment, residence, citizenship)

   2. Whether subject was or is presently employed in a vital facility. If so, if subject had or has access to classified data.

   3. Whether subject is in a position, because of contacts or employment, to be of value to the Polish Intelligence Service.

2. Upon completion of investigation, will submit recommendations to the Bureau as to advisability of interviewing subject.

The letterhead memo is classified ~~"Secret"~~ to protect the identity of a defector who has not been surfaced and who is currently furnishing info of value.

The evaluation memo is classified ~~"Confidential"~~ in view of Polish Intelligence interest in a U. S. citizen.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-19-2020 BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~SECRET~~

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
February 9, 1961

b3
b7E

[redacted]

On February 1 and 6, 1961, a confidential source advised that in early 1957, a survey and analysis had been begun by Section 6 (Technical Scientific Branch), Department I (Foreign Intelligence), Polish Security Service (UB), in Warsaw, Poland, of the potential of individuals living abroad on whom data had been accumulated for reasons of possible eventual use for intelligence purposes. Upon completion of this analysis, Section 6 concluded that it would not be feasible to continue interest in a certain number of persons by that particular section for the following reasons: (1) To date, they had either not furnished any information at all or the information was of little value and even negligible; (2) The distance involved was a deterrent factor for operational use by this specific section, since it related to residents of the United States, Mexico, Canada, and Argentina; (3) If any of these persons should be recruited by the UB and should happen to furnish information of value in the scientific/technical field, Section 6 did not have the facilities in personnel or technical acumen to properly evaluate this information and would have to turn it over for analysis by the Soviets anyway; and (4) Such matters were normally the primary interest and responsibility of Section 2, Department 1, who were concerned with "legal" operations in the United States, Canada, Mexico, and so forth.

The analysis indicated that these persons fell into two categories: (1) Those who might be of possible interest to Section 2 and were, therefore, turned over to that section for processing; and (2) Those who had proved to be unproductive at that time and the data about them was retired to the archives.

65-65192- ~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE

RE: [redacted] b3 b7E

Source stated that the above was finally completed in May, 1958, and that he had learned nothing further concerning any action taken by the UB with respect to these persons, other than that Section 2 was still actively interested in some of the cases they had received as of May, 1960. Included in the list of persons about whom Section 2 had professed continued interest was [redacted] b3 b7E

Source advised that the following thumb-nail sketch about [redacted] was turned over to Section 2 in May, 1958:

[redacted] a United States citizen of Polish nationality; metallurgical engineer; employed as [redacted] a steel corporation; and resides in Harrisburg (?), USA. Source stated that [redacted] had been assigned the cover name [redacted] and that UB interest in him commenced in 1958. b3 b7E

Source explained that UB interest in such persons as [redacted] was initiated due to his employment, background, and national origin. Source pointed out that, to his knowledge, none of these persons had furnished classified data to Polish Intelligence. He added that some of these people, however, had furnished nonclassified data to the Polish Government which was undoubtedly motivated by love of their mother country. Source emphasized that these persons may be loyal Americans who had no idea as to the ultimate destination of any of the information they had furnished or, in specific instances, even with whom they were dealing.

Source stated that he was not personally acquainted with [redacted] and could furnish no additional information about him. He also stated that he did not know of any efforts by the UB to recruit [redacted] or if he had ever furnished any information to or been contacted by any representatives of the Polish Government. Source stressed the point that such people as [redacted] may not even know that the UB had an interest in them or that they had been given pseudonyms primarily for reference purposes by the UB. b3 b7E

This document contains neither r
nor its contents are to be distributed outside of
your agency.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-19-2020 BY [redacted]

FD-323 (3-28-60)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Washington 25, D. C.
February 9, 1961

Title [redacted]

b3
b7E

Character

Reference

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

65-65192-~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ENCLOSURE

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

RECEIVED FBI
FEB 9 1961
WFO SIP

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-19-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

b3
b7E

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT : Jozef BARTOSIK [redacted]

b1 Per
b3 CIA

1. Reference is made to this Agency's memorandum [redacted] dated 1 February 1961, subject as above.

2. The following information is from the source [redacted] Jozef BARTOSIK, an MSW (UB) staff officer who travels outside Poland as a diplomatic courier, is also an agent handler.

b1 Per
b3 CIA

3. The following information is from the source [redacted] Jozef BARTOSIK is a Staff Officer of Section 6 Department I of the MSW. His cover job is that of a courier for the foreign office of the MSZ.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

James R. Hunter
JAMES ANGLETON

[redacted]

65-65192-
NOT RECORDED
16 FEB 16 1961

b1 Per
b3 CIA

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

1 XEROX
FEB 15 1961

CC [redacted] (Goleniewski)
1C 65-65192

b3
b7E

[redacted]

Copy to WFO, NY & CG
by routing slip for
☑ info ☐ action
date 2-21-61
by [redacted]

62 FEB 20 1961
258

~~SECRET~~

17 FEB 15 1961

SECRET

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 08-19-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Trotter
Evans
W. C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

b6
b7C

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: February 8, 1961

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: LIEUTENANT COLONEL MICHAL GOLENIEWSKI
INTERNAL SECURITY - PO
RELATIONS WITH THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

[redacted] Mr. Edward Ryan, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), stated that undoubtedly CIA was coordinating the investigation of Dr. Heinrich Schutze with Bureau Headquarters. The Director asked the question "are they?"

b1 Per
b3 CIA

Since April, 1958, CIA has been furnishing to the Bureau information regarding Soviet and Polish intelligence efforts against the United States. This information originated from an individual using the pseudonym of Dr. Heinrich Schutze.

Prior to January 4, 1961, CIA advised of Schutze's intention to defect to the United States. On January 4, 1961, Schutze personally contacted CIA in West Berlin, at which time he identified himself as Lieutenant Colonel Michal Goleniewski, Deputy Director, Scientific Branch, Ministry of Internal Affairs, and a representative of the Polish Security Service.

CIA furnished the Bureau with the results of its initial interviews with Goleniewski as such interviews were conducted. CIA on January 4, 1961, advised that interviews which were to commence January 5, 1961, would be conducted so that priority would be given to information furnished by Goleniewski having United States ramifications.

CIA brought Goleniewski to the United States on January 12, 1961, at which time CIA advised he would be available for interview by the Bureau commencing the week of January 15, 1961.

Pursuant to such information, Polish-speaking Agents, Chester J. Gustowski of the New York Office and Joseph E. Michalski of the Washington Field Office commenced interviewing Goleniewski. These interviews have continued to date on a two-day-a-week basis. Said interviews are producing information

65-65192

REC-9 65-65192-98

1 - Parsons
1 - Belmont
1 - Branigan
1 - Wallace

EX-114

11 FEB 14 1961

HHW:ct

65 FEB 20 1961

ESP. SEC.

SECRET

of an investigative interest and of intelligence value to the Bureau. CIA on its part is furnishing to the Bureau the results of interviews it is conducting of Goleniewski.

This matter is being closely followed at the Seat of Government.

ACTION:

For information.

~~SECRET~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-19-2020 BY J75J65T81 ADC

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Trotter
Evans
W. C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : Mr. Belmont

DATE: February 10, 1961

FROM : R. O. L'Allier

SUBJECT: [redacted]

b1 Per
b3 CIA

On February 9, 1961, James Hunt, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), advised Agent Papich on a strictly confidential basis that Allen Dulles briefed President Kennedy on Monday, February 6, 1961, concerning the [redacted] operation. Dulles gave the background commencing with the initial letter addressed to the Director, [redacted] and continuing in a lengthy period of correspondence between CIA and the Polish intelligence agent who recently defected. Dulles outlined the numerous ramifications which related to Soviet and Polish intelligence activity in various countries throughout the world. He told the President how [redacted] furnished the lead which led to the development of the [redacted] case. Included in Dulles' briefing was the statement that Mr. and Mrs. Kroger, apprehended in the [redacted] case, were identified as being Morris Cohen and his wife.

b3
b7E
b6
b7C
b7E

ACTION:

For your information.

SJP:ban
(7)

1 - Mr. Parsons
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. McDonnell
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich

65-65192
S-upon

REC-58 65-65192-99

EX-114

5 FEB 17 1961

FEB 20 1961

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-19-2020 BY [redacted] ADS

b6
b7C

2/14/61

AIRTEL

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, WFO [redacted]

b3
b7E

[redacted]

(OO: DE)

Enclosed are 6 copies for the Bureau, 2 copies for Detroit, and 1 copy each for New York and Chicago of a letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above. Also enclosed is a similar number of copies of a letterhead memorandum evaluating the confidential source used in above-mentioned memorandum.

b7D

The confidential source mentioned is [redacted] who furnished the information to SAs JOSEPH S. MICHALSKI and CHESTER J. GUSTOWSKI on 2/1 and 8/61.

b3
b7E

Copies are being furnished for the information of Chicago and New York in view of their interest in Polish intelligence activities and because of possibility of future investigation by those offices in this matter.

It is noted that informant was in charge of Section 6, Department I, Polish Security Service (UB),

CONF. SOURCE

4 - Bureau (Enc. - 6)
(1 - 65-65192) [redacted]
1 - Chicago (Enc. - 1) (INFO) (RM)
2 - Detroit (Enc. - 2) (RM)
1 - New York (Enc. - 1) (INFO) (RM)
2 - WFO
(1 - [redacted]

65-65192
NOT RECORDED
198 FEB 17 1961

b3
b7D
b7E

ORIGINAL IN [redacted]

JEM:pmc
(10)

AIRTEL 2 ENCLOSURE

50 FEB 24 1961

WFO [redacted] b3 b7E

prior to his defection and the analysis of cases mentioned in enclosed letterhead memorandum was initiated and directed by him. In view of informant's present status, extreme caution should be used regarding the above and information supplied by this source should be maintained on a need-to-know basis.

WFO indices contain no reference pertaining to S. BOJARCZUK or UE pseudonym "BUK."

LEADS

DETROIT DIVISION

AT DETROIT, MICHIGAN

1. Will conduct appropriate investigation of subject to determine:

a. Background (employment, residence, citizenship)

b. Whether subject was or is presently employed in a vital facility. If so, whether subject had or has access to classified data.

c. If subject is in a position, because of contacts or employment, to be of value to Polish Intelligence.

2. Upon completion of investigation, will submit recommendations to the Bureau regarding interview of subject.

The letterhead memorandum is classified "Secret" to protect the identity of a defector who has not been surfaced and who is currently furnishing information of value.

The evaluation memorandum is classified "Confidential" in view of the highly sensitive nature of the source, and because of Polish Intelligence interest in a person domiciled in the U.S.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-19-2020 BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~SECRET~~

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

February 14, 1961

b3
b7E

[redacted]

On February 1 and 8, 1961, a confidential source advised that in early 1957, a survey and analysis had been begun by Section 6 (Technical/Scientific Branch), Department 1 (Foreign Intelligence), Polish Security Service (UB), in Warsaw, Poland, of the potential of individuals on whom data had been accumulated for reasons of possible eventual utilization for intelligence purposes. Upon completion of this analysis, Section 6 officials concluded that it would not be practical to continue such interest in a certain number of persons, most of whom were residing abroad, by that specific section for the following reasons: (1) To date, they had either not furnished any information at all or the information they did furnish was of little value or negligible; (2) The distance involved was a deterrent factor for operational use by Section 6, since it almost unanimously related to residents of the United States, Mexico, Canada, and Argentina; (3) If any of these persons were recruited by the UB and furnished information of value in the scientific/technical field, Section 6 did not have facilities in personnel or technical access to properly evaluate this data and would have to turn it over for analysis by the Soviets; and (4) Section 2, Department I of the UB had primary interest in and responsibility for "legal" operations in such Western countries as United States, Canada, Mexico, and Argentina anyway.

The analysis indicated that most of these people fall into two categories: (1) Those who might be of interest to Section 2 and were, therefore, turned over to that section

65-65192 -

ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

for processing; and (2) Those who had been unproductive at that time and the data about them was retired to the archives.

Source stated that this task was completed in May, 1958, and that data concerning various people such as one S. Bojarczuk was turned over to Section 2, Department 1, for their consideration. Included in this data was the following thumbnail sketch pertaining to S. Bojarczuk:

S. Bojarczuk was a chemical engineer of Polish nationality and was described as a builder of chemical industry factories. His residence was listed as Harbor Beach, Michigan, United States. He was assigned the pseudonym of "Buk" and the UB's interest in him commenced in 1958.

Source explained that UB interest in such persons as Bojarczuk was initiated by such factors as his employment, background, and Polish origin. Source pointed out that, to his knowledge, none of these persons had furnished classified data to Polish Intelligence as of May, 1958. He added that some of these people, however, had furnished nonclassified material to the Polish Government which was probably motivated by love of their mother country. Source emphasized that people on this list could very well be loyal Americans who had no idea as to the ultimate destination of the material or information they had furnished and specifically had no idea with whom they were dealing.

Source stated that he was not personally acquainted with Bojarczuk and could furnish no additional information about him. He also stated that he knew of no efforts by the UB to recruit Bojarczuk as of December, 1960, or if he had furnished any information to or been contacted by any representatives of the Polish Government abroad. Source stressed the point that such people as Bojarczuk may not even have known that Polish Intelligence had an interest in them and had given them pseudonyms for reference purposes.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-19-2020 BY [redacted]

FD-323 (3-28-60)

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Washington 25, D. C.

February 14, 1961

Title [redacted]

b3
b7E

Character

Reference Memorandum dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

65-65190 -

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-19-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

2/14/61

AIRTEL

TO: DIRECTOR, [redacted]

b3
b7E

FROM: SAC, [redacted]

[redacted]

(SOUGHT)

b3
b7D
b7E

Enclosed herewith are 6 copies for the Bureau, 2 for Albany, and one copy each for New York and Chicago of a letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above. Also enclosed are a similar number of copies of a letterhead memorandum evaluating the confidential source used in above-mentioned memorandum.

CONF. INFT.

The confidential source mentioned is [redacted] who furnished the information to SAs JOSEPH E. MICHALSKI and CHESTER J. GOSTOMSKI on 2/1 and 2/6l.

Copies are being furnished for the information of Chicago and New York who have received previous correspondence in this matter, in view of their interest in Polish intelligence activities.

It is noted that informant [redacted] was in charge of Section 6, Department I, Polish Security Service (UB) prior to his defection and the analysis of cases mentioned in enclosed letterhead was initiated and directed by him. With reference to UB's continued interest in SKAPSKI in May, 1960, as set forth in enclosed letterhead, informant advised he had an informal discussion with Major [redacted] of Section 2, and the latter stated that Section 3 was still actively interested in various people, specifically mentioning SKAPSKI.

ENC.
4 - Bureau (Enc. 3)
(1- 65-65192) [redacted]
ENCLOSURE 2 - [redacted] (Enc. 2)(DH)
1 - Chicago (Enc. 1)(Info)(ER)
1 - [redacted] (Enc. 1)(Info)(MM)
3 - NYC [redacted]

b3
b7C
b7E

JEM:lic
(10)
AIRTEL

65-65192-
NOT RECORDED
174 FEB 17 1961

59 FEB 24 1961

NAL FILED IN

[redacted]

b3
b7E

The letterhead memorandum is classified "Secret" to protect the identity of a defector who has not been surfaced and who is currently furnishing information of value.

The evaluation memorandum is classified "Confidential" in view of Polish Intelligence interest in a U.S. citizen.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-19-2020 BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C

SECRET

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
February 14, 1961

[redacted]

b3
b7E

On February 1 and 8, 1961, a confidential source advised that in early 1957, a survey and analysis had been begun by Section 6 (Technical/Scientific Branch), Department I (Foreign Intelligence), Polish Security Service (UB), in Warsaw, Poland, of the potential of individuals on whom data had been accumulated for reasons of possible eventual utilization for intelligence purposes. Upon completion of this analysis, Section 6 officials concluded that it would not be practical to continue such interest in a certain number of persons, most of whom were residing abroad, by that specific section for the following reasons: (1) To date, they had either not furnished any information at all or the information they did furnish was of little value or negligible; (2) The distance involved was a deterrent factor for operational use by Section 6, since it almost unanimously related to residents of the United States, Mexico, Canada, and Argentina; (3) If any of these persons were ever recruited by the UB and furnished information of value in the scientific/technical field, Section 6 did not have facilities in personnel or technical acumen to properly evaluate this data and would have to turn it over for analysis by the Soviets; and (4) Section 2, Department I of the UB had primary interest in and responsibility for "legal" operations in such Western countries as United States, Canada, Mexico, and Argentina anyway.

The analysis indicated that most of these people fell into two categories: (1) Those who might be of interest to Section 2 and were, therefore, turned over to that section for processing; and (2) Those who had been unproductive at that time to the extent that no information hadever been attributed to them and the data about them was retired to the archives.

SECRET

65-65192-

ENCLOSURE

[redacted]

b3
b7E

Source stated that this task was finally completed in May, 1958, and that he had learned nothing further concerning any action taken by the UB with respect to these persons, other than that Section 2 was still actively interested in some of the cases they had received as of May, 1960. Included in the list of persons about whom Section 2 had indicated continued interest in May, 1960, was Adam Skapski. Source advised that the following thumbnail sketch concerning Skapski was obtained from data turned over to Section 2 in May, 1958:

Adam Skapski was a United States citizen of Polish extraction and a professor of physical chemistry at the University of Vermont. He resided in Burlington, Vermont. The UB's interest in Skapski began in 1955 and he was assigned the pseudonym of "Fizyk" for reference purposes.

Source explained that UB's interest in such persons as Skapski was initiated by such factors as his employment, background, and Polish origin. Source pointed out that, to his knowledge, none of these persons had furnished classified data to Polish Intelligence as of May, 1958. He added that some of these people, however, had furnished nonclassified material to the Polish Government which might have been motivated by love of their mother country. In many instances, this material was primarily destined for friends and relatives in Poland, who took it upon themselves to turn it over to Polish authorities. Source emphasized that people on this list could very well be loyal Americans who had no idea as to the ultimate destination of the material or information they had furnished and specifically had no idea with whom they were dealing.

Source stated that he was not personally acquainted with Skapski and could furnish no additional information about him. He also stated that he knew of no efforts by the UB to recruit Skapski as of December, 1960, or if he had furnished any information to or been contacted by any representative of the Polish Government abroad. Source stressed the point that such people as Skapski may not even have known that Polish Intelligence had an interest in them and had given them pseudonyms for reference purposes.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-19-2020 BY [redacted]

FD-523 (3-28-60)

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Washington 25, D. C.

FEB 14 1961

Title [redacted]

b3
b7E

Character [redacted]

Reference Memorandum dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

65-65192 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 08-19-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

FBI

Date: 2/14/61

Transmit the following in _____ (Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL (Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Evans
Mr. Malone
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Mr. W.C.Sullivan
Tele. Room
Mr. Ingram
Miss Gandy

b6 b7C

TO: DIRECTOR, [redacted] b3 b7E

FROM: SAC, [redacted]

[redacted]

(OO:NY)

BRANIGAN

b3 b7D b7E

Enclosed are six copies for the Bureau, three copies for New York and one copy for Chicago of a letterhead memo dated and captioned as above. Also enclosed is a similar number of copies of a letterhead memo evaluating confidential source used in above mentioned letterhead memo.

Confidential source mentioned is [redacted] who furnished the information to SAs JOSEPH E. MICHALSKI and CHESTER J. GUSTOWSKI on 2/8/61. One copy is being furnished for the information of Chicago in view of that office's interest in Polish Intelligence activities.

For information, [redacted] was in charge of Section 6 (Scientific/Technical Branch), Polish Security Service (UB), prior to his defection. In that capacity he maintained close supervision of and interest in operational plans of that section relative to [redacted] as set out in enclosed. Reference is made to Section 6 officials in enclosed rather than to the informant for obvious reasons. Above information should be handled with extreme caution and on a need-to-know basis in view of informant's present status.

2 ENCLOSURE

NOT RECORDED

It is noted that interview with informant disclosed minor variances with information he had previously furnished in

RUC

4-Bureau (Enc. 6)
(1-65-65192) [redacted]
1-Chicago (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
3-[redacted] (Enc. 3) (RM)
3-WFO [redacted]

XEROX FEB 27 1961

FEB 28 1961

JEM:dll
(11)

AIRTEL

C - Wi[illegible]

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

50 MAR 2 1961

258

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

[redacted] b3 b7E

correspondence such as reference to WLADYSLAW KRAWCZYK as a Soviet intelligence agent therein. Informant explained that he did this primarily to throw suspicion away from himself in the event the correspondence was intercepted since there would not be any question in anyone's mind that he was fully aware of KRAWCZYK's association with the UB rather than Soviet intelligence.

The letterhead memo is classified ~~"Secret"~~ to protect the identity of a defector who has not been surfaced and who is currently furnishing information of value. The evaluation memo is classified ~~"Confidential"~~ in view of Polish intelligence interest in a U. S. citizen.

CIA representative advised interviewing agents that they have copies of some of the material submitted by [redacted] b7D for KRAWCZYK and furnished by informant which they will forward to the Bureau as soon as they are processed. Upon receipt, the office of origin will be advised of the nature of this material.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-19-2020 BY [redacted] b6 b7C

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

February 14, 1951

[redacted] b3 b7E

On February 8, 1951, a confidential source furnished the following information concerning operational plans and interest the Polish Security Service (UB) and the Soviet Committee of State Security (KGB) had with regard to [redacted] from the period of late 1950 to December, 1950:

[redacted] b7D

Mieczyslaw Krzewnyk, a Polish engineer and co-opted worker (collaborator) for the UB, attended an atomic energy conference at Geneva, Switzerland, in the Fall of 1950, wherein he became acquainted with an American scientist named [redacted] Upon his return to Warsaw, Poland, Krzewnyk submitted a report to his principal, Inspector Dyszteyn of Section 6 (Scientific/Technical Branch), Department I (Foreign Intelligence) of the UB in which he was enthusiastic about [redacted] potential as a candidate for consideration for recruitment by the UB.

In view of this report, Dyszteyn immediately became vitally interested and this matter was shortly brought to the attention of such officials as Colonel Kubalek, Deputy Chief, and Colonel Witold Sienkiewicz, Director of Department I. The consensus of opinion by these persons and especially Dyszteyn was that [redacted] possessed potential for recruitment since Krzewnyk was highly regarded as an intelligent individual and his observations were worthy of consideration. It was also felt that cooperation with Polish intelligence by [redacted] would be welcomed but that scientific advancement in Poland had not yet progressed to the point that highly technical information as [redacted] disclosed could be properly evaluated until sometime in the future. b7D

In view of the above, Sienkiewicz brought this matter to the attention of Colonel Widzyka, representative of Chief Directorate I of the KGB in Warsaw, who was in liaison with Department I of the UB. In addition to the extreme importance the UB attached to this matter, it was felt that Soviet technology could more effectively cope with its scientific aspects if [redacted] should be recruited. The UB also felt that Poland would profit from any immediate exchange of scientific information even if material from Germany should be unclassified since Polish technology would probably not have it anyway. b7D

~~SECRET~~

65-65192-

ENCLOSURE

RE: [redacted] b3 b7E

Subsequent conversations between Vladykin and Section 4 officials revealed the former continued to stress the importance of the [redacted] case and to recommend extreme caution in handling it. These sentiments were also expressed by Vladykin's successors in Warsaw. b7D

During the beginning of 1969, Krzewnyk came to the United States ostensibly to attend a scientific conference in New York City, but in reality it was to solidify his friendship with [redacted] In preparation for this, Krzewnyk had corresponded with [redacted] as directed by Rysatyga.

Upon Krzewnyk's return to Poland from this trip, he submitted a report in which he gave a detailed account of his visit to [redacted] home and included various particulars such as his home life, ancestry, income, continued interest in financial gain, et cetera. In addition, Krzewnyk brought back some unclassified technical data which [redacted] had given him. This report was thoroughly reviewed in Section 4 and then sent on for further analysis to Sokolak and Siechiewicz. Inasmuch as Edigary Rybala, Deputy Chief of Department I, had primary interest in operations pertaining to the United States, he was called upon to attend a conference for consideration as to future action to be taken regarding [redacted] b7D

At this conference, Rysatyga submitted a plan of operation which in essence was to proceed cautiously and covertly in an effort to involve [redacted] in an intelligence activity. This plan was subsequently approved by Vladykin upon instructions from authorities in Moscow. b7D

After discussing various possibilities for establishing personal contact with [redacted] in the United States, Sokolak agreed that Jan Kanya, a UB collaborator with cover-name "Andrzej," who was attached to the Polish Embassy in Washington, D.C., would be a good choice in view of his background as an economist. Rybala approved of this choice but stipulated that Section 2, Department I, should also give their approval since that Section had the responsibility for UB "legal" operations in the United States.

This plan was then discussed with Vladykin who expressed disapproval with UB "legal" operations in the United States. Rybala then suggested that contact with [redacted] might be more effective if done openly as if it were an official visit, but Vladykin preferred an illegal operation for utilization of Krzewnyk in the future. Vladykin finally agreed to this b7D

~~SECRET~~

Re: [redacted] b3 b7E

proposal provided that Strzemor was "frozen" (because inactive) and utilized sometime in the future in an illegal network if [redacted] should be eventually recruited to the extent that he accepted money for any information he might furnish.

In the summer of 1958 Manys visited [redacted] at his home and extended an official invitation to him on behalf of Krawczyk to attend a scientific conference in Warsaw in the fall of 1958. [redacted] accepted the invitation in which the Polish Government would bear some of the cost of the transportation. b7D

When [redacted] arrived in Warsaw the UB conducted surveillances on him for about two days and the only results reported were that he appeared to be frightened. Section 6 officials attributed this to the fact that he was probably behind the "Iron Curtain" for the first time. Wladykin, who made daily inquiries about [redacted] while in Warsaw, felt that this was a good sign and that the operation was going smoothly, but that Krawczyk should now make a specific approach to him.

With this in mind, Krawczyk invited [redacted] to his apartment where they dined and drank a quantity of liquer. During the course of the evening, Krawczyk, while stressing mutual friendship with him, requested technical cooperation from [redacted] He also advised that [redacted] would be reimbursed for any scientific data he might furnish in the future. Krawczyk indicated that he would not be furnishing information in return. [redacted] agreed to this proposal but was reluctant to maintain personal contact with Manys for more than once or twice a year. Krawczyk also gave [redacted] about $800 in American currency to cover one half the cost of the trip to Poland. Krawczyk claimed this money was furnished by the Atomic Institute in Warsaw but in reality he obtained it from his principal, Dyaktyga. Krawczyk submitted a memorandum to Dyaktyga in which he explained the disposition of this money as it appeared that [redacted] probably would not sign a receipt for it. b7D

Upon [redacted] departure from Poland, Krawczyk wrote a lengthy report describing in detail what had transpired at this meeting. The [redacted] operation, which had been assigned the UB cover-name of [redacted] was now considered to be progressing most satisfactorily and was under the direct supervision and control of top officials in Department I. b7D

Krawczyk continued to correspond with [redacted] while Manys visited him at his home in February, 1960, under pretext of delivering some technical books and a letter from Krawczyk.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] b3 b7E

Hanya wrote a report on this contact in which he stated that [redacted] agreed to furnish material and that arrangements for a meeting in the near future at the Trade Fair in New York City were made. Hanya also reported that this meeting had definitely not been compromised and cited various examples in support such as that (Stefan) Wysocyklewicz conducted a counter-surveillance and determined that he was not followed to [redacted] house. This report was analyzed by Vladykin and Rekelak and the conclusion was drawn that United States intelligence was completely unaware of any CIA interest in [redacted] b7D

The November, 1960, "List of Employees of Diplomatic Missions," published by the United States Department of State, indicated that Stefan Wysocyklewicz was attached to the Polish Embassy, Washington, D.C., as a clerk.

The meeting between Hanya and [redacted] at the Trade Fair did not materialize probably because of continued consternation in Polish intelligence circles following the defection of [redacted] of Polish Military Intelligence the previous year to the United States. The KGB recommended that operational plans concerning [redacted] remain dormant for the time being which was done. b7D

[redacted] subsequently telephoned Hanya in Washington, D.C., and inquired as to the reason he had not been present for their meeting. [redacted] stated that he had some material and wanted to see him, but Hanya made no definite commitment. This information was forwarded to Warsaw by the head of the GB residentura attached to the Polish Embassy, Washington, D.C., Tadeusz Ciber. Ciber also recommended against a meeting as he felt that this might be provocation by the Americans in connection with the United Nations Session. b7D

[redacted] then mailed two declassified documents, bearing a time-clock stamp, to Hanya's home in Washington, D.C. This action by [redacted] was thoroughly analyzed by the GB and KGB, who reserved final judgment until the documents reached Warsaw. Upon their receipt the KGB representative read them and forwarded photostat copies to Moscow. He also stated that [redacted] probably blundered by his action in mailing them to Hanya and did not believe this was a form of provocation instigated by the United States Government. He further pointed out that American scientists are extremely independent by nature and firmly believe in the free exchange of scientific information on the international level without restrictions.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

RE: [redacted] b3 b7E

The [redacted] case remained dormant in the files until the early part of December, 1980, when Bekaian requested Section 6 to make a thorough analysis. Bekaian immediately forwarded this analysis to Beamer for further study and a final decision. b7D

Source stated that he had no information concerning any plans or decisions reached by the mob or its relative to [redacted] subsequent to December, 1980. He also noted that it was highly unlikely that [redacted] were even aware of the CP affiliations of Krzemyk or Hanyo.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-19-2020 BY [redacted]

FD-323 (3-28-60)

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Washington 25, D.C.

February 14, 1961

Title : [redacted]

b3
b7E

Character :

Reference : Letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ENCLOSURE 65-65192-

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-19-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

2/18/61

AIRTEL

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, WFO ([redacted])

[redacted]

(OO: DE)

b3
b7E

Enclosed herewith are 6 copies for the Bureau, 2 copies for Detroit, and one copy each for Chicago and New York of a letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above. A similar number of copies of a letterhead memorandum evaluating the confidential source used in above-mentioned memorandum is also enclosed.

b3
b7D
b7E

The confidential source mentioned is [redacted] who furnished the information to SAs JOSEPH E. MICHALSKI and CHESTER J. GUSTOWSKI on 2/1 and 8/61.

Copies are being furnished for information of Chicago and New York in view of their interest in Polish Intelligence activities and because of possibility of future investigations by those offices in this matter.

It is noted that informant was in charge of Section 6, Department I, Polish Security Service (UB),

RUC Conf. Source

(4) - Bureau (Enc. - 6)
(1) - 65-65192) [redacted]
1 - Chicago (INFO) (RM) (Enc. - 1)
2 - Detroit (Enc. - 2) (RM)
1 - New York (Enc. - 1) (INFO) (RM)
2 - WFO
[redacted]

65-65192 -
NOT RECORDED
198 FEB 17 1961

b3
b7D
b7E

JEM:pmc
(10)

FEB 23 1961

ENCLOSURE

ORIGINAL FILED IN

WFO [redacted]

b3
b7E

prior to his defection and the analysis of cases mentioned in enclosed letterhead memorandum was initiated and directed by him. In view of informant's present status, extreme caution should be used regarding the above and information supplied by this source should be maintained on a need-to-know basis.

WFO indices contain no reference to CZESLAW FOCHTMAN or UB pseudonym "Mat."

LEADS

DETROIT DIVISION

AT DETROIT, MICHIGAN

1. Will conduct appropriate investigation of subject to determine:

a. Background (employment, residence, citizenship)

b. Whether subject was or is presently employed in a vital facility. If so, whether subject had or has access to classified data.

c. If subject is in a position, because of contacts or employment, to be of value to Polish Intelligence.

2. Upon completion of investigation, will submit recommendations to the Bureau regarding interview of subject.

The letterhead memorandum is classified "Secret" to protect the identity of a defector who has not been surfaced and who is currently furnishing information of value.

The evaluation memorandum is classified "Confidential" in view of the highly sensitive nature of the source, and because of Polish Intelligence interest in a person domiciled in the United States.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-19-2010 BY [redacted]

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

February 14, 1961

[redacted]

b3
b7E

On February 1 and 8, 1961, a confidential source advised that in early 1957, a survey and analysis had been begun by Section 6 (Technical/Scientific Branch), Department I (Foreign Intelligence), Polish Security Service (UB), in Warsaw, Poland, of the potential of individuals on whom data had been accumulated for reasons of possible eventual utilization for intelligence purposes. Upon completion of this analysis, Section 6 officials concluded that it would not be practical to continue such interest in a certain number of persons, most of whom were residing abroad, by that specific section for the following reasons: (1) To date they had either not furnished any information at all or the information they did furnish was of little value or negligible; (2) The distance involved was a deterrent factor for operational use by Section 6, since it almost unanimously related to residents of the United States, Mexico, Canada, and Argentina; (3) If any of these persons were recruited by the UB and furnished information of value in the scientific/technical field, Section 6 did not have facilities in personnel or technical acumen to properly evaluate this data and would have to turn it over for analysis by the Soviets; and (4) Section 2, Department I of the UB had primary interest in and responsibility for "legal" operations in such Western countries as United States, Canada, Mexico, and Argentina anyway.

The analysis indicated that most of these people fell into two categories: (1) Those who might be of interest to Section 2 and were, therefore, turned over to that section

65-65192-

ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

for processing; and (2) Those who had been unproductive at that time and the data about them was retired to the archives.

Source stated that this task was completed in May, 1958, and that the name of Czeslaw Pochtman was included in data which had been retired to the archives. Source also advised that the following thumbnail sketch about Czeslaw Pochtman was contained in this data:

Czeslaw Pochtman was born in 1921 in Poland and resided in Detroit. He was assigned the pseudonym of "Mat" and notation was made on the thumbnail sketch that Pochtman was of little interest to the US.

Source explained that US interest in such persons as Pochtman was initiated by such factors as his employment, background and Polish origin. Source pointed out that, to his knowledge, none of these persons had furnished classified data to Polish Intelligence as of May, 1958. He added that some of these people, however, had furnished nonclassified material to the Polish Government which was probably motivated by love of their mother country. Source emphasized that people on this list could very well be loyal Americans who had no idea as to the ultimate destination of the material or information they had furnished and specifically had no idea with whom they were dealing.

Source stated that he was not personally acquainted with Pochtman and could furnish no additional information about him. He also stated that he knew of no efforts by the US to recruit Pochtman as of December, 1960, or if he had furnished any information to or been contacted by any representatives of the Polish Government abroad. Source stressed the point that such people as Pochtman may not even have known that Polish Intelligence had an interest in them and had given them pseudonyms for reference purposes.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-19-2020 BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C

FD-923 (8-28-60)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Washington 25, D. C.

February 14, 1961

Title [redacted]

b3
b7E

Character [redacted]

Reference Memorandum dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

65-65192

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-19-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

2/14/61

AIRTEL

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted]

b3
b7E

FROM: SAC, [redacted]

[redacted]

(CC:NH)

b3
b7D
b7E

Enclosed herewith are 6 copies for the Bureau, two copies for New Haven, and one copy each for New York and Chicago of a letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above. A similar number of copies of a letterhead memorandum evaluating the confidential source used in above-mentioned memorandum are also enclosed.

CONF. INFT.

The confidential source mentioned is [redacted] who furnished the information to SAs JOSEPH E. MICHALSKI and CHESTER J. GUSTOWSKI on 2/1 and 8/61.

Copies are being furnished for the information of Chicago and New York in view of their interest in Polish intelligence activities and possibility of future investigation in this matter. If deemed pertinent, New Haven will furnish Chicago with additional data concerning previous investigation conducted relative to KXCAT.

It is noted that informant was in charge of Section 6, Department I, Polish Security Service (UB), prior to his defection and the analysis of names mentioned in enclosed

√ ENCLOSURE

5DC

4 - Bureau (Enc. 6)
(1- 65-65192) [redacted]
1 - Chicago (Enc. 1)(Info)(RM)
2 - [redacted] (RM)
1 - [redacted] (NH) (INFO)
2 - NHO
[redacted]

JEM:lic
(10)

AIRTEL

65-65192-1

NOT RECORDED
174 FEB 17 1961

50 MAR 1 1961

b3
b7D
b7E

ORIGINAL FILED IN

b3
b7E

letterhead memorandum was initiated and directed by him. In enclosed memorandum wherein it is mentioned that Section 3, Department I, UB, professed continued interest in KOCAY in May, 1960, informant attributed this information to an informal discussion with Major ROMER of Section 3, who, in reply to informant's inquiry, claimed that KOCAY was still a matter of interest to that section. In view of informant's present status, extreme caution should be used regarding the above and information supplied by this source should be maintained on a need-to-know basis.

The letterhead memorandum is classified "Secret" to protect the identity of a defector who has not been surfaced and who is currently furnishing information of value.

The evaluation memorandum is classified "Confidential" in view of Polish Intelligence interest in a U.S. citizen.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-19-2020 BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

[redacted], Please Refer to

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
February 14, 1961

[redacted]

b3
b7E

On February 1 and 8, 1961, a confidential source advised that in early 1957, a survey and analysis had been begun by Section 6 (Technical/Scientific Branch), Department 1 (Foreign Intelligence), Polish Security Service (UB), in Warsaw, Poland, of the potential of individuals on whom data had been accumulated for reasons of possible eventual utilization for intelligence purposes. Upon completion of this analysis, Section 6 officials concluded that it would not be practical to continue such interest in a certain number of persons, most of whom were residing abroad, by that specific section for the following reasons: (1) To date, they had either not furnished any information at all or the information they did furnish was of little value or negligible; (2) The distance involved was a deterrent factor for operational use by Section 6, since it almost unanimously related to residents of the United States, Mexico, Canada, and Argentina; (3) If any of these persons were ever recruited by the UB and furnished information of value in the scientific/technical field, Section 6 did not have facilities in personnel or technical acumen to properly evaluate this data and would have to turn it over for analysis by the Soviets; and (4) Section 3, Department I of the UB had primary interest in and responsibility for "legal" operations in such Western countries as United States, Canada, Mexico, and Argentina anyway.

The analysis indicated that most of these people fell into two categories: (1) Those who might be of interest to Section 2 and were, therefore, turned over to that section for processing; and (2) Those who had been unproductive at that time to the extent that no information had ever been attributed to them and the data about them was retired to the archives.

SECRET

65-65-42-

ENCLOSURE

b3
b7E

Source stated that this task was finally completed in May, 1960, and that he had learned nothing further concerning any action taken by the US with respect to these persons, other than that Section 2 was still actively interested in some of the cases they had received as of May, 1960. Included in the list of persons about whom Section 2 had indicated continued interest in May, 1960, was Vitold Roman Kocay. Source advised that the following thumbnail sketch concerning Kocay was obtained from data turned over to Section 2 in May, 1960:

Vitold Kocay was a United States citizen of Polish extraction. He was a chemical engineer employed by a chemical company and resided in Stamford, Connecticut. US's interest in Kocay commenced in 1959 and the US had assigned him the pseudonym "Kot/I" for reference purposes.

Source was of the opinion that Kocay had furnished unclassified chemical data, which was retained by Section 2. Subject could furnish no additional information concerning this data or manner of its receipt by Section 2.

Source explained that US's interest in such persons as Kocay was initiated by such factors as his employment, background, and Polish origin. Source pointed out that, to his knowledge, none of these persons had furnished classified data to Polish intelligence as of May, 1960. He added that some of these people, however, had furnished unclassified material to the Polish Government which might have been motivated by love of their mother country. In many instances this material was primarily destined for friends and relatives in Poland who took it upon themselves to turn it over to Polish authorities. Source emphasized that people on this list could very well be loyal Americans who had no idea as to the ultimate destination of the material or information they had furnished and specifically had no idea with whom they were dealing.

Source stated that he was not personally acquainted with Kocay and could furnish no additional information about him. He also stated that he knew of no efforts by the US to recruit Kocay as of December, 1960, or if he had furnished any information to or been contacted by any representatives of the Polish Government abroad. Source stressed the point that such people as Kocay may not even have known that Polish intelligence had an interest in them and had given them pseudonyms for reference purposes.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-19-2020 BY: [redacted]

FD-323 (8-28-60)

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CONFIDENTIAL

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Washington 25, D. C.

Title [redacted]

b3
b7E

Character [redacted]

Reference Memorandum dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

CONFIDENTIAL

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE 65-65192-

~~SECRET~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 08-19-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

Tolson
Parsons
Mohr
Belmont
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach b6
Evans b7C
Malone
Rosen
Tavel
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Candy

TO : Mr. L'Allier

DATE: February 13, 1961

FROM : S. J. Papich

SUBJECT: JAN SLUSARZ
IS - POLAND

b1 Per
b3 CIA

On February 10, 1961, James Hunt, CIA, advised the Liaison Agent that his Agency is formulating a plan to approach the subject in Mexico City. Slusarz, an attache at the Polish Embassy, Mexico City, already has been identified as the UB representative in Mexico. Hunt confided that in organizing this plan CIA will utilize background information and suggestions being made by [redacted] CIA would like to recruit the subject in place in order to be able to operate him in Mexico. [redacted] has indicated that it was very doubtful that subject would agree to acting as a U.S. agent in Poland.

ACTION:

The above information is being directed to the attention of the Espionage Section.

b3
b7E

SJP:ban
(5)

1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. Wallace
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich

65-65192
NOT RECORDED
191 FEB 20 1961

REC-71

25 FEB 15 1961

b1 Per
b3 CIA

65-65192

[redacted]

b3
b7E

1 XEROX
FEB 20 1961

62 FEB 21 1961

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-19-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

b6
b7C

2/13/61

AIRTEL

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, WFO [redacted]

[redacted]

(00: NY)

b3
b7E

b3
b7D
b7E

Enclosed herewith are 6 copies for the Bureau, 2 copies for New York, and one copy for Chicago of a letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above. A similar number of copies of a letterhead memorandum evaluating the confidential source used in above-mentioned memorandum is also enclosed.

The confidential source mentioned is [redacted] who furnished the information to SAs JOSEPH E. MICHALSKI and CHESTER J. GUSTOWSKI on 2/1 and 8/61.

A copy is being forwarded for the information of Chicago in view of that office's interest in Polish intelligence activities and because of possibility of future investigation by Chicago in this matter.

RUC

4 - Bureau (Enc. 6) CONF. SOURCE [redacted]
(1 - 65-65192)
1 - Chicago (Enc. - 1) (INFO) (RM)
2 - New York (Enc. 2) (RM)
2 - WFO [redacted]

JEM:pmc
(9)

AIRTEL 2 ENCLOSURE

65-65192-1
NOT RECORDED
168 FEB 16 1961

FINAL FILED

b3
b7D
b7E

1 258

50 FEB 27 1961

WFO [redacted]

b3
b7E

It is noted that informant was in charge of Section 6, Department I, Polish Security Service (UB), prior to his defection and the analysis of cases mentioned in enclosed letterhead memorandum was initiated and directed by him. In view of informant's present status, extreme caution should be used regarding the above and information supplied by this source should be maintained on a need-to-know basis.

WFO indices contain no reference to W. S. GIERCZYNSKI, or UB pseudonym "KING."

LEADS

NEW YORK DIVISION

AT NEW YORK, NEW YORK

1. Will conduct appropriate investigation of subject to determine:

a. Background (employment, residence, citizenship)

b. Whether subject was or is presently employed in a vital facility. If so, whether subject had or has access to classified data.

c. If subject is in a position, because of contacts or employment, to be of value to Polish Intelligence.

2. Upon completion of investigation, will submit recommendations to the Bureau regarding interview of subject.

The letterhead memorandum is classified "Secret" to protect the identity of a defector who has not been surfaced and who is currently furnishing information of value.

The evaluation memorandum is classified ~~"Confidential"~~ in view of the highly sensitive nature of the source and because of Polish intelligence interest in a person domiciled in the U.S.

[redacted] SECRET

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-19-2020 BY [redacted]

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

February 13, 1961

[redacted]

b3
b7E

On February 1 and 8, 1961, a confidential source advised that in early 1957, a survey and analysis had been made by Section 6 (Technical/Scientific Branch), Department 1 (Foreign Intelligence), Polish Security Service (UB), in Warsaw, Poland, of the potential of individuals on whom data had been accumulated for reasons of possible eventual utilization for intelligence purposes. Upon completion of this analysis, Section 6 officials concluded that it would not be practical to continue such interest in a certain number of persons, most of whom were residing abroad, by that specific section for the following reasons: (1) To date, they had either not furnished any information at all or the information they did furnish was of little value or negligible; (2) The distance involved was a deterrent factor for operational use by Section 6 since it almost unanimously related to residents of the United States, Mexico, Canada, and Argentina; (3) If any of these persons were recruited by the UB and furnished information of value in the scientific/technical field, Section 6 did not have facilities in personnel or technical acumen to properly evaluate this data and would have to turn it over for analysis by the Soviets; and (4) Section 2, Department I of the UB, had primary interest in and responsibility for "legal" operations in such Western countries as United States, Canada, Mexico, and Argentina anyway.

The analysis indicated that most of these people fell into two categories: (1) Those who might be of interest to Section 2 and were, therefore, turned over to that section

65-65142

SECRET

ENCLOSURE

[redacted]

b3
b7E

for processing; and (2) those who had been unproductive at that time and the data about them was retired to the archives.

Source stated that this task was completed in May, 1958, and that the name of J. S. Cierczynski was included in data which had been retired to the archives. Source also advised that the following thumbnail sketch about J. S. Cierczynski was contained in this data:

J. S. Cierczynski was a salesman for metallurgical firms and lived in New York. He was of Polish nationality and had been assigned the cover name of "King." Notation was also made that Cierczynski did not constitute any operational value to the UB.

Source explained that UB interest in such persons as Cierczynski was initiated by such factors as his employment, background, and Polish origin. Source pointed out that, to his knowledge, none of these persons had furnished classified data to Polish Intelligence as of May, 1958. He added that some of these people, however, had furnished nonclassified material to the Polish Government which was probably motivated by love of their mother country. Source emphasized that people on this list could very well be loyal Americans who had no idea as to the ultimate destination of the material or information they had furnished and specifically had no idea with whom they were dealing.

Source stated that he was not personally acquainted with Cierczynski and could furnish no additional information about him. He also stated that he knew of no efforts by the UB to recruit Cierczynski as of December, 1960, or if he had furnished any information to or been contacted by any representatives of the Polish Government abroad. Source stressed the point that such people as Cierczynski may not

[redacted]

b3
b7E

even have known that Polish Intelligence had an interest in them and had given them pseudonyms for reference purposes.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-323 (3-28-60)

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-19-2020 BY: [redacted] b6 b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Washington 25, D. C.

February 13, 1961

Title [redacted] b3 b7E

Character [redacted]

Reference Memorandum dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

65-65192 -

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

SECRET

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-19-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

Mr. L'Allier

February 10, 1961

S. J. Papich

[redacted]

b7D

b1 Per
b3 CIA

On February 7, 1961, the Liaison Agent contacted James Hunt, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and pointed out that information developed through [redacted] has suggested that it might become necessary to disseminate certain information to the Atomic Energy Commission, Health, Education and Welfare, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The Liaison Agent asked for Hunt's views regarding such dissemination. Hunt conferred with other CIA officials and replied that CIA would not have any objection to any dissemination desired by the Bureau. CIA is taking the position that the Polish and Soviet intelligence services must be fully aware of the fact that [redacted] knew about the activities and assignments of the two subjects. CIA, therefore, feels that there is basically nothing to lose with appropriate dissemination.

b3
b7E

b1 Per
b3 CIA

[redacted] This development may be of interest to us in determining the nature of action we may desire to take in the United States.

With regard to [redacted] H. D. Nice, Immigration and Naturalization Service advised the Liaison Agent on February 7, 1961, that no action was being taken by INS concerning [redacted] visa status until Immigration and Naturalization Service had received a report from the Bureau.

b6
b7C
b7E

ACTION:

The above information is being directed to the attention of the Espionage Section.

SJP:ban
(8)
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. O'Neal
1 - [redacted] File
1 - Mr. McDonnell
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich

65-65192-

FEB 1 1961

b1 Per
b3 CIA

57 FEB 1

SECRET

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 08-19-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

Tolson
Parsons
Mohr
Belmont
Callahan
Conrad — b6
DeLoach
Evans — b7C
Malone
Rosen
Tavel
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : Mr. L'Allier

DATE: February 15, 1961

FROM : S. J. Papich

SUBJECT [redacted]

b1 Per
b3 CIA

On February 14, 1961, James Hunt, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), advised the Liaison Agent that CIA was not interposing any objection to the Bureau initiating investigations or disseminating information on the basis of data made available to us through [redacted] Hunt stated that as far as CIA is concerned it would be left to the Bureau's discretion to disseminate information received [redacted] or developed as a result of leads provided by the source.

ACTION:

The above information is being directed to the attention of the Espionage Section.

b1 Per
b3 CIA

SJP:ban
(5)

1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. McDonnell
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich

REC- 66 65192-100

EX-114

FEB 16 1961

65-65192

62 FEB 21 1961

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-19-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

2/20/61

AIRTEL

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted]

b3
b7E

FROM: SAC, WFO [redacted]

[redacted]

(OO: NY)

Enclosed are 6 copies for the Bureau, 3 copies for NY, and 1 copy each for CG and NY of a letterhead memo dated and captioned as above. A similar number of copies of a letterhead memo evaluating the confidential source used in above-mentioned memo are also enclosed. CONF. INFT.

The confidential source mentioned is [redacted] b7D
who furnished the info to SAs JOSEPH E. MICHALSKI and CHESTER J. GUSTOWSKI on 2/1,8/61.

Copies are being furnished for the info of CG and NY because of their interest in Polish Intelligence activities.

It is noted that informant was in charge of Section 6, Department I, Polish Security Service (UB), prior to his defection and the analysis of cases mentioned in enclosed was initiated and directed by him. In view of informant's present status, extreme caution should be used regarding the above info and it should be maintained on a need-to-know basis.

ENCLOSURE

RUC

4 - Bureau (Enc. 6)
(1 - 65-65192) [redacted] b3

1 - [redacted] (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM) b7D
3 - [redacted] (Enc. 3) (NY) b7E

1 - [redacted] (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
2 - WFO
[redacted]

JEM:mrs
(11)
AIRTEL

NOT RECORDED
174 MAR 1 1961

ORIGINAL FILED IN

[redacted]

b3
b7E

WFO indices contain no info concerning the UB pseudonym "ANASTAZY."

LEAD

ME DIVISION

AT NASHVILLE, TENN.

Will consider requesting the Bureau, through London Legat, to have OTOWSKI interviewed by appropriate sources in Sweden regarding ASCIK, if this has not already been done.

WFO indices disclosed in the Satellite Intelligence Album prepared by the Bureau, that JOSEF (JOZEF) OTOWSKI was Industrial Attache, Polish Embassy, London, England, in 1949 and that sources had described him as a Polish Intelligence Officer engaged in intelligence work while in the United Kingdom.

The letterhead memo is classified ~~"Secret"~~ to protect the identity of a defector, who has not been surfaced and who is currently furnishing info of value. The evaluation memo is classified ~~"Confidential"~~ in view of Polish Intelligence interest in a person domiciled in the U. S.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-19-2020 BY: [redacted]

SECRET

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

February 20, 1961

[redacted]

b3
b7E

On February 1 and 8, 1961, a confidential source advised that in early 1957, a survey and analysis had been begun by Section 6 (Technical/Scientific Branch), Department I (Foreign Intelligence), Polish Security Service (UB), in Warsaw, Poland, of the potential of individuals on whom data had been accumulated for reasons of possible eventual utilization for intelligence purposes. Upon completion of this analysis, Section 6 officials concluded that it would not be practical to continue such interest in a certain number of persons, most of whom were residing abroad, by that specific section for some of the following reasons: (1) To date, they had either not furnished any information at all or the information they did furnish was of little value or negligible; (2) The distance involved was a deterrent factor for operational use by Section 6, since it almost unanimously related to residents of the United States, Mexico, Canada, and Argentina; (3) If any of these persons were ever recruited by the UB and furnished information of value in the scientific/technical field, Section 6 did not have facilities in personnel or technical acumen to properly evaluate this data and would have to turn it over for analysis by the Soviets; and (4) Section 2, Department I of the UB had primary interest in and responsibility for "legal" operations in such Western countries as United States, Canada, Mexico, and Argentina anyway.

The analysis indicated that most of these people fell into two categories: (1) Those who might be of interest to Section 2 and were, therefore, turned over to that section for processing; and (2) Those who had been unproductive at that time to the extent that no information had ever been attributed to them and the data about them was retired to the archives.

SECRET

65-65192-

ENCLOSURE

RE: [redacted]

b3
b7E

Source stated that in May, 1958, data concerning various people, including Antoni Ancik, was turned over to Section 2 for their consideration. He advised that Major Rombel, a Staff Officer in Section 2, noted in May, 1960, that that section was still actively interested in Antoni Ancik. Source further advised that the following thumbnail sketch about Ancik was obtained from data turned over to Section 2 in May, 1958: Antoni Ancik, born January 18, 1918; Polish nationality and citizenship; metallurgical engineer; Director of a steel mill/factory; resides in Pittsburgh, USA. Notation was also made that UB interest in Ancik commenced in 1952 and that he had been assigned the pseudonym "Anastasy" for reference purposes.

Source recalled that, according to Major Rombel, a co-opted worker (collaborator) for the Polish Military Intelligence (2-II) named Otawski, who had been attached to the Polish Embassy in London, England, initiated interest in Ancik by Polish Intelligence in 1952. Source added that Major Rombel had also indicated he had planned to contact Ancik personally, while the latter was in Europe approximately in 1956, for purposes of recruitment, but his plans in that respect did not materialize. Source noted that Otawski defected to Sweden in 1960, while attached to the Polish Embassy in Stockholm, and that he undoubtedly had considerable information concerning UB efforts with respect to Ancik.

Source stated that the UB received information on steel, which was attributed to Ancik. He further recalled that sometime in 1957, information from Ancik was forwarded to Warsaw through their residentura attached to the Polish Embassy, Washington, D. C., but that he did not know if Ancik was actually an agent for the UB.

Source explained that UB interest in such people as Ancik was initiated by such factors as his employment, background and Polish origin. Source pointed out that, to his knowledge, none of these persons had furnished classified data to Polish Intelligence as of May, 1958. He added that some of these people, however, had furnished unclassified material to the Polish Government which might have been

b3
b7E

[redacted]

motivated by love of their mother country. In many instances, this material was primarily destined for friends or relatives in Poland, who took it upon themselves to turn it over to Polish authorities. Source emphasized that people on this list could very well be loyal Americans who had no idea as to the ultimate destination of the material or information they had furnished or specifically had no idea with whom they were dealing.

Source stated that he was not personally acquainted with Ascik and could furnish no additional information about him or about any family he might have in Poland. He also stated that as of December, 1960, he learned nothing further about UB plans relative to Ascik or if Ascik had ever been actually recruited by the UB.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-19-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

b6
b7C

2/20/61

AIRTEL

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, WFO [redacted]

b3
b7E

[redacted]

(OO:NY)

Enclosed are six copies for the Bureau, two copies for New York and one copy for Chicago of a letterhead memo dated and captioned as above. Also enclosed is a similar number of copies of a letterhead memo evaluating the confidential source used in above-mentioned memo.

b3
b7D
b7E

Confidential Source

The confidential source mentioned is [redacted] who furnished the information to SAs JOSEPH E. MICHALSKI and CHESTER J. GUSTOWSKI on 2/1,8/61.

One copy is being furnished for the information of Chicago in view of its interest in Polish Intelligence activities.

It is noted that informant was in charge of Section 6, Department I, Polish Security Service (UB)

RUC
4 - Bureau (Encls. 6)
(1-65-65192) [redacted]
1 - Chicago (Encl. 1) (Info) (RM)
2 - New York (Encls. 2) (RM)
2 - WFO
[redacted]

b3
b7D
b7E

JEM:mdc
(9)

65-65192
NOT RECORDED
87 MAR 7 1961

AIRTEL

ENCLOSURE

63 MAR 2 1961

ORIGINAL FILED

b3
b7E

prior to his defection and the analysis of cases mentioned in enclosed was initiated and directed by him. In view of the informant's present status extreme caution should be used regarding the above information and it should be maintained on a need-to-know basis.

WFO indices disclosed no identifiable data concerning STANISLAW KARAS or his UB pseudonym "Rak."

LEADS

NEW YORK DIVISION

AT NEW YORK, NEW YORK

1. Will attempt to locate and further identify subject.

2. Upon identification of subject, will conduct appropriate investigation to determine:

   1. Background (employment, residence, citizenship).

   2. Whether subject was or is presently employed in a vital facility. If so, whether subject had or has access to classified data.

   3. If subject is in a position, because of contacts or employment, to be of value to Polish Intelligence.

3. Upon completion of investigation, will submit recommendations to the Bureau regarding interview of subject.

The letterhead memo is classified ~~"Secret"~~ to protect the identity of a defector who has not been surfaced and who is currently furnishing information of value.

The evaluation memo is classified ~~"Confidential"~~ in view of Polish Intelligence interest in a person domiciled in the U. S.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-19-2020 BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~SECRET~~

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
February 20, 1961

[redacted]

b3
b7E

On February 1 and 8, 1961, a confidential source advised that in early 1957, a survey and analysis had been begun by Section 6 (Technical/Scientific Branch), Department I (Foreign Intelligence), Polish Security Service (UB), in Warsaw, Poland, of the potential of individuals on whom data had been accumulated for reasons of possible eventual utilization for intelligence purposes. Upon completion of this analysis, Section 6 officials concluded that it would not be practical to continue such interest in a certain number of persons, most of whom were residing abroad, by that specific section for some of the following reasons: (1) To date, they had either not furnished any information at all or the information they did furnish was of little value or negligible; (2) The distance involved was a deterrent factor for operational use by Section 6, since it almost unanimously related to residents of the United States, Mexico, Canada and Argentina; (3) If any of these persons were ever recruited by the UB and furnished information of value in the scientific/technical field, Section 6 did not have facilities in personnel or technical acumen to properly evaluate this data and would have to turn it over for analysis by the Soviets; and (4) Section 2, Department I of the UB had primary interest in and responsibility for "legal" operations in such Western countries as United States, Canada, Mexico and Argentina anyway.

The analysis indicated that most of these people fell into two categories: (1) Those who might be of interest to Section 2 and were, therefore, turned over to that section

~~SECRET~~

65-65792

ENCLOSURE

Re: [redacted]

b3
b7E

of the Polish government abroad. Source stressed the point that such people as Karas may not even have known that Polish Intelligence had an interest in them and had given them pseudonyms for reference purposes.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-19-2020 BY [redacted]

FD-323 (3-28-60)

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Washington 25, D.C.
February 20, 1961

b3
b7E

Title [redacted]

Character [redacted]

Reference Memorandum dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

65-65192

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-19-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

2/17/61

AIRTEL

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, WFO [redacted]

b3
b7E

[redacted]

(OO: NK)

Enclosed are 6 copies for the Bureau, 2 copies for NK, and 1 copy each for CG and NY, of a letterhead memo, dated and captioned as above. A similar number of copies of a letterhead memo evaluating the confidential source used in above-mentioned memo are also enclosed.

The confidential source mentioned is [redacted] b7D who furnished the info to SAs JOSEPH E. MICHALSKI and CHESTER J. GUSTOWSKI on 2/1,8/61.

Copies are being furnished for the info of CG and NY in view of their interest in Polish Intelligence activities and because of possibility of future investigation by those offices in this matter.

It is noted that informant was in charge of Section 6, Department I, Polish Security Service (UB), prior to his defection and the analysis of cases mentioned in enclosed was initiated and directed by him. In view of informant's present status, extreme caution should be used regarding the above and it should be maintained on a need-to-know basis.

CONF. INFT.

RUC
4 - Bureau (Enc. 6) [redacted]
~~1 - 65-65192~~)
1 - Chicago (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
1 - New York (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
2 - Newark (Enc. 2) (RM)
2 - WFO [redacted]

b3
b7D
b7E

65-65192-
NOT RECORDED
191 MAR 2 1961

JEM:mrs
(10)
1 ENCLOSURE

AIRTEL
51 MAR 6 1961

ORIGINAL FILED IN

WFO [redacted]

WFO file 62-0-9343 indicated that ONE STANISLAW WOJCIECH ROGALSKI, 410 Shorehaven Drive, Erie, Penna., on 2/24/49 presented a copy of a letter dated 2/21/49, addressed to the Bureau, requesting advice at WFO on how to obtain clearance for employment on classified aircraft contracts. Bureau's jurisdiction was explained to him and he was advised that he would receive a reply to his letter.

Report of SA THOMAS S. LOVERING, dated 9/14/53 at NK, captioned [redacted] reflected that b3 b7E MICHAEL STROUKOFF, President of Chase Aircraft Co., Trenton, NJ, displayed personnel file of STANISLAW WOJCIECH ROGALSKI, which revealed the following info:

ROGALSKI was born 5/25/04 at Olomouc, Czechoslovakia; Polish national; and was employed at the Chase Aircraft Co. For the period of 1929-1939, he was employed as a teacher at Technical Institute of Warsaw and also at Lwow, and at the Experimental Aircraft Factory, Okecie in Warsaw. From February, 1940, to February, 1941, he was employed at Westland Aircraft, Ltd., England, and from 1941 to 1943, he taught at Technical University of Istanbul, Turkey. From March, 1949, to 4/6/49, he was employed at Lord Manufacturing Co., Erie, Penna. His present address was listed as 1920 Riverside Drive, Trenton, NJ, and his address in 1949, as 410 Shorehaven Drive, Erie, Penna.

WFO indices contain no info concerning the UB pseudonym "ROGACZ."

LEAD

NK OFFICE

AT TRENTON, NJ

1. Will conduct appropriate investigation of subject to determine:

   1. Background (employment, residence, citizenship)

   2. Whether subject was or is presently employed in a vital facility. If so, whether subject had or has access to classified data.

WFO [redacted]

b3
b7E

3. If subject is in a position, because of contacts or employment, to be of value to Polish Intelligence.

2. Upon completion of investigation, will submit recommendations to the Bureau regarding interview of subject.

The letterhead memo is classified "~~Secret~~" to protect the identity of a defector, who has not been surfaced and who is currently furnishing info of value. The evaluation memo is classified "~~Confidential~~" in view of Polish Intelligence interest in a person domiciled in the U. S.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-19-2020 BY: [redacted]

SECRET

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C. 1961

b3
b7E

[redacted]

On February 1 and 6, 1961, a confidential source advised that in early 1957, a survey and analysis had been begun by Section 6 (Technical/Scientific Branch), Department I (Foreign Intelligence), Polish Security Service (UB), in Warsaw, Poland, of the potential of individuals on whom data had been accumulated for reasons of possible eventual utilization for intelligence purposes. Upon completion of this analysis, Section 6 officials concluded that it would not be practical to continue such interest in a certain number of persons, most of whom were residing abroad, by that specific section for some of the following reasons: (1) To date, they had either not furnished any information at all or the information they did furnish was of little value or negligible; (2) The distance involved was a deterrent factor for operational use by Section 6, since it almost unanimously related to residents of the United States, Mexico, Canada, and Argentina; (3) If any of these persons were ever recruited by the UB and furnished information of value in the scientific/technical field, Section 6 did not have facilities in personnel or technical acumen to properly evaluate this data and would have to turn it over for analysis by the Soviets; and (4) Section 2, Department I of the UB had primary interest in and responsibility for "legal" operations in such Western countries as United States, Canada, Mexico, and Argentina anyway.

The analysis indicated that most of these people fell into two categories: (1) Those who might be of interest to Section 2 and were, therefore, turned over to that section for processing; and (2) Those who had been unproductive at that time to the extent that no information had ever been attributed to them and the data about them was retired to the archives.

SECRET

ENCLOSURE 1

RE: [redacted]

b3
b7E

Source stated that in May, 1950, data concerning Stanislaw Bagalski was included in material turned over to Section 2 for further consideration. Source also stated that the following thumbnail sketch about Bagalski was obtained from this data: Stanislaw Bagalski was a construction engineer of Polish extraction and resided in Trenton. The UB had assigned him the pseudonym of "Bagaza" for reference purposes.

Source explained that UB interest in such people as Bagalski was initiated by such factors as his employment, background and Polish origin. Source pointed out that, to his knowledge, none of these persons had furnished classified data to Polish Intelligence as of May, 1950. He added that some of these people, however, had furnished unclassified material to the Polish Government which might have been motivated by love of their mother country. In many instances, this material was primarily destined for friends or relatives in Poland, who took it upon themselves to turn it over to Polish authorities. Source emphasized that people on this list could very well be loyal Americans who had no idea as to the ultimate destination of the material or information they had furnished or specifically had no idea with whom they were dealing.

Source stated that he was not personally acquainted with Bagalski and could furnish no additional information about him. He also stated that he knew of no efforts by the UB to recruit Bagalski as of December, 1949, or if he had furnished any information to or been contacted by any representatives of the Polish Government abroad. Source stressed the point that such people as Bagalski may not even have known that Polish Intelligence had an interest in them and had given them pseudonyms for reference purposes.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-323 (3-28-60)

~~SECRET~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-19-2020 BY [redacted]

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

b6
b7C

Washington 25, D. C.
February 17, 1961

Title [redacted]

b3
b7E

Character [redacted]

Reference **Memorandum dated and captioned as above.**

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

~~SECRET~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE 65-65192

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-19-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

2/17/61

AIRTEL

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, WFO [redacted]

b3
b7E

[redacted]

(OO:NY)

Enclosed are six copies for the Bureau and two copies for New York and one copy for Chicago of a letterhead memo dated and captioned as above. Also enclosed is a similar number of copies of a letterhead memo evaluating the confidential source used in above-mentioned memo.

The confidential source mentioned is [redacted] b7D who furnished the information to SAsJOSEPH E. MICHALSKI and CHESTER J. GUSTOWSKI on 2/1,8/61.

A copy is being furnished for the information of Chicago in view of its interest in Polish Intelligence activities.

It is noted that informant was in charge of Section 6, Department I, Polish Security Service (UB) b3 b7E

RUC
CONF. INFT.
4 - Bureau (Encls. 6)
(1-65-65192) [redacted]
1 - Chicago (Encl. 1) (Info) (RM)
2 - New York (Encls. 2) (RM)
2 - WFO
[redacted] b3 b7D b7E

JEM:mdc
(9)

AIRTEL

65-65192
NOT RECORDED
133 FEB 21 1961

50 MAR 1 1961

ORIGINAL FILED IN

WFO [redacted]

prior to his defection and the analysis of cases mentioned in enclosed was initiated and directed by him. In view of the informant's present status extreme caution should be used regarding the above information and it should be maintained on a need-to-know basis.

WFO indices disclosed that TADEUSZ ULLMAN, 6849 Burns Road, Forest Hills, New York, had been interviewed by Bureau Agents on 8/5/49, at the Offices of Einco, 51 South Street, New York City, where he was employed as an Assistant Manager of the Export Department, in connection with ANTONI KOREJWO (report of SA KENNETH S. SMITH dated 9/16/49, at Detroit, Michigan), [redacted] b3 b7E captioned [redacted]

WFO letter to the Director 7/25/49, captioned [redacted] indicated that Lt. General IZYDOR MODELSKI (a defected Polish official) informed Bureau Agents in July, 1949, that KOREJWO was employed in the Intelligence Service of the Polish government in exile and was under the supervision of TADEUSZ ULLMAN who was then Head of the Polish Intelligence Service (World War II).

WFO indices contained no data identifiable with the pseudonym "Szum."

LEADS

NEW YORK DIVISION

AT NEW YORK, NEW YORK

1. Will conduct appropriate investigation to determine:

   1. Background (employment, residence, citizenship).

   2. Whether subject was or is presently employed in a vital facility. If so, whether subject had or has access to classified data.

   3. If subject is in a position, because of contacts or employment, to be of value to Polish Intelligence.

2. Upon completion of investigation, will submit recommendations to the Bureau regarding interview of subject.

WFO [redacted]

b3
b7E

The letterhead memo is classified ~~"Secret"~~ to protect the identity of a defector who has not been surfaced and who is currently furnishing information of value.

The evaluation memo is classified ~~"Confidential"~~ in view of Polish Intelligence interest in a person domiciled in the U. S.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-19-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

2/17/61

AIRTEL

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, WFO [redacted]

b3
b7E

[redacted]

(OO:DE)

b3
b7D
b7E

Enclosed are six copies for the Bureau and two copies for Detroit and one copy each for Chicago and New York of a letterhead memo dated and captioned as above. Also enclosed is a similar number of copies of a letterhead memo evaluating the confidential source used in above-mentioned memo.

The confidential source mentioned is [redacted] who furnished the information to SAs JOSEPH E. MICHALSKI and CHESTER J. GUSTOWSKI on 2/1,8/61.

Copies are being furnished for the information of Chicago and New York in view of their interest in Polish Intelligence activities.

RUC Conf. Source
(4) - Bureau (Encls. 6)
(1-65-65192) [redacted]
1 - Chicago (Encl. 1) (Info) (RM)
2 - Detroit (Encls. 2) (RM)
1 - New York (Encl. 1) (Info) (RM)
2 - WFO [redacted]

JEM:mdc
(10)

57 MAR 1 1961

AIRTEL

1 65-65192
NOT RECORDED
185 FEB 21 1961

2 ENCLOSURE

[redacted]

b3
b7D
b7E

ORIGINAL FILED IN

WFO [redacted] b3 b7E

It is noted that informant was in charge of Section 6, Department I, Polish Security Service (UB) prior to his defection and the analysis of cases mentioned in enclosed was initiated and directed by him. In view of informant's present status extreme caution should be used regarding the above information and it should be maintained on a need-to-know basis.

WFO indices disclosed the following information obtained from Passport Office, Department of State, contained in WFO letter to Director 4/19/56, captioned as above:

ANTONI NIEDZWIECKI was born 5/14/00, at Colanka, Poland and immigrated to the U. S. on 3/7/03. Since his arrival in the U. S. he has resided at Wilmington, Delaware, New London, Connecticut, Springfield and Worcester, Massachusetts. His permanent address was listed as 77 Harlem Street, Worcester, Massachusetts, and he was naturalized in Worcester on 3/27/23. His occupation is listed as a machinist. A passport was issued him on 10/13/55. On his passport application, NIEDZWIECKI stated he intended to leave New York on 12/15/55, for a three month trip to Poland to visit his brothers KONSTANTY and PETER NIEDZWIECKI who are living in Radzidlo, Poland.

Passport files also indicated that NIEDZWIECKI was in Poland from August, 1949 to September, 1949.

It is not known if above person is identical with the subject due to insufficient data concerning both persons. In view of discrepancies as to residence and occupation it does not appear that they are identical.

WFO indices contained no information identifiable with the UB pseudonym "Wiek."

LEADS

DETROIT DIVISION

AT DETROIT, MICHIGAN

1. Will attempt to locate and further identify subject.

2. Upon identification of subject, will conduct appropriate investigation to determine:

LFO [redacted]

b3
b7E

1. Background (employment, residence, citizenship)

2. Whether subject was or is presently employed in a vital facility. If so, whether subject had or has access to classified data.

3. If subject is in a position, because of contacts or employment, to be of value to Polish Intelligence.

3. Upon completion of investigation, will submit recommendations to the Bureau regarding interview of subject.

The letterhead memo is classified ~~"Secret"~~ to protect the identity of a defector who has not been surfaced and who is currently furnishing information of value.

The evaluation memo is classified ~~"Confidential"~~ in view of Polish Intelligence interest in a person domiciled in the U. S.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-19-2020 BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~SECRET~~

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
February 17, 1961

[redacted]

b3
b7E

On February 1 and 8, 1961, a confidential source advised that in early 1957, a survey and analysis had been begun by Section 6 (Technical/ Scientific Branch), Department I (Foreign Intelligence), Polish Security Service (UB), in Warsaw, Poland, of the potential of individuals on whom data had been accumulated for reasons of possible eventual utilization for intelligence purposes. Upon completion of this analysis, Section 6 officials concluded that it would not be practical to continue such interest in a certain number of persons, most of whom were residing abroad, by that specific section for some of the following reasons: (1) To date, they had either not furnished any information at all or the information they did furnish was of little value or negligible; (2) The distance involved was a deterrent factor for operational use by Section 6, since it almost unanimously related to residents of the United States, Mexico, Canada and Argentina; (3) If any of these persons were ever recruited by the UB and furnished information of value in the scientific/ technical field, Section 6 did not have facilities in personnel or technical acumen to properly evaluate this data and would have to turn it over for analysis by the Soviets; and (4) Section 2, Department I of the UB had primary interest in and responsibility for "legal" operations in such Western countries as United States, Canada, Mexico and Argentina anyway.

The analysis indicated that most of these people fell into two categories: (1) Those who might be of interest

~~SECRET~~

65-6272

ENCLOSURE

SECRET

Re: [redacted]

b3
b7E

to Section 2 and were, therefore, turned over to that section for processing; and (2) those who had been unproductive at that time to the extent that no information had ever been attributed to them and the data about them was retired to the archives.

Source stated that in May, 1958, data concerning Antoni Niedzwiecki was relegated to the archives. Source further advised that the following thumbnail sketch about Niedzwiecki was obtained from this material:

Antoni Niedzwiecki was a mechanical engineer of Polish extraction and resided in Detroit. The UB foresaw no possible utilization of Niedzwiecki in the future and had previously assigned him the pseudonym "Niek."

Source explained that UB interest in such people as Niedzwiecki was initiated by such factors as his employment, background and Polish origin. Source pointed out that, to his knowledge, none of these persons had furnished classified data to Polish intelligence as of May, 1958. He added that some of these people, however, had furnished unclassified material to the Polish government which might have been motivated by love of their mother country. In many instances, this material was primarily destined for friends or relatives in Poland, who took it upon themselves to turn it over to Polish authorities. Source emphasized that people on this list could very well be loyal Americans who had no idea as to the ultimate destination of the material or information they had furnished or specifically had no idea with whom they were dealing.

Source stated that he was not personally acquainted with Niedzwiecki and could furnish no additional information about him. He also stated that he knew of no efforts by the UB to recruit Niedzwiecki as of December, 1960, or if he had furnished any information to or been contacted by any representatives of the Polish government abroad. Source stressed the point that such people as Niedzwiecki may not even have known that Polish intelligence had an interest in them and had given them pseudonyms for reference purposes.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

SECRET

FD-323 (3-28-60)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Washington, D. C.
February 17, 1961

b6
b7C

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-19-2020 BY:

Title

b3
b7E

Character

Reference Memorandum dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

65-65192-

ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-19-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

b6
b7C

2/16/61

AIRTEL

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, WFO [redacted]

b3
b7E

[redacted]

(OO:CG)

Enclosed are six copies for the Bureau, two copies for Chicago, one each for Indianapolis and New York of a letterhead memo dated and captioned as above. A similar number of copies of a letterhead memo evaluating the confidential source used in above-mentioned memo is also enclosed.

b3
b7D
b7E

The confidential source mentioned is [redacted] who furnished the information to SAs JOSEPH E. MICHALSKI and CHESTER J. GUSTOWSKI on 2/1,8/61.

Copies are being furnished for the information of Indianapolis and New York in view of possibility of future investigation by those offices in this matter.

RUC
Copy Source
4 - Bureau (Encls. 6)
(1-65-65192) [redacted]
2 - Chicago (Encls. 2) (RM)
1 - Indianapolis (Encl. 1) (Info) (RM)
1 - New York (Encl. 1) (Info) (RM)
2 - WFO
[redacted]

1 65-65192
NOT RECORDED
170 MAR 3 1961

JEM:mdc
(10)

AIRTEL

1 ENCLOSURE

51 MAR 8 1961

b3
b7D
b7E

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

WFO [redacted] b3 b7E

It is noted that informant was in charge of Section 6, Department I, Polish Security Service (UB) prior to his defection and the analysis of cases mentioned in enclosed was initiated and directed by him. In view of informant's present status extreme caution should be used regarding the above information, and it should be maintained on a need-to-know basis.

WFO indices disclosed the following information in FD Form 210 dated 11/14/60. INS, New York, advised the New York Division on 11/7/60, that [redacted] b6 b7C B-2 visa, arrived 11/5/60, on Scandinavian Airlines (SAS) flight 919 at New York International Airport, New York. Destination was listed as 1500 Markland Avenue, Kokomo, Indiana, and he was admitted until 3/29/61.

It is not known if the above individual may be identical with the subject due to insufficient data concerning both.

WFO indices were negative regarding the UB pseudonym "Elektryk."

LEADS

CHICAGO DIVISION

AT CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

1. Will attempt to locate and further identify subject.

2. Upon identification of subject, will conduct appropriate investigation to determine:

   1. Background (employment, residence, citizenship)

   2. Whether subject was or is presently employed in a vital facility. If so, whether subject had or has access to classified data.

   3. If subject is in a position, because of contacts or employment, to be of value to Polish Intelligence.

WFO [redacted]

b3
b7E

3. Upon completion of investigation, will submit recommendations to the Bureau regarding interview of subject.

The letterhead memo is classified ~~"Secret"~~ to protect the identity of a defector who has not been surfaced and who is currently furnishing information of value.

The evaluation memo is classified ~~"Confidential"~~ in view of Polish Intelligence interest in a person domiciled in the U. S.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-19-2020 BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
February 10, 1961

b3
b7E

[redacted]

On February 1 and 6, 1961, a confidential source advised that in early 1957, a survey and analysis had been begun by Section 6 (Technical/Scientific Branch), Department I (Foreign Intelligence), Polish Security Service (UB) in Warsaw, Poland, of the potential of individuals on whom data had been accumulated for reasons of possible eventual utilization for intelligence purposes. Upon completion of this analysis, Section 6 officials concluded that it would not be practical to continue such interest in a certain number of persons, most of whom were residing abroad, by that specific section for some of the following reasons: (1) To date, they had either not furnished any information at all or the information they did furnish was of little value or negligible; (2) The distance involved was a deterrent factor for operational use by Section 6, since it almost unanimously related to residents of the United States, Mexico, Canada, and Argentina; (3) If any of these persons were ever recruited by the UB and furnished information of value in the scientific/technical field, Section 6 did not have facilities in personnel or technical access to properly evaluate this data and would have to turn it over for analysis by the Soviets; and (4) Section 2, Department I of the UB had primary interest in and responsibility for "legal" operations in such Western countries as United States, Canada, Mexico and Argentina anyway.

The analysis indicated that most of these people fell into two categories: (1) Those who might be of interest to Section 2 and were, therefore, turned over to that section for processing; and (2) Those who had been unproductive at that time to the extent that no information had ever been attributed to them and the data about them was retired to the archives.

65-65192 ~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE

Re: [redacted]

b3
b7E

Source stated that in May, 1948, data concerning Josef Zaborowski was included in material turned over to Section X for further consideration. Source also stated that the following thumbnail sketch about Zaborowski was obtained from this data:

Josef Zaborowski resided in Chicago and was of Polish extraction. He was an electrical engineer and was employed in a firm producing parts for production automation. US interest in Zaborowski commenced in 1946, and he was assigned the pseudonym of "Elektryk" for reference purposes.

Source explained that US interest in such people as Zaborowski was initiated by such factors as his employment, background and Polish origin. Source pointed out that, to his knowledge, none of these persons had furnished classified data to Polish intelligence as of May, 1948. He added that some of these people, however, had furnished unclassified material to the Polish government which might have been motivated by love of their mother country. In many instances, this material was primarily destined for friends or relatives in Poland, who took it upon themselves to turn it over to Polish authorities. Source emphasized that people on this list could very well be loyal Americans who had no idea as to the ultimate destination of the material or information they had furnished or specifically had no idea with whom they were dealing.

Source stated that he was not personally acquainted with Zaborowski and could furnish no additional information about him. He also stated that he knew of no efforts by the US to recruit Zaborowski as of December, 1950, or if he had furnished any information to or been contacted by any representatives of the Polish government abroad. Source stressed the point that such people as Zaborowski may not even have known that Polish intelligence had an interest in them and had given them pseudonyms for reference purposes.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-19-2020 BY [redacted]

b6
b7C

FD-323 (3-28-60)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Washington, D. C.
February 16, 1961

Title [redacted]

b3
b7E

Character [redacted]

Reference Memorandum dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE

65-65792-

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-19-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

b6
b7C

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: [illegible]

FROM : SAC, WFO

b3
b7E

SUBJECT: [redacted]

(OO:NY)

[redacted]

(OO:NY)

ReBulet 3/1/61, captioned as above, setting out lead for WFO to show photographs of captioned Polish Nationals to [redacted]

Two copies being furnished for info of Newark as re Bulet indicates both subjects planned to visit Englewood, New Jersey.

[redacted] advised SAs JOSEPH E. MICHALSKI and CHESTER J. GUSTOWSKI on 3/9/61 that he did not recognize the name or photograph of CZELADSKI and could furnish no information about him. b7D

Informant stated he did not recognize the photograph of STROCZAN but recalled that a person of this name had been attached to the Commercial Office of the Polish Embassy, Paris, France, a few years ago. Informant stated following concerning STROCZAN was common knowledge among Polish Security Service (UB) officials:

RUC
(5) - Bureau
(1 - 65-65192)
2 - Newark (Info) (RM)
4 - New York (RM)
3 - WFO

Other Source [redacted]

b3
b7D
b7E

[redacted]

JEM:bjt
(14)

65-65192-
NOT RECORDED
183 MAR 24 1961

66 MAR 29 1961

ORIGINAL FILED IN

[redacted] b3 b7E

STROCZAN was of Jewish descent, and did not use his true name. While in France he was a co-opted (collaborator) worker for the UB and had been a friend of a high UB official named CZAPLICKI since 1954. In addition, STROCZAN enjoyed the protection of Vice-Minister JOZEF KUTIN of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Trade at one time.

STROCZAN was concerned with Polish Communist Party activities while in France with regard to finances and to business ventures controlled by the Polish Communist Party. In that connection he was later suspected of embezzling party funds from such activities which he deposited in a Swiss bank.

Upon his return to Warsaw, Poland, STROCZAN declined an offer to be an agent for the UB and as of December, 1960, has not been associated with the UB.

Subsequent to his return to Poland, the section within Department II (counterintelligence), UB, which deals with defensive counterintelligence in the field of foreign trade instituted an investigation of STROCZAN's financial manipulations while in France.

WFO indices contain no additional information concerning subjects.

[redacted] should be characterized as having furnished reliable information in the past. Information disseminated should be carefully paraphrased to protect the identity of the informant. The information should be classified ~~"Secret"~~ in order to protect the identity of a defector who has not been surfaced and who is currently furnishing information of value. b7D

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted] 3/16/61

b3
b7E

SAC, [redacted]

[redacted]

CO: New York

Re Bureau letter to Chicago, dated 1/13/61.

Enclosures of a letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above are six for the Bureau, two for New York, and two for Washington Field Office.

The source referred to in enclosed letterhead memorandum is [redacted] who was contacted by SA FRANCIS W. EVANS, JR., on January 23, 1961.

b7D

The letterhead memorandum is classified "Secret" to protect the identity of a Polish defector who is currently furnishing information of value to the United States Government authorities.

The reliability memorandum is classified "Confidential" inasmuch as it indicates investigative interest in a foreign diplomatic establishment and/or a foreign diplomatic official.

b3
b7E

[redacted]

MJC.

4 - Bureau (Encl. 6) (RM)
(1 - 62-65102)
2 - [redacted] (Encl. 2) (RM)
2 - [redacted] (Encl. 2) (RM)
1 - Chicago

MJC:mjd
(9)

ENCLOSURE

62-65102-F-360
RECORDED
78 MAR 21 1961

62 1 MAR 27 1961

CLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted]

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Chicago, Illinois
March 16, 1961

SECRET

UNKNOWN SUBJECT, also known as
"Chlopak" (Illegal Resident
Polish Military Agent)
INTERNAL SECURITY - POLAND

On January 23, 1961, a source advised that he has no knowledge of a supposed Illegal Resident Polish Military Agent using the name "Chlopak". He related that he has no information pertaining to any individual in New York City, New York, who reportedly operates a travel agency and was or is a Polish Military Agent.

He did state however, that he learned through rumor in the mid-1950's, that a Polish Military Agent, who was an American citizen, came to Warsaw, Poland, a few days before the arrest of General Waclaw Komar, former Director of Polish Military Intelligence (then O-II, now Z-II), for an operational meet with Komar. This individual reportedly arrived by train from the Federal Republic of Germany and was warned by friends of Komar's arrest and left immediately by train back to West Berlin, Germany. He continued that he had no further information relating to this individual.

This source also advised that Jack Bjoze and Lazarez Ajces are unknown to him.

This memorandum is loaned to you by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and neither it nor its contents are to be distributed outside the agency to which loaned.

SECRET

65-65192-

ENCLOSURE

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Chicago, Illinois
March 16, 1961

Title [redacted]

Character [redacted]

b3
b7E

Reference Letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

65-65192-

ENCLOSURE

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

3/16/61

AIRTEL

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, WFO [redacted]

b3
b7E

[redacted]

Enclosed herewith are 6 copies for the Bureau, one copy each for MM and NY of a letterhead memo dated and captioned as above. Also enclosed are a similar number of copies of a letterhead memorandum evaluating the confidential source used in above-mentioned memorandum.

b3
b7D
b7E

The confidential source mentioned is [redacted] who furnished the info to SAs JOSEPH E. NICHALSKI and CHESTER J. GUSTOWSKI on 3/9/61.

Copies are being furnished for the info of MM and NY in view of their interest in Cuban matters.

Prior to the interview with [redacted] on 3/9/61, a representative of the CIA mentioned that he jotted down the subject's name from an overseas edition of the "Stars and Stripes" after noting from this unidentified issue that

[redacted]

FINAL FILED IN

b3
b7D
b7E

RUC
(5)- Bureau (Encs. 6) CONF. INFT.
(1)- 65-65192) [redacted]
[redacted] (Foreign Political Matters - Cuba)
1 - Miami (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
1 - New York (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
3 - WFO
[redacted]
[redacted] (Foreign Political Matters -
JRM:[redacted]
(10)

65-65192
NOT RECORDED
98 MAR 20 1961

AIRTEL

3 ENCLOSURE

66 MAR 24 1961

WFO [redacted]

b3
b7E

she was reported to be a private secretary of FIDEL CASTRO in Cuba. During the course of the interview this info was brought to the attention of the informant as a matter of interest and he provided the info set out in the letterhead memo.

WFO indices disclosed no info pertaining to subject.

The letterhead memo is classified "Secret" to protect the identity of a defector who has not been surfaced and who is currently furnishing info of value.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY: [redacted] b6 b7C

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

March 16, 1961

[redacted] b3 b7E

On March 9, 1961, a confidential source recalled that one Maria Dziedluszynska had been an agent of Section 2 (Operations directed against the United States and other Western countries), Department 1 (Foreign Intelligence), Polish Security Service (UB), prior to her departure, possibly for South America, a few years ago. Source stated that she was in her forties and that she had a sister who was also utilized by the UB in Poland.

Source further stated that he had no further information about her, but that it was entirely possible that she was presently in Cuba.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

FD-323 (3-28-60)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

March 16, 1961

Title [redacted]

b3
b7E

Character [redacted]

Reference **Letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above.**

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

ENCLOSURE

65-65192-

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

SECRET

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

MR. A. H. BELMONT

MR. W. A. BRANIGAN

[redacted]

3-1-61
1 - Mr. Parsons
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. McDonnell
1 - Mr. Gheesling

b3
b7E

Lieutenant Colonel Michal Goleniewski, Polish Security Service official who defected to CIA 1-4-61, furnished information indicating subject, an American citizen residing in Paris, is a Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB) and East German Intelligence Service (BFS) agent and recommendation re dissemination of this information and action to be taken set forth.

WFO letterhead memo 2-23-61 reported results of interview with Lieutenant Colonel Michal Goleniewski, Polish Security Service official who defected to CIA 1-4-61, as follows.

In 1958 Goleniewski, through Michael Wisniewski, an BFS agent, met subject for purpose of appraising his qualifications. Wisniewski told Goleniewski that subject is an American engaged in steel business in Paris, France, a former Counter Intelligence Corps colonel in U.S. Army, and formerly secretary to U.S. Government official, Robert Murphy, in Berlin prior to 1950. Wisniewski referred to subject as an important person in whom the KGB and BFS had been extremely interested for about 12 years and that subject was personally acquainted with former President Eisenhower and had been a guest in latter's home. Wisniewski claimed subject had furnished information to BFS and KGB and in return had benefited financially through favored business dealings with East Germany. In latter part of 1959 subject had an intelligence assignment to report on public opinion in the U.S. re Khrushchev's visit to this country and to obtain Robert Murphy's views in this respect. Goleniewski also met through Wisniewski an American named (First Name Unknown) Morris from Geneva, Switzerland, identified by Wisniewski as a member of his intelligence network.

OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

In 9-51 Legal Attache, Paris, was advised by [redacted]

b7D

[redacted]

100-148697
W. G:hrt
(8) 1 - Bufile 65-65192-[redacted]

CONF. SOURCE

1 65-65192 -
NOT RECORDED
145 MAR 14 1961

b7D

63 MAR 16 1961

SECRET

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

b3
b7E

Memo for Mr. Belmont
RE: [redacted]
100-143697

[redacted] b7D

[redacted] Our investigation determined subject was born 6-8-20 at Berlin, Germany, entered U.S. 11-4-38, enlisted US Army 8-7-41, became naturalized US citizen 11-2-42 when he changed his name from Jacob Szuchman, was officer in US Military Intelligence in Europe in 1944 to 1947 and for period of about one year during 1946 to 1947 served in that capacity in Ambassador Robert Murphy's office in Berlin, Germany. In interview by American Embassy, Paris, 7-31-52, subject denied illegal traffic with Iron Curtain countries. U.S. Treasury Department conducted extensive investigation to determine whether subject had violated Foreign Assets Control Regulations, with apparent negative results. Results of our investigation were disseminated to Justice, State, CIA, G-2, IRS, ONI, OSI, and Treasury. In 6-52 we received a name check request from the White House Military Aide (basis for request unknown) and we furnished information in our files.

We have no information that subject has been in the U.S. since 1948. Check of State Department Passport records 3-2-61 confirmed subject departed US 8-13-48. He last obtained passport at Paris, France, 4-28-59, valid for 2 years, and at that time stated he had resided abroad since 1948.

Since Goleniewski is CIA source and inasmuch as subject resides abroad, recommended our investigation, at this time, be limited to following:

(1) Dissemination to CIA and State by WFO letterhead memo and by letter to AG. If you approve, attached is letter to AG.

(2) That Liaison determine whether CIA has interviewed Robert Murphy (former Under Secretary of State) and if not, that we interview Murphy to determine full details of his knowledge re subject's activities. Murphy is friendly toward Bureau.

(3) That Liaison determine results of CIA's efforts to identify (FNU) Morris, it being noted that CIA let 3-14-69 captioned [redacted] CIA reference [redacted] noted they were attempting to identify that individual. b1 Per b3 CIA

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] b6 b7C

~~SECRET~~

1 - Mr. Parsons
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Evans - McDonnell
1 - Mr. Branigan 1 - Gheesling
1 - Liaison

The Attorney General

March 8, 1961

Director, FBI 65-65192

[redacted] b3 b7E

A confidential source has advised that in February, 1958, he met, through Michael Wisniewski, an agent of the East German Ministry for State Security (MFS), one Jack Sanders, an American citizen engaged in the steel business in Paris, France.

According to our source, Wisniewski operated an extensive intelligence network in East Berlin, Germany, directed primarily against the West and specifically the United States for both the MFS and the Soviet Committee of State Security (KGB). His operatives included Sanders and an American citizen named Morris from Geneva, Switzerland.

Wisniewski informed our source that Sanders was a former Counter Intelligence Corps colonel in the United States Army and had been secretary to the United States Government official Robert Murphy in West Berlin prior to 1950. Wisniewski referred to Sanders as an important person in whom the MFS and KGB had been extremely interested for about twelve years. Wisniewski also alleged that Sanders was personally acquainted with former President Eisenhower and had been a guest in Eisenhower's home.

Wisniewski told our source that Sanders had furnished much information to the MFS and KGB in return for which he had benefited financially through favored business dealings with East Germany.

In September or October, 1959, Wisniewski advised our source that Sanders had an intelligence assignment to report on public opinion in the United States regarding Khrushchev's visit to the United States and to obtain Robert Murphy's views in that respect.

Our source later viewed a photograph of Jacques James Saunder and identified him as Sanders. Investigative reports concerning Saunder have previously been furnished to the

100-143697

WMG:hrt

See note page two 1 - Bufile (65-65192 [redacted] b7D

63 MAR 16 1961

~~SECRET~~

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 100-143697-4
UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

The Attorney General

Internal Security Division. That investigation was predicated upon receipt of an allegation in 1951 that Saunder was in close contact in Paris with the semiofficial purchasing agent of the Soviet Government, who had secured through Saunder over 200,000,000 francs' worth of strategic materials. Saunder was also reported, at that time, to be in contact with agents of the Cominform. Investigation at that time determined that Saunder was born June 8, 1920, in Berlin, Germany, entered the United States November 4, 1938, enlisted in the United States Army August 7, 1941, and became a naturalized United States citizen November 2, 1942. He was an officer in United States Military Intelligence in Europe from 1944 to July, 1947. In 1946 Saunder was assigned to Ambassador Robert Murphy's office in Berlin, Germany, as Military Intelligence Officer with the Political Affairs Division of the Office of the Military Government of the United States.

No information has been reported to us to indicate Saunder has resided in the United States since 1948.

Additional investigation concerning Saunder is being conducted and you will be furnished with any pertinent developments.

This information should be carefully handled to protect our source.

1 - Mr. Byron R. White
Deputy Attorney General

NOTE: ~~SECRET~~ tp protect identity Michal Goleniewski, CIA defector whose defectionnot yet made public. See memo Branigan - Belmont 31-61, same cap., WMG:hrt.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

b6
b7C

2/23/61

AIRTEL

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-148397)

FROM: SAC, WFO [redacted]

[redacted]

b3
b7E

(CO:NY)

Enclosed are seven copies for the Bureau, two copies for New York and one copy for Chicago of a letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above. A similar number of copies of a letterhead memorandum evaluating the confidential source used in the above-mentioned memorandum is also enclosed.

The confidential source mentioned is [redacted] who furnished the information to SAs JOSEPH S. MICHALSKI and CHESTER J. GUSTOWSKI on 2/15/61.

b7D

A copy is being furnished for the information of Chicago in view of its interest in intelligence activities by Soviet-bloc nations. An extra copy is furnished the Bureau for transmittal to Legat, Paris, if so desired.

Informant attributed information set out in enclosed to personal participation on his part in events described therein. For obvious reasons he was referred to as a UB official. The majority of information set out concerning subject was obtained during the course of

p.

5- Bureau (Enc.7)
(1- 65-35192) [redacted]
1- Chicago (Enc.1)(Info)(RM)
2- [redacted] (Enc.2)(RM)
2- WFO
[redacted]

b3
b7D
b7E

NOT RECORDED
184 MAR 3 1961

JEM:dab
(10)

AIRTEL

b3
b7E

several conversations with WISNIEWSKI, who contacted informant as a fellow intelligence agent in frequent contact with him. In view of informant's present status, extreme caution should be used regarding the above and it should be maintained strictly on a need-to-know basis.

WFO indices contained no additional identifying data concerning the subject.

LEADS

NEW YORK DIVISION

AT NEW YORK, NEW YORK

Will report results of indices check relative to the subject.

WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE

AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

Will review files of the Passport Division and State Security, Department of State, for any information pertaining to subject.

The letterhead memorandum is classified ~~"Secret"~~ to protect the identity of a defector who has not been surfaced and who is currently furnishing information of value.

The evaluation memorandum is classified ~~"Confidential"~~ in view of allegation that subject, currently a United States citizen residing in Paris, was an intelligence agent for a foreign government.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~"SECRET"~~

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
February 23, 1961

b3
b7E

[redacted]

On February 15, 1961, a confidential source advised that an American citizen residing in Paris, France, whose name was similar to Jack Sanders, was an agent for the Soviet Committee of State Security (KGB) as well as for the East German Ministry for State Security (MFS). Source furnished the following information as support to this allegation:

Prior to the Leipzig Fair in Leipzig, East Germany, during February, 1958, Colonel Wladykin (Vladykin), KGB Advisor to the Polish Security Service (UB) in Warsaw, Poland, requested a UB official to meet Sanders through a MFS agent, Michael Wisniewski, from East Berlin. The UB official's assignment was to interest himself in Sanders sufficiently to be able to set out a personal opinion about him and to determine what contacts he had with Wisniewski.

In February, 1958, a party took place in a reserved dining room at the International Hotel at Leipzig during the Leipzig Fair. Among the people present at this party were Stach, a Czech Jew and head of a steel firm in London, England; an American named Morris from Geneva, Switzerland who spoke perfect Russian; an elderly German female; Mr. and Mrs. Wisniewski; Jack Sanders; and three Polish models of loose morals accompanied by a female chaperon about 60 years of age named Grabowska. These models were named Barbara, Beata and Maria and were from the Ewa Fashion House in Warsaw, Poland.

Arrangements for this party and for the models were made by Wisniewski, who was also known as Michael Libermann and Michael Gerlach. Wisniewski operated an extensive intelligence network in East Berlin, directed primarily against the West and specifically the United States, for both the MFS and KGB. His operatives in various countries were largely Jewish businessmen and included Stach, Morris and Sanders of those present.

~~"SECRET"~~

65-65192-

ENCLOSURE

RE: [redacted] b3 b7E

Sanders was described as an American engaged in the steel business in Paris, France, about 40 years of age, dark complexion, intelligent, fluent in German and wearing a decoration in his lapel which he attributed to a landing in Africa during World War II.

As the evening progressed, the party became quite lively due to the amount of liquor the participants were consuming. Beata learned that Sanders was a bachelor and, being extremely interested in marriage, concentrated on him. Sanders encouraged her advances with amorous talk, obviously insincere and caused by too much liquor. Sanders became intoxicated to the extent that he was making a fool of himself and insisted that the party continue elsewhere after most of the participants had departed. With the departure of most of the guests Sanders and Morris, accompanied the models elsewhere.

Wisniewski subsequently mentioned that Sanders was a former CIC Colonel in the United States Army and had been Secretary to the United States Government official Robert Murphy in West Berlin prior to 1950. Wisniewski stated that this was Sanders' first trip to the Leipzig Fair where he had come at Wisniewski's invitation. Wisniewski referred to Sanders as an important person in whom the MFS and KGB both had been extremely interested for about twelve years. He also claimed that Sanders was even personally acquainted with President Eisenhower and had been a guest in the latter's home.

Wisniewski stated that Sanders had furnished much information to the MFS and KGB. In return for such cooperation, he had benefited financially through favored business dealings with East Germany.

Wladykin later expressed disapproval in Warsaw that Wisniewski had been so outspoken in his appraisal of Sanders, but appeared to confirm the impression that Sanders had been working for the KGB.

Sanders next appeared in Poznan, Poland, during the time of the Poznan Fair in June, 1959. He arrived there by plane at Wisniewski's invitation but remained only for a couple of days, probably because of Beata's desires to renew their amorous adventure of the previous year. The KGB did not express much interest in Sanders' presence at Poznan,

RE: [redacted]

b3
b7E

stating that their agents there were probably aware of it. On the other hand, Wisniewski stated that the Sanders matter was progressing favorably from the point of view of intelligence operations.

In September or October, 1959, Wisniewski advised that Sanders had an intelligence assignment to report on public opinion in the United States regarding Khrushchev's visit to the United States and to obtain Robert Murphy's views in that respect.

During the first part of 1960, Wisniewski explained the lack of personal contact he had with Sanders in the recent past as due to the fact that Sanders had to go to Teheran, Iran, for an unknown reason, but that his secretary would be coming to Berlin in his place. Wisniewski also hinted that this secretary would have many interesting things to report on behalf of Sanders.

Source stated that as of December, 1960, he learned nothing further concerning Sanders and could furnish no additional information about MFS' and KGB's interest in him.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY: [redacted]

FD-323 (3-28-60)

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

"CONFIDENTIAL"

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Washington 25, D.C.
February 23, 1961

b3
b7E

Title [redacted]

Character [redacted]

Reference **Memorandum dated and captioned as above at Washington, D.C.**

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

65-65192-

ENCLOSURE

"CONFIDENTIAL"

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

b6
b7C

3/6/61

AIRTEL

TO: DIRECTOR, [redacted]

b3
b7E

FROM: SAC, WFO [redacted]

[redacted]

(CC:WFO)

Enclosed are 7 copies for the Bureau and 2 copies each for New Haven and New York, and one copy for Chicago of a letterhead memo dated and captioned as above. A similar number of copies of a letterhead memo evaluating the confidential source used in above-mentioned memo are also enclosed.

The confidential source mentioned is [redacted] who furnished the information to Ths JOSEPH E. NICHALSKI and CHESTER J. GUSTOWSKI on 3/1/61. b7D

A copy is being furnished for the information of Chicago in view of the interest by that office in Polish intelligence activities and because of the possibility of future investigation in this matter. An extra copy is designated for the Bureau for transmittal to Legat, Rome, if so desired.

b3
b7D
b7E

P
(3) - Bureau [redacted] (Enc 7)
(1 - 65-85192) [redacted] CONF. INFT.
1 - Chicago (Enc 1) (Info) (RM)
2 - New Haven (Enc 2) (RM)
2 - New York (Enc 2) (RM)
2 - WFO
[redacted]

JRM:hed
(12)

65-65192-
NOT RECORDED
98 MAR 8 1961

AIRTEL ENCLOSURE

63 MAR 14 1961

~~SECRET~~

WFO [redacted] b3 b7E

For information of interested offices. CIA letter to the Bureau dated 1/22/61, captioned [redacted] - FNU BUJALSKI, b1 Per b3 CIA set out following information concerning persons possibly identical with subject:

1. PAUL PETER FRANCIS BUJALSKI, S.E., [redacted] b6 b7C education: Yale University; Electronics Instrumentation Engineer, AEMA Corp. 1951 - 1953; Shielding and Instrumentation Engineer, Electric Boat Division, General Dynamics Corp. 1953 - 1956; Staff Associate, ASTRA, Inc., 1955 to present. Address: 888 Orange Street: Who's Who in Atoms (1959).

[redacted] 2. CEZARY BUJALSKI, Address: [redacted]

WFO indices contained no information concerning subject.

LEADS

NEW HAVEN DIVISION

AT NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT

1. Will conduct appropriate investigation to ascertain if subject is identical with PAUL PETER FRANCIS BUJALSKI, 888 Orange Street, New Haven, Connecticut.

2. If identical will determine:

A. Background (employment, residence, citizenship).

B. Whether subject was or is presently employed in a vital facility. If so, whether subject had or has access to classified data.

C. If subject is in a position, because of contacts or employment, to be of value to Polish intelligence.

3. Upon completion of investigation, will submit recommendation to the Bureau regarding interview of the subject.

WFO [redacted]

b3
b7E

NEW YORK DIVISION

AT WHITE PLAINS, NEW YORK

1. Will discreetly determine at Nuclear Development Corporation of America, 5 New Street, whether a person with last name of BUJALSKI is or has been recently employed by this firm.

2. If so, will determine BUJALSKI's full name, background and present whereabouts to ascertain if he may be identical with subject.

3. If subject presently in New York, will conduct investigation as requested of the New Haven Office.

The letterhead memo is classified "Secret" to protect the identity of a defector who has not been surfaced and who is currently furnishing information of value.

The evaluation memo is classified "Confidential" in view of Polish Intelligence interest in recruitment of a United States citizen.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY: [redacted]

SECRET

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
March 6, 1961

b3
b7E

[redacted]

On March 1, 1961, a confidential source advised that one Dr. Bujalski, a United States citizen representing an American firm in Rome, Italy, was a target for recruitment by the Polish Security Service (UB). Source furnished the following information concerning this matter:

In 1959, Captain Jerzy Roman, a Staff Officer attached to Section 6 (Scientific/Technical Branch), Department I, (Foreign Intelligence), UB, attended an International Atomic Energy Conference in Vienna, Austria. While there he met Bujalski, who represented an American nuclear development corporation in Rome, whose initials were N.D.A. In view of Bujalski's Polish background, Roman made it a point to become acquainted with him and succeeded in doing so.

Roman reported this contact to Inspector Syszyga, who handled atomic energy matters within Section 6. Roman recommended that Bujalski be actively considered as a recruitment target by the UB in view of his position and Polish background.

In September, 1960, Syszyga assigned Roman and Jozef Kossacki, a nuclear engineer who had been associated with Polish intelligence since 1939, to attend an atomic energy conference in Stockholm, Sweden, for the express purpose of meeting Bujalski there. Kossacki was a co-opted worker (collaborator) for Section 6 at that time and had been assigned the UB pseudonym of "Cyrkon." Syszyga felt that Kossacki was a logical choice to be placed in contact with Bujalski in view of his background in nuclear research.

Roman and Kossacki met Bujalski in Stockholm and noted that he had sympathetic feelings toward Poland. Bujalski also voluntarily gave them some N.D.A. bulletins. The three of

ORIGINAL FILED IN

SECRET

ENCLOSURE

65-65192-

(X)

b3
b7E

[redacted]

them went out to lunch and to dinner on one occasion each. Following the dinner, for which Bujalski paid after mild protests by his companions, they indulged in drinking and the evening became so sociable that Bujalski called long distance, possible to Hamburg, Germany, and cancelled an appointment he had there.

Both Kowan and Kowanski reported favorably on this meeting to Dyantyga. Dyantyga considered the possibility of inviting Bujalski to Warsaw, but as of December, 1960, no positive advances in that respect had been made to him.

Source explained that UB plans for Bujalski were merely in the preliminary stages of development and that Bujalski had no idea with whom he had been dealing. Source noted that Bujalski fell into the category of those persons in whom the UB maintained interest for possible agent development based on their position and Polish background.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

SECRET

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted]

FD-323 (3-28-60)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

b6
b7C

CONFIDENTIAL

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Washington 25, D. C.
March 6, 1961

b3
b7E

Title [redacted]

Character [redacted]

Reference Memo dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

CONFIDENTIAL

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE

65-65792

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

3/3/61

AIRTEL

TO: DIRECTOR, [redacted]

FROM: SAC, WFO

[redacted]

(00: OC)

b3
b7E

Enclosed are six copies for the Bureau, 2 copies for OC, and one each for CG and NY of a letterhead memo, dated and captioned as above. A similar number of copies of a letterhead memo evaluating the confidential source used in above-mentioned letterhead memo are also enclosed.

b7D

Confidential source mentioned in [redacted] who furnished the info to SAs JOSEPH X. MICHALSKI and CHESTER J. GUSTOWSKI on 3/1/61.

Copies are being furnished for the info of NY and CG in view of their interest in Polish intelligence activities and because of the possibility of future investigation by those offices in this matter.

For info of OC, informant was in charge of Section 6 (scientific/technical branch), Department I (Foreign Intelligence), Polish Security Service (UB), prior to his defection. In view of informant's present status, extreme caution should be used regarding this info and it should be maintained on a need-to-know basis.

RUC
4 - Bureau (Enc. 6)
(1 - 65-83192) [redacted]
1 - Chicago (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
2 - [redacted] (Enc. 2) (RM)
1 - New York (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
2 - WFO
[redacted]

JEM:mrs
(10)
AIRTEL

NOT RECORDED
87 MAR 9 1961

63 MAR 14 1961
F107

b3
b7D
b7E

ORIGINAL

WFO [redacted]

b3
b7E

WFO indices contain no additional data concerning subject.

LEADS

OKLAHOMA CITY

AT NORMAN, OKLA.

Will conduct appropriate investigation to determine whether subject has access to any classified info in his position.

The letterhead memo is classified "Secret" to protect the identity of a defector, who has not been surfaced and who is currently furnishing info of value.

The evaluation memo is classified "Confidential" in view of Soviet intelligence interest in a U. S. citizen.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted]

SECRET

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

March 3, 1961

b3
b7E

[redacted]

On March 1, 1961, a confidential source advised that information concerning a recruitment operation by the Soviet Committee of State Security (KGB) relative to Wolfgang Frajtag was contained in a bulky dossier outlining intelligence activities of one Madame de Trouville, who had repatriated to the Soviet Union in 1957.

At the end of 1958, a KGB liaison officer in Warsaw, Poland, made available for review the above dossier to Colonel Ryszard Matejewski, Chief of Department II (Counterespionage), Polish Security Service (UB), because of its operational interest. It was also felt that Madame de Trouville's extensive intelligence operations for the KGB, while purportedly employed by the American Intelligence Service (AIS) and other Western countries, had been compromised anyway by her repatriation.

As the UB found this dossier to be of extreme operational interest, they photographed it in its entirety without the knowledge of the KGB before returning it. The photographed copy was then forwarded to various ranking officials of the UB for their information and for review.

Included in this dossier was the following account of recruitment efforts and progress made in a KGB operation directed against the AIS in West Germany, in which Madame de Trouville played a major role:

65-65792

ENCLOSURE

SECRET

b3
b7E

RE: [redacted]

As it was felt that Mr. Weber, Chief of a section within AIS in West Germany directed against Poland, possessed a strong character while his subordinate, Wolfgang Frajtag, was relatively weak, the KGB decided to concentrate on the recruitment of Frajtag through compromise. As a result, Madame de Trouville was placed in contact with Frajtag in November, 1954, after coming to West Germany from Sweden where she had operated an intelligence network directed against the West. She was then introduced to Weber and obtained employment in his organization.

During the course of her employment, she noted that there was friction between Frajtag and Weber. She and [redacted] which revealed that [redacted] In addition, she learned from Frajtag that his brother-in-law had a scientific background and was in the field of atomic energy in New York City, as well as other background data such as the existence of relatives residing in Vienna, Austria. She also determined that Frajtag frequently submitted "padded" expense accounts, in which he claimed reimbursement for larger sums of money than he paid out. In that connection, Frajtag would request Madame de Trouville to sign receipts for more money than he paid her.

b6
b7C

At the same time the KGB obtained additional data on Frajtag in accordance with the plan to compromise him. They conducted surveillances on Frajtag and obtained information such as covert meeting places with some of his agents, which they were even able to record on occasions.

In 1955, Frajtag went to Copenhagen, Denmark, to contact an agent from Stockholm, Sweden, who was de Trouville's husband. While in Copenhagen, the KGB, disguised as Danish police, kidnapped him and took him to a villa outside of town. Frajtag was confronted with all of the information they had accumulated to date, such as recordings of various meetings he had with his agents, including de Trouville, compromising photographs, data concerning false claims for his expenditures, and so forth. Frajtag was given a choice to cooperate with the KGB, for which he would receive $10,000 plus regular payments, or be denounced to his superiors. In addition, it was pointed out to Frajtag that from all appearances he had been cooperating with the KGB anyway. Frajtag agreed to these demands.

[redacted]: [redacted]

b3
b7E

This account was concluded with a statement to the effect that it was a description of the manner of the recruitment of Wolfgang Krajta.

Informant stated that as of December, 1960, he learned nothing further concerning Krajta, or about his reported association with the KGB. He noted that the only information he had relative to Krajta was contained in the dossier mentioned above.

[redacted]

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] b6 b7C

FD-323 (3-28-62)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Washington 25, D. C.
March 3, 1961

Title [redacted] b3 b7E

Character [redacted]

Reference Memorandum dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

b6
b7C

b3
b7E

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: [redacted]

[redacted] In reviewing the letter material received from [redacted] on Subject, we discovered that we had inadvertently omitted to pass the following portion of [redacted] 15 August 1959 letter to the Bureau. We regret the oversight.

b1 Per
b3 CIA

2. "According to [redacted] the political attache Mr. BERG, recalled about three months ago, had the function of resident agent of CIA in the Embassy. Department II, MSW, has established that, on instructions from U.S. intelligence, BERG mails letters containing secret writing to various agents in Poland. [redacted] suggested that the stamps used by BERG be treated with a chemical preparation so that one could then quickly identify the letters he mails. This was done successfully, also with [redacted] help, and in addition was introduced by the Soviet and Polish CE as a regular practice at all embassies. Six or seven agents whom BERG had contacted were ascertained and are now being worked on."

b7D

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

James Angleton

[redacted]

b1 Per
b3 CIA

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

65-65192-
NOT RECORDED
47 MAR 9 1960

13 1961

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

3/3/61

AIRTEL

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, WFO [redacted]

b3
b7E

[redacted]

(OO:WFO)

Enclosed are 6 copies for the Bureau and 1 copy each for Chicago and New York of a letterhead memo dated and captioned as above. A similar number of copies of a letterhead memo evaluating the confidential source used in above-mentioned memo are also enclosed.

The confidential source mentioned is [redacted] who furnished the information to SAs JOSEPH E. MICHALSKI and CHESTER J. GUSTOWSKI on 3/1/61.

b7D

Copies are being furnished for the information of Chicago and New York in view of their interest in Polish intelligence activities and because of the possibility of future investigation by those offices in this matter.

WFO indices contained no information concerning subject or the pseudonym "EKRAN."

P
(4) - Bureau (Enc 6) CONF. SOURCE
(1 - 65-65192) [redacted]
1 - Chicago (Enc 1) (Info) (RM)
1 - New York (Enc 1) (Info) (RM)
2 - WFO
[redacted]

b3
b7D
b7E

JEM:ked
(8)

AIRTEL

ENCLOSURE

165-65192-
NOT RECORDED
78 MAR 7 1961

51 MAR 10 1961

ORIGINAL FILED IN

~~SECRET~~

WFO [ ]

b3
b7E

LEADS

WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE

AT WASHINGTON, D. C.

1. Will report results of review of State Security and Visa files, United States Department of State, and files of Central Office, INS, relative to subject.

b1 Per
b3 CIA

[ ]

3. Will consider requesting the Bureau, through London Legat, to have OTOWSKI interviewed by appropriate sources in Sweden.

It is noted that informant felt that OTOWSKI, a former Polish Embassy official in London, who defected to Stockholm, Sweden, in 1960, may possibly know WOJTOWICZ and could very well have "spotted" him initially for recruitment in view of OTOWSKI's active affiliation with Polish Intelligence.

The letterhead memo is classified "Secret" to protect the identity of a defector who has not been surfaced and who is currently furnishing information of value.

The evaluation memo is classified "Confidential" in view of Polish Intelligence interest in a person possibly domiciled in the United States.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY: [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
March 3, 1961

[redacted]

b3
b7E

On March 1, 1961, a confidential source advised that the Polish Security Service (UB), instituted consideration for agent development of one, Wojtowicz, on November 29, 1957. Source furnished the following information concerning subject and the basis for UB interest in him:

Mr. Ciesnik, Technical Attache, and a UB co-opted worker since 1957, with pseudonym of "Stefan," assigned to the Polish Embassy, London, England, recommended Wojtowicz through the London Residentura of the UB to Section 6 (Scientific/Technical Branch), Department I, (Foreign Intelligence), UB, in November, 1957. Ciesnik advised that Wojtowicz was a British subject of Polish origin, who had furnished unclassified data in connection with his employment as an Electrical Engineer. Captain Nyk was charged with the responsibility within Section 6 of supervising this matter, which was included in UB files reserved for persons whom the UB hoped to recruit in the future. Wojtowicz was also assigned the UB cover-name of "Ekran," for reference purposes.

In 1959, Wojtowicz departed for the United States where he had obtained a responsible position, possibly in connection with his background as an Electrical Engineer, (location unknown).

Source stated that as of November, 1960, this case had remained dormant in UB files and that no action had ever been taken to actually recruit Wojtowicz for intelligence work. Source added that Ciesnik had not been in contact with Wojtowicz since his departure from England, and that his present whereabouts or employment were unknown. Source stated that he was not personally acquainted with Wojtowicz and could furnish no additional information about him, other than that his full name was Zdzislaw Wojtowicz.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

65-65192-

ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

b6
b7C

DIRECTOR, FBI

3/2/61

SAC, WFO [redacted]

b3
b7E

[redacted]
(CC:CG)

RC

Enclosed herewith are six copies for the Bureau, two copies for CG and one for NY of a letterhead memo dated and captioned as above. Also enclosed are a similar number of copies of a letterhead memo evaluating the confidential source used in above-mentioned memo.

The confidential source mentioned is [redacted] who b7D furnished the information to SAs JOSEPH E. MICHALSKI and CHESTER J. GUSTOWSKI on 2/1, 3/61.

A copy is being furnished for the information of NY in view of its interest in Polish intelligence activities and because of the possibility of future investigation in this matter by that office.

It is noted that informant was in charge of Section 6, Department I, Polish Security Service (UB), prior to his defection and the analysis of cases mentioned in enclosed was initiated and directed by him. In view of the informant's present status, extreme caution should be used regarding the above and it should be maintained on a need-to-know basis.

WFO indices disclose following data concerning one MARIA D. JANICKA contained in Form FD-210 dated 5/26/58:

INS, New York, advised FBI, NY, on 5/8/58, that MARIA D. JANICKA, [redacted] Warsaw, Poland, Polish Passport No. 0106717 B-2 Visa, arrived U. S. via KLM 603 at New York International Airport. Destination was listed as 5007 W. Wrightwood Ave., Chicago, Ill., and she was admitted until 8/10/58. b6 b7C

CONF. SOURCE

4 - Bureau (Enc 6)
1 - 65-65192) [redacted]
2 - Chicago (Enc 2) (RM)
1 - New York (Enc 1) (Info) (RM)
2 - WFO
[redacted]

b3
b7D
b7E

JEM:mbb
(9)

65-65192-
NOT RECORDED
169 MAR 10 1961

2 ENCLOSURE

50 MAR 13 1961

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN [redacted]

WFO [redacted]

b3
b7E

LEADS

CHICAGO DIVISION

AT CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

1. Will contact appropriate sources for any available information concerning subject.

2. Will conduct investigation to determine identity of person or persons subject presumably visited in 1958 at 5007 W. Wrightwood Ave., Chicago, Ill.

3. If identified, will conduct appropriate investigation to determine:

A. Background (employment, citizenship).

B. If employed in a vital facility, whether he has access to classified data.

C. Relationship with subject.

4. Upon completion of investigation will submit recommendations to the Bureau regarding interview of this person.

WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE

AT WASHINGTON, D. C.

1. Will report results of a review of files of the Office Security, including Visa files, Department of State, for any information concerning subject.

2. Will check records of Central Office, INS, regarding subject.

The letterhead memo is classified "Secret" to protect the identity of a defector who has not been surfaced and who is currently furnishing information of value.

The evaluation memo is classified "Confidential" in view of Polish intelligence interest in subject, who may be identical with a person who visited a resident of the U. S. in 1958.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~SECRET~~

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
March 2, 1961

[redacted]

b3
b7E

On February 1 and 8, 1961, a confidential source advised that in early 1957, a survey and analysis had been begun by Section 6 (Technical/Scientific Branch), Department I (Foreign Intelligence), Polish Security Service (UB), in Warsaw, Poland, of the potential of individuals on whom data had been accumulated for reasons of possible eventual utilization for intelligence purposes. Upon completion of this analysis, Section 6 officials concluded that it would not be practical to continue such interest in a certain number of persons, most of whom were residing abroad, by that specific section for some of the following reasons: (1) To date, they had either not furnished any information at all or the information they did furnish was of little value or negligible; (2) The distance involved was a deterrent factor for operational use by Section 6, since it almost unanimously related to residents of the United States, Mexico, Canada, and Argentina; (3) If any of these persons were ever recruited by the UB and furnished information of value in the scientific/technical field, Section 6 did not have facilities in personnel or technical acumen to properly evaluate this data and would have to turn it over for analysis by the Soviets; and (4) Section 2, Department I of the UB had primary interest in and responsibility for "legal" operations in such Western countries as United States, Canada, Mexico and Argentina anyway.

The analysis indicated that most of these people fell into two categories: (1) Those who might be of interest to Section 2 and were, therefore, turned over to that section for processing; and (2) Those who had been unproductive at that time to the extent that no information had ever been attributed to them and the data about them was retired to the archives.

ENCLOSURE
65-65192-
~~SECRET~~

SECRET

RE: [redacted]

b3
b7E

Source stated that data concerning various people, including Maria Janicka, was turned over to Section 2, Department I, for their consideration in May, 1958. The following thumbnail sketch pertaining to Janicka was obtained from this data:

Maria Janicka was a Polish citizen who resided in Warsaw. She was presently on a temporary stay in the United States. The UB assigned her the code name of "Ola I" for reference purposes.

Source stated that he was not personally acquainted with Janicka and could furnish no additional information about her. He added that as of December, 1960, he had received no information to indicate that Janicka had been actively engaged in intelligence work for the UB.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

SECRET

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

b6
b7C

DIRECTOR, FBI 2/23/61

SAC, WFO [redacted]

b3
b7E

[redacted]

(OO:WFO)

Enclosed herewith are six copies for the Bureau and one copy each for NY and CG of a letterhead memo dated and captioned as above. Also enclosed are a similar number of copies of a letterhead memo evaluating the confidential source used in above-mentioned memo.

b3
b7D
b7E

The confidential source mentioned is [redacted] who furnished the information to SAs JOSEPH E. MICHALSKI and CHESTER J. GUSTOWSKI on 2/1, 8/61.

Copies are being furnished for the information of CG and NY in view of their interest in Polish Intelligence activities.

It is noted that informant was in charge of Section 6, Department I, Polish Security Service (UB), prior to his defection and the analysis of cases mentioned in enclosed was initiated and directed by him. In view of the informant's present status, extreme caution should be used regarding the above and it should be maintained on a need-to-know basis.

WFO indices were negative regarding FRANCISZEK GAJEWSKI or the UB pseudonym "CHEMIK."

In view of lack of any data other than subject's name, enclosed is submitted for information only.

The letterhead memo is classified ~~Secret~~ to protect the identity of a defector who has not been surfaced and who is currently furnishing information of value.

4 - Bureau (Enc 6)
(1-65-65192) [redacted]
1 - Chicago (Enc 1) (Info) (RM)
1 - New York (Enc 1) (Info) (RM)
2 - WFO

b3
b7D
b7E

[redacted]

JEM:mbb
(8)

1 ENCLOSURE

65-65192-

NOT RECORDED
98 FEB 24 1961

51 MAR 7 1961

ORIGINAL FILED IN

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY: [redacted]

FD-323 (3-28-60)

b6
b7C

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Washington 25, D. C.
March 3, 1961

Title [redacted]

b3
b7E

Character [redacted]

Reference Memorandum dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted]

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Washington 25, D. C.
March 2, 1961

Title [redacted]

Character [redacted]

b3
b7E

Reference Memorandum dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

ENCLOSURE

65-61972

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WFO [redacted]

b3
b7E

The evaluation memo is classified "Confidential" in view of Polish Intelligence interest in subject, who might be domiciled in the United States.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~SECRET~~

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
February 23, 1961

b3
b7E

[redacted]

On February 1 and 8, 1961, a confidential source advised that in early 1957, a survey and analysis had been begun by Section 6 (Technical/Scientific Branch), Department I (Foreign Intelligence), Polish Security Service (UB), in Warsaw, Poland, of the potential of individuals on whom data had been accumulated for reasons of possible eventual utilization for intelligence purposes. Upon completion of this analysis, Section 6 officials concluded that it would not be practical to continue such interest in a certain number of persons, most of whom were residing abroad, by that specific section for some of the following reasons: (1) To date, they had either not furnished any information at all or the information they did furnish was of little value or negligible; (2) The distance involved was a deterrent factor for operational use by Section 6, since it almost unanimously related to residents of the United States, Mexico, Canada, and Argentina; (3) If any of these persons were ever recruited by the UB and furnished information of value in the scientific/technical field, Section 6 did not have facilities in personnel or technical acumen to properly evaluate this data and would have to turn it over for analysis by the Soviets; and (4) Section 2, Department I of the UB had primary interest in and responsibility for "legal" operations in such Western countries as United States, Canada, Mexico and Argentina anyway.

The analysis indicated that most of these people fell into two categories: (1) Those who might be of interest to Section 2 and were, therefore, turned over to that section for processing; and (2) Those who had been unproductive at that time to the extent that no information had ever been attributed to them and the data about them was retired to the archives.

ENCLOSURE

65-65[illegible]

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

Source stated that in May, 1958, data concerning Franciszek Gajewski was included in material which had been retired to the archives. Source advised that the following notation concerning Gajewski was made by Section on Franciszek Gajewski, pseudonym, Chemik, lack of perspective work for us.

Source explained that [redacted] interest in such people as Franciszek Gajewski was initiated by such factors as his employment, background and Polish origin. Source pointed out that, to his knowledge, none of these persons had furnished classified data to Polish intelligence as of May, 1958. He added that some of these people, however, had furnished unclassified material to the Polish government which might have been motivated by love of their mother country. In many instances, this material was primarily destined for friends or relatives in Poland, who took it upon themselves to turn it over to Polish authorities.

Source stated that he was not acquainted with Gajewski and could furnish no additional information about him. He also stated that he knew of no efforts by the [redacted] to recruit Gajewski as of December, 1958, or if he had ever furnished any information to the [redacted].

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted]

b6
b7C

AUTHORITY (28-60)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Washington 25, D. C.
February 23, 1961

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Title [redacted]

b3
b7E

Character [redacted]

Reference Memorandum dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

AUTHORITY

ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

2/21/61

AIRTEL

b3
b7E

TO: DIRECTOR, [redacted]

FROM: SAC, WF[redacted]

[redacted]

(00:WFO)

ReLegat, Ottawa report to the Director, dated 12/30/60, dual captioned UNSUB; aka, [redacted] and UNSUB; U. S. Citizen, Architectural Engineer, [redacted] enclosing original and one copy of [redacted] letter dated 12/28/60, and Legat, Ottawa letter to Director 1/6/61, captioned UNSUB; aka, [redacted]

Enclosed herewith are 7 copies for the Bureau and one copy each for Chicago and New York of a letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above. A similar number of copies of a letterhead memorandum evaluating the confidential source used in above-mentioned memorandum is also enclosed.

The confidential source mentioned is [redacted] who furnished the information to SAs JOSEPH E. MICHALSKI and CHESTER J. GUSTOWSKI on 2/15/61.

Copies are bing furnished for the information of Chicago and New York in view of their interest in Polish Intelligence activities and because of the possibility of future investigation by those offices in this matter.

It is noted that informant was in charge of Section 6, Department [redacted], Polish Security Service (UB) prior to his defection. Information set out in enclosed was obtained as a result of conversation informant personally held with Section 2 officials mentioned. In view of informant's present status,

b3
b7D
b7E

2 ENCLOSURE

OCONF. SOURCE

5-Bureau (Enc-7)
(1-65-65192 [redacted]
(1-Legat, [redacted]
1-Chicago (Enc-1)(Info)(RM)
1-New York (Enc-1)(Info)(RM)
2-WFO [redacted]
JEM:rsa
(9)

65-65192

NOT RECORDED
29 MAR 1 1961

63 MAR 2 1961

b3
b7D
b7E

WFO [redacted] b3 b7E

extreme caution should be used regarding the above which should be maintained on a need-to-know basis.

Rerep indicated that [redacted] tentatively identified in enclosed [redacted] letter as [redacted] recently applied for a Certificate of Identity requesting it be made valid for travel to the U. S. and indicating he intended to spend one week's vacation in the U. S. at the end of the year and would also be making occasional weekend trips to the U. S. Legat, Ottawa has requested the Consul, U. S. Embassy, to make available [redacted] file from the [redacted] as soon as possible. b6 b7C b7D

[redacted] b6 b7C b7D

[redacted] b6 b7C b7D

Rerep indicated that this information was classified ~~"Top Secret"~~ by the [redacted] and should not be disseminated without the prior approval of [redacted] b7D

[redacted]

WFO indices contained no information identifiable with [redacted] b6 b7C

WFO [redacted] b3 b7E

LEADS

WASHINGTON FIELD DIVISION

AT WASHINGTON, D. C.

Will, through appropriate sources be alert for any information concerning [redacted] trip to the U. S. b6 b7C

Will contact Central Office, INS, and Visa Office, Department of State for any information they may have concerning [redacted]

The letterhead memorandum is classified ~~"Secret"~~ to protect the identity of a defector who has not been surfaced and who is currently furnishing information of value.

The evaluation memorandum is classified ~~"Confidential"~~ in view of allegation that [redacted] is a UB agent in Canada whose assignment includes intelligence activity against the United States.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY: [redacted]

SECRET

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

February 21, 1961

[redacted]

b3
b7E

On February 15, 1961, a confidential source advised that [redacted] was a co-opted worker (collaborator) for the Polish Security Service (UB). Source stated that he based this contention on the following:

b6
b7C

In the early spring of 1960, Major Polubiec, a UB Staff Officer who was in charge of operations directed against Canada within Section 2, Department I (Foreign Intelligence), UB, requested technical assistance from Section 6 (scientific/technical branch), Department I, regarding an assignment for one of his co-opted workers. Polubiec noted that this agent was a doctor-engineer, who had been associated with the Polytechnic Institute in Gdansk, Poland, as Director of the Faculty of Water Conservation, and was going to Canada for two years to be employed at an electric company in Montreal. Polubiec referred to this individual as Tomasz which could have been his UB pseudonym, as well as his first name.

Section 6 was reluctant to furnish a specific assignment without knowledge as to the reliability of this person as it felt that he might go to Canada and then defect, thereby compromising that Section through the assignment given him.

In April, 1960, Lieutenant Colonel Stanislaw Jastrzebski, Chief of Section 2, and Major Polubiec assured Section 6 that this person was a trusted co-opted worker since 1954. Polubiec casually referred to him as Dystrzycki. They pointed out that he had good contacts among the Canadians and that he was about 36 years old. He was still in Poland at that time but had a general assignment from the UB to spot people for recruitment; to obtain immigration data; to establish contacts in the United States; and to build up eventually an intelligence network directed against the United States and Canada.

Jastrzebski and Polubiec agreed to a suggestion from Section 6 that Dystrzycki first go to Canada and orient himself in his position before being given a specific assignment. Polubiec felt that [redacted] could go to the Polish Consulate in Canada.

b6
b7C

65-15175

ENCLOSURE

SECRET

RE: [redacted] b3 b7E

in September as if to obtain his visa extension but in reality he would be given a specific assignment, presumably in connection with his employment.

[redacted] Source stated that he learned nothing further about or about KB plans for him as of December, 1960. b6 b7C It was the source's opinion that Bystrzycki was still undergoing a period of acclimatization in Canada.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FD-323 (3-28-60)

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Washington 25, D. C.

February 21, 1961

Title : [redacted]

b3
b7E

Character : [redacted]

Reference : Letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

65-65192

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

b6
b7C

DIRECTOR, FBI 2/21/61

SAC, WFO [redacted]

b3
b7E

[redacted]
(OO:WFO)

Enclosed herewith are six copies for the Bureau and one copy each for NY and CG of a letterhead memo dated and captioned as above. Also enclosed are a similar number of copies of a letterhead memo evaluating the confidential source used in above-mentioned memo.

b3
b7D
b7E

CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE

The confidential source mentioned is [redacted] who furnished the information to SAs JOSEPH E. MICHALSKI and CHESTER J. GUSTOWSKI on 2/1, 8/61.

Copies are being furnished for the information of CG and NY in view of their interest in Polish Intelligence activities.

It is noted that informant was in charge of Section 6, Department I, Polish Security Service (UB), prior to his defection and the analysis of cases mentioned in enclosed was initiated and directed by him. In view of the informant's present status, extreme caution should be used regarding the above and it should be maintained on a need-to-know basis.

WFO indices failed to disclose any information concerning TADEUSZ DZIULAK or the UB pseudonym "LAK."

Enclosed is submitted for information as it apparently pertains to a Polish national presumably residing in Poland. No leads are being set out to identify subject's brother, mentioned in enclosed as residing in the United States, due to lack of any identifying data.

The letterhead memo is classified "Secret" to protect the identity of a defector who has not been surfaced and who is currently furnishing information of value.

2 ENCLOSURE

4 - Bureau (Enc 6)
(1-65-65192) [redacted]
1 - Chicago (Enc 1) (Info) (RM)
1 - New York (Enc 1) (Info) (RM)
2 - WFO
[redacted]

b3
b7D
b7E

65-65192-
NOT RECORDED
150 FEB 27 1961

(8) MAR 6 1961

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

WFO [redacted]

b3
b7E

The evaluation memo is classified "Confidential" in view of Polish Intelligence interest in subject, whose brother reportedly resides in the United States.

LEAD

WFO

AT WASHINGTON, D. C.

Will review files of the Visa Office and Office of Security, U. S. Department of State, for the purpose of identifying subject's brother, as it is possible subject may have applied for a visit or immigration to this country.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

[redacted]

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

February 21, 1951

[redacted]

b3
b7E

On February 1 and 2, 1951, a confidential source advised that in early 1947, a survey and analysis had been begun by Section 6 (Technical/Scientific Branch), Department I (Foreign Intelligence), Polish Security Service (UB), in Warsaw, Poland, of the potential of individuals on whom data had been accumulated for reasons of possible eventual utilization for intelligence purposes. Upon completion of this analysis, Section 6 officials concluded that it would not be practical to continue such interest in a certain number of persons, most of whom were residing abroad, by that specific section for some of the following reasons: (1) To date, they had either not furnished any information at all or the information they did furnish was of little value or negligible; (2) The distance involved was a deterrent factor for operational use by Section 6, since it almost unanimously related to residents of the United States, Mexico, Canada, and Argentina; (3) If any of these persons were ever recruited by the UB and furnished information of value in the scientific/technical field, Section 6 did not have facilities in personnel or technical acumen to properly evaluate this data and would have to turn it over for analysis by the Soviets; and (4) Section 2, Department I of the UB had primary interest in and responsibility for "legal" operations in such Western countries as United States, Canada, Mexico and Argentina anyway.

The analysis indicated that most of these people fell into two categories: (1) Those who might be of interest to Section 2 and were, therefore, turned over to that section for processing; and (2) Those who had been unproductive at that time to the extent that no information had ever been attributed to them and the data about them was retired to the archives.

[redacted] 65-65192-

ENCLOSURE

RE: [redacted]

b3
b7E

Source stated that in May, 1958, data concerning Tadeusz Dziulak was included in the material which had been retired to the archives. Source noted that the following thumbnail sketch about Dziulak was obtained from this data:

Tadeusz Dziulak, born September 24, 1914, was a scientific employee of the Polytechnic Institute in Silesia (Poland). He was a Polish citizen and had a brother in the United States. He was assigned the UB pseudonym "Lak" and notation was made that he did not constitute any operational value to the UB.

Source explained that UB interest in such people as Tadeusz Dziulak was initiated by such factors as his employment, background and Polish origin. Source pointed out that, to his knowledge, none of these persons had furnished classified data to Polish Intelligence as of May, 1958. He added that some of these people, however, had furnished unclassified material to the Polish government which might have been motivated by love of their mother country. In many instances, this material was primarily destined for friends or relatives in Poland, who took it upon themselves to turn it over to Polish authorities. Source emphasized that people on this list could very well be loyal Americans who had no idea as to the ultimate destination of the material or information they had furnished or specifically had no idea with whom they were dealing.

Source stated that he was not personally acquainted with Dziulak and could furnish no information about him or about his brother who presumably resided in the United States. He also stated that he knew of no efforts by the UB to recruit Dziulak as of December, 1960, or if he had ever furnished any information to or been contacted by the UB.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~AUTHENTICATED~~

Washington 25, D. C.
February 21, 1961

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

b6
b7C

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted]

Title [redacted]

b3
b7E

Character [redacted]

Reference **Memo dated and captioned as above.**

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~AUTHENTICATED~~

ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

3/21/61

AIRTEL

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, WFO [redacted]

b3
b7E

[redacted]

(OO:PG)

Enclosed are six copies for the Bureau, two copies for PG, and one copy each for NY and CG of a letterhead memo dated and captioned as above. A similar number of copies of a letterhead memo evaluating the confidential source used in above-mentioned memo are also enclosed.

The confidential source mentioned is [redacted] who furnished the information to SAs JOSEPH E. MICHALSKI and CHESTER J. GUSTOWSKI on 2/15/61.

b3
b7D
b7E

[redacted]

Copies are being furnished for the information of CG and NY in view of their interest in Polish Intelligence activities and because of the possibility of future investigation by those Offices in this matter.

It is noted that informant was in charge of Section 6, Department 1, Polish Security Service (UB), prior to his defection and while in that position received information concerning MASALSKI set out in enclosed. In view of

MUC Conf. Source E
4 - Bureau (Enc 2)
(65-65192) [redacted]
1 - Chicago (Enc 1) (Info) (RM)
1 - New York (Enc 1) (Info) (RM)
2 - Pittsburgh (Enc 2) (RM)
2 - WFO
[redacted]

b3
b7D
b7E

JEM:mbb
(10)
AIRTEL

65-65192-

NOT RECORDED
185 FEB 24 1961

ORIGINAL FILED IN

2 ENCLOSURE

62 FEB 28 1961

WFO [redacted] b3 b7E

informant's present status, extreme caution should be used regarding the above and it should be maintained on a need-to-know basis.

WFO indices were negative regarding TADEUSZ MASALSKI and the UB pseudonym "Kot II."

LEADS

PITTSBURGH DIVISION

PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA

1. Will conduct appropriate investigation of subject to determine:

   A. Background (employment, residence, citizenship).

   B. Whether subject was or is presently employed in a vital facility, if so, whether subject had or has access to classified data.

   C. If subject is in a position, because of contacts or employment, to be of value to Polish Intelligence.

2. Upon completion of investigation, will submit recommendations to the Bureau regarding interview of subject.

The letterhead memo is classified "Secret" to protect the identity of a defector who has not been surfaced and who is currently furnishing information of value.

The evaluation memo is classified "Confidential" in view of Polish Intelligence interest in a person domiciled in the United States.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

SECRET

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
February 21, 1961

[redacted]

b3
b7E

On February 15, 1961, a confidential source advised that Polish Security Service (UB) Staff Officer, Inspector Raczynski recommended consideration of Tadeusz Masalski for future recruitment by Section Six (Scientific/Technical Branch) Department I (Foreign Intelligence) of the UB on May 21, 1959. Source stated that Raczynski pointed out that Masalski was in the field of metallurgy as Director of a section of the Mellon Institute and, therefore, this matter would be of interest to Section Six.

Source stated that as of December, 1960, no positive action had been taken in this matter by Section Six. Source also stated that Masalski had not been recruited by or furnished information to the UB; nor had he been contacted by UB representatives in the United States.

Source stated that the modus operandi used by UB in such cases was to select Poles in the United States who might be of interest to them because of their position, particularly if they were engaged in scientific research work of some nature. Source reiterated that Masalski was merely under consideration for future development by Section Six and that no specific efforts in that respect had been taken as of December, 1960, although the UB had assigned the pseudonym "Pat II" to this matter for reference purposes.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

65-65192

ENCLOSURE

SECRET

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-19-2020 BY: [redacted]

FD-323 (3-28-60)

b6
b7C

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Washington 25, D. C.
February 21, 1961

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

b3
b7E

Title [redacted]

Character [redacted]

Reference Memorandum dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

2/21/61

AIRTEL

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted]

b3
b7E

FROM: SAC, WFO [redacted]

[redacted]

BB

(OO: BUREAU)

Rerep of Legat, Ottawa, dated 12/30/60, dual captioned UNSUB; aka [redacted] and as above, enclosing original and one copy of [redacted] letter dated 12/28/60.

b3
b7D
b7E

Enclosed are 7 copies for the Bureau and 1 each for CG and NYO of a letterhead memo, dated and captioned as above. Also enclosed are a similar number of copies of a letterhead memo evaluating the confidential source used in above-mentioned memo.

The confidential source mentioned is [redacted] who furnished the info to SAs JOSEPH E. MICHALSKI and CHESTER J. GUSTOWSKI on 2/15/61.

Copies are being furnished for the info of CG and NY in view of their interest in Polish Intelligence activities and because of the possibility of future investigation by those offices in this matter.

CONF. SOURCE

RUC
5 - Bureau (Enc. 7)
(1 - 65-65192) [redacted]
1 - Chicago (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
1 - New York (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
2 - WFO
[redacted]

b3
b7D
b7E

65-65192-

JEM:mrs
(9)
AIRTEL

NOT RECORDED
29 MAR 1 1961

2 ENCLOSURE

63 MAR 2 1961

ORIGINAL FILE IN [redacted] b7D

WFO [redacted]

An extra copy is being furnished the Bureau for transmission to Legat, Ottawa, if so desired [redacted] b3 b7E

For purposes of clarification as to the manner of receipt of info set out in enclosed, informant was in charge of Section 6, Department I, Polish Security Service (UB), prior to his defection. While in this position, Major POLUBIEC often requested a specific technical assignment from his section for some of his operatives directed against Canada. During the course of a conversation relative to the merits of [redacted] b3 b7E copies for CG, NY and Legat, Ottawa), informant asked POLUBIEC if he had any other agents in Canada who were professional people. POLUBIEC then briefly told him about the subject in JASTRZEBSKI's presence, as set out in enclosed.

Above info should be treated with extreme caution and should be maintained on a need-to-know basis in view of informant's present status.

Referenced enclosure to rerep indicated that [redacted] b7D investigation had failed to reveal any positive clues to date regarding the identity of the subject. It is noted that this matter was classified ~~"Top Secret"~~ by the [redacted] and should not be disseminated without their prior approval.

The letterhead memo is classified ~~"Secret"~~ to protect the identity of a defector who has not been surfaced and who is currently furnishing info of value.

The evaluation memo is classified ~~"Confidential"~~ in view of the allegation that subject, a U.S. citizen, is an agent for Polish Intelligence.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
February 21, 1961

[redacted]

b3
b7E

On February 15, 1961, a confidential source advised that a United States citizen (name unknown), residing in Canada, was in reality an operative of Section 2 ("legal" residencies and operations directed against the United States, Canada, Mexico, Argentina, United Kingdom, Israel), Department I (Foreign Intelligence), Polish Security Service (UB), since 1953. Source furnished the following information concerning this person:

In April, 1960, Major Polubiec, who was in charge of Canadian matters within Section 2, claimed that he was then supervising the activities of an architectural engineer in Ottawa, Canada. Polubiec identified this person as a United States citizen, born in Vilna, Lithuania, who was currently employed in the magistrate's office in Ottawa. Polubiec stated that this person had various contacts in the field of United States rocketry and had resided in the United States before coming to Canada. Polubiec also stated that this person was not a proven agent and that he did not have complete confidence in him as yet.

Source further advised that Lieutenant Colonel [redacted] Chief of Section 2, appeared to hold similar views concerning this person.

b6
b7C
b7E

Source stated that as of December, 1960, he had been unable to learn anything further concerning this individual, who apparently was inactive in the meantime.

ENCLOSURE

NR: [redacted]

b3
b7E

He pointed out that UB activities in the United States and Canada had come to a virtual standstill in 1960, as an aftermath to the defection of Colonel Pawel Monat of the Polish Military Intelligence (Z-II) the previous year to the United States.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted]

b6
b7C

FD-323 (3-28-60)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Washington 25, D. C.
February 21, 1961

Title [redacted]

Character [redacted]

b3
b7E

Reference **Memorandum dated and captioned as above.**

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

Tolson
Parsons
Mohr
Belmont
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Tavel
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

b6
b7C

TO : Mr. L'Allier

DATE: March 21, 1961

FROM : S. J. Papich

SUBJECT [redacted]

b1 Per
b3 CIA

On March 20, 1961, James Hunt, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), advised that [redacted] and his wife would be departing for West Germany on or about March 27, 1961, and would return in approximately 10 days. The purpose of this trip is to have the informant's wife visit her parents. All travel will be handled under appropriate cover in order to provide maximum security.

ACTION:

The above information is being directed to the attention of the Espionage Section.

SJP:ban
(6)

1 - Mr. D. E. Moore
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. McDonnell
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich

REC-6 65-65172-104

EX-114

MAR 24 1961

63 MAR 30 1961

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

5. The above is from a highly sensitive source and should not be further disseminated outside your organization. In order to protect the source, it is requested that no action be taken on this information without the express approval of this Agency.

b1 Per
b3 CIA

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

for James Angleton

[redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

DIRECTOR, FBI (100-148627) 3/30/61

SAC, WFO [redacted]

b3
b7E

[redacted]

b7D

OO:NY

ReWFOairtel enclosing letterhead memo dated 2/23/61, captioned as above, setting out info furnished by [redacted] regarding a party attended by subject and arranged by MICHAEL WISNIEWSKI, head of an East Berlin intelligence Network directed against the U. S. and other Western countries for the Soviet Committee of State Security (KGB) and the East German Ministry for State Security (MFS).

Enclosed herewith are six copies for the Bureau, two copies for New York and one copy for Chicago of a letterhead memo dated and captioned as above. A similar number of copies of a letterhead memo evaluating the confidential source used in above-mentioned memo are also enclosed.

The confidential source mentioned is [redacted] b7D who furnished additional info concerning this party and its participants as set out in enclosed letterhead memo to SAs JOSEPH E. MICHALSKI and CHESTER J. GUSTOWSKI on 3/9, 10/61 & 2/15/61.

A copy is being furnished for info of Chicago as that Office received referenced communication in view of its interest in intelligence activities by Soviet-bloc nations.

WFOlet to the Bureau, enclosing letterhead memo, dated 3/21/61, captioned "(FNU) [redacted]" contained descriptive data concerning MORRIS furnished by [redacted] on 3/9/61. Informant noted that previous reference to MORRIS as an American and as of Jewish ancestry was entirely due to inadvertance on his part.

b3
b7D
b7E

-P-

(3) - Bureau (Enc. 6) CONF. INFT.
(1) - 65-60192) [redacted]
1 - Chicago (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
2 - [redacted] (Enc. 2) (RM)
2 - WFO
[redacted]

b3
b7D
b7E

65-65122-
NOT RECORDED
98 APR 3 1961

JEM:fet
(5) 51 APR 17 1961

1 ENCLOSURE

ORIGINAL FILED IN 100-148627-4

[redacted]

b3
b7E

LEADS

WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE

AT WASHINGTON, D. C.

1. Will report results of a review of files of the Security and Visa Offices, Department of State and of the Central Office, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), for any information concerning JADWIGA GRABOWSKA.

2. Will obtain appropriate copies of Polish magazines "Poland" and "Przekroj" for display to informant to further identify BEATA OPOCZYNSKA and will obtain June, 1959, issue of "Poland" containing JADWIGA GRABOWSKA's photograph.

The letterhead memo is classified "Secret" to protect the identity of a defector who has not been surfaced and who is currently furnishing information of value.

The evaluation memo is classified "Confidential" in view of allegation that subject, apparently a United States citizen residing in Paris, was an intelligence agent for a foreign government.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

March 30, 1961

b3
b7E

[redacted]

On February 15, 1961, a confidential source advised that an American citizen residing in Paris, France, whose name was similar to Jack Sanders, was an agent for the Soviet Committee of State Security (KGB) as well as for the East German Ministry for State Security (MFS) as a member of an East Berlin intelligence network headed by Michael Wisniewski, an MFS agent. Source furnished the following information concerning a party held in Leipzig, Germany, in February, 1958, and attended by several members of Wisniewski's intelligence network:

This party took place in a reserved dining room at the International Hotel at Leipzig during the Leipzig Fair. Among the people present were Stach, a Czech Jew and head of a steel firm in London, England; an American named Morris from Geneva, Switzerland who spoke perfect Russian; an elderly German female; Mr. and Mrs. Wisniewski; Jack Sanders; and three Polish models of loose morals accompanied by a female chaperon about 60 years of age named Grabowska. These models were named Barbara, Beata and Maria and were from the Eva Fashion House in Warsaw, Poland.

Arrangements for this party and for the models were made by Wisniewski, who was also known as Libermann and Gerlach. Wisniewski operated his network from East Berlin and it was directed primarily against the West and specifically the United States, for both the KGB and MFS. His operatives in various countries were largely Jewish businessmen and included Stach, Morris and Sanders of those present.

On March 1, 1961 this source identified a photograph of subject Saunder as the Jack Sanders mentioned above.

ENCLOSURE

b3
b7E

On March 9, 1961, confidential source furnished the following additional data concerning participants of above-mentioned party:

The party was an engagement party in honor of Wisniewski's secretary, who was also present along with her fiance. She displayed a large engagement ring to persons present, but the wedding did not materialize as she returned the ring shortly after the party.

The elderly German female present was about forty-five years of age and, according to Wisniewski, the MFS was extremely interested in recruiting her as she was a cousin of West German Foreign Minister von Brentano.

Although Wisniewski's operative in Geneva, Switzerland, whose last name was Morris, spoke English and was actively involved in American circles in Geneva in business dealings, as well as on behalf of Wisniewski, he was apparently a Swiss citizen of Russian origin and not an American.

The three Polish models who were chaperoned by Madame Grabowska from the Ewa Fashion House in Warsaw, Poland, frequently posed for such Polish magazines as "Przekroj." Beata, with whom Sanders was romantically involved at this party, appeared in a fairly recent issue of this magazine.

Beata, whose last name is Opoczynska, married a businessman in West Germany subsequently and was reported to be currently residing there.

Madame Grabowska was a well-known figure in the fashion world in Poland and her photograph also appeared in fashion magazines. Her first name was Jadwiga and it was reported in Poland that she had planned to come to or was presently in the United States.

The June, 1959, issue of the magazine, "Poland," containing photographs of various Polish models as well as the photograph of one Jadwiga Grabowska from a Warsaw fashion house, was displayed to the source on March 15, 1961. Source

b3
b7E

immediately identified Grabowska's photograph on page 18 of this issue as the Grabowska who brought three Polish models to this party. Source noted that none of the models portrayed, including the photograph of one Beata, was identical with the models present at this party.

In conclusion source advised that although Wisniewski's operatives in various countries were largely Jewish businessmen the only persons present at this party who were of Jewish ancestry were Mr. and Mrs. Wisniewski, Sanders and Stach.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted]

b6
b7C

FD-323 (3-28-30)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 100-4529

Washington, D. C.

March 30, 1961

b3
b7E

Title [redacted]

Character [redacted]

Reference Memorandum dated and captioned as above

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ACC

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted] DATE: MAR 31 1961

FROM : SAC, [redacted]

SUBJECT: [redacted]

(00: NY)

Enclosed are 7 copies for the Bureau and 3 copies for New York and 1 copy for Chicago of a letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above. A similar number of copies of a letterhead memorandum evaluating the confidential source used in above-mentioned memorandum are also enclosed.

The confidential source mentioned is [redacted] who furnished the information to SAs JOSEPH E. MICHALSKI and CHESTER J. GUSTOWSKI on 3/16/61.

A copy is being furnished for information of Chicago in view of its interest in Polish intelligence activities and because of the possibility of future investigation by Chicago in this matter.

Extra copies are designated for the Bureau and New York Office for inclusion in the SAMUEL SPERBER file (Bufile 100-397666) [redacted] since the unidentified man of Jewish extraction who lives in New York City, who is mentioned in the memorandum, in all probability is identical with SAMUEL SPERBER.

RVC

4 - Bureau (Enc. - 7) CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE
(1 - 65-65192) [redacted]
(1 - 100-397666) (SAMUEL SPERBER)
1 - Chicago (Enc. - 1) (INFO) (RM)
3 - New York [redacted] (Enc. - 3) (RM)
[redacted]
3 - WFO
[redacted]
(1 - 100-26923) (SAMUEL SPERBER)

2 ENCLOSURE

65 65192-
NOT RECORDED
150 APR 4 1961

CJG:pmc
(11)

62 APR 10 1961

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b3
b7E
b7D
b3
b7E
b3
b7D
b7E

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

b3
b7E

For information of New York and Chicago, informant was in charge of Section 6 (scientific/technical branch), Department 1 (Foreign Intelligence), Polish Security Service (UB), prior to his defection. In view of informant's present status, extreme caution should be used regarding this information and it should be maintained on a need-to-know-basis.

LEADS

NEW YORK DIVISION

AT NEW YORK, NEW YORK

1. Will conduct appropriate investigation to identify unidentified United Press Correspondent attached to the United Nations, in whom subject had an operational interest.

2. Will conduct appropriate investigation to identify the Polish UB official employed as a correspondent who was in contact with subject sometime during latter part of 1959 or early 1960.

3. Will advise Bureau whether New York Office concurs with observation that unidentified man of Jewish extraction from New York City who was operated by subject is identical with SAMUEL SPERBER.

The letterhead memorandum is classified ~~"Secret"~~ to protect the identity of a defector, who has not been surfaced and who is currently furnishing information of value.

The evaluation memorandum is classified ~~"Confidential"~~ since it refers to an official of a foreign government establishment, disclosure of which might be prejudicial to the best interests of the United States Government.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted]

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

~~SECRET~~

Washington 25, D. C.

MAR 31 1961

ANTONI CZARKOWSKI

A confidential source on March 16, 1961, furnished the following information concerning Antoni Czarkowski, First Secretary of the Polish United Nations Delegation, New York City:

Czarkowski is the chief Polish Security Service (UB) agent of the number 2 legal residentura in the United States at the Polish United Nations Delegation, located in New York City. He is responsible to Department I (Foreign Intelligence), Section II (United States, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, United Kingdom, Israel) of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MSW). The number one legal residentura is located at the Polish Embassy, Washington, D. C. These are two distinct residenturas, not responsible nor subservient to one another. The number two residentura is primarily engaged in matters concerning the United Nations.

Czarkowski has been given the pseudonym "Kosma". He is one of the older UB agents, having been assigned to his present post about six or seven years. He is to be recalled shortly and in all probability will be situated in the American Section in Department I, Section II, at UB Headquarters in Warsaw, Poland.

In 1958 source saw Czarkowski at UB Headquarters in Warsaw, when Czarkowski returned to Poland on official leave. As required, Czarkowski reported to his superiors,

ENCLOSURE ~~SECRET~~

65-65192-

b3
b7E

who criticized him for his ineptitude in conducting intelligence work in New York. Czarkowski blamed his ineffectiveness on close Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) surveillances and stated that on occasion as many as ten FBI cars followed him. Czarkowski has the reputation at UB Headquarters of not being an outstanding agent. However, when he was first assigned to his post in New York, he worked more energetically and with good results. Since Gomulka came into power in 1956, Czarkowski produced very little regarding intelligence work and his reports showed lack of decision in dealing with ordinary matters.

Source read only one of Czarkowski's reports, which dealt exclusively on United Nations matters. This particular report reflected Czarkowski's contacts at the United Nations Headquarters, specifically, contact with a United Press correspondent assigned to the United Nations, whose name source could not recall. Czarkowski indicated this correspondent was an American of Polish extraction who was sympathetic to Poland. In this matter, Czarkowski requested permission to continue his contact with the correspondent, whom he recommended for consideration as a candidate for recruitment in the UB.

Czarkowski commanded little respect as a UB resident by his superiors in Warsaw. He has been described as a "pro-Gomulka man," whose political beliefs were not crystallized, who is becoming Americanized and who is "tainted" with such American customs as "martinis and manhattans for lunch." It is Czarkowski's superiors' belief that he has lost his initiative for work. He is alleged to have accumulated a large sum of money and wants to remain in the United States as long as possible.

When Antoni Czajer, former UB resident at the Polish Embassy, Washington, D. C., returned to Poland recently, he criticized Czarkowski personally to Colonel Witold Sienkiewicz, Lieutenant Colonel

[redacted] b3 b7E

[redacted] and Lieutenant Colonel Zbigniew Dybala, all from Department I, Section II, of the UB. Source feels that this complaint, coupled with his mediocre intelligence work in the United States, does not augur well for Czarkowski and he will not be assigned to any important position in the UB when he is recalled to Poland.

Source learned from [redacted] that a Polish official employed as a correspondent and a co-opted worker of the UB in late 1959 or early 1960 came to the United States for a short stay, at which time he contacted Czarkowski regarding a matter of interest to the UB. Prior to the correspondent's departure he was interviewed by FBI Agents and was queried about his association with Czarkowski. However, this correspondent furnished no information to the FBI. When he returned to Poland he reported this incident to [redacted] The latter stated "here we have an agent who goes to U. S. to contact Czarkowski and immediately he is compromised by the FBI." This incident was a further indication to the UB in Poland of Czarkowski's ineptitude. b6 b7C b7E

In 1958, Colonel Martiuk, former Chief of Section II, Department I of the UB and presently in West Berlin on a UB assignment, told source that in 1955 or 1956 Czarkowski was having problems with an unidentified man of Jewish extraction in New York City, who was to be operated as an illegal agent of the UB. This man was recommended by Juliusz Katz-Suchy, whom source described as a KGB (Soviet Ministry of Internal Security) agent, and presently Polish Ambassador to India and formerly Polish Ambassador to the United Nations. He was to operate a photography shop or do some sort of photography work for the UB and was given an undisclosed sum of money, possibly from Czarkowski, to start this operation. However, this man either did not want to do it or showed some reluctance in

[redacted]

b3
b7E

performing this task and the operation never got started since Czarkowski did not know how to make the proper arrangements or handle this type of undercover work. Source could recall no additional details regarding this matter.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Washington 25, D. C.

JAN 31 1961

Title [redacted]

Character [redacted]

b3
b7E

Reference Memorandum dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ENCLOSURE 65-65192-

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 3/21/61

FROM : SAC, WFO

SUBJECT: [redacted]

(OO:WFO)

b6
b7C
b3
b7E
b7D
b7D

ReBulet dated 3/14/61, (no copies to Chicago) captioned as above, setting out lead for WFO to reinterview [redacted] concerning subject and to display photograph of IRA VICTOR MORRIS, aka (Bufile 100-379037)(NY file 100-106080) to him to determine if he is identical with subject.

Enclosed herewith are seven copies for the Bureau, two copies each for Chicago and New York of a letterhead memo dated and captioned as above. A similar number of copies of a letterhead memo evaluating the confidential source used in above-mentioned memo are also enclosed.

The confidential source mentioned is [redacted] who furnished the information to SAs JOSEPH E. MICHALSKI and CHESTER J. GUSTOWSKI on 3/9 and 15/61.

Copies are being furnished for the information of Chicago and New York as those offices received previous communication in this matter in view of their interest in Soviet-bloc intelligence activities. For the info of Chicago, information concerning subject was contained in WFO airtel 2/23/61, captioned, "JACQUES JAY SAUNDER, aka" to the effect that "an American named MORRIS from Geneva, Switzerland, who spoke perfect Russian" was a member of an intelligence network in East Berlin operating against the U.S. and the West for the East German Ministry for State Security and the Soviet Committee of State Security (KGB).

Photographs of IRA VICTOR MORRIS and of [redacted] were exhibited to [redacted] on

b6
b7C

4 - Bureau (Enc. 7)
(1 - 65-65192) [redacted] (1 - 100-148697)(JACQUES JAY SAUNDER)
2 - New York (Enc. 2)(Info)(RM) [redacted]
2 - Chicago (Enc. 2)(Info)(RM) [redacted]
3 - WFO
(2) [redacted]

b3
b7D
b7E

JEM:lmb

1 ENCLOSURE

165-65192-
NOT RECORDED
78 MAR 23 1961

83 APR (11) 1961

ORIGINAL FILED IN

WFO

3/15/61. Informant stated that he did not recognize the persons in these photographs and that neither resembled the subject.

As noted in reBulet CIA is conducting an investigation to identify MORRIS. CIA representative was present during interviews with [redacted] concerning MORRIS and noted that they were conducting an active investigation to identify MORRIS and his contacts in Geneva, Switzerland, based on information supplied by informant. b7D

In view of the above and based on information as set out in enclosed letterhead memo to the effect that subject was not an American no further action is contemplated in this matter UACB.

The letterhead memo is classified ~~"Secret"~~ to protect the identity of a defector who has not been surfaced and who is currently furnishing information of value.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted]

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~SECRET~~

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Washington 25, D. C.
March 21, 1961

[redacted]

b3
b7E

On March 9, 1961, a confidential source furnished the following descriptive data concerning an agent whose last name was Morris and who was associated with an intelligence network in East Berlin directed by Michal Wisniewski against various Western countries for the East German Ministry for State Security (MFS) and the Soviet Committee of State Security (KGB):

Although Morris had an American name, spoke English and was engaged in intelligence activities for Wisniewski directed against certain Americans in Geneva, Switzerland, he himself was not an American.

According to Wisniewski, Morris came from Odessa, Russia, in about 1950 and became a Swiss citizen while residing in Geneva. Morris is in the timber business which he uses as a cover for illegal activities on behalf of the KGB and MFS through Wisniewski.

Morris was between [redacted] (1958); youthful appearance; average build and height being about 5 foot 9 inches; light brown hair; aquiline nose; and generally resembled a Swiss national in dress and appearance. In addition to perfect Russian, he also was able to converse in French and English. He appeared to be of above average intelligence and may possibly have been married.

b6
b7C

Wisniewski noted that Morris' father was a communist residing in France where he was also engaged in intelligence activities for the KGB and only incidentally for the MFS.

~~SECRET~~

65-65192-

ENCLOSURE

RE: [redacted]

b3
b7E

Source stated that Morris came to Warsaw, Poland, in late Summer of 1958, where he claimed that he was involved in a business matter concerning timber with the Polish Government. At that time source noted his first name was Russian and may have begun with an "R."

Source stated he could furnish no additional information about Morris, but was reasonably sure he could recognize his photograph if displayed to him.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the property of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

Washington 25, D. C.
March 21, 1961

b6
b7C

Title: [redacted]

b3
b7E

Character: [redacted]

Reference: Memorandum dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the property of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

65-65192-

ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ACG

b6
b7C

3/23/61

AIRTEL

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, WFO [redacted]

b3
b7E

[redacted]

(00: WFO)

b3
b7D
b7E

Confidential Source

On 3/22/61, [redacted] advised SA JOSEPH A. MICHALSKI that, according to Lt. Col. SKIBINSKI, Chief of Section 8 (operations against U.S. diplomatic establishments and personnel in Warsaw, Poland), Department II (Counterintelligence) Polish Security Service (UB), [redacted] Counsellor of the U.S. Embassy in Warsaw, Poland, in 1959, was one of his agents. Source stated that SKIBINSKI furnished him the following information concerning this person:

She was either an old maid or a divorcee. Her association with Section 8 was minor in capacity and she could not be labeled a first-class agent. Source noted that it was common practice within Section 8 to place or recruit such persons in the employ of the U.S. Embassy personnel in Warsaw, particularly if they held positions equivalent to that of [redacted] for possible utilization in some intelligence operation or to gather specific data about them.

[redacted]

b3
b7D
b7E

2-Bureau
(1-65-65192) [redacted]

[redacted]

4-WFO

[redacted]

65-65192-

JAM:MJB
(9)

NOT RECORDED
180 MAR 28 1961

50 MAR 31 1961

WFO [redacted] b3 b7E

SKIBINSKI advised the informant that this person initially furnished the information that [redacted] was amenable to extra-marital activities, which was subsequently forwarded to the Soviet Committee of State Security (KGB). SKIBINSKI further advised the informant sometime in 1959, that [redacted] was taking this person with him to the United States. b6 b7C b7D

Informant stated he could furnish no additional info about this person and that he was not even aware of her name.

WFOlet to the Director dated 11/10/60, captioned "EMILIA BAGAN LUKASZEWICZ; IS-PO," set out following info concerning [redacted] obtained from a file review on 11/7/60, from the District Office, INS, WDC: b7D

On 9/21/60, EMILIA BAGAN LUKASZEWICZ, 3422 Garfield St., N.W., WDC, executed a form entitled "Application to Extend Time of Temporary Stay Or Application By Alien Student For Permission to Accept Employment." This form revealed the following info:

Name:	EMILIA BAGAN LUKASZEWICZ
Mailing Address:	3422 Garfield St., N.W., WDC
Born:	9/6/13, Poland
Date & Port of Arrival:	11/7/59, Idlewild, N.Y.
Passport#:	CA 0220052
Marital Status:	Divorced
[redacted]	b7D
Kind of Employment:	Domestic Service
Reason for Coming to U.S.:	Towork for present employeronly.

WFO [redacted] b3 b7E

The above described form contained a notation that the temporary stay for LUKASZEWICZ had been extended to 4/14/61.

While it appears from the above that LUKASZEWICZ may be identical with the subject, it is noted that the composition of [redacted] household is not known nor if the person [redacted] is the same person presently employed by him. b7D

LEADS

WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE

AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

1. Will interview [redacted] to determine the composition of his household and for any information he may possess concerning the subject.

[redacted] should be characterized as having furnished reliable information in the past. If disseminated, the information should be carefully paraphrased to protect the informant's identity. The information should be classified "Secret" in order to protect the identity of a defector who has not been surfaced and who is currently furnishing information of value. b7D

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

b6
b7C

DIRECTOR, [redacted] 3/28/61

b3
b7E

SAC, [redacted]

[redacted]

(OO:BA)

b7D

CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE

Photographs of members of above group were exhibited to [redacted] on 3/22/61, by SA JOSEPH B. MICHALSKI. Source advised he did not recognize them by name or photograph and could furnish no info about them.

JOZEF DABROWSKI	ANDRZEJ GOLISZ
JOZEF HURNY	STANISLAW KOWALCZYK
LEON LASSOTA	KAZIMIERZ MARCULEWICZ
TADEUSZ MYSZKA	WANDA NOWACKA
ZBIGNIEW PINDEL	STANISLAW SIEMION
JERZY SZYRMER	KAZIMIERZ VISCARDI
WINCENTY WOZNIAK	BARBARA ZAWADZKA

[redacted] should be characterized as having furnished reliable info in the past. If disseminated, the info should be carefully paraphrased to protect the informant's identity. The info should be classified "Secret" in order to protect the identity of a defector who has not been surfaced and who is currently furnishing info of value. For further characterization, [redacted] was a Polish Security Service (UB) official prior to defection.

b7D

For info.

RUC
(3) - Bureau
(1 - 65-65192) [redacted]
2 - [redacted] (RM)
2 - WFO
[redacted]

JEM:jmm
(7)

MAR 31 1961

65-65192-
NOT RECORDED
150 MAR 29 1961

b3
b7D
b7E

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

MEMORANDUM

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (65-65192)

DATE: 3/30/61

FROM : SAC, [redacted]

b3
b7E

SUBJECT: MICHAL GOLENIEWSKI
IS - PO

Attached for the Bureau are five copies of letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above.

Four copies are designated for information of Washington Field, office of origin, and one copy for information of New York because of their interest in activities of Polish Intelligence in the United States.

b3
b7D
b7E

Information contained in referenced letterhead memorandum was made available by [redacted] to SA JOHN J. JARMUL on March 24, 1961.

Both letterhead memorandum and letterhead memorandum evaluating source, FD-323, are classified ~~secret~~ since information contained therein originates with an extremely sensitive and valuable source and involves foreign intelligence activity in the United States.

2 cc retained for 2204

3 - Bureau (Encls. 5) (RM)
4 - Washington Field [redacted] (Encls. 4) (RM)
2 - [redacted]
1 - New York (Encl. 1) (Info) (RM)
10 - Chicago
1 - [redacted]
1 - 100-17864 (POLISH INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN U.S.)
1 - 100-21057 (POLISH CONSULATE - CHICAGO)
1 - [redacted]
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 -

AGENCY CIA Langley
REQ. RECD 4-7-61
FWD. BY Mail
BY W.J. Mulroy

b3
b7D
b7E

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

JJJ:mcg
(18)

REC-92 65-1-51 92-106

58 APR 21 1961

APR 3 1961

ENCLOSURE 61-114

4 cc retained for 2204

file cc in [redacted]
re: [redacted]

ESP SEC.

[redacted] b3 b7D b7E

Special Agents handling information originating with [redacted] should be aware of the following Bureau instructions:

It is the responsibility of Chicago, the contacting office, to process and submit to the Bureau and interested offices all pertinent information received from [redacted] by letterhead memorandum suitable for dissemination. Dissemination restricted to date except for CIA, which is handled by the Bureau. b7D

The Bureau has instructed that no action may be taken on data received from this source which could possibly compromise informant, who is an extremely sensitive and valuable source. His identity, information received from him and investigations predicated thereon should be confined to Bureau personnel on a need-to-know basis. Source should never be referred to by name or title in any communication.

Should a question arise at any time regarding the advisability of taking any investigative step based on source's information, the question should be resolved in favor of security of this informant. Any special problems involving source or handling information from him should be referred to the Bureau for decision. There must be no dissemination locally. When setting forth data originating with source to other Field Divisions, such offices should be appropriately cautioned as outlined herein.

Investigation predicated on data furnished by [redacted] should be submitted separately in report or letterhead memorandum form, whichever is appropriate. In situations where an investigation is requested of an auxiliary office and it is necessary to refer to material from [redacted] same should be referred to in the administrative pages of the report or cover letter to the letterhead memorandum. b7D

The Chicago Division should be furnished with a copy of all correspondence and reports where investigation predicated on information from [redacted] b7D

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted]

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~SECRET~~

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. [redacted]

Chicago, Illinois
March 30, 1961

b3
b7E

MICHAL GOLENIEWSKI
INTERNAL SECURITY - POLAND

Source advised March 24, 1961, that Jerzy Polakowski, a UB Intelligence Staff Officer and Resident Agent assigned to the Chicago Polish Consulate under cover of Vice Consul, made a trip to the Polish Embassy, Washington, D.C. on March 20, 1961. While at the Embassy he was given two communications to read which communications were designated for information of Resident Agents only. The first communication was received at the Embassy in February, 1961, and indicated Michal Goleniewski of Section 6 (Scientific/Technical Section), Department I (UB), was reported missing as of January 14, 1961, in connection with a trip to Berlin. Comments in this communication indicated Goleniewski may have defected.

A second communication from UB Headquarters, also designated for information of UB Resident Agents only, was believed to have been received in March, 1961. This second communication definitely confirmed Goleniewski's defection to the West through West Berlin and cautioned all Resident Agents to be alert and discontinue all contacts which may in any way be affected by the disclosure of information available through Section 6. The UB feels the United States will no doubt attempt to entrap UB personnel currently in the United States.

Source learned further Goleniewski's defection was due in part to a love affair. When he defected he allegedly brought his "girl friend" with him, leaving behind in Poland his wife and children. The UB is now aware Goleniewski had been cooperating with the Central Intelligence Agency long before his actual defection. The UB made known the fact Goleniewski traveled frequently to Germany, Switzerland, and France, utilizing the many passports available at UB Headquarters for this purpose.

~~SECRET~~

65-65122-103

ENCLOSURE

Source learned UB Headquarters in Warsaw, Poland, is very much disturbed over this defection inasmuch as Goleniewski's disclosure of information available to him in Section 6 would jeopardize the "technical" operations of the Polish Government throughout the world. Source noted this would affect only technical projects. Source predicted a complete reorganization of Department I.

Source further learned from comments made by Jerzy Polakowski that Henryk Szefs, who recently returned to the Polish Embassy from a visit to Poland, allegedly commented a complete reorganization of Department I is inevitable. Szefs noted Witold Sienkiewicz, Director of Department I, is believed to be reorganizing the Department and has locked himself in his own offices and will not talk with his deputies, Dybala and Sokolak. Sienkiewicz allegedly will not talk with anyone and communication with him is maintained by messages only. Source commented Witold Sienkiewicz is in a very embarrassing position as a result of Goleniewski's defection and his position with the Polish Government has been decidedly weakened. If Sienkiewicz is "Moscow's" man as many people believe, he may be under severe pressure for a complete reorganization of Department I.

Source learned information concerning Goleniewski's defection is being released to UB Resident Agents only at this time and that knowledge of his defection will not be made available to the general Embassy and Consulate staff for some five or six months because of the undesirable affect it may have on them.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the property of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~SECRET~~

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. [redacted]

b3
b7E

Chicago, Illinois
March 30, 1961

Title: MICHAL GOLENIEWSKI

Character: INTERNAL SECURITY - POLAND

Reference: Letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

~~SECRET~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE
65-1-5192-1[illegible]

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

b6
b7C

18 APR 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Franciszek Bronislaw CHRAPKIEWICZ

1. Reference is made to our memorandum of 6 March 1961 [redacted] subject as above. The information in paragraphs one through eight below was obtained from source [redacted]

b1 Per
b3 CIA

2. During the summer of 1957 Colonel YEVDOKYMYENKO, Soviet advisor to the Polish Security Service (UB), briefed source on the Soviet Security Service's (KGB) interest in Subject and his activity at the French Nuclear Research Center in Saclay, France. Subject's case was at that time being handled by Section 8 (spotting and recruiting within Poland) of Department I (Foreign Intelligence). Although the KGB planned to take over the case eventually, it was decided that the operation should be initiated by the UB because of Subject's known anti-Soviet attitude. Subject was given the cryptonym "DOBRY".

b3
b7E

3. In the course of reviewing Subject's dossier, Source learned that during the German occupation of Poland during World War II Subject, his parents and his sister lived in a small village near Rzeszow, Poland. The entire family collaborated with the German authorities, and in addition to various treacherous deeds, including the denunciation of Jews, they were also responsible for the compromise of a county-level A.K. (Polish Home Army) leader. As a result of their deeds, a secret A.K. court delivered the death sentence for the entire family, despite the youth of Subject and his sister. Subject's parents and a maid were duly executed, but he and his sister managed to escape. After the war Subject fled to France while his sister married and returned to the same small village near Rzeszow.

4. Section 8 of Department I became interested in Subject when it was discovered that the sister visited Subject in France in 1957. The resulting investigation turned up the fact that Subject was sending medicine to his sister for resale on the blackmarket and the sister,

APR 21 1961

b1 Per
b3 CIA

Airtel w 40 (encs)
2 - New York (encs)
2 - Buffalo (encs)
2 - Philadelphia (encs)
4-21-61 WEO: bar

place copy in [redacted]
65-65192

65-65192

XEROX
APR 24 1961

NOT RECORDED
170 APR 24 1961

~~SECRET~~

5

MAY 1 1961

(23)

accordingly, was able to live fairly well. Subject was concerned about his own case lest his close friends learn of his and his family's past treacherous activities and was therefore attempting, via his sister, to achieve some official rehabilitation. The sister had been able to bribe a substantial part of the committee membership of the local county unit of ZBOWID (Union of Fighters for Freedom and Democracy), the regime-sponsored organization of underground veterans. Further UB investigation showed that after Subject had fled the Rzeszow area he, surprisingly enough, joined an A.K. unit in Krakow in 1945; was imprisoned briefly thereafter by the Communists on some minor charge and settled in Zielona Gora following his release. In Zielona Gora he joined a PGR (nationalized farming venture) where in his position as manager he embezzled the proceeds from the sale of 100 cows, using the zlotys to purchase green dollars, and bought his way out of Poland to France. In France he studied to become a veterinarian and married a Jewish girl of French background. His wife's father, whose name source said sounded phonetically like "Martier", was a political activist in the French MRP (Mouvement Republicain Populaire) Party and a departmental director in the French Foreign Office. Subject's wife and in-laws were completely ignorant of his wartime collaboration with the Germans and his father-in-law even apparently assisted him in gaining a position at the Nuclear Research Center in Saclay. At Saclay Subject was engaged in conducting nuclear experiments on behalf of French military organizations.

5. Subject's case was transferred to Section 6 (Scientific and Technical) of Department I of the UB and placed under the immediate supervision of Fnu BYSZTYGA, the Inspector of Section 6's Atomic Energy Inspectorate, who began to take steps to bring about the eventual recruitment of Subject. BYSZTYGA, using the cover of a representative of the Polish Army's Historical Institute, traveled to the Rzeszow area in order to meet Subject's sister. His ostensible official purpose was his interest in documenting A.K. activity in the Rzeszow area and obtaining personal affidavits from knowledgeable people. It was thus that he was able to interview Subject's sister who complained bitterly about the A.K.'s sentence and execution of her parents. She also told BYSZTYGA of her brother's attempts to rehabilitate the family and BYSZTYGA advised her that he had "friends" in Warsaw judicial circles who could probably help. The sister accordingly came to Warsaw to talk to these "friends", who were in reality UB officials who had been briefed to play their parts. At their advice, the sister wrote to Subject asking him to come to Warsaw to talk personally with the "friends". The brother refused to come to Poland and suggested Vienna as an alternate meeting place, a proposal which was rejected by the UB. The UB suggested that both the sister and brother go to East Berlin where they could discuss their case with another "official" but Subject again refused. He wrote that the sensitivity of

his position prevented his coming to East Berlin, a statement which further increased the UB's interest in him. The UB decided on another course of action and began to investigate the sister's blackmarketeering activities. They discovered that she was also connected with a currency exchange ring and promptly jailed her sometime near the end of 1959. Although this action was of great concern to Subject, he made no attempts to arrange to meet any Polish officials.

6. About this time the KGB reported that Subject was scheduled to travel to Moscow as a member of a French nuclear research delegation and it was hoped that the plans to recruit Subject could be carried out at that time. In early 1960, however, it was learned that he would not be coming to Moscow but that he would be leaving in the near future for a two-year stay in the United States on a research project. In March 1960 Zdzislaw PACHOWSKI, the UB Resident in France, reported that Edward WYCHOWANIEC, Polish Consul in Paris and a co-opted worker of Section 5 (Emigre groups in the West) Department I, had met Subject at a party in Paris. WYCHOWANIEC had learned from Subject of his sister's imprisonment in Poland and his desire to have her released. He also learned that Subject was going to the United States. PACHOWSKI, therefore, recommended that Subject be considered by the UB as a potential recruitment. The UB advised PACHOWSKI that they were already aware of Subject and suggested that WYCHOWANIEC arrange to meet Subject again. He was to inform Subject that his "friends" in the Warsaw Prosecutor's Office were amenable to Subject's case but that it would take "money" to arrange the sister's release. He was also to tell Subject that one of these "friends" was coming to France or Switzerland in the near future and that Subject could obtain further details from him. BYSZTYGA was selected by the UB to make the recruitment pitch to Subject and WYCHOWANIEC was to tell Subject that in May 1960 a certain "SIERADZKI" (i.e., BYSZTYGA), the son of an official of Poland's highest court, would be traveling to Switzerland and could be contacted at the Polish Embassy in Bern. "SIERADZKI" could relay to his father, for a price, whatever message and requests Subject might wish to pass on. Subject agreed to this proposal.

7. One week before the meeting with "SIERADZKI" was to take place in Switzerland, however, Subject's father-in-law, at Subject's request, came to the Polish Embassy in Paris, identified himself and his official position, and requested a personal meeting with Stanislaw GAJEWSKI, the Polish Ambassador. He then succinctly informed the Ambassador that if the Poles did not stop harassing his son-in-law immediately both GAJEWSKI and WYCHOWANIEC would leave France in the midst of one of the messiest diplomatic scandals the Poles had experienced since the end of the war.

PACHOWSKI quickly cabled this turn of events to Warsaw and after much discussion it was decided that the whole compromising dossier on Subject should be photographed and presented to MARTIER for his inspection. MARTIER borrowed the photographs for a day, returned them without comment and nothing has been heard from him since.

8. The UB considered Subject's case closed but the KGB did not give up its interest in Subject. Source believes that the KGB still thinks that Subject will come to Moscow or some other country where it will be possible to make an effective recruitment approach.

[redacted] 1S

10. Although this Agency has no further interest in Subject's case, we would appreciate being advised of his current location in the United States and the date of his departure in order that we may include this information in our correspondence with the British and the French authorities. b1 Per b3 CIA

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

James Angleton

[redacted] 1S

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

DIRECTOR, FBI (62-56597) 3/14/61

SAC, WFO (100-352)

POLISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D. C.
IS - PO
(00: WFO)

Enclosed are six copies of a letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above. A similar number of copies of a letterhead memorandum evaluating the confidential source used are also enclosed.

The confidential source mentioned is [redacted] b7D who furnished the information to SAs JOSEPH E. DICIALSKI and CHESTER J. CUSIOWSKI during March, 1961.

Enclosed was prepared at the request of the CIA agent, currently engaged in debriefing informant, as it was felt that it would avoid duplication of efforts by CIA in the future by not displaying photographs of persons he had already been unable to identify. Additional data concerning these persons was also submitted as requested for purposes of further identification.

The letterhead memorandum is classified ~~"Secret"~~ to protect the identity of a defector who has not been surfaced and who is currently furnishing information of value.

The evaluation memorandum is classified ~~"Confidential"~~ as it discloses the Bureau's investigative interest in a foreign diplomatic establishment.

4- Bureau (Enc. 6)
(1- 65-65192) [redacted]
2- WFO
[redacted]
JEDirps
(6)

7-ENCLOSURE

NOT RECORDED
67 APR 19 1961

b3
b7D
b7E

ORIGINAL FILED

58 APR 24 1961

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C

SECRET

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

March 14, 1961

POLISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D. C.
INTERNAL SECURITY - IO

Photographs of the following individuals attached to the Polish Embassy, Washington, D. C., were displayed to a confidential source, a former official of the Polish Security Service (UB), during March, 1961. Source stated he did not recognize these persons by photograph, name, or brief descriptive data, and could furnish no information about them.

Name	Date and Place of Birth	Present Position
Adam Bonarski	3/14/05; Krakow Poland	Consul General
[redacted]		
Henryk Ladon	3/31/17; Zawiercie, Poland	Military, Naval, and Air Attache
[redacted]		
Romana Buzek	8/8/16; Krakow, Poland	Staff Official in Office of Economic Minister
Wanda Chodakowska	8/24/14; Warsaw, Poland	Staff Official in Office of Economic
[redacted]		

b6
b7C

SECRET

65-13-19-

ENCLOSURE

POLISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Name	Date and Place of Birth	Present Position
[redacted]		
Marian Dobrosielski	3/25/23; Czerniowce, Poland	Counselor
[redacted]		
Rudolf Heller	11/29/04; Bialystok, Poland	First Secretary
Edward Iwaszkiewicz	5/9/04; Sawojki, Poland	Commercial Counselor; Chief, Polish Trade Mission
[redacted]		
Edward Kmiecik	3/2/15; Berlin, Germany	First Secretary
Zygmunt Kochanski	9/2/14; Dzierzbielow, Poland	Janitor-Doorman
Henryk Malesa	8/18/20; Warsaw, Poland	Chauffeur
Antoni Maliszewski	7/28/11; Janowek, Poland	Janitor-Chauffeur
[redacted]		

b6
b7C

POLISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Name	Date and Place of Birth	Present Position
Aleksander Saporer	9/5/14; Chelm, Poland	Senior Clerk, Consular Division
[redacted]		

b6
b7C

Photographs of the following members of a Polish Agricultural Exchange group in the United States were also displayed to the source, who stated he could furnish no information about them as he did not recognize them by name or photograph.

Name	Date and Place of Birth	Present Position
[redacted]		
Kazimierz Hieronim Maroulewicz	10/9/23; Lodz, Poland	Engineer
Tadeusz Zygmunt Myszka	3/12/21; Rzeszow, Poland	Engineer-Gardner
[redacted]		

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~ SECRET

POLISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Name	Date and Place of Birth	Present Position
Wincenty Wirgiliusz Wozniak	1/6/23; Kielce, Poland	Engineer-Farmer
[redacted]		
Stanislaw Kowalczyk	5/27/14; Zabiele, Poland	Doctor of Veterinary Medicine

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~ SECRET

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-19-2020 BY: [redacted]

FD-323 (3-28-60)

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Washington 25, D. C.
April 14, 1961

Title: POLISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Character: INTERNAL SECURITY - P0

Reference: Memorandum dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

CONFIDENTIAL

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

SECRET

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

b6
b7C

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT : Agents of the Polish Intelligence Service in the U. S.

1. Reference is made to our [redacted] dated 7 February 1961, Subject: [redacted] Polish Intelligence Activities in The U. S.

b1 Per
b3 CIA

2. We have now collated additional agents lists made available to us [redacted] and we append herewith the complete lists of agents, coopted workers, and operational leads of Section 6, Department I, MSW, in the U. S. and Canada. Where the UB pseudonym is known, it appears in quotation marks at the end of the explanation opposite each name. The abbreviation "DOI" means "Date of Information".

b1 Per
b3 CIA

[redacted]

[redacted]

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

NOT RECORDED
14 APR 3 1961

James Angleton

b1 Per
b3 CIA

[redacted]

2 Attachments

51 APR 6 1961

SECRET

SECRET

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

Tolson
Parsons
Mohr
Belmont
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Tavel
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

b6
b7C

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: 4/10/61

FROM : W. A. Branigan

1 - Parsons
1 - Belmont
1 - Branigan
1 - Wallace

SUBJECT: MICHAL GOLENIEWSKI
INTERNAL SECURITY - PO

b1 Per
b3 CIA

For information concerning the reaction of the Polish Security Service (UB) to the defection of Michal Goleniewski, [redacted] by Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and formerly known to the Bureau as Heinrich Schutze.

b7D

[redacted] advised the Polish Embassy, Washington, D. C., has received two communications, the contents of which are being released to UB residents. The contents will not be furnished to the general Polish Embassy and Consulate staffs for some five or six months as it is felt same would have an undesirable effect on them.

b3
b7E

The first communication indicates Goleniewski of Section 6 (Scientific/Technical Section), Department I (UB), was reported missing 1/14/61 and may have defected. The second communication cautions all resident agents to be alert and discontinue all contacts which may in any way be affected by the disclosure of information available through Goleniewski concerning Section 6 operations.

[redacted] stated the UB is very disturbed as Goleniewski's disclosure of information available to him as Chief of Section 6 jeopardizes its operations in the technical field throughout the world. According to the source, the UB is now aware Goleniewski had been cooperating with CIA long before his actual defection. The source further predicts a complete reorganization will take place in Department I. In this respect the source learned that Witold Sienkiewicz, Director of Department I, is in a very embarrassing position in that if he is "Moscow's" man, as many believe, he may be under severe pressure to completely reorganize Department I.

b7D

CIA has been furnished the above information. Further dissemination is not being made as CIA has not surfaced Goleniewski for security reasons. [redacted] was turned over to the Bureau to operate while assigned in US and his security must be protected.

b1 Per
b3 CIA
b7D
b7E

REC-94

RECOMMENDATION: For information.

65-65192
HHW:prg (6)

1 - [redacted]

EXP. SEC.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

SECRET

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1352864-000

Total Deleted Page(s) = 85
Page 8 ~ b3; b7D; b7E;
Page 10 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 11 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 12 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 13 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 14 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 15 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 16 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 68 ~ b1 - Per; b3 - CIA; b6; b7C;
Page 69 ~ b1 - Per; b3 - CIA;
Page 70 ~ b1 - Per; b3 - CIA;
Page 75 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7D; b7E;
Page 76 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7D; b7E;
Page 77 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7D; b7E;
Page 78 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7D; b7E;
Page 79 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7D; b7E;
Page 80 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7D; b7E;
Page 81 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7D; b7E;
Page 82 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7D; b7E;
Page 83 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7D; b7E;
Page 84 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7D; b7E;
Page 85 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7D; b7E;
Page 86 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7D; b7E;
Page 117 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 118 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 119 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 120 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 149 ~ b1 - Per; b3 - CIA; b6; b7C; b7D; b7E;
Page 150 ~ b1 - Per; b3 - CIA;
Page 167 ~ b1 - Per; b3 - CIA; b6; b7C; b7D; b7E;
Page 168 ~ b1 - Per; b3 - CIA;
Page 179 ~ b1 - Per; b3 - CIA; b6; b7C;
Page 180 ~ b1 - Per; b3 - CIA; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 181 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 182 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 183 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 184 ~ b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 185 ~ b1 - Per; b3 - CIA;
Page 186 ~ b1 - Per; b3 - CIA;
Page 187 ~ b1 - Per; b3 - CIA;
Page 188 ~ b1 - Per; b3 - CIA;
Page 189 ~ b1 - Per; b3 - CIA;
Page 190 ~ b1 - Per; b3 - CIA;
Page 193 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 194 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 195 ~ b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 196 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 197 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 198 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 199 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 200 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 201 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 202 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 203 ~ b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 204 ~ b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 205 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 206 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 207 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 208 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 209 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 210 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 211 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 212 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 213 ~ b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 214 ~ b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 215 ~ b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 216 ~ b6; b7C; b7E;

Page 217 ~ b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 218 ~ b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 219 ~ b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 220 ~ b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 221 ~ b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 222 ~ b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 223 ~ b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 224 ~ b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 225 ~ b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 226 ~ b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 227 ~ b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 228 ~ b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 229 ~ b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 230 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 231 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 232 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 233 ~ b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 234 ~ b6; b7C; b7E;

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
X Deleted Page(s) X
X No Duplication Fee X
X For this Page X
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-103

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

RECEIVED FBI
APR 27 1961

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

TO : Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

DATE: April 26, 1961

b6
b7C

REC-83

FROM : H. D. Nice, Chief Intelligence Officer
Immigration and Naturalization Service

b3
b7E

SUBJECT: [redacted] Michal GOLENIEWSKI (travel name Wladislaw NOWAK)
[redacted]

Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

b1 Per
b3 CIA

The subjects departed foreign from Washington, D. C. on March 29, 1961. On April 6, 1961, their inspection was deferred under the immigration laws, and they were again paroled into the United States at McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey.

65-65192 - 108
NOT RECORDED
19 APR 28 1961

REC-83

H. D. Nice
65-65192

VIA LIAISON

~~SECRET~~

5 MAY 4 1961

SECRET

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Parsons
1 - Belmont
1 - Branigan
1 - Liaison
1 - Wallace

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

Tolson
Parsons
Mohr
Belmont
Callahan
Conrad b6
DeLoach b7C
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Tavel
Trotter
W. C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : MR. BELMONT

FROM : W. A. BRANIGAN

DATE: May 24, 1961

SUBJECT: LT. COL. MICHAL GOLENIEWSKI
INTERNAL SECURITY - POLAND

This morning's "Washington Post" on page 1 carried an article date-lined today from London captioned "Chief of Polish Intelligence Defects with Mistress to West, London Hears." In essence, the news-story reported that a top agent in the Polish Secret Service had defected to the West and that he was instrumental in identifying George Blake as a Soviet agent. (Blake was recently convicted and sentenced for espionage in England.) According to the news account, the Polish Secret Agent is now in Washington. Reportedly, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and British Military Intelligence have stated they have no knowledge of any such person.

This news article, of course, refers to the defection of Goleniewski who was a top agent for the Polish Intelligence Service. He first made contact in 1958 when he addressed a letter to the Director, in care of the American Embassy, Bern, Switzerland. In this letter he offered to furnish information to the U. S. Government if suitable arrangements could be worked out for its receipt. The letter was opened by the American Ambassador in Switzerland [redacted] Arrangements were worked out by CIA to receive information from him and through letter communications questions were asked of him. CIA kept us advised of developments. b1 Per b3 CIA

Early in January, 1961, CIA was informed by Goleniewski that he was openly going to defect and that he would appear at the American Consulate in Berlin. This he did, accompanied by his mistress and her parents. Since then he has been continuously interviewed by representatives of the intelligence agencies and Bureau Agents have extensively interviewed him. He is in the Washington area in safe custody of CIA.

Goleniewski has furnished information concerning a number of U. S. residents and citizens who, he claims, were connected with Polish and/or Soviet intelligence. Among these were [redacted] an employee of the U. S. Information Agency who was interviewed today and denied affiliation and recruitment by the Polish and the Soviets. Another is Aleksandr Skoczek who is residing in Chicago and who was interviewed in December and denied recruitment or operation for Polish intelligence. b7D

ENCLOSURE

65-65292-109

REC-65

WAB:hmm
(6)

JUN 1 1961

Enclosure

58 JUN 7 1961

SECRET

MEMO TO: MR. BELMONT
RE: LT. COL. MICHAL GOLENIEWSKI

In view of the leak of information concerning the existence of Goleniewski, it is obvious that Congressional Committees are going to start to ask questions concerning him and it would appear that officially or unofficially representatives of these Committees are going to learn of his existence in Washington and availability. Since Goleniewski was the source of the information which led to the success of the prosecution of [redacted] the Cohens and also George Blake, it is obvious that he has a story which would be of tremendous interest to Congressional Committees. b6 b7C b7E

ACTION:

In view of this, Liaison should immediately get together with CIA and find out what CIA is going to do about surfacing Goleniewski so that we can be guided in our investigations accordingly.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

Said to Be in Washington

Chief of Polish Intelligence Defects With Mistress to West, London Hears

By Richard C. Wald
Herald Tribune News Service

LONDON, May 23—A top agent in the Polish Secret Service has defected to the West, sources here said today.

He was instrumental in identifying George Blake as a double agent for the Soviet Union and has been giving details of his own network to Western security agents, it is believed.

The agent is said to have defected secretly from Warsaw.

His name and identity are not known. He is presumed to have used a "cover" for the past 2½ months, and to have left with his mistress, not with his wife.

[The London Daily Mail said Polish emigres in London described the agent as the "head of Polish intelligence" and reported that he is now in Washington, Reuters said.

[Government sources in Washington said last night they knew nothing about the London reports.]

The available information is that he has been talking continuously to Western intelligence agents from the time he made contact in West Berlin, through a period in London and now back again in Western Europe.

It is believed that information he supplied led to the capture of Blake, who was convicted here on May 3 of working for the Russians while ostensibly a British intelligence agent.

The Central Intelligence Agency and British Military Information say they have no knowledge of any such person.

The pattern of defection is curiously like that of Col. Pavel Monat in the summer of 1959. He escaped from Warsaw with his wife and children by leaving a train in Vienna and going with them to the United States Embassy.

Taken secretly to America, he outlined his activities as a top espionage agent in the Polish military security setup and was kept under wraps for several months until a newspaper story that fall revealed the facts.

65-65192-109

"Washington Post"
Washington, D. C.
May 24, 1961
Page 1

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

S.T.

TO : DIRECTOR, [redacted] DATE: MAY 29 1961

FROM : SAC, [redacted]

b3
b7E

SUBJECT: [redacted]

(OO:NY)

Enclosed herewith are 17 copies for the Bureau, 12 copies for New York and two copies for Chicago of a letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above. A similar number of copies of a letterhead memorandum evaluating the confidential source used in above-mentioned memorandum are also enclosed.

The confidential source mentioned is [redacted] who b7D furnished the information to SAs JOSEPH E. MICHALSKI and CHESTER J. GUSTOWSKI on 5/3 and 4/61.

Copies are being furnished for the information of Chicago in view of that office's interest in Polish intelligence activities.

[redacted] noted that of the individuals mentioned in enclosed, the only persons he would recommend for possible consideration of an approach for recruitment purposes would be [redacted] Source based his opinion entirely on observations he had made concerning these individuals, as mentioned in enclosed, in which he had pointed out certain character deficiencies on their part.

ORIGINAL FILED IN [redacted] b7D b3 b7E

P
14 - Bureau (Enc. 17) CONF. Source
(1) - 65-65192) [redacted] b7D
(1 - 100-359027) (TOMASZ BARAN)

[redacted]

b3
b7E

65-65192-
NOT RECORDED
176 MAY 31 1961

2

(copy count continued on next page)

JUN 8 1961

[redacted]

b3
b7E

It is noted that observations of courier activities to date have rarely, if ever, disclosed that couriers are unaccompanied while in Washington, D.C. As a rule a courier is either in the company of his fellow courier or is accompanied by a representative of the Polish diplomatic establishment, which would preclude such an approach.

In the event future investigation reveals any change in current practice of constant escort for couriers, active consideration will then be given to source's recommendation and steps taken to capitalize on this situation by appropriate offices.

The letterhead memorandum is classified ~~"Secret"~~ to protect the identity of a defector who has not been surfaced, and who is currently furnishing information of value.

The evaluation memorandum is classified ~~"Confidential"~~ as it discloses the Bureau's investigative interest in representatives of a foreign government.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted]

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Washington 25, D.C.

MAY 29 1961

Title: [redacted]

Character: [redacted]

b3
b7E

Reference: Memorandum dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

65-65192-

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

DIRECTOR, [redacted] 18 MAY 1961

b3
b7E

SAC, NEW YORK (100-93022)

[redacted]

b6
b7C

IS-PO
(00: Philadelphia)

Enclosed herewith are 6 copies for the Bureau, 2 copies for Philadelphia, 2 copies for WFO and one copy for Chicago of a letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above. A similar number of copies of a letterhead memorandum evaluating the confidential source used in above-captioned memorandum is also enclosed.

The confidential source mentioned is [redacted] who furnished the information to SAS JOSEPH E. MICHALSKI and CHESTER J. GUSTOWSKI on 5/3-4/61.

b7D

A copy is being forwarded for the information of Chicago in view of that office's interest in Polish intelligence activities and because of possibility of future investigation by Chicago in this matter.

It is noted that source was in charge of Section 6, Department I, Polish Intelligence Service (UB), prior to his defection. In view of source's present status, extreme caution should be used regarding the above and information furnished by this source should be maintained on a need-to-know basis.

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN [redacted]

Rec-
3 [redacted] (Encls. 12) (RM)
(1-65-65192)
[redacted]
1-Chicago (Encls. 2) (Info.) (RM)
2 [redacted] (Encls. 4) (RM)
2-Washington Field (100-20194) (Encls. 4) (RM)
[redacted]
1-New York (100-93022)

b3
b7D
b7E

CJG:JVM
(9)

65-65192-
NOT RECORDED
184 MAY 22 1961

1 ENCLOSURE

63 JUN 1 1961

NY 100-93022

LEAD:

PHILADELPHIA

At Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

1. Will conduct appropriate investigation to determine whether subject's present activities might indicate that subject has been recruited to work among the Polonia in the US, for the benefit of the Polish Government.

The letterhead memorandum is classified ~~"Secret"~~ to protect the identity of a defector who has not been surfaced and who is currently furnishing information of value.

The evaluation memorandum is classified ~~"Confidential"~~ in view of Polish intelligence interest in a person domiciled in the US.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

New York, New York

May 18 1961

Re: [redacted]
Internal Security - Poland

On May 4, 1961, a confidential source advised that Section 5 (Emigre Branch), Department I (Foreign Intelligence) Polish Intelligence Service (UB) is interested in [redacted] a journalist from Scranton, Pennsylvania, and initiated investigation to recruit him as an intelligence agent. When [redacted] was in Poland sometime in 1960, the UB had placed one of their agents in contact with him. However, when [redacted] returned to the United States, the UB desired that contact with [redacted] for recruitment purposes continue in the United States, and it was suggested that [redacted] employee in the Office of the Economic Minister, Polish Embassy, Washington, D.C., be assigned this task. When one of the chiefs of Department I heard of this suggestion, he immediately gave an order than an old time UB agent like [redacted] should not be used for such an assignment. Source does not know who eventually was given the assignment to continue contact with [redacted] in the United States. Source stated that [redacted] is not aware of the UB's interest in him.

b6
b7C
b7E

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~SECRET~~

65-65192

ENCLOSURE

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] b6 b7C

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

New York, New York
May 18, 1961

Title [redacted] b6 b7C

Character Internal Security - Poland

Reference New York memorandum dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

65-65192-

ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

b6
b7C

DIRECTOR, [redacted] 6/10/61

b3
b7E

SAC, [redacted]

[redacted]

(OO: New York)

Enclosed herewith are 6 copies for the Bureau, two copies for WFO and one copy for Chicago of a letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above. A similar number of copies of a letterhead memorandum evaluating the confidential source used in above-mentioned memorandum is also enclosed.

b3
b7D
b7E

The confidential source mentioned is [redacted] who furnished the information to SAS JOSEPH E. MICHALSKI and CHESTER J. GUSTOWSKI on 5/4/61.

A copy is being forwarded for the information of Chicago in view of that offices interest in Polish intelligence activities and because of possibility of future investigation by Chicago in this matter.

It is noted that source was in charge of Section 6, Department I, Polish Intelligence Service (UB), prior to his defection. In view of source's present status, extreme caution should be used regarding the above and information furnished by this source should be maintained on a need-to-know basis.

[redacted]

b3
b7E

The letterhead memorandum is classified ~~"Secret"~~ to protect the identity of a defector who has not been surfaced and who is currently furnishing information of value.

The evaluation memorandum is classified ~~"Confidential"~~ in view of the highly sensitive nature of source and since it pertains to an individual concerning whom there exists as unresolved intelligence allegation.

3- [redacted] (Encls. 12) (RM)
(1- 65-65192)
1- Chicago (INFO) (Encls. 2) (RM)
2- [redacted] (Encls. 4) (RM)
1- [redacted]

b3
b7D
b7E

65-65192-
NOT RECORDED
126 MAY 18 1961

CJS:jr
(6)

62 MAY 24 1961

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

b6
b7C

DIRECTOR, [redacted] 5/19/61

SAC, [redacted]

[redacted]

b3
b7D
b7E

(00: CHICAGO)

CONFIDENTIAL Confidential Source [redacted] on 5/4/61, advised SAS JOSEPH E. MICHALSKI and CHESTER J. GUSTOWSKI that Professor [redacted] was never engaged in any intelligence activity for the benefit of the Polish government. To the best of source's knowledge, Department 1, Polish Intelligence Service (UB) did not and was not planning to recruit [redacted] into its service.

b7D

[redacted] a former staff officer in the Polish Intelligence Service, should be characterized as having furnished reliable information in the past. Information from this source should be classified ~~"Secret"~~ to protect his identity since he is a defector who as yet has not surfaced.

b3
b7E

[redacted]

For
5 [redacted] (RM)
(1-65-65192) [redacted]
2 [redacted] (RM)
2 [redacted] (RM)
1 [redacted]

CJG:dcr
(8)

1 65-65192
NOT RECORDED
158 MAY 23 1961

b3
b7D
b7E

ORIGINAL FI

63 MAY 31 1961

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C
b3
b7E

DIRECTOR, [redacted] 5-11-61

SAC, [redacted]

[redacted]
(00:CV)

b7D

ReWFOairtel 1-31-61, and CVlet 4-10-61, both to the Bureau and captioned as above.

b6
b7C
b7E

Inasmuch as referenced CVlet indicated that [redacted] a section chief in the Polish Security Service (UB) as set out in reWFOairtel, corresponded with his brother, the subject, while outside of Poland, [redacted] was questioned by SAs JOSEPH E. MICHALSKI and CHESTER J. GUSTOWSKI on 5-3-61, as to any knowledge on his part of any trips [redacted] might have taken outside of Poland and the reasons for these trips.

b3
b7E

Source stated that [redacted] did take occasional trips outside of Poland, presumably in connection with intelligence activities for the UB, but that he was unable to furnish any specifics about the nature of these assignments other than that he believed they took place in Austria and Switzerland as well as in various Soviet-bloc nations. Source recalled that [redacted] once took a vacation in the Crimea, Russia, in 1959, where the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB) provides facilities in exchange for similar arrangements with the UB. While on vacation, he engaged in an amorous escapade with the daughter of a KGB general, who fell in love with him and who attempted to carry on correspondence with him in Warsaw, Poland, after she had returned to Moscow, Russia.

b6
b7C
b7E

[redacted]

Source was then asked if he ever heard that [redacted] may have corresponded with his brother in the U.S. other than as mentioned in reWFOairtel. Source stated he had

CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE

RUC
3-Bureau (1- 65-65192) [redacted]
2- [redacted] (RM)
2- [redacted] A)

65-65192-
NOT RECORDED
136 MAY 15 1961

JCM:kj1
(7)

ORIGINAL FILED IN [redacted]

b3
b7D
b7E

56 MAY 18 1961

b3
b7E

[redacted]

heard of no other correspondence. Source added that [redacted] would not have been permitted to carry out such correspondence from Poland that if he did so while out of the country for example, it would have been done unofficially and [redacted] would have kept this information to himself.

b6
b7C
b7E

[redacted] also mentioned that even though [redacted] had complained of the renewal of correspondence with his brother in the U.S. (reWFOairtel) he had detected a fairly close attachment for this brother by the manner [redacted] spoke of him. Source further advised that he had once seen a picture of [redacted] brother in the U.S. and felt that he might be able to recognize it if made available to him.

b6
b7C
b7D
b7E

[redacted] should be characterized as having furnished reliable information in the past. If disseminated the information should be carefully paraphrased to protect the informant's identity. This information should be classified "Secret" to protect the identity of a defector who has not been surfaced and who is currently furnishing information of value.

b7D

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

b6
b7C

DIRECTOR, [redacted] 4/28/61

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

SAC, [redacted]

[redacted]

(OO:NEW YORK)

b3
b7D
b7E

Enclosed herewith are six copies for the Bureau, two copies for WFO and one copy for Chicago of a letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above. A similar number of copies of a letterhead memorandum evaluating the confidential source used in above mentioned memorandum is also enclosed.

"Confidential Source" [redacted] who furnished the information to SAS JOSEPH E. MICHALSKI and CHESTER J. GUSTOWSKI on 4/20/61.

A copy is being forwarded for the information of Chicago in view of that office's interest in Polish intelligence activities and because of possibility of future investigation by Chicago in this matter.

It is noted that informant was in charge of Section 6, Department [redacted], Polish Security Service (UB), prior to his defection. In view of informant's present status, extreme caution should be used regarding the above and information furnished by this source should be maintained on a need to know basis.

The letterhead memorandum is classified ~~"Secret"~~ to protect the identity of a defector who has not been surfaced and who is currently furnishing information of value.

ORIGINAL FILED

b3
b7D
b7E

3- Bureau [redacted] (Encls. 12) (RM)
(12 65-65192) [redacted]
1- [redacted] (Encls. 2) (Info) (RM)
2- Washington Field (Encls. 4) (RM)
1- [redacted]

65-65192
NOT RECORDED
87 MAY 14 1961

CJG:ram
(7)

1 ENCLOSURE

62 MAY 17 1961

The evaluation memorandum is classified ~~"Confidential"~~ since it concerns an individual concerning whom there exists an unresolved intelligence allegation.

It should be noted that when subject's photo was first shown to [redacted] at an earlier date he did not recognize it and was not familiar with her name. b7D

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

New York, New York
April 28, 1961

[redacted]

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

A confidential source furnished on April 20, 1961, the following information concerning a woman identified as Barbara Wojciechowska:

Section 8, Department II (counter-intelligence) of the UB had about 150 female agents who operated against foreign diplomatic establishments in Poland. One of them was Barbara Wojciechowska described as about [redacted] cunning, intelligent and a capable operative.

Source recalls that Wojciechowska was employed with Section 7 (operations against non-official foreigners in Poland), Department II, and was transferred to Section 8 of Department II when employed at the American Embassy in Warsaw, Poland.

When Wojciechowska was employed at the Poznan Trade Fair around 1954 or 1955, Lieutenant Colonel Eugeniusz Gruber, Chief of Section 8, Department II, pointed out Wojciechowska to source as "one of our operatives". This was the only time source saw Wojciechowska. However, source did not meet her personally.

On another occasion source learned from Colonel Wyparlo, Chief of the Polish counter-intelligence section, who in turn heard from Nikodem Skibinski, Chief of Section 8, Department II that Barbara Wojciechowska, during 1958 or 1959, was sent to West Germany on an assignment for the UB. Wyparlo said Wojciechowska worked peripherally against the American Intelligence Service and went to Germany legally. It is source's recollection that Wojciechowska has been an agent for about nine or ten years.

65-65792-

ENCLOSURE

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY: [redacted]

FD-324 (3-28-80)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

New York, New York
April 20, 1961

Title [redacted] b3 b7E

Character [redacted]

Reference NEW YORK memorandum dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

65-65192-

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

DIRECTOR, [redacted] 5/8/61

SAC, [redacted]

b3
b7E

[redacted]
(00:WFO)

b3
b7D
b7E

Enclosed herewith are six copies for the Bureau, one copy each for Chicago and New York of a letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above. A similar number of copies of a letterhead memorandum evaluating the confidential source used in above-mentioned memorandum are also enclosed.

The confidential source mentioned is [redacted] who furnished the information to SAs JOSEPH E. MICHALSKI and CHESTER J. GUSTOWSKI on 4/13/61.

Copies are being furnished for the information of Chicago and New York in view of their interest in Polish intelligence activities and because of the possibility of future investigation in this matter.

[redacted] advised he had never met nor seen NANYS and that information contained in enclosed was obtained during discussions with ranking UB officials in early 1959, regarding operational plans to establish personal contact with [redacted] in the United States through NANYS. (WFO airtel 2/14/61, captioned [redacted] copies for Chicago and New York). Source further stated that the only other operation

Confidential Source

P

3-Bureau (Enc. 6) WFO
(1-65-65192) [redacted]
1-[redacted] (Info) (RM) (Enc. 1)
1-[redacted] (Info) (RM) (Enc. 1)
2-WFO
[redacted]
JEM/bls
(7)

b3
b7D
b7E

65-65192

NOT RECORDED
MAY 9 1961

58 MAY 16 1961

2 ENCLOSURE

[redacted] b3 b7E

NANYS was specifically engaged in for the UB as of December, 1960, to the best of his knowledge, was in connection with the offer by Colonel KOBYLINSKI to sell information concerning an underground organization operating in Southern Poland, against the Polish Government. (WFO airtel 2/1/61, captioned [redacted] copies b3 b7E for Chicago and [redacted]

Informant was also interviewed concerning any information he might have about the status of health of members of either NANYS' or his wife's family which would necessitate recall to Poland. As set out in WFO airtel to the Director 4/11/61, captioned as above, [redacted] b7D advised on 4/4/61, that JADWIGA NANYS, wife of subject, plans to leave for Poland, because of her mother's health and in view of subject's expected recall in 1961, she would remain in Poland, permanently.

[redacted] b7D stated he knew nothing about NANYS' or his wife's family. He added that the Polish Security Service (UB) is well aware of the personal knowledge he has of NANYS' involvement with the UB because of the [redacted] matter mentioned above and would therefore no doubt create some pretext to recall NANYS prematurely such as illness in the family which would afford them such an excuse without "losing face." Source noted that the UB also probably fears that NANYS might be arrested by American authorities because of intelligence operations since he does not possess diplomatic immunity, and might therefore compromise the UB as a result.

It was source's opinion that NANYS would confess to intelligence operations after a relatively short period of questioning. If such did happen, it would cause considerable consternation particularly within Soviet intelligence circles in view of their involvement in the [redacted] case. Source is, b7D therefore, of the opinion the Soviets might take action to have

[redacted]

b3
b7E

NANYS recalled and to have him leave the U.S. as quietly as possible never to return.

The letterhead memorandum is classified ~~"Secret"~~ to protect identity of a defector who has not been surfaced, and who is currently furnishing information of value.

The evaluation memorandum is classified ~~"Confidential"~~ because it discloses the Bureau's investigative interest in an employee of a foreign diplomatic establishment.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] b6 b7C

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

May 8, 1961

[redacted] b3 b7E

On April 13, 1961, a confidential source furnished the following information concerning Jan Kanya, whom he identified as an operative of the Polish Security Service (UB) since about 1946:

During the period from about 1948 to 1951, Kanya infiltrated various underground organizations operating against the Government in Poland, such as the National Armed Forces (NSZ) on behalf of the UB. As a result of information furnished by Kanya, many people affiliated with such organizations were arrested and Kanya came to be regarded by the UB as a trusted and tested agent.

Subsequent UB assignments given Kanya were in connection with student circles in Czestochowa, Poland, where Kanya lectured in a school of economics. He also succeeded in penetrating groups consisting of church officials as well as nationalistic societies inimical to the present form of government in Poland, and reported on their activities to the UB.

From November, 1956, until shortly before his departure for the United States in June 1958, Lieutenant Colonel Moraweki, Deputy Chief of the militia and also head of the UB unit attached to provincial headquarters in Katowice, Poland, supervised Kanya's activities for the UB in that area. It was upon Moraweki's recommendation that Kanya received his present assignment in the United States.

65-65192-

~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE

RE: [redacted]

b3
b7E

Nanys is reputed to be an intelligent, scholarly and capable individual who is desirous of remaining in the Polish diplomatic services. While attached to the Polish Embassy, Washington, D. C. his association with the UB is that of a coopted worker, operating undercover with the UB pseudonym of "Andrzej." As such he does not receive any salary from the UB other than for expenses incurred in performing some assignment for the UB and his association with the UB is honorary in nature.

Nanys' continued cooperation with the UB probably stems from his desire to remain as long as possible in the United States and to be associated with the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs as he does not have the reputation of being a dedicated communist. His UB assignment in the United States is general in nature and consists of making contacts and recommending likely prospects for recruitment by the UB.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b6
b7C

FD-323 (3-28-60)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Washington 25, D. C.
May 8, 1961

Title [redacted]

b3
b7E

Character [redacted]

Reference: Memorandum dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

65-65192

ENCLOSURE

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

DIRECTOR, FBI

May 2, 1961

SAC, [redacted]

b3
b7E

CHANGED
CZESLAW FOCHTMAN, aka.
Chester John Fochtman
[redacted]

(OO: DETROIT)

Re Washington Field airtel to Director dated 2/14/61, entitled "CZESLAW FOCHTMAN, IS - PO", and enclosed letterhead memorandum similarly dated and captioned.

The title of this matter has been marked "Changed" to reflect the name of Subject which he used for naturalization purposes and which he currently uses in his employment.

Enclosed herewith are 6 copies for the Bureau, 3 for Washington Field, and one copy each for Chicago and New York of a letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above.

Copies are being furnished for the information of Chicago and New York, which offices received copies of referenced communications, in order that they may be aware of the current status of this matter and in the event investigation is conducted in these offices.

Contact with ROBERT J. BOISE, Ford Motor Company, was made by SE BERNARD A. SCHWEDER, who also caused records of the Detroit Police Department Criminal Information Bureau to be checked.

[redacted]

b7D

P.
OCONF, SOURCE

(4) - Bureau (Encs. - 6)(REGISTERED)
(1 - 65-65192) [redacted]
1 - Chicago (Enc. - 1)(INFO)(REGISTERED)
1 - New York (Enc. - 1)(INFO)(REGISTERED)
2 - Washington Field (Encs. - 3)(REGISTERED)
1 - Detroit

BP/hrw
(9) 57 MAY 16 1961

1 ENCLOSURE

65-65192-
NOT RECORDED
28 MAY 5 1961

[redacted]

[redacted] b3 b7E

IC FRANCIS M. WALKER checked records of the Wayne County Sheriff's Office and Detroit Police Department Bureau of Criminal Identification.

SA B. PEREHOWSKI, JR. contacted RAYMOND MARCINIAK, Investigative Section, Ford Motor Company, and reviewed Naturalization Records at the United States District Court, Detroit.

The following informants were contacted negatively in this matter:

[redacted] on March 17, 1961, by SA ROBERT A. MOFFATT; b7D

DE 215-S, [redacted] on March 17, 1961, by SA JOSEPH HYBLE;

[redacted] on March 21, 1961, by SA T. S. KLIMASZEWSKI.

The enclosed letterhead memorandum is classified ~~"Confidential"~~ because of the interest expressed in the Subject by Polish Intelligence and because revelation of FBI interest in this individual might lead to compromise of the source of the original information in this matter.

None of the divisions of the Ford Motor Company in the Detroit area are presently listed as key facilities and that division in which Subject is employed is not designated as a vital facility.

Referenced airtel set forth a lead for Detroit to submit recommendations to the Bureau regarding interview of Subject upon completion of the investigation in this matter. Because the original source in this matter is not able to state whether Subject has been contacted by the Polish Security Service and/or has furnished information, classified or nonclassified, to the Polish Government, it is considered that an interview of Subject probably will be desirable based upon the reported interest of the UB in him. Leads are being set forth herein, however, for check of Bureau indices and of State Department records and no request for Bureau authority is being submitted pending receipt and consideration of this information.

[redacted]

b3
b7E

The Bureau is requested to check its indices pertaining to CZESLAW or CHESTER JOHN FOCHTMAN, also known as "NAT", and his wife, GERTRUDE FOCHTMAN, nee WIESCHALK.

Washington Field, at the United States Department of State, is requested to check State Department records pertaining both to Subject and his wife. Subject's wife reportedly entered the United States on November 8, 1952.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY: [redacted]

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b6
b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Detroit, Michigan
May 2, 1961

Czeslaw Fochtman
Also Known as Chester John Fochtman

[redacted]

b3
b7E

Naturalization records at the United States District Court, Detroit, Michigan, as reviewed on February 17, 1961, by Special Agent R. Perkowski, Jr., contained the following record pertaining to Czeslaw Fochtman, who is also known as Chester John Fochtman.

Petition for Naturalization Number 238122 was filed at the United States District Court, on November 19, 1952, by Czeslaw Fochtman, 16842 Caldwell, Detroit, who was born August 17, 1920, at Lopianka, Poland. At that time he was a soldier serving in the United States Army, Army Serial Number RA 16 264 329. He had arrived in the United States on October 2, 1947, and entered into service with the Army on March 23, 1948. His wife was listed as Gertrude, born October 2, 1923, at Silesia, Germany, who arrived in the United States at New York City, New York, on November 9, 1952. They were married on July 29, 1952, at Oberursel, Germany. Petitioner had two children: [redacted]

b6
b7C

In this petition, petitioner requested his name be changed to Chester John Fochtman. Certificate of Naturalization Number 7167825 was issued to him on April 15, 1953.

On March 2, 1961, Raymond Marciniak, Investigative Section, Ford Motor Company, Dearborn, Michigan, made available to Special Agent Perkowski the employment record of Chester J. Fochtman, who was born August 17, 1920, in Poland, then employed as a Production Design Engineer at the Plant Engineering and Electrical Engineering Building of the Ford Motor Company at Dearborn, Michigan. His Social Security Number is 368-30-2460, and he had furnished the following information pertaining to himself:

ENCLOSURE
65-65192-~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Czeslaw Pochtman

Education

High School	September, 1933, through June, 1937 State Technical, Sosnowice, Poland "Electro. Mech."
College or Institute	September, 1937, through June, 1939 Institute of Science and Technology, Katowice, Poland "Elec. Eng., Electro."
	April, 1950, through December, 1950 Milwaukee School of Engineering, Milwaukee, Wisconsin "Elec. Eng., Electro."
	February, 1954, through date (1956) Wayne University, Detroit, Michigan

Residences

As of February 8, 1950	18937 Albany Avenue Detroit 23, Michigan
As of December 20, 1957	22256 Champaign, Taylor, Michigan

Employments

December, 1947, through March, 1948	Plymouth Motor Company Mt. Elliott, Detroit, Assembly Worker
March, 1948, through March, 1954	United States Army
April, 1953, through September, 1953	Globe Union Company Keefe Avenue Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Setting up capacit or making machines
October, 1953, through December, 1954	Allen B Bradley, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Manufacturing high frequency transformer cores. (Lab worker)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Caesley Pechtman

Employments

June, 1954, through October, 1955	Dix Auto Electric, Detroit, Michigan "Electro" repairman, repair speedometers
October, 1955, through (date) (1956)	Ford Motor Company Dearborn, Michigan, "Electro. tech.", test auto accessories, build test equipment.

This record contains an evaluation of the type of work performed by Pechtman which includes statements that he assisted in the design of an electrical control system for a mechanical ride-levelling device and an overdrive governor and parts of the 1951 Special Continental automatic window control system.

On April 13, 1961, Robert J. Bolte, Manager, Security Section, Ford Motor Company, advised Chester Pechtman had no access to classified information in the performance of his work at the Ford Motor Company.

On February 20, 1961, Miss Katherine Tracy, Supervisor, Merchants Credit Bureau, Detroit, advised she could locate no record pertaining to Chester or Caesley Pechtman in the files of that office.

On February 20, 1961, and February 21, 1961, respectively, Mrs. Joyce Murray, Stenographer, Wayne County Sheriff's Office, and Isabell Canaan, Clerk, Bureau of Criminal Identification, Detroit Police Department, advised they could locate no record identifiable with Chester John or Caesley Pechtman, or his wife, Gertrude, in the files of their respective offices.

On March 10, 1961, Detective Stanley Kowalski, Subversive Detail, Criminal Information Bureau, Detroit Police Department, advised he could locate no record pertaining to Caesley or Chester John Pechtman in the files of that office.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Czeslaw Fechtman

During March, 1951, contact was made with confidential informants, who have some knowledge of Communist Party activities in the Detroit, Michigan, area, and who have furnished reliable information in the past. All advised they were not acquainted with and possessed no information pertaining to Chester John or Czeslaw Fechtman, or his wife Gertrude.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

SECRET

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] AEG

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

MEMORANDUM

FD-211

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

0-17(13 b) to CG DATE: April 20, 1961
cons. Bur 5-3-61

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO [redacted]

SUBJECT: [redacted]

Attached for the Bureau are five copies of letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above.

b3
b7D
b7E

Two copies are designated for New Orleans, believed to be office of origin, and four copies for Washington Field and one for New York for information because of their interest in activity of Polish intelligence in the United States.

Information contained in referenced letterhead memorandum was made available by [redacted] to SA JOHN J. JARMUL on April 12, 1961.

AGENCY CIA (Angleton)
REQ. REC'D one by 0-7 5-12-61 by Letter C.A
DATE FORW 5-12-61 by Letter C.A
HOW FORW by liaison
BY W.E. Tolbert

b1 Per
b3 CIA

RUC.
(3) 1 - Bureau (Encls. 5) (RM)
2 - New Orleans (Encls. 2) (RM)
4 - Washington Field (Encls. 4) (Info) (RM)
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - 100-382 (POLISH EMBASSY, WASHINGTON, D.C.)
1 - [redacted] (UNKNOWN SUBJECT)
1 - New York (Encl. 1) (Info) (RM)
9 - Chicago
1 - [redacted]
1 - 100-21057 (POLISH CONSULATE - CHICAGO)
1 - 100-17864 (POLISH INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN U.S.)
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - XEROX

MCF 12
65-65192
RECORDED
170 MAY 12 1961
REC'd

b3
b7D
b7E

2 ENCLOSURE

JJJ:mcg

MAY 15 1961

58 MAY 15 1961

SECRET

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

CG [redacted]

b3
b7E

Both letterhead memorandum and letterhead memorandum evaluating source, FD-323, are classified secret since information contained therein originates with an extremely sensitive and valuable source and involves foreign intelligence activity in the United States.

CG [redacted] b3 b7E

Special Agents handling information originating with [redacted] should be aware of the following Bureau instructions: b7D

It is the responsibility of Chicago, the contacting office, to process and submit to the Bureau and interested offices all pertinent information received from [redacted] by letterhead memorandum suitable for dissemination. Dissemination restricted to date except for CIA, which is handled by the Bureau.

The Bureau has instructed that no action may be taken on data received from this source which could possibly compromise informant, who is an extremely sensitive and valuable source. His identity, information received from him and investigations predicated thereon should be confined to Bureau personnel on a need-to-know basis. Source should never be referred to by name or title in any communication.

Should a question arise at any time regarding the advisability of taking any investigative step based on source's information, the question should be resolved in favor of security of this informant. Any special problems involving source or handling information from him should be referred to the Bureau for decision. There must be no dissemination locally. When setting forth data originating with source to other Field Divisions, such offices should be appropriately cautioned as outlined herein.

Investigation predicated on data furnished by [redacted] should be submitted separately in report or letterhead memorandum form, whichever is appropriate. In situations where an investigation is requested of an auxiliary office and it is necessary to refer to material from [redacted] same should be referred to in the administrative pages of the report or cover letter to the letterhead memorandum. b7D

The Chicago Division should be furnished with a copy of all correspondence and reports where investigation predicated on information from [redacted] b7D

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

CG [redacted]

Chicago, Illinois
April 20, 1961

b3
b7E

[redacted]

Source advised April 12, 1961, an incident has come to his attention which apparently is the result of the defection of Michal Goleniewski, Chief of Section 6, Department I of the UB (Scientific/Technical Section), Warsaw, Poland. Source learned unknown subject is a Polish student recruited by the UB in Poland and that allegedly Michal Goleniewski had contact with him in Poland.

Source learned unknown subject allegedly was given funds by the UB and sent by plane from Warsaw, Poland, to London, England, where he remained with relatives for a number of months while attempting to secure admission to the United States. Unknown subject allegedly left London, England for New Orleans, Louisiana via a Polish merchant ship.

According to meager information available, when this ship came into port at New Orleans two immigration officers came on board and took the student off and held him for four days before releasing him. The explanation allegedly given was that the student should have arrived sooner and his visa expired within six days. Source advised the handling of this matter indicated information on unknown subject had undoubtedly been furnished by Goleniewski to American intelligence authorities.

Source also learned that after this incident involving unknown subject and Immigration and Naturalization Service representatives, the captain of the vessel advised the Polish Embassy, Washington, D.C. of the circumstances and results of the interview with unknown subject.

ENCLOSURE 65-65192

~~105-98302~~ ~~SECRET~~

2 Hqs. XEROX

MAY 12 ..

ENCLOSURE [redacted]

b3
b7E

According to source Chief of the UB Residency at the Polish Embassy, [redacted] notified UB Headquarters, Warsaw, Poland, and received confirmation unknown subject is an illegal agent of the UB who had been recruited and sent to the United States. b7D

According to UB instructions no one affiliated with Polish diplomatic establishments in the United States will have any contact with unknown subject.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the property of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~SECRET~~

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

CG [redacted]

Chicago, Illinois
April 20, 1961

b3
b7E

Title: [redacted]

Character: [redacted]

Reference: Letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

~~SECRET~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE 65-65192

b3
b7E

ENC [redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

DIRECTOR, [redacted] 5/4/61

b3
b7E

SAC, [redacted]

[redacted]

(CO:WFO)

Enclosed herewith are six copies for the Bureau, one copy each for Chicago and New York of a letterhead memo dated and captioned as above. A similar number of copies of a letterhead memo evaluating the confidential source used in above-mentioned memo are also enclosed.

b3
b7D
b7E

CONF. INFT.

The confidential source is [redacted] who advised SAs JOSEPH E. MICHALSKI and CHESTER J. GUSTOWSKI on 4/13/61.

Copies are being furnished for the info of CG and NY in view of the interest by those offices in Polish Intelligence activities and because of the possibility of future investigation at those offices in this matter.

It is noted that source was in charge of Section 6, mentioned in enclosed, prior to his defection and as such served as the intermediary regarding efforts described herein to have subject transferred to the U.S.

The letterhead memo is classified "Secret" to protect the identity of a defector who has not been surfaced and who is currently furnishing info of value.

The evaluation memo is classified "Confidential" because it discloses the Bureau's investigative interest in an employee of a foreign diplomatic establishment.

2 - Bureau (Enc 6)
(2 - 65-65192) [redacted]
1 - Chicago (Enc 1) (Info) (RM)
1 - New York (Enc 1) (Info) (RM) [redacted]
3 - WFO

[redacted]

65-65192-
NOT RECORDED
201 MAY 5 1961

JEM:jfh
(8)

2 ENCLOSURE

58 MAY 11 1961

ORIGINAL FILED IN

b3
b7D
b7E

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

May 4, 1961

SECRET

[redacted]

b3
b7E

DATE

On April 19, 1961, a confidential source furnished the following information concerning Zuzana Bielecka:

At the end of 1959, or the beginning of 1960, Marek Fink, a section chief in the Polish Security Service (SB), Warsaw, Poland requested assistance of Section 6 (Scientific/Technical Branch), Department I (Foreign Intelligence), SB, concerning a "delicate matter." Fink wanted Section 6 to intercede with the Polish Ministry of Foreign Trade (MHZ), on behalf of Josef Tokarski, Vice-Premier of Poland, to have Bielecka assigned to the Commercial Office of the Polish Embassy, Washington, D.C., stating that Witold Sienkiewicz, Director of Department I, SB, was aware of this request. Fink also wanted to know if someone from Section 6, who would be coming to the United States himself, could handle this matter.

Mr. (Zygmunt) Sroka, a departmental director in MHZ, was subsequently notified of this request and was advised that Szczepan Mizura, SB staff officer from Section 6, would give him further details. Mizura then handled all of the arrangements to determine that Bielecka would obtain a position in the United States with the MHZ. As a result, Bielecka obtained an assignment with MHZ in the United States, and received her visa expeditiously and without any difficulty.

Source noted that Bielecka was not associated with the SB in any way and that Section 6 had not formulated or even considered any plans to utilize her as of December, 1960. He further observed that Tokarski was probably romantically interested in Bielecka, which would account for the unusual interest in having her desires realized in going to the United States and in having the matter covertly handled.

ENCLOSURE

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

65-65192 —

FD-323 (3-28-60)

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted]

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

[redacted]

Washington 25, D.C.
May 8, 1961

b3
b7E

Title [redacted]

Character [redacted]

Reference Memorandum dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) used in reference communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

[redacted]

ENCLOSURE

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

65-65192 -

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

DIRECTOR, [redacted] 4/12/61

b3
b7E

SAC, [redacted]

[redacted]

(CO:WFO)

b3
b7D
b7E

Enclosed herewith are seven copies for the Bureau, one copy each for Chicago and New York of a letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above. Also enclosed are a similar number of copies of a letterhead memorandum evaluating the confidential source used in above-mentioned memorandum.

The confidential source mentioned is [redacted] who furnished the information to SA JOSEPH E. MICHALSKI on 3/22/61.

An extra copy is forwarded to the Bureau for transmittal to Legat, Bonn.

Copies are being furnished for the information of Chicago and New York in view of their interest in Polish Intelligence activities and because of the possibility of future investigation by those offices.

It is noted that source was chief of Section 6, Polish Security Service (UB) prior to his defection and, in view of subject's association with that Section as mentioned in enclosed, he was personally acquainted with him from a supervisory level. In view of informant's present status, extreme caution should be used regarding this information and it should be maintained on a need-to-know basis.

-P-

(4) - Bureau (Encls. 7)
(1 - 65-65192) [redacted]
1 - Chicago (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
1 - New York (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
4 - WFO

b3
b7D
b7E

[redacted]

JEM/dm
(10)

65-65192
NOT RECORDED
184 APR 28 1961

67 MAY 10 1961

2 ENCLOSURE

56 MAY 4 1961

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

Conf Source

[redacted]

b3
b7E

REQUEST OF THE BUREAU

The Bureau is requested to check with CIA and G-2 through liaison and with West German sources through Legat, Bonn for data regarding subject's activities in West Germany and particularly relative to the "Berg" group. Information concerning the colored sergeant mentioned herein should also be solicited.

The letterhead memo is classified "Secret" to protect the identity of a defector who has not been surfaced and who is currently furnishing information of value.

The evaluation memo is classified "Confidential" since it reflects the Bureau's investigative interest in a foreign diplomatic official.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~SECRET~~

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

APRIL 12, 1961

[redacted]

b3
b7E

On March 22, 1961, a confidential source furnished the following information concerning Szczepan Misiura, whom he described as a Polish Security Service (UB) staff officer.

Misiura was born in Poznan, Poland, where he was employed at the Cegielski factory prior to World War II. Soon after the Germans occupied Poznan in 1939, Misiura was placed in the Buchenwald concentration camp where he remained until toward the end of the war.

While at Buchenwald, Misiura became friendly with Henryk Sokolik, now Deputy Director of Department I (Foreign Intelligence), Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs (MSW). He was also a member of the powerful communist group within Buchenwald whose influence may account for the reason he was not exterminated by the Germans.

At the close of World War II, Misiura returned to Poznan and became a foreman at the Cegielski factory. Although he had no prior formal education he was anxious to progress in life and enrolled in the Polytechnic Institute at Wroclaw, Poland, about 1949 or 1950. He completed his studies there in 1954, with the reputation of being a good mechanical engineer.

As Sokolik was the UB resident in Berlin, Germany, he was instrumental in having Misiura assigned to the Polish Commercial Counselor's office there as a Commercial Attache in 1954. At the same time, Misiura held the rank of Second Lieutenant in the UB and, in view of his technical background, obtained information primarily destined for Section 6 (Scientific/Technical Branch), Department I, UB.

65-65192-

ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

b3
b7E

Mistura was actively engaged in intelligence work in Germany from 1954 until the middle of 1957. As long as Sokolek was the LO resident in Berlin, matters ran smoothly for Mistura. Since Mistura had no prior experience in intelligence activities, Sokolek taught him how to arrange meetings with agents and other basic principles in that field.

Upon Sokolek's recall from Berlin, Mistura could not seem to get along with his superior in his cover position, Janusz Burchiewicz, currently a vice-minister in the Polish Ministry of Foreign Trade (MZZ). The reason for this may be the same as the reason he was arrested by the Germans so soon after they occupied Poland in that Mistura is foolishly outspoken in those instances when discretion is preferable.

Among achievements by Mistura for the US was the successful recruitment of a West German businessman named Kessler in 1955, with the assistance of Sokolek. He was also directly involved in an operation under the cryptonym "Bern", which consisted of a group of West German engineers who gathered technical drawings for Mistura and for the East German Ministry for State Security (MfS).

The "Bern" group also received military data from a *Negro* sergeant in the United States Army stationed in West Germany which they forwarded to Mistura. This sergeant returned to the United States sometime in 1956, without ever having met Mistura. Since the Soviet Committee of State Security (KGB) received the information attributed to this sergeant from the US, they also indicated an interest in him but further details as to the extent of this interest are unknown.

Sometime during the first part of 1957, the entire "Berg" group was arrested by the West German police and their cooperation with the Poles was exposed. As a result, Mistura did not dare to appear in West Germany for fear of arrest and he was subsequently recalled to Poland in the late summer of 1957.

[redacted]

b3
b7E

According to Sokolak the "Herz" group used to bring documents to Misiura who photographed them and forwarded copies to Warsaw. In return they were paid a sum total of 60,000 German marks by Misiura.

Upon Misiura's return to Poland he requested a release of two years from participation in intelligence work from Department I and returned to the Ceglelski factory in Poznan. Department I, however, utilized his services on two occasions in 1959, and once at the beginning of 1960, for the purpose of contacting an agent representative buyer, named Franz Grunt, in Austria.

Misiura visited an automobile factory in Vienna, Austria, using the fictitious name of Nowak, and contacted Grunt. He stayed in Austria from seven to ten days using the cover of a delegate from the Polish Ministry of Heavy Industries. Misiura also utilized Grunt's office to photograph technical data Grunt had furnished him.

At the end of 1959, the MSW desired to place a good technical man in the United States and turned to Department I for assistance. Sokolak, who was now a Deputy Director of Department I, recommended Misiura. The original plan was to send Misiura to Chicago, but it was discarded and he was sent to Washington, D.C., instead.

Misiura at this time became a staff officer for the UB and was advanced in rank to First Lieutenant. He also received some schooling in his cover position in the United States at the MSW for a short period of time.

Due to the unusual delay in receiving a United States visa, speculation arose within Department I that Misiura's role in connection with the "Herz" affair as well as his intelligence activities in Austria were known to the Americans. When Misiura finally received his visa, he was introduced to Tadeusz Cibor, Chief of the UB Residentura in the United States, in the office of Lieutenant Colonel Stanislaw Jastrzebski, Chief of Section 2 ("legal" operations directed against the United States, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, United Kingdom, Israel), Department I.

Misiura was also given instructions as to his assignment and signed the usual UB statement that he was a staff officer for Department I assigned to the United States under Cibor and administratively responsible to Section 2, but operationally responsible to Section 6 for technical assignments.

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

b3
b7E

While still in Warsaw, Misiura met a UB co-opted worker named Ryszard Szepke, who was scheduled to proceed to the United States. Misiura was to act as Szepke's principal and therefore arrangements were made for a future meeting in the United States.

During his acclimatization period of six months after arrival in the United States, Misiura's assignment was general in nature in that he was to use his commercial position to become acquainted with technical engineers with Polish backgrounds, look over the terrain, and so forth.

Following the acclimatization period it was anticipated that Misiura's general assignment would include:

1) Establishing contacts with engineers at such American firms as Radio Corporation of America (RCA) and obtain technical data from these firms.

2) To "spot" candidates for possible recruitment by the UB.

Specific assignments would also be received from Section 2 with the full cooperation and recommendations of Section 6. If Misiura should recommend consideration of a certain candidate for recruitment, Section 2 as well as Section 6 would have to give their approval in view of Misiura's limited intelligence experience. In addition, Misiura would eventually supervise or control intelligence activities of the UB operative, Jan Kanya, who was also attached to the Polish Commercial Office in Washington, D.C. This point resulted from the meeting Misiura previously had with Cibor in Warsaw.

In the beginning of December, 1960, Misiura forwarded a report to Department I which merely advised of his impressions and stated that relations with the resident attached to the Polish Embassy, Washington, D.C., were satisfactory.

In conclusion, source provided the following character analysis of Misiura:

Misiura is an ardent Polish nationalist whose political philosophy stem from a consuming desire to improve the lot of the working class in Poland which is influenced by his own humble upbringing. Although not a dedicated communist or even politically active, Misiura's communistic leanings might be described as resembling more closely that of "Titoism" in Yugoslavia with his opinions on communism within the scope

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

b6
b7C

rather than on an international scale. Nisiura's support of Wladyslaw Gomulka, present head of the Polish government, stems from Gomulka's successful efforts to lessen Soviet dominance in Poland. On the other hand, Nisiura's form of nationalism has resulted in openly expressing anti-Semitic sentiments and he opposes Gomulka's policy of retaining Jews in the Polish government, particularly within the MVD. Nisiura is also anti-Soviet but he keeps such sentiments concealed.

Nisiura owns his own home in Passaic. His family life is satisfactory although his wife appears to be a neurotic. At the same time, Nisiura would not be adverse to extra-marital activities if covertly and discreetly managed.

He is also conservative in his drinking and spending habits. He likes to drive and to go on long automobile trips. Nisiura may be described as an energetic, ambitious, capable individual who possesses a hard and stubborn character.

~~SECRET~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted]

FD-323 (3-28-60)

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

April 12, 1961

Title [redacted]

b3
b7E

Character [redacted]

Reference Memo and letterhead memo dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

65-65192-

ENCLOSURE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

DIRECTOR, FBI (100-350264) 4/28/61

SAC, [redacted]

b3
b7E

POLISH INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
IN THE UNITED STATES
IS - PO

[redacted] advised SAs JOSEPH E. MICHALSKI and CHESTER J. GUSTOWSKI on 4/19/61, the only pseudonyms utilized by Polish Security Service (UB) "legal" representatives in the U. S. he is cognizant of are as follows:

b7D

ANTONI CZARKOWSKI, Polish UN Delegation, New York - "Kosma"

TADEUSZ CIBOR, Polish Embassy, WDC - "Bor"

SZCZEPAN NISIURA, Polish Embassy, WDC - "Janek"

STEFAN SZYMCZYKIEWICZ, Polish Embassy, WDC - "Braun"

JAN NANTS, Polish Embassy, WDC - "Andrzej"

Source noted that coded messages to UB headquarters from the residentura attached to the Polish Embassy, WDC, would be forwarded under the name of the chief resident if he should be present, in that event would be "Bor". The same would be true regarding messages emanating from the residentura attached to the Polish UN Delegation, which would be that of the chief resident; namely "Kosma". In the event the chief resident happens to be away from the city the first deputy's pseudonym would be utilized which, in the case of the Polish Embassy, would be that of SZYMCZYKIEWICZ or "Braun".

It was brought to the source's attention that he had referred to the cover name of the residentura attached to the Polish Embassy, WDC, as "Janek". (WFOairtel to the Bureau 1/30/61, captioned [redacted] Source stated this was in error and could be attributed only to inadvertance.

b3
b7E

(3) - Bureau (Source - [redacted])
(1 - 65-65192)
1 - Chicago (100-17864) (Info) (RM)
1 - New York (100-85363) (RM)
2 - WFO

65-65192-
NOT RECORDED
141 MAY 22 1961

b3
b7D
b7E

JEM:jld
(7)

57 MAY 10 1961

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 100-350264-1633

[redacted]

b3
b7E

Copies are being forwarded for the information of Chicago and New York in view of their interest in Polish Intelligence activities.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

b6
b7C

DIRECTOR, FBI (100-397666) 4/28/61

SAC, WFO (100-26923)

[redacted]

b3
b7E

(CO: NY)

ReBulet dated 3/13/61, captioned as above, setting out leads for WFO to interview [redacted] regarding intelligence coverage given JULIUSZ KATZ-SUCHY by the Poles while he was assigned to Polish United Nations Delegation in New York.

b7D

[redacted] advised SAs JOSEPH S. MICHALSKI and CHESTER J. GUSTOWSKI on 4/13/61, that he could furnish no information about the type of intelligence coverage given KATZ-SUCHY by the Poles while he was assigned in New York. Source noted that in 1954 he first learned from Colonel KNYRKOV, a Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB) advisor to the Polish Security Service (UB) in Warsaw, Poland, that the UB should not concern themselves with KATZ-SUCHY as he was working for the KGB. After WLADYSLAW GOMULKA came into power in Poland in October, 1956, source stated he learned from KGB advisor Colonel EVDOKOMENKO that KATZ-SUCHY assisted the Soviets in political matters and also from HENRYK SOKOLAK, Deputy Director, Department I (Foreign Intelligence), UB, that KATZ-SUCHY was not an agent for the KGB but was a co-opted worker for them.

[redacted] could furnish no information that the Soviets may have taken over from the Poles an individual or number of individuals in the New York area during the middle

b7D

Confidential Source WFO

DUC
4 - Bureau
(1 - 65-65192) [redacted]
(1 - 100-348330 (JULIUSZ KATZ-SUCHY)
3 - New York (RM)
(1 - 100-86601) (KATZ-SUCHY)
3 - WFO [redacted]
(1 - 100-18727) (KATZ-SUCHY)

b3
b7D
b7E

65-65192-
NOT RECORDED
160 MAY 9 1961

JEM:pac
(10)

55 MAY

ENCLOSURE FILED IN 100-397666-612

or late 1950s. He recalled he learned in about 1957 that the Soviets had taken over a scientist from the Poles, but was unable to furnish any other particulars about this matter, including the area where this may have occured.

[redacted] should be characterized as having furnished reliable information in the past. If disseminated the information should be carefully paraphrased to protect the informant's identity. This information should be classified "Secret" in order to protect the identity of a defector who has not been surfaced and who is currently furnishing information of value. b7D

Refulet, 4/26/61, requesting that [redacted] furnish any data he possesses concerning period KATZ-SUCHY was recruited by the KGB, as well as details regarding KATZ-SUCHY's intelligence activity. b7D

[redacted] reported that information regarding KATZ-SUCHY, previously set forth in this communication, is the extent of his knowledge of KATZ-SUCHY's relationship with the KGB. This data was obtained during conversations with the KGB and UB personnel listed and such conversations, as they pertained to KATZ-SUCHY, were not lengthy or detailed. b7D

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ACC

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

M E M O R A N D U M

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-350264)

DATE: April 20, 1961

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (100-17864)

SUBJECT: POLISH INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
IN THE UNITED STATES
IS - PO

Attached for the Bureau are five copies of letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above.

Three copies are designated for information of Washington Field and one for the information of New York because of their interest in activities of Polish intelligence in the United States.

Information contained in referenced letterhead memorandum was made available by [redacted] to SA JOHN J. JARMUL on April 12, 1961. b7D

Both letterhead memorandum and letterhead memorandum evaluating source, FD-323, are classified secret since information contained therein originates with an extremely sensitive and valuable source and involves foreign intelligence activity in the United States.

3 - Bureau (Encls. 5) (RM).
3 - Washington Field (Encls. 3) (Info) (RM)
1 - [redacted]
1 - 100-382 (POLISH EMBASSY, WASHINGTON, D.C.)
1 - [redacted]
1 - New York (Encl. 1) (Info) (100-85368) (RM)
8 - Chicago
1 - [redacted]
1 - 100-21057 (POLISH CONSULATE - CHICAGO)
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
JJJ:mcg
1 - [redacted]

65-65192 NOT RECORDED 104 APR 24 1961

EX 104 REC-60

2 ENCLOSURES

MAY 5 1961

50 MAY 8 1961

cc 65-65192 [redacted]
cc 100-350264 (Pol. Intell. Act. in US)
cc [redacted]

b3
b7D
b7E

COPY MADE

Special Agents handling information originating with [redacted] should be aware of the following Bureau instructions: b7D

It is the responsibility of Chicago, the contacting office, to process and submit to the Bureau and interested offices all pertinent information received from [redacted] by letterhead memorandum suitable for dissemination. Dissemination restricted to date except for CIA, which is handled by the Bureau.

The Bureau has instructed that no action may be taken on data received from this source which could possibly compromise informant, who is an extremely sensitive and valuable source. His identity, information received from him and investigations predicated thereon should be confined to Bureau personnel on a need-to-know basis. Source should never be referred to by name or title in any communication.

Should a question arise at any time regarding the advisability of taking any investigative step based on source's information, the question should be resolved in favor of security of this informant. Any special problems involving source or handling information from him should be referred to the Bureau for decision. There must be no dissemination locally. When setting forth data originating with source to other Field Divisions, such offices should be appropriately cautioned as outlined herein.

Investigation predicated on data furnished by [redacted] should be submitted separately in report or letterhead memorandum form, whichever is appropriate. In situations where an investigation is requested of an auxiliary office and it is necessary to refer to material from [redacted] same should be referred to in the administrative pages of the report or cover letter to the letterhead memorandum. b7D

The Chicago Division should be furnished with a copy of all correspondence and reports where investigation predicated on information from [redacted] b7D

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-21-2020 BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Chicago, Illinois
April 20, 1961

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. CG 100-17864

POLISH INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
IN THE UNITED STATES
INTERNAL SECURITY - POLAND

Source advised April 12, 1961, that in March, 1961, UB Headquarters, Warsaw, Poland, dispatched a communication to [redacted] Chief of the UB Residency at the Polish Embassy, Washington, D.C., where [redacted] is currently assigned under cover of Second Secretary. This communication instructed [redacted] to advise UB Residencies in the United States to discontinue intelligence operations until further notice. Source learned these instructions are the direct result of the defection of Michal Goleniewski, Chief of Section 6, Department I of the UB (Scientific/Technical Section). Source noted the UB appears to be desirous of determining fully the extent of the reaction in the United States to Goleniewski's defection before resuming intelligence activities. The UB is especially interested in ascertaining the extent to which UB Agents in the United States may have been compromised, especially those who may have been known to Goleniewski.

b7D

Source stated he was unable to determine if the instructions to discontinue intelligence operations until further notice pertained only to the United States or world wide. Goleniewski allegedly had access to considerable information on Polish scientific and technical projects throughout the world.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the property of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE ~~SECRET~~

100-350264-1629

ENCLOSURE

65-65192

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-21-2020 BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Chicago, Illinois
April 20, 1961

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. CG 100-17864

Title: POLISH INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

Character: INTERNAL SECURITY - POLAND

Reference: Letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

~~SECRET~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

2 XEROX 2251

ENCLOSURE
100-350264-1629
ENCLOSURE 65-65192

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-21-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

DIRECTOR, [redacted] 4/26/61

b3
b7E

SAC, [redacted]

[redacted]

(OO: NEW YORK)

Enclosed herewith are 6 copies for the Bureau, 2 copies for WFO and one copy for Chicago of a letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above. A similar number of copies of a letterhead memorandum evaluating the confidential source used in above-mentioned memorandum is also enclosed.

The confidential source mentioned is [redacted] b7D who furnished the information to SAS JOSEPH E. MICHALSKI and CHESTER J. GUSTOWSKI on 4/20/61.

A copy is being forwarded for the information of Chicago in view of that office's interest in Polish intelligence activities.

It is noted that source was in charge of Section 6, Department I, Polish Security Service (WB), prior to his defection. In view of source's present status, extreme caution should be used regarding the above and information furnished by this source should be maintained on a need to know basis.

The letterhead memorandum is classified ~~"Secret"~~ to protect the identity of a defector who has not been surfaced and who is currently furnishing information of value.

[redacted]

ORIGINAL COPY FILED

2 ENCLOSURE

[redacted] 65-65192

NOT RECORDED
167 MAY 2 1961

3-Bureau (ENCLS. 12) (RM)
(1 - 65-65192)
[redacted] b3
1-Chicago (ENCLS. 2) (INFO) (RM) b7D
2-Washington Field [redacted] (ENCLS. 4) (RM) b7E
1 [redacted]

CJG:pdw
(7)

58 MAY 5 1961

[redacted]

b3
b7E

The evaluation memorandum is classified ~~"Confidential"~~ since it refers to an employee of a foreign establishment in whom the FBI has interest, disclosure of which might be prejudicial to the best interests of the US government.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-21-2020 BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C

~~S E C R E T~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

New York, New York
April 26, 1961

Re: [redacted]

b3
b7E

On April 20, 1961, a confidential source advised, after viewing a photograph of Kazimierz Jagielski, chauffeur at the Polish United Nations Delegation, New York City, that he does not recognize it and the name is not familiar to him. However, source stated that there is a (First Name Unknown) Jagielski, who is assigned as assistant to a section chief of Z II (Zarzad II - Polish Military Intelligence), who has a brother whose first name source does not know.

Source learned from Colonel Jedynak of Z II that the Polish United Nations Delegation in New York City has in its employ a Z II cadre officer, employed as a chauffeur whose exclusive task is doing contact and liaison work, counter-surveillances, and taking care of dead drops. Source could not recall the name of this chauffeur.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~S E C R E T~~

ENCLOSURE
65-65192-

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-21-2020 BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C

FD-323 (3-28-60)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

New York 21, New York
April 26, 1961

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

Title [redacted]

b3
b7E

Character [redacted]

Reference is made to NY memorandum, dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

65- 65192 -

ENCLOSURE

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-21-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

DIRECTOR, [redacted] 4/18/61

b3
b7E

SAC, [redacted]

[redacted]

(OO: NEW YORK)

Enclosed herewith are 6 copies for the Bureau, 2 copies to Washington Field and one copy for Chicago, of a letterhead memorandum, dated and captioned as above. A similar number of copies of a letterhead memorandum evaluating the confidential source used in above-mentioned memorandum is also enclosed.

The confidential source mentioned is CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE [redacted] who furnished the information to SAS JOSEPH E. MICHALSKI and CHESTER J. GUSTOWSKI, on 4/13/61.

b3
b7D
b7E

A copy is being forwarded for information of Chicago, in view of that office's interest in Polish intelligence activities and because of possibility of future investigation by Chicago in this matter.

It is noted that informant was in charge of Section 6, Department 1, Polish Security Service (UB), prior to his defection. In view of informant's present status, extreme caution should be used regarding the above, and information furnished by this source should be maintained on a need-to-know basis.

Indices, NYO, reflect that CIA source reported that a man named GRAU was sent by the UB as an illegal resident agent in Austria in 1956 - 1958. As a result, investigation was initiated by NYO, culminating in an interview with subject, who stated he had never been in contact with the UB.

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN [redacted]

2 ENCLOSURE

3-Bureau (Encls. 12) (RM)
(1-65-65192) [redacted]
1-Chicago (Encls. 2) (Info) (RM)
2-[redacted] (Encls. 4) (RM)
1-[redacted]

b3
b7D
b7E

CJG:dbr
(7)

65-65192
NOT RECORDED
150 APR 21 1961

56 MAY 2 1961

[redacted]

b3
b7E

LEADS

NEW YORK

At New York, New York

Will give consideration to possibly recontacting GRAU, pursuant to NYO letter, dated 4/11/61, which reopened case.

The letterhead memorandum is classified ~~"Secret"~~ to protect the identity of a defector who has not been surfaced, and who is currently furnishing information of value.

The evaluation memorandum is classified ~~"Confidential"~~ in view of the highly sensitive nature of the source, and because of Polish intelligence allegation of a person domiciled in the US.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-21-2020 BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

New York, New York
April 18, 1961

b3
b7E

Re: [redacted]

On April 13, 1961, a confidential source furnished the following information concerning a Polish national (first name unknown), Grau:

Source learned from (first name unknown) Michalski of the Polish Security Service, that Grau is an old time cadre officer of the Polish Security Service, having previously been assigned to Section 7 of the Polish Ministry of Public Security. Grau operated as an illegal agent in Vienna for approximately 18 months, and was recalled to Poland sometime in 1958, when he became too well known personally among the Jewish people there. Michael Libermann also known as Michael Wisniewski and Michael Gerlach, an agent for the East German Ministry for State Security, was responsible for providing illegal documentation for Grau while in Vienna.

Source was shown the photograph of Anczel Grau, presently residing at 1972 Honeywell Avenue, Bronx, New York, which he did not recognize. Source may have seen Grau in the past; however, he could not be certain. He could furnish no additional details regarding Grau.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE 65-65192-

FD-323 (3-28-60)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED TATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

New York, New York
April 18, 1961

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-21-2020 BY: [redacted]

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Title: [redacted]

Character [redacted]

Reference letter of Special Agent Chester J. Gustowski, dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

ENCLOSURE

65-65192-

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-21-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

DIRECTOR, [redacted] 4/25/61

SAC, [redacted]

b3
b7E

[redacted]

(00:WFO)

Enclosed herewith are six copies for the Bureau, one copy each for Chicago and New York of a letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above. Also enclosed are a similar number of copies of a letterhead memorandum evaluating the confidential source used in above-mentioned memorandum.

The confidential source mentioned is [redacted] who furnished the information to SAs JOSEPH E. MICHALSKI and CHESTER J. GUSTOWSKI on 4/13/61.

b7D

Copies are being furnished for the information of Chicago and New York in view of their interest in Polish Intelligence activities.

The letterhead memo is classified "Secret" to protect the identity of a defector who has not been surfaced and who is currently furnishing information of value.

The evaluation memo is classified "Confidential" because it discloses the Bureau's investigative interest in an employee of a foreign diplomatic establishment.

[redacted]

3 - Bureau (Enc.6)
(1 - 65-65192) [redacted]
1 - [redacted] (Enc.1)(Info.)(RM)
1 - [redacted] (Enc.1)(Info.)(RM)
2 - WFO
[redacted]

JEM:mlp
(7)

65-65192
NOT RECORDED
136 APR 28 1961

b3
b7D
b7E

ORIGINAL FILED IN

ENCLOSURE

MAY 1 1961

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-21-2020 BY [redacted]

SECRET

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
April 25, 1961

b3
b7E

[redacted]

On April 13, 1961, a confidential source furnished the following information concerning Tadeusz Lychowski, whom he described as a well-known personality in Poland, active in scholastic circles and in government for many years:

Lychowski is not a member of the Polish United Workers' (Communist) Party and is not associated with Polish Intelligence in any way. His position as Economic Minister for the Polish Government in Washington, D. C., is entirely due to the influence of (Jozef) Cyrankiewicz, President of Poland, with whom he has had a close friendship for many years. As long as Cyrankiewicz retains his high position in the Polish Government, Lychowski will remain in this post but he would immediately be recalled if Cyrankiewicz should ever fall into disfavor in Poland.

There have also been rumors in governmental circles in Poland that Lychowski had developed a pro-American attitude while in the United States. This factor, coupled with the lack of any communist leanings on his part, had resulted in an investigation of Lychowski by a special section within Department I,(Foreign Intelligence) Polish Security Service (UB), charged with such matters relative to Polish diplomatic establishments abroad. In addition the Polish Ministry of Foreign Trade has also conducted an investigation of Lychowski.

In late 1959, prior to his departure for the United States, (Piotr) Jaroszewicz, Vice Premier of Poland, solicited comments from a UB official for his impressions of Lychowski and was advised of his non-communist affiliations and pro-American leanings. Upon his return, however, an associate of Jaroszewicz mentioned that Jaroszewicz was highly impressed with Lychowski and spoke complimentarily of his excellent contacts as well as the good time Lychowski had shown him in the United States.

In 1960, Henryk Sokolak, Deputy Director of Department I, UB, specifically mentioned that Lychowski should not be made cognizant of UB operations or identity of UB personnel in Lychowski's office as he is not to be trusted and might compromise persons involved.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

SECRET

ENCLOSURE 65-65192

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-21-2020 BY: [redacted]

FD-325 (3-28-60)

CONFIDENTIAL b6 b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

April 25, 1961

Title : [redacted] b3 b7E

Character : [redacted]

Reference : Memorandum dated and captioned above at Washington, D. C.

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

CONFIDENTIAL

65-65192

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-21-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

DIRECTOR, [redacted] 4/24/61

b3
b7E

SAC, [redacted]

[redacted]

(CC:CG)

Enclosed herewith are six copies to the Bureau, two copies for Chicago and one copy for New York of a letterhead memo dated and captioned as above. A similar number of copies of a letterhead memo evaluating the confidential source used in above-mentioned memo are also enclosed.

The confidential source is [redacted] who furnished the information to SAs JOSEPH E. MICHALSKI and CHESTER J. GUSTOWSKI on 4/12/61.

b7D

A copy is being furnished for the information of New York in view of its interest in Polish Intelligence activities.

The letterhead memo is classified "Secret" to protect the identity of a defector who has not been surfaced and who is currently furnishing information of value.

The evaluation memo is classified "Confidential" because it discloses the Bureau's investigative interest in an employee of a foreign diplomatic establishment.

RUC
(3) - Bureau (Encls. 6)
(1 - 65-65192) [redacted]
2 - [redacted] (Encls. 2) (RM)
1 - [redacted] (Encl. 1) (Info) (RM)
2 - WFO
[redacted]

b3
b7D
b7E

JEM:bbg
(8)

65-65192
NOT RECORDED
185 APR 26 1961

56 MAY 1 1961

ENCLOSURE

ORIGINAL FILED IN [redacted]

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] b6 b7C

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
April 24, 1961

[redacted] b3 b7E

On April 12, 1961, a confidential source furnished the following information concerning Jerzy Polakowski, whom he described as the Polish Security Service (UB) resident attached to the Polish Consulate in Chicago, Illinois, with the rank of captain:

According to Lieutenant Colonel [redacted] b6 b7C b7E chief of Section 2 ("legal" residencies and operations in the United States, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, United Kingdom, Israel), Department 1 (Foreign Intelligence), UB, Polakowski was assigned to his section after serving at the Polish Embassy, Bern, Switzerland. [redacted] did not think too highly of Polakowski and referred to unfavorable reports about his activities in Switzerland. Polakowski was reputed to have had agents with whom he had been in contact there sign receipts for larger sums of money than he paid them and would appropriate the difference for his own use. He also purchased merchandise from local business establishments in Bern and departed without paying, which caused embarrassment to the Polish Embassy as merchants frequently telephoned, requesting reimbursement. In addition, he was reported to be interested in extra-marital activities and to frequent night clubs which featured "strip-teasers" regularly.

~~SECRET~~
ENCLOSURE

b3
b7E

[redacted] reluctantly permitted Polakowski to come to the United States and his assignment in Chicago was entirely due to the influence of Witold Sienkiewicz, Director of Department I. Polakowski, who is a personable individual and an excellent drinking companion, furthered the friendship with Sienkiewicz by sending him and his wife gifts from Switzerland. As a result Sienkiewicz was regarded within Department I as Polakowski's protector.

b6
b7C
b7E

[redacted] felt that Polakowski was an easy target for recruitment or for defection if the Americans became aware of his shortcomings and capitalized on them. As a result, [redacted] was critical of Sienkiewicz's policy when he learned that Sienkiewicz had selected Polakowski for the assignment as UB resident in Chicago. Zbigniew Dybala, Deputy Director of Department I, initially notified [redacted] of this selection, but made it apparent that he had nothing to do with it and that it was entirely Sienkiewicz's idea.

b6
b7C
b7E

Source further advised that Polakowski had been associated with Polish Intelligence for eight to ten years. He had completed the intelligence school in Department I which is referred to as the "two year intelligence school" although the course lasts one and one-half years. Prior to coming to the United States, Polakowski was indoctrinated at the Polish Ministry for Foreign Affairs in his cover position and was also briefed on his assignment.

Source described Polakowski as a relatively "weak" individual who is not a confirmed communist by any means. He noted that Polakowski used to spend much of his time in the UB recreation room while in Warsaw, Poland, where he would usually be found around a card table playing bridge.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted]

b6
b7C

FD-323 (3-28-60)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

April 24, 1961

b3
b7E

Title [redacted]

Character [redacted]

Reference **Letterhead memo dated and captioned as above.**

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

65-65192

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

APR 21 1961

DIRECTOR, [redacted]

SAC, [redacted]

b3
b7E

[redacted]

(OO:NEW YORK)

Enclosed herewith are six copies for the Bureau, two copies for Washington Field Office, and one copy for Chicago of a letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above. A similar number of copies of a letterhead memorandum evaluating the confidential source used in above-mentioned memorandum is also enclosed.

The confidential source mentioned is [redacted] who furnished the information to SAS JOSEPH E. MICHALSKI and CHESTER J. GUSTOWSKI on 4/13/61.

b7D

A copy is being forwarded for the information of Chicago in view of that office's interest in Polish intelligence activities and because of possibility of future investigation by Chicago in this matter.

It is noted that informant was in charge of Section 6, Department I, Polish Security Service (UB), prior to his defection. In view of informant's present status, extreme caution should be used regarding the above, and information furnished by this source should be maintained on a need-to-know basis.

The letterhead memorandum is classified ~~"Secret"~~ to protect the identity of a defector who has not been surfaced and who is currently furnishing information of value.

The evaluation memorandum is classified ~~"Confidential"~~ since it reflects FBI's interest in a Polish national, disclosure of which might be prejudicial to the best interests of the U.S. Government.

Copy Source

3 - [redacted] (Encls. 12)(RM)
(1 - 65-65192) [redacted]
1 - Chicago (Encls. 2)(Info.)(RM)
2 - [redacted] (Encls. 4)(170)
1 - [redacted]

65-65192
NOT RECORDED
170 APR 24 1961

b3
b7D
b7E

CJG:RCM
(7)
2 ENCLOSURE

50 APR 27 1961

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

New York, New York

APR 21 1961

b3
b7E

Re: [redacted]

On April 13, 1961, a confidential source furnished the following information concerning Bogdan Chylinski, correspondent, Polish Press News, New York City:

Jan Chylinski, cousin of subject, and a Polish Security Service staff officer presently assigned in Rome, Italy, informed source that subject is a co-opted worker of Department I, Section II of the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs. His assignment in the United States is to gather political information and furnish names of individuals for possible recruitment into the Polish Intelligence Service. However, Chylinski is not engaged in the recruitment of personnel for intelligence work and does not want to engage in such work for fear of being forced to leave the United States.

Source does not know subject and believes he had never been him and could furnish no additional information concerning him.

[redacted] to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE 65-65192

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted]

b6
b7C

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

New York, New York

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. [redacted]

APR 21 1961

b3
b7E

Re: [redacted]

Reference is made to New York memorandum dated and captioned as above.

Source furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE 65-65192

CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

3 APR 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT : Barbara Isabella WOJCIECHOWSKA nee Gruszka

b3
b7E

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 13 January 1961, Subject as above, and previous related correspondence.

2. [redacted] recently stated that Subject's name was very familiar to him and that he is quite certain she is a long-time agent of Department II (CE) of the UB. Source believed she had been a UB agent for several (perhaps ten) years, and that she was probably originally recruited because of her contacts among foreigners. Source described her as ca. [redacted] (ca. 1958), pretty, and very intelligent, actually more intelligent than she allowed people to notice. Source was never in direct contact with her but got his information on her from Nikodem SKIBINSKI, (Chief, Section 8, Ops Against Foreign Embassies), Department II.

b1 Per
b3 CIA

b6
b7C

3. Source stated that she was originally an agent of Section 7 (ops against non-official foreigners in Poland), Department II and was transferred to Section 8 when she got a job with the American Embassy.

4. Source knew that the UB meant to mount Subject against American Intelligence because of her contacts with and recommendations from the U.S. Embassy in Warsaw, but Source was not aware that she had already left Poland. Source stated that before Subject was dispatched, she was undoubtedly turned over to Section 1 (operations against American Intelligence), Department II, and that she would not be handled by the UB Residentura in the U.S. but would stay in touch with Warsaw Headquarters either by SW or by travelling to places outside the U.S. to make meetings.

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

65-65192 —
NOT RECORDED
199 APR 21 1961

~~SECRET~~

55 APR 27 1961

~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

5. [redacted] (S)

b1 Per
b3 CIA

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

Signed [redacted] (S)

JAMES ANGLETON

[redacted] (S)

~~SECRET~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

Tolson
Parsons
Mohr
Belmont
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Tavel
Trotter
W. C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

b6
b7C

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: 5-26-61

FROM : Mr. R. O. L'Allier

SUBJECT: MICHAL GOLENIEWSKI
IS - POLAND

The subject is the Polish intelligence defector who has been in the United States under Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) control. You already have been advised that a London newspaper released a article concerning the defection of a top-flight Polish intelligence official who was not identified but the article clearly pointed to the subject.

On 5-26-61, James Hunt, CIA, advised Agent Papich that on the afternoon of 5-26-61, Jay Sourwine of the Senate Internal Security Committee contacted CIA, referred to the recent publicity and inquired if CIA could furnish any information concerning the whereabouts and availability of the defector. Sourwine, who referred to the defector by his correct name, indicated that he had received information concerning the subject from the State Department. The CIA official, who was contacted by Sourwine, stated that he personally was ignorant about the entire matter but he would refer it to Allen Dulles.

Hunt stated that his agency is highly upset because the surfacing of the subject will be highly prejudicial to several cases which CIA is following in various foreign countries. In addition, the subject himself has made it very clear that he did not want to be publicized because of fear for his personal safety and because publicity could wreck his marriage.

Hunt confided that since Sourwine has the identity of the subject, he undoubtedly will pressure Dulles for cooperation. Dulles is not in a very strong position to buck the Senate Committee particularly in view of the Cuban setback and the wave of criticism which has been directed against CIA. 65-65192-110

REC-96 JUN 5 1961

Hunt further commented that his agency cannot understand how Sourwine obtained the identity of the subject. His name has been carefully concealed up to date.

ACTION: 6/21/61 - Nothing new. 65-65192

Liaison will follow closely and report any development of interest to us.

56 JUN 8 1961

SJP:klh (9)

1 - Mr. Parsons
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. McDonnell
1 - Mr. L'Allier
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich

SECRET

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

Tolson
Parsons
Mohr
Belmont
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Tavel
Trotter
W. C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

b6
b7C

TO : Mr. Belmont

DATE: May 26, 1961

FROM : R. O. L'Allier

SUBJECT: [redacted]

b1 Per
b3 CIA

The instant matter deals with Michal Goleniewski, the Polish intelligence agent who defected and who has been in the United States under Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) control. As you know, Bureau Agents have been interviewing Goleniewski and we have received considerable information of value. Goleniewski provided information which instigated a British intelligence investigation leading to the identity of George Blake, the British MI-6 Agent who has admitted working for the Russians.

The Washington Post of May 24, 1961, carried an article with a London dateline concerning the defection of a Polish intelligence agent. The article obviously referred to Goleniewski. The question is raised as to how this got into the newspapers.

On May 24, 1961, Agent Papich advised James Angleton, CIA, that the publicity suggested the possibility CIA had planted the article as a step toward eventually surfacing Goleniewski and thereby take advantage of all the publicity and fanfare which would result. Angleton stated that he could never discount the possibility of a leak from his own Agency or from the British but he was very confident that there was no move on foot to surface Goleniewski. He explained that CIA has too many cases in foreign countries which are receiving close attention and the publicizing of Goleniewski's identity and activities would gravely jeopardize the handling of the particular cases. He further stated that Goleniewski's wife never has been made aware of the fact that he was an intelligence agent. She has always accepted him as a Polish newspaperman. The article in the Post indicated that there was a woman involved. Goleniewski read the Post article on May 24, 1961, and became extremely irritated and upset. He is concerned about his personal safety but is more worried about the possibility of his wife's reading such an article and then deducing that the man involved is her husband.

SJP:ban
(6)
1 - Mr. Parsons
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich

EX-116

REC-4 65-65192-111

JUN 7 1961

SECRET

Memorandum L'Allier to Belmont
Re: [redacted] 181

b1 Per
b3 CIA

With regard to the Post article, Angleton stated that this is not the first instance of such publicity. He advised that on or about May 8, 1961, an article appeared in a local newspaper in Beirut, Lebanon, setting forth an expose of Blake's activities in the Middle East. According to the article, Blake had identified numerous intelligence agents in the area. There was one statement to the effect that Blake's identity as a Soviet agent came from information furnished by a "defector now in Washington, D. C."

[redacted] 181

b1 Per
b3 CIA

Angleton and others in CIA are taking the position that the publicity which has appeared so far has stemmed from information planted by the Soviets. Angleton thinks that the Soviets are doing this in order to "smoke out" the whereabouts of Goleniewski. He also suggests that the Soviets are pushing for publicity in order to convince Soviet informants throughout the world that the Russian Intelligence Service actually is not penetrated and that the information concerning Blake and others came from a defector who is no longer particularly harmful. Bear in mind this is strictly speculation on the part of Angleton. [redacted]

b1 Per
b3 CIA

[redacted] 181

Angleton stated that on May 24, 1961, Stanley Grogan, who handles press relations for CIA, received a phone call from the London Daily Mail, who inquired concerning the "defector." According to Angleton, Grogan indicated to the caller that CIA had no information on the matter.

Memorandum L'Allier to Belmont
Re: [redacted]

b1 Per
b3 CIA

ACTION:

The Liaison Agent will be on the alert for any additional information of interest. Although CIA may not have deliberately perpetrated any leak, we can't discount the fact that CIA is badly in need of favorable publicity at this time.

~~SECRET~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

Tolson
Parsons
Mohr
Belmont
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Tavel
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

b6
b7C

TO : *Mr. Sullivan*

DATE: *June 7, 1961*

FROM : *R. O. L'Allier*

REC-20

SUBJECT: [redacted]

b3
b7E

Reference is made to my memorandum dated June 1, 1961, concerning publicity to the effect that the subject, a top Polish security official, allegedly had defected and was in Washington, D. C. I previously advised you that inquiries at Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) failed to disclose any evidence that such a defection had taken place. The following additional information was furnished to the Liaison Agent on June 5, 1961, by [redacted] *CIA.*

b1 Per
b3 CIA

Apparently there has not been any follow-up to the original publicity which emanated from London. CIA theorizes that either the Soviet or the Polish intelligence service planted a story that a Polish intelligence official had defected. This was done to "smoke out" the whereabouts of Michal Goleniewski, the Polish official who is in the U. S. currently under the control of CIA. CIA continues its theory with the observation that after the story had been planted, Western news reporters began seeking details. They very likely contacted Polish emigre sources in London and undoubtedly were given the name of Colonel Alster. Polish emigres are very familiar with the identity of top Polish security officials. It had been fairly common knowledge among such emigres that Alster has been out of circulation for several weeks and it would have been natural for them to surmise that, if there was a defection of a top Polish official, it undoubtedly was Alster. [redacted] *stated that there is no evidence of Alster's defection, but it has been well established that Alster was in a serious automobile accident several weeks ago and has been convalescing for some time. This would explain his absence from his normal duties.*

b1 Per
b3 CIA

65-65192-112

[redacted] *also commented that for some unexplained reason, there has not been any further press comments concerning the defection story.*

b1 Per
b3 CIA

REC-20 25 JUN 12 1961

ACTION:

For information.

1-Mr. Sullivan
1-Mr. Branigan
1-Mr. McDonnell
1-Liaison
1-Mr. Papich

65-65192

5-cm

SJP:jbh (6)

JUN 15 1961

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

DIRECTOR, [redacted] 6/11/61

b3
b7E

SAC, [redacted]

[redacted]

(90:NK)

Enclosed herewith are six copies for the Bureau, two copies for Newark, and one copy each for Chicago and New York of a letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above. A similar number of copies of a letterhead memorandum evaluating the confidential source used in above-mentioned memorandum are also enclosed.

b7D

The confidential source mentioned is [redacted] who furnished the information to SAs JOSEPH E. MICHALSKI and CHESTER J. GUSTOWSKI on April 10, 1961.

Copies are being furnished for the information of Chicago and New York in view of the interest by those offices in intelligence activities of Soviet-bloc nations.

It is noted that informant was in charge of Section G (Scientific/Technical Branch), Polish Security Service (UB), prior to his defection and while in that capacity was an active participant in the operation described in enclosed. For obvious reasons reference was made to some action taken by the UB or by Section G in enclosed wherein in reality the source was directly involved. Extreme caution should be utilized regarding above information and it should be maintained on a need-to-know basis in view of the informant's present status.

No action should be taken by the office of origin concerning information set out herein pending specific instructions from the Bureau.

RUC
3-Bureau (Enc. 2) SOURCE
(1-65-65192) [redacted]
2-[redacted] (RM)
1-Chicago (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
1-New York (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
2-WFO
1 ENCLOSURE [redacted]

b3
b7D
b7E

JEM:pat
(9)

65-65192
NOT RECORDED
83 MAY 15 1961

57 AUG 15 1961

CRIMINAL FILE

WFO [redacted]

b3
b7E

The letterhead memo is classified "Secret" to protect the identity of a defector who has not been surfaced and who is currently furnishing information of value.

The evaluation memo is classified "Confidential" in view of Polish and Soviet intelligence interest in a U.S. citizen.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

[redacted]

furnish all possible background information concerning Leopold and to determine from him whether he could possibly meet Fischel in the United States; data about Fischel's current status and situation in the United States; the identity of his contacts; and so forth. Wladyka also noted that this information was of interest to and requested by the Scientific/Technical Section of the KGB.

Arrangements were then made through Lieutenant Lemon Eilik, a Section 6 staff officer in Berlin, Germany, who handled Leopold, to meet at the International Hotel in Leipzig, Germany, during the Leipzig Fair in early March, 1966. Colonel Ernest Sokolak, Deputy Director of Department I, GB, intercepted the wire to Section 6, advising that such plans had been consummated, and expressed a desire to be present at this meeting. Section 6 relayed this request to Wladyka who urged that efforts should be made to elicit desired information from Leopold while not in Sokolak's presence.

In accordance with this request conversation with Leopold initially was general in nature and pertained to the field of rocketry.

Upon Sokolak's departure, the conversation turned to Doctor Fischel. Leopold claimed that Fischel, in his opinion, was even more an expert in the field of rocketry than Von Braun. Leopold further advised that while he had not maintained correspondence with Fischel, who was now a United States citizen, he could start such correspondence with him. Leopold also mentioned he had no specific information about any of Fischel's contacts in the United States but knew that he was an important rocket specialist with access to Pentagon circles in Washington, D. C.

When Wladyka was notified of the results of this meeting with Leopold and was asked why he had referred to Fischel as a German whereas he was really an American citizen, Wladyka shrugged off this inquiry and commented that the information would be of extreme interest to the KGB scientific section. Wladyka indicated the KGB hoped to utilize the former Nazi organization to convince Fischel he should return to West Germany to continue his work there. Wladyka also noted that the KGB was thinking in terms of a long-range plan with respect to Fischel and were not considering him as a recruitment target at present.

As Leopold was subsequently arrested by West German police presumably in connection with intelligence activities against the State and is presently incarcerated, no contact with him was covered.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY: [redacted]

~~SECRET~~ b6 b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
May 11, 1961

[redacted] b3 b7E

On April 19, 1961, a confidential source furnished the following information concerning interest in rocket specialist Doctor Eduard Fischel by the counterintelligence division of the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB):

In 1951 or 1952, information concerning the continued existence of a Nazi organization formulated in 1943 by one of Chancellor Adolf Hitler's top assistants in Germany was forwarded to the Soviet Ministry of State Security (MGB), generally known as the NKS, by the Polish Security Service (UB). This organization, whose primary function was to attempt to effect the return to West Germany of various German scientists, was subsequently taken over by the MGB. Sometime in 1953, it was determined by the UB that the counterintelligence division of the MGB definitely intended to utilize this organization for such purposes.

Following the Poznan Fair at Poznan, Poland, in June, 1953, the UB succeeded in recruiting a West German citizen who was an electrical engineer named Leopold (last name unknown). Leopold, whose UB covername was "Leon", had worked on the electrical guidance system of rockets and had been associated in that respect during World War II with such German rocket specialists as Werner Von Braun and Fischel.

Toward the end of 1958, this information was relayed to Colonel Vladykin (or Vladykin), MGB advisor to the UB in Warsaw, Poland, by Colonel Witold Sienkiewicz, Director of Department I (Foreign Intelligence), UB. Vladykin sent this information on to Moscow, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

At the end of 1958 or beginning of 1959, Vladykin contacted Section 6 (Scientific/Technical Branch), Department I, UB, regarding Leopold, since that section was handling Leopold's activities on behalf of the UB. Vladykin ordered Section 6 to

65-65192 —

ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

Source noted that as of December, 1959, he learned nothing further concerning KGB interest in Fischel, and that Kindyuk had been recalled from Warsaw in the meantime. Source emphasized that neither the KGB nor the GRU had ever formulated any plans, to the best of his knowledge, to recruit Fischel or even to approach him for the purpose of determining his attitude. He further reiterated that KGB plans regarding Fischel were long-range in nature and that Fischel was, so far as he could determine, a loyal American citizen.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted]

FD-323 (3-28-60)

b6
b7C

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Washington, D. C.
May 11, 1961

Title : [redacted]

b3
b7E

Character : [redacted]

Reference : **Memorandum dated and captioned as above.**

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

65-61792-

ENCLOSURE

CONFIDENTIAL

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

May 26, 1961

b3
b7E

[redacted]

A confidential informant, who has furnished reliable information in the past, on May 3, 1961, advised that Stanislaw Kielan was a co-opted worker for Department III (Internal Security), UB (Polish Security Service). The informant advised that Kielan had been associated with Department III for a very long time and was utilized in counterintelligence pertaining to industrial security. The informant described Kielan as a very capable engineer, who was used on a consultant basis in evaluation of intelligence matters of a technical nature and, as such, would not, in informant's opinion, be utilized in an operational sense by Department III.

Mr. Max E. Keller, Adolf Keller Company, Post Office Box 6001, Turnkey, Providence, Rhode Island, by letter to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington, D. C., dated March 31, 1961, advised that Stanislaw Kielan, Industrial Institute of Telecommunication, Poliguown 30, Warsaw, Poland, recently visited the Keller Company exhibit at the Institute of Radio Engineers show held in New York, New York; also, that Kielan took all of the literature available at the Adolf Keller Company exhibit.

The letterhead of the Adolf Keller Company revealed they are makers of "synthetic sapphire components, windows, domes, lenses, rods, tubes and spacers."

The Office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, New York, New York, on April 4, 1961, notified the Federal Bureau of Investigation, New York, New York, that Stanislaw Kielan, born November 3, 1915, at Warsaw, Poland, entered into the United States at New York, New York, on March 19, 1961, and departed the United States from New York, New York, on March 30, 1961.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~SECRET~~

65-65192

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, [redacted]

DATE: MAY 31 1961

b3
b7E

FROM : SAC, [redacted]

SUBJECT: [redacted]

Enclosed herewith are 15 copies for the Bureau, 10 copies for New York, and 2 copies for Chicago of a letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above. A similar number of copies of a letterhead memorandum evaluating the confidential source used in above-mentioned memorandum are also enclosed.

-P-

12 - Bureau (Encs. 15) CONF. INFT.
(1- 65-65192) [redacted]

[redacted]

2 - [redacted]
(Encs. 2) (Info) (RM)

[redacted]

b3

10 - New York [redacted]
(Encs. 10) (RM)

b7D
b7E

[redacted]

11 - WFO

[redacted]

b3
b7D
b7E

NOT RECORDED
98 JUN 1 1961

JEM:mmf
(35)

1 ENCLOSURE

62 JUN 9 1961

[redacted]

b3
b7D
b7E

The confidential source mentioned is [redacted] who furnished the information to SA JOSEPH E. MICHALSKI on 5/17/61.

Two copies are being forwarded for the information of Chicago in view of that office's interest in Polish intelligence activities.

The letterhead memorandum is classified ~~"Secret"~~ to protect the identity of a defector who has not been surfaced and who is currently furnishing information of value.

The evaluation memorandum is classified ~~"Confidential"~~ as it discloses the Bureau's investigative interest in diplomatic representatives of a foreign government.

FD-323 (3-28-60)

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted]

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Washington 25, D. C.
May 31, 1961

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Title: [redacted]

b3
b7E

Character: [redacted]

Reference: Letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

ENCLOSURE

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (65-65192) DATE: June 2, 1961

FROM : SAC, [redacted] CONF. SOURCE

SUBJECT: [redacted]

b3
b7D
b7E

The Bureau is aware that captioned confidential source is MICHAL GOLENIEWSKI, a former ranking official of the Polish Security Service who defected to the West in Europe late in 1960. The Bureau is also aware that the source is presently in the Washington, D. C., area under the control of the Central Intelligence Agency and that he is being contacted on a regular basis by Special Agents of WFO. He has furnished considerable information concerning both Polish and Soviet intelligence activities in the U. S. and abroad.

3-1
4-1

During the course of contacts with the source he has frequently professed his admiration for the Director, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation and its aims and purposes. He has specifically commented on the Director's forward in the book "The FBI Story" by RICHARD WHITEHEAD which he had read in the German language. He has expressed a desire to read this book again in English and now feels that his progress in the study of the English language has been such that he is capable of doing this. In this regard he has asked whether he might have a copy of this book personally autographed by the Director, stating that he would be extremely honored and appreciative if this were possible.

RECOMMENDATION:

Unless the Bureau is in possession of information indicating the desirability of another course of action in this matter, it is recommended that the source's request not be granted because of the possibility of embarrassment and because of the possible risk to the source himself. UACB, the source will be advised that while the Director is most appreciative of his comments and his assistance, it is a matter of long-standing policy not to furnish autographs in situations which might cause possible embarrassment to the recipient. He will be courteously advised that this Bureau does not desire to do anything which might jeopardize

2 - Bureau
1 - WFO
LWRO/pcn
(3)

REC- 50 65-65192-113

JUN 7 1961

57 JUN 16 1961

[redacted]

b3
b7D
b7E

his safety and that the possession of the Director's autograph might create a situation which would be difficult for him to explain and, consequently, might very well jeopardize his security.

Wes

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

DIRECTOR, [redacted] 6/15/61

b3
b7E

SAC, [redacted]

[redacted]
(OO:NY)

ReWFOlet dated 4/24/61, captioned as above.

Enclosed are 6 copies for the Bureau, 2 copies for NY and one copy for CG of a letterhead memo dated and captioned as above. A similar number of copies of a letterhead memorandum evaluating the confidential source used in above-mentioned memorandum are also enclosed.

b7D

The confidential source mentioned is [redacted] who furnished the info to SAs JOSEPH E. MICHALSKI and CHESTER J. GUSTOWSKI on 4/20/61.

One copy is being furnished for the info of Chicago in view of that office's interest in Polish intelligence activities.

The letterhead memo is classified ~~"Secret"~~ to protect the identity of a defector who has not been surfaced and who is currently furnishing info of value.

The evaluation memo is classified ~~"Confidential"~~ as it discloses the Bureau's investigative interest in a diplomatic representative of a foreign government.

On 5/1/61, SA JAMES A. SCHMITZ exhibited a photo of subject to [redacted] a former Polish official who has furnished reliable info in the past and he could not identify subject by name or photo.

b7D

[redacted]

ORIGINAL FILED IN

Informant
Prior Source

RUC
1 - Bureau (Encs. 6)
(1 - 65-65192)
1 - [redacted] (Encs. 2) (RM)
1 - Chicago (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
1 - WFO

65-65192-

NOT RECORDED
133 JUN 16 1961

b3
b7D
b7E

57 JUN 21 1961

JPD:jmm
(6)

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY: [redacted]

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

June 15, 1961

b6
b7C

[redacted]

b3
b7E

On April 20, 1961, a confidential source advised he did not recognize Tomczak by name or photograph, but recalled that a very important agent for the Polish Security Service (UB) named Waldemar Tomczak had a brother in the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MSZ). He added the UB had plans to recruit this brother, but does not know if these plans ever materialized.

The United States Department of State advised on October 3, 1960, that subject was born [redacted] at Poland and was scheduled to arrive at New York City on September 18, 1960. Subject was to serve in the capacity of a security officer assigned to the Polish Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly. The New York Office of Immigration and Naturalization advised on October 14, 1960, that subject departed the United States on October 12, 1960.

b6
b7C

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

65-63112-

ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

FD-323 (3-28-60)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY: [redacted]

Washington 25, D. C.
June 15, 1961

b6
b7C

Title [redacted]

b3
b7E

Character [redacted]

Reference **Letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above.**

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

DISCLOSURE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

DIRECTOR, [redacted] 5/22/61

b3
b7E

SAC, [redacted]

[redacted]

(OO:NY)

Enclosed herewith are six copies for the Bureau and two copies each for Chicago and New York of a letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above. A similiar number of copies of a letterhead memorandum evaluating the confidential source used in above-mentioned memorandum are also enclosed.

The confidential source mentioned is [redacted] who furnished the information to SAs JOSEPH E. MICHALSKI and CHESTER J. GUSTOWSKI on 5/4/61.

b7D

Copies are being furnished for the information of Chicago and New York in view of their interest in Polish Intelligence activities.

The letterhead memorandum is classified ~~"Secret"~~ to protect the identity of a defector who has not been surfaced and who is currently furnishing information of value.

The evaluation memorandum is classified ~~"Confidential"~~ since it discloses the Bureau's investigative interest in representatives of a foreign government.

3 Bureau (Enc. 6) CONF. SOURCE
(1- 65-65192) [redacted]
2- [redacted] (Enc. 2) (Info) (RM)
2- [redacted] (Enc. 2) (RM)
3- WFO
[redacted]

b3
b7D
b7E

JEM:jas
(11)

1 ENCLOSURE

65-65192-

NOT RECORDED
183 MAY 25 1961

58 JUN 20 1961

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY: [redacted]

SECRET

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
May 22, 1961

[redacted]

b3
b7E

On May 4, 1961, a confidential source furnished the following information concerning Polish diplomatic couriers.

Couriers are attached to a special section of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MSZ), Warsaw, Poland, although only about 30 per cent of them are regular MSZ employees not affiliated with the Polish Security Service (UB). While the MSZ is administratively responsible for the remaining 70 per cent, they are in reality staff officers of the UB and operationally utilized by Department I (foreign intelligence), UB. The head of this courier section is Major Leon Zmijewski, a UB career officer who has held this position for approximately eight years.

UB staff officers are attached to the courier section of the MSZ since essential administrative functions as granting them special passports, accrediting individuals as couriers, and so forth, are performed by the MSZ. In addition, the association of UB men with this section, serves as cover for their affiliation with the UB. The MSZ is well aware of the existence of UB staff officers within this section but, forthe most part, are either unaware of their identities or merely suspect such an association.

Identities of many UB staff officers serving as couriers are well known to Department I personnel, especially on the supervisory level, since their services are frequently utilized, particularly in connection with an intelligence assignment abroad. In addition, such couriers often attend receptions and other social functions sponsored by Department I exclusively for its personnel.

All requests for the services of UB couriers are forwarded directly to Zmijewski. Zmijewski will either recommend a courier for the particular assignment or will advise of the availability of a specific courier requested by UB officials. Courier assignments are known only to persons directly involved and neither the MSZ nor anyone else has the right to inquire as to the nature of these assignments.

SECRET

65-68492-

ENCLOSURE

b3
b7E

The position of courier is eagerly sought after by numerous UB personnel because of its many benefits. In addition to travel, prestige, and being a comparatively easy job, couriers almost unanimously engage in some form of smuggling in varying degrees. It is widely known and generally accepted in Poland that couriers smuggle items into and out of Poland, ranging from whiskey and cigarettes to Swiss watches and American dollars. As a result, the total income of couriers is in excess of the average UB employee and, in many instances, exceeds that of some high officials within the UB. A UB courier benefits by as much as $150 for every trip he takes to North America from smuggling activities and expense accounts.

The least desirable trip for a courier is to China because of the length of the trip and because of the difficulty of deriving any personal benefits from smuggling activities.

Courier salaries vary in accordance to their rank in the UB, number of dependents, knowledge of foreign languages, and the duration of their trips. In that connection couriers who come to the United States, which is considered to be a choice trip, receive in the vicinity of ten dollars a day for expenses, exclusive of their hotel room. In the event the UB courier has an intelligence assignment, he would get 50 per cent in addition, and if he should receive an illegal assignment, he would receive 100 per cent more or about $20 a day in the United States for expenses.

Couriers always travel in pairs to countries in the West, but occasionally go alone on trips to Soviet-bloc nations. On trips to such countries as the United States, the courier team is either composed of two UB staff officers or one UB man and one regular MSZ courier. Under no circumstances would two MSZ couriers be permitted to come to the United States to pick up courier mail at the Polish Embassy, Washington, D. C.

Not every trip to the West includes an intelligence assignment for the UB courier. A reasonable estimate would be approximately one trip out of every three or four in which the courier would have such an assignment. This procedure is further complicated by the fact that courier itineraries are constantly being changed and couriers rarely, if ever, make successive trips to the same countries or go to the same country

[redacted]

b3
b7E

with any degree of frequency. Although the UB courier may not have an intelligence assignment to perform in some Western country, as in the United States for as long as a year, he will eventually receive such an assignment.

The Polish Military Intelligence (Z-II) has not operated any couriers since Wladyslaw Gomulka came into power in Poland in October 1956. Z-II may utilize the services occasionally of UB couriers, who are exclusively under the control of Department I.

UB couriers' training in intelligence work is concentrated on such matters as various methods to be used to make "lightening" contacts with an operative on a train, airport and so forth, in which data is exchanged quickly without being apparent to persons present. They are also used to extract information from or place instructions in "dead drops" as well as other intelligence activity which does not involve lengthy, personal contact with an illegal agent. UB couriers might also be used to contact co-opted workers in Polish diplomatic establishments abroad and act as liaison between them and Department I without the knowledge of the co-opted worker's association with the UB by UB agents attached to this diplomatic establishment. This procedure was taken into active consideration by the UB with regard to Jan Nanys, a co-opted worker presently attached to the Polish Embassy, Washington, D. C., but was rejected.

In some instances, UB couriers are unable to fulfill an intelligence assignment because of a close surveillance being conducted of their activities by local authorities such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the United States. In their report, these couriers briefly acknowledge their failure in that respect and refer to the reason as being attributable to a "Japanese" surveillance, since Japanese are reputed to maintain very close surveillances on individuals.

When arriving at a Polish diplomatic establishment abroad, UB couriers usually determine immediately from the UB resident there the situation relative to surveillances by local authorities. They also sometimes utilize the services of UB staff officers at these establishments to conduct counter-surveillances for them, particularly when on an intelligence assignment.

[redacted]

b3
b7E

High ranking officials within the UB might travel as couriers but it would be an exceptional case and would be usually in connection with an especially important intelligence mission.

UB couriers are not assigned pseudonyms or covernames. On occasions persons, who might act as couriers in a special situation and do not serve in that capacity regularly, have been known to adopt fictitious names for further cover in connection with a specific trip. UB couriers are not permitted to carry firearms, although it is quite possible that this rule may be waived if a particular assignment is considered to be of especial importance.

In about July, 1960, operational assignments in the West on behalf of Polish Intelligence by UB couriers were "frozen" due to the "Hroz Affair." (Wladyslaw) Hroz was formerly attached to the courier section and had been later sent to France as an illegal agent by the UB, where he was reportedly cooperating with French authorities. As a result of this cooperation, Hroz was murdered in France in late 1960, by Soviet-bloc intelligence agents.

It may be noted that the November 4, 1960, issue of "L'Aurore", a French newspaper published in Paris, France, contained a lengthy article indicating that French authorities had broken up a Polish espionage network in France as a result of information contained on the body of Wladyslaw Hroz, murdered because he presumably agreed to cooperate with the Polish secret service prior to his departure from Poland a year ago, but changed his mind after working with this espionage network for several months.

Tadeusz Jedynak, Deputy-Chief of Z-II, complained subsequently that Polish Military Intelligence was unable to send anything of a counterintelligence nature through the couriers. As of December, 1960, such activities by UB couriers continued to be "frozen" and they concerned themselves primarily with regular diplomatic mail as it was felt Hroz had compromised UB couriers to the West.

As a rule, a person becomes a UB courier only after he had been in the UB for some time and is considered to be trustworthy.

~~SECRET~~

~~TERRORISM~~

[redacted]

b3
b7E

UD couriers personally deliver mail from diplomatic pouches of operational or intelligence interest to a particular section of the UD. The section chief usually signs the receipt for this mail after carefully examining the sealed envelope to determine that it had not been tampered with. If the section chief is not available, his first deputy is required to sign for the mail.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~TERRORISM~~

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C

FD-323 (3-28-60)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~Confidential~~

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Washington, D. C.
May 22, 1961

Title [redacted]

b3
b7E

Character

Reference [redacted]

Memo of SA JOSEPH E. MICHALSKI dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

65-65192-

ENCLOSURE

~~Confidential~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

SECRET

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

TO : DIRECTOR, [redacted] DATE: 5/26/61

FROM : SAC, [redacted]

b3
b7E

SUBJECT: [redacted]
(OO: NEW YORK)

ReWFOairtel to Bureau, dated 3/30/61, under dual caption of [redacted] (OO: NY).

Enclosed for the Bureau are five copies, and one copy each for BS and NY, of a letterhead memo, dated and captioned as above.

The confidential informant mentioned in the letterhead memo is [redacted] who furnished the information to SAs JOSEPH E. MICHALSKI and CHESTER J. GUSTOWSKI.

b7D

The letterhead memo is classified ~~"Secret"~~ to protect the identity of a defector who has not been surfaced and who is currently furnishing information of value. The memo could have been classified ~~"Confidential"~~ since the unauthorized disclosure of the Bureau's interest in an official of a foreign government could be detrimental to the United States.

The NY and BS Offices were furnished copies of subject's photo by routing slip dated 5/3/61.

RUC
2 - Bureau (Enc. 5)
1 - Boston (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
1 - New York (Enc. [redacted]) (RM)
1 - WFO

ALP:mrs

(5)

ENCLOSURE

b3
b7E

REC-23

EX-102

MAY 29 1961

1cc cover let + memo to [redacted]

65-[redacted]

65-65192
NOT RECORDED
145 JUN 7, 1961

XEROX
JUN 7 1961

b1 Per
b3 CIA

AGENCY State & CIA
REQ. REC'D
DATE FORW. 6-5-61
HOW FORW. a-4 & x a-4
BY [redacted]

SECRET

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 6/22/61

FROM : SAC, WFO (62-0)

SUBJECT: FRANK R. OLDENBURG
MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION CONCERNING
Franz Roman Oldenburg

FP217

At 9:40 a.m., 6/21/61, Mrs. WILLIAM S. M. ARNOLD, Apt. 629, Dominion Towers, 1201 South Courthouse Rd., Arlington, Virginia, phone JAckson 2-6335, telephonically advised SA DANIEL J. KIERNAN as follows:

GERMANY

Since about March, 1961, the apartment directly across from complainant, Apt. 630, at the above address, has been occupied by an unknown white male and white female. About a week after they moved in, unsubs had the lock on their apartment door changed. Since they moved in, complainant and her husband, Lieutenant Commander WILLIAM S. M. ARNOLD, Office of Naval Research, U.S. Navy, have noticed unknown men in twos or threes, and sometimes singly, visiting Apt. 630. The visitors have always worn dark glasses, and have always carried brief cases. Whenever complainant has come upon them in the hall, they have always turned their heads away to the wall as if to avoid their faces being seen. The visitors always knock on the door, and immediately after they have entered, complainant has heard the latch chain being applied to the inside of the door. The visitors generally stay for only five or six minutes, and as soon as they have departed, complainant always has heard the latch chain being reapplied to the door. Complainant has noted that the visitors often use the stairwell rather than the elevator to leave the floor on which Apt. 630 is located.

APT. 629, DOMINION TOWERS, 1201 SOUTH COURTHOUSE RD., ARLINGTON, VA.

Mrs. ARNOLD stated she could not describe the visitors other than that they have resembled mid-Europeans in appearance. All have been dressed neatly but quietly.

GERMANY

On the night of about 6/7/61, the occupants of Apt. 630 had visitors, and from the sound of music and loud conversation, Mrs. ARNOLD felt they had a party. Mrs. ARNOLD stated that neither she nor her husband were able to recognize the language used, but noted that those present in Apt. 630 spoke in a foreign tongue.

2- Bureau
2- Richmond (RM)
1- WFO

DJK:jas
(5)

REC-72 MCT-16

62-107059-1

65-65192-113X

25 JUL 26 1961

EX-113

SUBV. CONTROL

Cooke/by

As the party was breaking up, about 1:00 a.m., Mrs. ARNOLD heard some of the people leaving Apt. 630 say thank you and good-bye in the German language. Mrs. ARNOLD mentioned she and her husband have travelled to Germany, and though they do not speak the language, they can recognize it when heard, and they do know some simple phrases of the language. Mrs. ARNOLD said she and her husband do not believe the loud foreign conversation coming from Apt. 630 on about 6/7/61, was in the German language.

According to Mrs. ARNOLD the occupants of Apt. 630 were absent from their apartment from 6/10/61, to 6/18/61.

Mrs. ARNOLD stated there were no visitors to Apt. 630 during their absence. She next noticed visitors to that apartment on the afternoon of 6/20/61. Except for the party about 6/7/61, Mrs. ARNOLD has noted that the visitors have all been men and have all carried brief cases, as noted above. The ARNOLDs did not see any women entering or leaving Apt. 630 the night of the party, but they did hear a woman's voice using the words, "nein, nein".

Mrs. ARNOLD stated she wished to bring the above to the attention of the FBI inasmuch as she feels it may represent a matter concerning the security of the U.S. For a time, she thought that the visitors to Apt. 630 might have something to do with gambling, but dismissed that idea inasmuch as they did not appear to be the type of men she would imagine to be gamblers. Except for the regularity of the visitors, their appearances, and the manner in which they enter and depart Apt. 630, and except for the language, foreign to herself and her husband, which the ARNOLDs have heard from that apartment, Mrs. ARNOLD could furnish no information to substantiate that the unsubs might represent a security problem.

Mrs. ARNOLD could furnish no description of the male occupant of Apt. 630 other than that he is white. Concerning the female occupant, Mrs. ARNOLD has greeted her several times in the hall, but she has merely acknowledged same with a nod and has not spoken. Mrs. ARNOLD described the female occupant as white, about 5'3'', 130-135 lbs., slender build, dark hair, light complexion.

WFO 62-0

On 6/21/61, Mrs. EUNICE TALLEY, Resident Manager, Dominion Towers, advised SA KIERNAN that Apt. 630 is occupied by FRANK R. OLDENBURG. She said she could furnish no information as to OLDENBURG's background or employment and noted that the rental had been handled in OLDENBURG's name by MOSS ROBERT SHERIFFS, an attorney of 815 15th St., N.W. D.C.

WFO indices are negative concerning OLDENBURG and SHERIFFS.

On 1/21/61, IC J. DONALD MYERS ascertained that the D. C. Credit Bureau, Inc., Wash., D. C., had no record of OLDENBURG.

On 1/21/61, IC MICHAEL J. HALLY caused a search to be made of the records of the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) and determined that there was no record of OLDENBURG; at all times an indefinite number of records are out of file and unavailable for review.

Richmond handle.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADC
b6
b7C

4-22 (Rev. 1-22-
Fe
Records Branch

6/30, 1961

- [ ] Name Searching Unit - Room 6527
- [ ] Service Unit - Room 6524
- [ ] Forward to File Review
- [ ] Attention Lockwell
- [ ] Return to Coakley 1252
  Supervisor Room Ext.

Type of References Requested:
- [ ] Regular Request (Analytical Search)
- [x] All References (Subversive & Nonsubversive)
- [ ] Subversive References Only
- [ ] Nonsubversive References Only
- [ ] Main _____ References Only

Type of Search Requested:
- [ ] Restricted to Locality of _____
- [ ] Exact Name Only (On the Nose)
- [ ] Buildup [ ] Variations

Subject Frank R. Oldenburg
Birthdate & Place
Address

Localities

R# Date 6/30 Searcher Initials rd
Prod.

	FILE NUMBER	SERIAL
	62-107059	
	Blaup	
	nr	
	Frank	
NI ✓	101-5849-2	
NI ✓	102-2-10-11 fg 117	
	F.R.	
	nr	
	A.	
NI ✓	102-1-17	
	Omaha Area not searched	

5/4

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : W. C. Sullivan

DATE: July 31, 1961

FROM : R. O. L'Allier

SUBJECT: MICHAL GOLENIEWSKI
INTERNAL SECURITY - POLAND

The subject is the Polish Intelligence official who defected in January, 1961. He has been in the United States under Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) control and so far his defection has not been publicized by the United States Government. We have periodically interviewed him concerning Polish Intelligence operations. On May 24, 1961, "The Washington Post and Times Herald" carried an article with a London dateline concerning the defection of a Polish Intelligence agent. The article obviously referred to the subject but he was not specifically identified. The basis for the publicity was never revealed. Shortly after this article appeared Jay Sourwine of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee contacted CIA and inquired concerning the whereabouts of the subject. We were informed that CIA did not give Sourwine any information.

On July 28, 1961, Miss Dorothe Matlack, Exploitation Branch, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Army, confidentially advised the Liaison Agent that the Army received a ~~"secret"~~ message from its Military Attache in Poland.

The message disclosed that Arthur Olson, "New York Times" correspondent in Poland, had informed the Army's Assistant Military Attache in Poland that he had information indicating that a Colonel Golanowski of the Polish Intelligence Service had defected to the West in Berlin approximately six months ago. Olson also informed the Assistant Military Attache that Golanowski's immediate superior,, one Colonel Sienkiewicz, had been removed from his position because of this defection.

CIA has received information indicating that a United States newspaper correspondent in Warsaw, married to a Polish national, had received information that subject had defected. CIA, however, has not received any confirmation that the correspondent planned to publish this. CIA anticipates that the "New York Times" eventually will publish an item on the subject.

65-65192-114

REC-29 65-65192

EX-105

AUG 1 1961

ACTION: 1 XEROX

AUG 2 1961

For your information

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. McDonnell
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich
1 - Mr. Cregar

65-65192

WOC/SJP:gp (10)

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 94-8-57-

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

DIRECTOR, [redacted] 7/18/61

b3
b7E

SAC, [redacted]

[redacted]

(OO:WFO)

[redacted]

b7D

Re WFO airtel 3/6/61, setting out info from [redacted] regarding subject.

Enclosed are six copies for the Bureau of a letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above. A similar number of copies of a letterhead memorandum evaluating the confidential source used in above-mentioned memorandum are also enclosed.

The confidential source mentioned is [redacted] who furnished the information to SA JOSEPH E. MICHALSKI on 6/28/61.

b3
b7E

REQUEST OF THE BUREAU

The Bureau is requested, through available sources abroad, to have Mr. KAROL KRACZKIEWICZ interviewed to determine his knowledge of the NDA representative in Rome, possibly named BUJALSKI, who attended the IAEA conference in Vienna, Austria, in 1958 or 1959, and whom he presumably introduced to JERZY ROMAN, Polish representative at this conference.

The letterhead memo is classified ~~"Secret"~~ to protect the identity of a defector who has not been surfaced and who is currently furnishing information of value.

The evaluation memo is classified ~~"Confidential"~~ in view of Polish Intelligence interest in recruitment of a United States citizen.

2 ENCLOSURES

Confidential Source

P

(3) - Bureau (Enc. 6)
(1-65-65192)
2 - WFO

[redacted]

[redacted]

b3
b7D
b7E

165-65192-
NOT RECORDED
180 JUL 19 1961

JEM:mdl
(5)

58 AUG 2 1961

ORIGINAL FILED IN

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

July 18, 1961

b3
b7E

[redacted]

On March 1, 1961, a confidential source advised that one Mr. Bujalski, a United States citizen representing an American nuclear development firm in Rome, Italy, whose initials were N. D. A., was a target for recruitment by the Polish Security Service (UB). Source noted that Captain Jerzy Roman, a UB staff officer, became acquainted with Bujalski during a conference of the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) in Vienna, Austria, in 1958, and recommended that the UB actively consider him as a recruitment target in view of his position and Polish background.

On June 28, 1961, the source acknowledged the possibility existed that the name, Bujalski, was a pseudonym assigned by the UB case officer handling this matter at UB headquarters in Warsaw, Poland, although the source has been of the impression that Bujalski was his true name.

Source further advised that the IAEA Personnel Director in Vienna, named Karol Kraczkiewicz, who is a United States citizen, was undoubtedly acquainted with the NDA representative in Rome and that he believed that Kraczkiewicz even introduced him to Roman, with whom he was acquainted. Source also noted the possibility that this IAEA conference in Vienna took place in 1959, rather than 1958, although he was inclined to believe the latter date was probably more accurate.

On July 12, 1961, Mr. Vincent Pusateri, Washington, D. C. area Security Operations Officer, Division of Security, United States Atomic Energy Commission, Germantown, Maryland, advised SA Edward D. Shields that Karol Kraczkiewicz has been the Personnel Director at IAEA in Vienna until December 27, 1960, and that he is now Acting Deputy Director, IAEA. His present address is c/o General Office of the Director General for Administration Liaison and Secretariat, Vienna, Austria.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

65-65192-

~~SECRET~~ ENCLOSURE

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted]

FD-323 (3-28-60)

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Washington, D. C.
July 18, 1961

Title : [redacted]

b3
b7E

Character: [redacted]

Reference: Letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

65-65192-

ENCLOSURE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

JUL 20 1961

RECEIVED FROM
JUL 19 1961
CIA SJP

~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

b6
b7C

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Washington 25, D. C.

19 July 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

ATTENTION: Mr. S. J. Papich, Liaison Officer

SUBJECT: Michael O. GOLENIEWSKI [redacted] (81)

b1 Per
b3 CIA
b7E

1. Reference is made to our letter dated 30 April 1954, concerning the above [redacted]

[redacted] (81)

3. Your cooperation in this matter will be very much appreciated.

65-65192

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

NOT RECORDED
9 JUL 26 1961

Sheffield Edwards
Director of Security

Attachments: Bio. Data

No Investigation Conducted by FBI
Pertinent to your inquiry.
This is the result of a request for an
FBI file check only and is not to be
considered as a clearance.

b1 Per
b3 CIA

[redacted] (81)

~~SECRET~~

W/CLOSURE

65 JUL 27 1961

65-65192
5 Apr

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

BIOGRAPHIC DATA

b1 Per
b3 CIA

[redacted]

ENCLOSURE
65-65192

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

6/29/61

AIRTEL

TO: DIRECTOR, [redacted]

b3
b7E

FROM: SAC, [redacted]

[redacted]

(OO: WFO)

ReWFOrep of SA JOSEPH E. MICHALSKI, 6/10/61, setting out lead for WFO to contact [redacted] re censorship of mail directed to the American Embassy, Warsaw, Poland.

b7D

Enclosed are six copies of a letterhead memo, dated and captioned as above. A similar number of copies of a letterhead memo evaluating the confidential source used in above-mentioned memo are also enclosed.

The confidential source mentioned is [redacted] who furnished the info to SA JOSEPH E. MICHALSKI on 6/28/61.

b7D

The letterhead memo is classified "~~Secret~~" to protect the identity of a defector who has not been surfaced and who is currently furnishing info of value.

[redacted]

FILED IN 105

b3
b7D
b7E

P
4 - Bureau Enc. 6) CONF. SOURCE [redacted]
(1 - 65-65192)
2 - WFO
[redacted]

JEM:mrs
(6)

AIRTEL

105-65192
NOT RECORDED
162 JUL 6 1961

2-ENCLOSURE

8 JUL 24 1961

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

June 29, 1961

[redacted]

b3
b7E

On June 28, 1961, a confidential source advised that he was reasonably positive the Polish Security Service (UB) had not recruited Searbeck nor had active plans for such recruitment in 1959 and the beginning of 1960. Source further noted that Colonel Skibinski, Chief of section within Department II (Counterintelligence) UB, concerned with operations directed against Western diplomatic establishments and personnel in Warsaw, Poland, would necessarily have had full knowledge of such an operation if it had existed at that time and that it would definitely have been brought to his, source's, attention as a result.

The source also furnished the following information concerning censorship of mail directed to Western diplomatic establishments and personnel in Warsaw by Polish authorities:

All mail forwarded to or sent by establishments such as those of the United States undergoes strict censorship by Bureau W of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, (MSW). Bureau W is an independent department within the MSW and lends support to various operating sections of the UB as that headed by Colonel Skibinski.

Bureau W employs from 1,500 to 2,000 persons in Warsaw alone for the purpose of censorship of mail and interception of telephone conversations and telegrams. Its employees are extremely skilled in this work as they have been usually so engaged for a long time.

Bureau W has representatives in all post offices in Warsaw. All official and personal mail addressed to the American Embassy as well as to its personnel is carefully scrutinized and even sometimes confiscated. In the event

ENCLOSURE
65-65192
~~SECRET~~

b3
b7E

that through inadvertance a letter should happen to be overlooked at a sub-station where mailed, it is more than likely that it would be intercepted at the sub-station from which mail is forwarded to the American Embassy.

There are no exceptions to this censorship. A letter could be sent by airmail or by special delivery and since it has to go through some post office it would necessarily be checked if addressed to the American Embassy. As an example, airmail-special delivery letters to West Germany are received by the addressee after about six days because of such censorship whereas normal delivery of this type should require considerably less time. Local mail also takes much more time as a result. Special delivery letters addressed to the American Embassy from Warsaw itself could take as much as a day for delivery whereas about a half a day would normally be sufficient.

Censorship of all mail directed to the American Embassy and its personnel in Warsaw is well known to all UB employees. A UB employee would therefore take a far less dangerous means of contacting the Embassy than by utilization of mail service. As an example he would personally deliver a letter to the American Ambassador since he would also know that the UB does not conduct surveillances on him or on his residence. In addition the American Ambassador has a host of visitors at his residence and there would be less likelihood that he would be detected if he went there than if he went to the Embassy itself.

On the other hand the average person would not be necessarily aware of such censorship, as evidenced by the fact that the UB has intercepted many letters from Polish nationals addressed to the American Embassy. As a result there are many instances in which active investigation had been instituted culminating, on occasions, with successful prosecution of a Polish national who offered to be of assistance or furnished information detrimental to Poland to American authorities.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-323 (3-28-60)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Washington 25, D.C.
June 29, 1961

Title [redacted]

b3
b7E

Character [redacted]

Reference **Letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above.**

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE
65-65192

~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADG b6 b7C

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

42739

3 JUL 1961

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director, Plans

SUBJECT: Michal CIESLAR

1. The source of the attached report on Subject is [redacted] b1

2. Subject is known to you from previous correspondence between this Agency and the Bureau. According to the latest information supplied by you he is teaching at and attending the Polish National Church Seminary in Scranton, Pennsylvania.

[redacted] b1 Per b3 CIA b7E

[redacted] b1

1 Enclosure

65-65192-
NOT RECORDED
191 JUL 10 1961

~~SECRET~~

16 JUL 18 1961

~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADG b6 b7C

1 - [illegible] Papich
1 - Mr. McDonnell

Legal Attache, [redacted] 7/11/61 b3 b7E

Director, FBI (~~100-350264~~)

POLISH INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
IS - PO

Reurlet 6/23/61 advising of a request from the DST that in the event the former Polish official who reportedly defected and who was the source in the [redacted] b6 b7C b7E case is under FBI control that he be interviewed regarding his knowledge of Polish intelligence activities in France. This source is not under our control, nor are we in possession of any information regarding his knowledge of Polish intelligence activities in France.

[redacted] b1 Per b3 CIA

[redacted]

1 - [redacted]

YELLOW DUPLICATE JUL 11 1961 MAILED

WJMidcr
(8)

Conf. Inf.

1 - 65-65192 [redacted] b3 b7D b7E
1 - Foreign Liaison Unit (route through for review)

NOTE: Legat in relet advised of DST desire to have [redacted] (Schutze) interviewed re Polish intelligence activities in France. Source under CIA control and we have access. Our debriefing of source limited to his information re Polish intelligence activities in or directed against the U.S.; other debriefing being accomplished by CIA.

Jim Hunt, CIA, advised SA S.J. Papich 7/7/61 that it did not desire identity of source [redacted] or discussion re source that might provide lead to his identity. b3 b7E

62 JUL 14 1961

~~SECRET~~

ORIGINAL FILED IN 100-350264

SECRET

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

American Embassy
Paris 8, France

Date: June 23, 1961

To: Director, FBI (100-350264)

From: Legat, [redacted]

b3
b7E

Subject: [redacted]

[redacted] advised on 6/16/61 that there has been extensive press speculation following the apprehension of the individuals involved in the [redacted] espionage apparatus in England, that the first lead as to the activities of this group originated with an American security service which, in turn, had been furnished information by a defectee, who was a senior official of the Polish Ministry of Interior, that [redacted] were Polish illegal agents.

b7D

b6
b7C
b7E

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D
b7E

He was informed that this office was not in a position to comment on his inquiry but that an appropriate request would be made to Washington in this regard.

P
2 - Bureau
1 - Paris
WFD:mas
(3)

NOT RECORDED
87 JUN 12 1961

SECRET

SECRET

b1 Per
b3 CIA

Director, FBI June 23, 1961

[redacted]

b7D
b7E

SECRET

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

DIRECTOR, FBI 6/12/61

SAC, [redacted]

b3
b7E

[redacted]

Copies are being furnished for the information of Chicago and New York in view of their interest in Polish intelligence activities.

Following information concerning Polish Intelligence Services was furnished SA JOSEPH E. MICHALSKI by [redacted] during the course of interviews on other topics during May, 1961. [redacted] should be characterized as having furnished reliable information in the past. If disseminated the information should be carefully paraphrased to protect the identity of the source. This information should be classified "Secret" to protect the identity of a defector who has not been surfaced and who is currently furnishing information of value.

b7D

CODE CLERKS

All code clerks in Polish Embassies abroad have to be staff officers of the Polish Security Service (UB) although their rank would not exceed that of Major. Code clerks are attached to Subsection A, Department I (Foreign Intelligence), UB, which concerns itself with codes and ciphers.

CONF. INFT.

b3
b7E

4 - Bureau
(1 - 65-65192)
[redacted]
(1 - 100-350264) (Polish Intelligence Activities in the U.S.)
2 - [redacted] (info) (RM)
(1 - 100-17864) (Polish Intelligence Activities in the U.S.)
2 - New York (info) (RM)
(1 - 100-85368) (Polish Intelligence Activities in the U.S.)
4 - WFO
[redacted]
(1 - 100-382) (Polish Embassy)

b3
b7D
b7E

65-6571-

JMM:bff
(12)

NOT RECORDED
98 JUN 13 1961

56 JUL 12 1961

ORIGINALLY FILED IN

[redacted]

b3
b7E

A cardinal rule observed in such countries as the United States is to have someone of responsibility in the code room at all times of the day and night, for reasons of security and to intercept or transmit messages. Incoming and outgoing messages even from the Ambassador, which had been sent to the code room for coding, are usually brought to the attention of the senior UB resident, at the Embassy. The Ambassador probably suspects that the resident reads all cables before they are coded and sent.

There are no special codes for the exclusive use of the Ambassador other than the one utilized by the code clerks. On the other hand the resident himself as well as the Military Attache, both of whom have had training in special codes, could prepare coded messages or decode an incoming message if designated at the outset as being special code, which would be known only to themselves individually. The Ambassador however could take a plane to Poland if he should deem some information he has to be of exceptional importance and deliver it in person, but such a recourse is not available to the resident or military attache, resulting in utilization of personal codes by them.

In the event that neither the resident nor his first assistant are present at the time a cable from the residentura is being sent, a UB staff officer is obliged to note on the cable that it had not been sent nor seen by the resident or his assistant. If the resident is present his pseudonym or cover-name is set out on the cable as is that of the assistant when the resident is away.

Polish Military Intelligence (Z-II) does not have its own code clerks, but relies on the services of UB code clerks except in those instances when the military attache handles his own messages.

ILLEGAL AGENTS

Z-II has been sending illegal agents to the United States since at least 1947, while the UB did not send any until about 1954 or 1955. According to the Polish diplomatic

[redacted] b3 b7E

courier, FRANCISZEK KRAWCZYK, who advised source the last part of December, 1956, there were 98 illegal agents in North and South America. (Data about KRAWCZYK in NFO let to Bureau 5/29/61, captioned [redacted] b3 b7E

There is no special school as such to train agents. They are individually trained or schooled by their principal in Poland and their identities are usually known only to him.

A UB resident attached to the Polish Embassy abroad would not necessarily be aware of the identity of illegal agents in that country even though he might provide such operational support for some of them as arranging "dead drops" and so forth. Contact by a resident with an illegal is restricted to emergency situations only.

EXAMPLES OF ILLEGAL AGENTS' MODUS OPERANDI (MO)

A basic technique used by Z-II was to usurp legitimate documents such as U.S. birth certificates of deceased persons or persons domiciled in Poland for use of illegal agents coming to the U.S. If the original owner was still alive and in Poland he would be diligently controlled by Z-II while the illegal was in the U.S.

Following World War II there was some confusion in Polish Intelligence Services and some operations as mentioned above could have been primitively handled. In addition, the lapse of many years during which there were several organizational changes within Z-II could very well have resulted in loss of control over the person in Poland who could have ultimately exposed such an operation. In addition the very existence of some illegal abroad might have been forgotten especially if he had been a "frozen" agent who subsequently lost any enthusiasm for cooperation or contact with Z-II.

Z-II has also been known to have its illegals remain dormant in some Western country for a number of years before

[redacted] b3 b7E

going on to some other Western country where they would eventually become active.

"LEGAL" AGENTS ATTACHED TO POLISH EMBASSIES

There are no UB staff officers operating as legals in other communist countries, but the UB maintains liaison with intelligence services through its officers attached to the Polish Embassy in that country.

It is very unlikely that a female has ever come to the U.S. as a UB staff officer, although it may have happened in the past in other countries. The wife of a UB staffer might handle some matter for him such as delivering a letter but would never get an intelligence assignment herself from the UB. A female who came to the U.S., as a member of some delegation or exchange group could be a co-opted worker for the UB, but even this association is denied to the wife of a UB staffer attached to the Polish Embassy.

The UB resident attached to the Embassy can not even utilize the services of a stenographer to type any intelligence information for him, but is required to prepare reports and such data himself.

It is very possible that Z-II would have representatives in the Polish Embassy, Washington, D.C., whose identity would only be known to the Polish military attache concerned with supervising his activities. UB personnel and other Z-II men attached to the Military Attache's Office would not necessarily know or even be aware of the existence of the Z-II man in the embassy itself.

Probably the best intelligence coverage by Z-II in the West emanates from the Military Attache's Office in Paris, France. This coverage is reputed to be superior even to that of Soviet Military Intelligence in France.

[redacted]

b3
b7E

Extra-marital activities by UB staffers are highly frowned upon by UB authorities in Poland, who would severely reprimand one guilty of carrying on such an affair. The UB would never permit a couple to come to the U. S. under diplomatic cover and not be married, although such immorality was permitted before WLADYSLAW GOMULKA came into power in Poland in October, 1956.

CO-OPTED WORKERS

Co-opted workers were usually persons of relatively high caliber and intelligence who, because of their training or background, possessed the potential to assist Z-II or the UB and had agreed to do so.

Although co-opted workers are usually handled by UB staffers at the Polish Embassy, they are also on occasions handled directly out of Department I and liaison is maintained through Polish diplomatic couriers. In such instances their association with the UB is not known even to UB staff officers attached to the embassy. It has also infrequently happened whereby a co-opted worker has returned to Warsaw upon termination of his assignment abroad and became a UB staff officer.

The Military Internal Service (WSW - formerly the Chief Directorate of Information or GZI) also has co-opted workers which are handled directly out of headquarters. The WSW has had a plan under consideration for some time to have representatives of its own abroad but as of December, 1960, it had not been realized.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

MEMORANDUM

TO : DIRECTOR, [redacted]

b3
b7E

DATE: 6/12/61

FROM : SAC, [redacted]

SUBJECT: [redacted] MICHAEL [illegible]

Attached for the Bureau are five copies of letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above.

One copy each is designated for the information of Washington Field and New York because of their interest in the activities of Polish intelligence.

b3
b7D
b7E

Information contained in referenced letterhead memorandum was made available by [redacted] to SA JOHN J. JARMUL on June 9, 1961.

Both letterhead memorandum and letterhead memorandum evaluating source, FD-323, are classified ~~secret~~ since information contained therein originates with an extremely sensitive and valuable source and involves foreign intelligence activity in the United States.

[redacted]

65-65192 -
NOT RECORDED
150 JUN 22 1961

3 - Bureau (Encls. 5) (RM)
1 - Washington Field (Encl. 1) (Info) (RM)
1 - New York (Encl. 1) (Info) (RM)
6 - Chicago
1 - [redacted]
1 - 100-17864 (POLISH INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN U.S.)
1 - 100-21057 (POLISH CONSULATE - CHICAGO)
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]

2 ENCLOSURE

b3
b7D
b7E

JJJ:mcg
(11)

[redacted]

2 ENCLOSURE

cc 65-65192 (Intelligence Div.)

[redacted]

EX-108

REC-70

16 JUN 16 1961

AGENCY CIA Langley
REQ. REC'D 6-21-61
DATE FORW'D 6-23-61
HOW FORW'D by liaison

57 JUN 23 1961

XEROX
JUN 22 1961

ORIGINAL COPY FILE

b3
b7E

[redacted]

Special Agents handling information originating with [redacted] should be aware of the following Bureau instructions: b7D

It is the responsibility of Chicago, the contacting office, to process and submit to the Bureau and interested offices all pertinent information received from [redacted] by letterhead memorandum suitable for dissemination. Dissemination restricted to date except for CIA, which is handled by the Bureau.

The Bureau has instructed that no action may be taken on data received from this source which could possibly compromise informant, who is an extremely sensitive and valuable source. His identity, information received from him and investigations predicated thereon should be confined to Bureau personnel on a need-to-know basis. Source should never be referred to by name or title in any communication.

Should a question arise at any time regarding the advisability of taking any investigative step based on source's information, the question should be resolved in favor of security of this informant. Any special problems involving source or handling information from him should be referred to the Bureau for decision. There must be no dissemination locally. When setting forth data originating with source to other Field Divisions, such offices should be appropriately cautioned as outlined herein.

Investigation predicated on data furnished by [redacted] should be submitted separately in report or letterhead memorandum form, whichever is appropriate. In situations where an investigation is requested of an auxiliary office and it is necessary to refer to material from [redacted] same should be referred to in the administrative pages of the report or cover letter to the letterhead memorandum. b7D

The Chicago Division should be furnished with a copy of all correspondence and reports where investigation predicated on information from [redacted]

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~SECRET~~

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

[redacted]

Chicago, Illinois
June 12, 1961

b3
b7E

[redacted]

Source advised June 9, 1961, rumors coming to his attention indicate Witold Sienkiewicz, Director of Department I of the UB, has been removed from his position due primarily to the defection of Michal Goleniewski, which made it impossible to continue as Director of Department I.

Source learned Goleniewski was more or less a protege of Sienkiewicz. On one occasion Goleniewski made a trip to Berlin and on his return became involved in some kind of financial difficulty. This situation allegedly was so serious that a Communist Party meeting was held at which these accusations were discussed and Goleniewski criticized. Director Sienkiewicz continued to defend Goleniewski and since Sienkiewicz was such a powerful figure no one dared oppose him. Consequently, after Goleniewski's defection, Sienkiewicz was placed in an impossible position which required his removal.

Source learned also Sienkiewicz is being moved to the Central Committee of the Communist Party. This is believed to be a temporary arrangement. It appears Wladyslaw Wicha, Minister of Internal Affairs (MSW), is scheduled to retire soon and there is a distinct possibility Sienkiewicz may take over the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MSW). This arrangement would, in fact, be a promotion for Sienkiewicz and is a possibility because it is unlikely that a man in Sienkiewicz' position and prestige would be completely dismissed solely because of Goleniewski's defection. Rumors are prevalent also that if Sienkiewicz does not receive the appointment as Minister of Internal Affairs, then he will undoubtedly become a permanent member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, an important and powerful position.

~~SECRET~~

65-65192-

~~ENCLOSURE~~

Rumors further indicate Henryk Sokolak, Vice Director of Department I of the UB, will now become Director, replacing Sienkiewicz. Stanislaw Jastrebski will replace Henryk Sokolak as Vice Director of Department I. Source feels the choice of Sokolak over Vice Director Zbigniew Dybala is a good move since Sokolak is more conservative.

According to source his own position has not in any way been jeopardized. Source expressed the opinion Witold Sienkiewicz will continue to play an important role in the Polish Communist Government.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the property of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY: [redacted]

b6
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~SECRET~~

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

[redacted]

Chicago, Illinois
June 12, 1961

b3
b7E

Title: [redacted]

Character: [redacted]

Reference: Letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

~~SECRET~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE 65-65192-

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

b6
b7C

1 - Mr. Coakley

SAC, Washington Field July 11, 1961

EX 100 REC-126 65-65192-113X

Director, FBI ~~(62-107059)~~

FRANK R. OLDENBURG
MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION CONCERNING
(SUBVERSIVE CONTROL)

ReWFOlet 6-22-61.

Bufiles do not contain any information identifiable with Oldenburg or Moss Robert Sheriffs, the attorney who arranged for the rental of Oldenburg's apartment. There are three references to one Frank Oldenburg, a resident of the Chicago area, in connection with investigation of the German-American Bund and the German-American National Alliance in 1941.

WFO conduct additional discreet inquiries in order to identify the subject and obtain all available background information concerning him so that a proper search may be made of Bureau files.

No action necessary at Richmond other than indices search pending results of WFO inquiries.

1 - Richmond

NOTE ON YELLOW: Relet sets forth vague complaint of a Mrs. William S. M. Arnold who resides in the same apartment building as the subject. Mrs. Arnold is the wife of a Navy Commander and has become suspicious due to the large number of visitors subject has at his apartment. She believes these individuals are European and has heard the German language spoken as well as other foreign languages.

GDC:sac
(5)

MAILED 20
JUL 11 1961
COMM-FBI

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

56 JUL 14 1961

~~SECRET~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad b6
DeLoach b7C
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : MR. R.O. L'ALLIER

DATE: August 7, 1961

FROM : S.J. PAPICH

SUBJECT: [redacted]

b1 Per
b3 CIA

On 8-4-61, James Hunt, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), advised the Liaison Agent that the subject has returned to the Washington, D.C. area and again will be made available to Bureau Agents each Wednesday, starting 8-9-61.

ACTION:

The above information is being directed to the attention of the Espionage Section.

SJP:jad (5)

1-Branigan
1-McDonnell
1-Liaison
1-Papich

REC-16

65-65192-115

22 AUG 10 1961

E.113

55 AUG 14 1961

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADG

b6
b7C

DIRECTOR, FBI (62-56597)

7/31/61

SAC, WFO (100-382)

POLISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D. C.
IS - PO
(OO:WFO)

Enclosed herewith are six copies of a letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above. A similar number of copies of a letterhead memorandum evaluating the confidential source used in above-mentioned memorandum are also enclosed.

The confidential source mentioned is [redacted] who furnished the information to SAs JOSEPH E. MICHALSKI and CHESTER J. GUSTOWSKI from April, 1961, through 5/4/61, and to SA JOSEPH E. MICHALSKI in May, 1961, and on 6/28/61.

b7D

b1 Per
b3 CIA

[redacted]

The letterhead memo is classified "Secret" to protect the identity of a defector who has not been surfaced and who is currently furnishing information of value.

The evaluation memorandum is classified "Confidential" as it discloses the Bureau's investigative interest in a foreign diplomatic establishment.

3- Bureau (Encs. 6)
(1- 65-65192) [redacted]
2- WFO [redacted]

b3
b7D
b7E

JEM:pac
(5)

2 ENCLOSURES

65-65192-
NOT RECORDED
150 AUG 2 1961

66 AUG 7 1961

SECRET

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY: [redacted] b6 b7C

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

July 31, 1961

POLISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D. C.
INTERNAL SECURITY - PO

Photographs of the following individuals attached to the Polish Embassy, Washington, D. C., the Polish United Nations Delegation (PUND), New York City, and the Polish Consulate, Chicago, Illinois, were displayed to a confidential source, a former official of the Polish Security Service (UB), in April and May, 1961, and on June 28, 1961. Source stated he could furnish no information about them as he was unable to identify them by photograph, name, or brief descriptive data. Country of birth is Poland unless otherwise indicated.

Name	Date and Place of Birth	Position
[redacted]		
Josif Bursztejn	October 12, 1906 Dubno	Chief of PUND Publishing Service
[redacted]		
Irena Dobosz	October 15, 1915 Warsaw	PUND Advisor, United Nations General Assembly Session
Alfred Dutkiewicz	March 10, 1920 Stargard	Chief of Chancery, Chicago Polish Consulate
[redacted]		

b6 b7C

~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE 65-65-192-

POLISH EMBASSY

Name	Date and Place of Birth	Position
[redacted]		
Tadeusz Mianowski	September 25, 1908 Warsaw	Clerk, Office of Financial Minister
[redacted]		
Mieczyslaw Pietrak	February 1, 1919 Warsaw	Bookkeeper, Chicago Polish Consulate
[redacted]		
Tadeusz Rudnicki	October 5, 1922 Warsaw	Chauffeur, Chicago Polish Consulate
[redacted]		
Marianna Terepeta	August 23, 1923 Dobra	Clerk, Consular Division, Polish Embassy
[redacted]		

b6
b7C

POLISH EMBASSY

Name	Date and Place of Birth	Position
Jan Woloszyn	December 28, 1912 Vienna, Austria	Financial Attache Polish Embassy

Photographs of the following Polish nationals who visited the United States in connection with the [redacted] were also exhibited to the source with negative results: b7D

Name	Date and Place of Birth	Speciality
[redacted]		
Henryk Matyja	March 24, 1923 Torun	Metallurgical Engineer
[redacted]		

b6
b7C

Photographs of the following Polish nationals who came to the United States on special assignments were also displayed to the source with negative results:

Name	Date and Place of Birth	Affiliated With
[redacted]		

b6
b7C

POLISH EMBASSY

Name	Date and Place of Birth	Affiliated With
[redacted]		
Stanislaw Czulowski	July 20, 1920 Chodorowy	Ministry of Finance (Official)
[redacted]		
Jan Gajewski	October 30, 1905 Warsaw	Gdansk Maritime Office (Director)
[redacted]		
Franciszek Gebauer	June 4, 1916 Trzebinia	"Skorimpex"
Henryk Gliszewski	May 17, 1920 Rozniaty	"Varimex"
Mieczyslaw Jablonski	June 17, 1922 Grabowce	Ministry of Foreign Trade
Antoni Jaczun	July 14, 1916 Wilno	"Textilimport"
[redacted]		

b6
b7C

POLISH EMBASSY

Name	Date and Place of Birth	Affiliated With
Stanislaw Korzeniewski	February 19, 1915 Warsaw	"Metalexport"
Witold Kowalewski	May 25, 1921 Pabianice	"Cetebe"
Feliks Koziebrodzki	August 28, 1905 Poznanka	"Coopexim"
[redacted]		

b6
b7C

Tadeusz Kusinski	January 13, 1912 Zawiercie	Central Office of the International Transport
Julian Lambor	January 15, 1901 Krakow	National Hydrological and Meteorological Institute, Poland (Director)
Marian Lis	December 15, 1916 Psary	"Animex"
Maciej Wit Milobedzki	June 15, 1921 Warsaw	"Skorimpex"
Konrad Modrakowski	August 31, 1916 Hamburg, Germany	Ministry of Finance (Official)
Oskar Narewicz	July 1, 1896 Andrychow	"Cetebe"
Zbigniew Portalewski	November 25, 1923 Lodz	"Varimex"
[redacted]		

b6
b7C

POLISH EMBASSY

Name	Date and Place of Birth	Affiliated With
Damian Silski	March 12, 1916 Strzelno	Ministry of Foreign Trade official
Andrzej Skawina	June 29, 1920 Borki	Foreign Department of Film Polski (Director)
Boleslaw Skrzypczak	October 29, 1920 Leszno	"Rolimpex"
[redacted]		
Ryszard Szadkowski	February 10, 1923 Krakow	"Rolimpex"
Julianna Szaniawska	July 5, 1923 Zabierzow	Film Polski (Director North American Department)
Wladyslaw Sztelman	May 24, 1909 Lodz	"Textilimport"
Zygmunt Jozef Szulc	August 24, 1921 Lodz	"Textilimport"
Jozef Wapinski	December 6, 1919 Warsaw	"Ars Polonia"

b6
b7C

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 08-20-2020 BY: [redacted]
b6
b7C

FD-323 (3-28-60)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Washington 25, D. C.
July 31, 1961

Title **POLISH EMBASSY**
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Character **INTERNAL SECURITY - PO**

Reference **Memorandum dated and captioned as above.**

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~ENCLOSURE~~ 65-65192

~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADC b6 b7C

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT : Co-opted Workers of the UB (Polish Security Service)

1. Reference is made to our [redacted] dated 7 February 1961, Subject: [redacted] Polish Intelligence Activities in U.S. In addition to reference, [redacted] has provided us with a list dated November 1960 of co-opted workers and operational leads of Section 6 (Scientific and Technical), Department I, MSW (Ministry of Interior), who are based in Poland. We attach a copy of this list for your information. b1 Per b3 CIA

[redacted]

3. Listed below is a glossary of the abbreviations used in Attachment A: b3 b7E

[redacted]

2 ENCLOSURE

58 SEP 25 1961

REC- 24

65-[illegible]-116

SEP 18

Copy to NY; WFO
by routing slip for
☒ info ☐ action
date 9-15-61
by [illegible]

ICC Retained 648 RB

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] b1 Per b3 CIA

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

b3
b7E

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

[redacted]

b1 Per
b3 CIA

JAMES ANGLETON

[redacted]

Attachments:
A - List dated November 1960

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ADC

b6
b7C

65-86512-116

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-20-2020 BY [redacted] ACG

b6
b7C

ENCLOSURES - SEARCH SLIPS
65-65192-116